


RUSTUM

THE ROYAL ARCHIVES OF EGYPT
AND THE ORIGINS OF THE
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITION TO
SYRIA 1831-1841




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
1831-1841

BY
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PROFESSOR OF ORIENTAL HISTORY
IN THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT

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THE ROYAL ARCHIVES OF EGYPT
AND
THE ORIGINS OF THE EGYPTIAN
EXPEDITION TO SYRIA

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THE ROYAL ARCHIVES OF EGYPT
AND
THE ORIGINS OF THE EGYPTIAN
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PREFATORY NOTE

Thanks to the gracious personal interest of His Majesty King Fouad the First, the Royal Archives of Egypt are now accessible to the student public. When, in 1925, I was ushered into the "Egyptian Archives" in the Citadel of Cairo, I found them piled up in sacking, from floor to ceiling. Since then great changes have occurred. The Egyptian Archives have been moved from the Citadel to the Palace. They have been carefully dusted, classified, and registered. Their condition now compares, very favourably, with the best preserved archives. Other sections of the Royal Archives of Egypt have also received similar attention.

As the classification, registration, and indexing of all these archives is not yet entirely complete, no final statement can be made regarding their contents. The present survey of those which relate to the causes of the Egyptian Expedition to Syria is, therefore, at best defective. It is useful only as spade work which, in the realm of thought, has to precede the erection of any structure.

Thus the purpose of this paper is to place at the disposal of the student of contemporary history a provisional estimate of the point of view of Cairo on the important events of 1831 to 1833 in the Near East. If it

arouses scientific criticism, and thus helps to uncover the truth, this paper will have served its purpose.

My thanks are due to His Egyptian Majesty King Fouad the First for having allowed me access to His Royal Archives, and for the atmosphere of free and unbiased thought which He has helped to create at Abdin Palace. I have also to thank H.E. Ali Mahir Pasha, Chief of His Majesty's Cabinet, Joseph Gelat Bey, Professor Angelo Sammarco, Georges Guindi Effendi, and other officials of the Palace for their unfailing courtesy and help.

I also wish to express my gratitude to Professors Harold Temperley of Cambridge University, Gabriel Levenq of the Université Saint Joseph de Beyrouth, Shafik Ghorbal of the Egyptian University; and Professors William Van Dyck, Stewart Crawford, Roger Soltau, Costi Zurayk, Jibrail Jabbur, Mrs. Edith Laird and Mr. Michel Sa'd of the American University of Beirut for valuable academic aid and advice.

A. J. R.

American University of Beirut,
Beirut, Jan. 2, 1936.

INTRODUCTORY—THE ROYAL ARCHIVES OF EGYPT

The Royal Palace of Abdin contains two different collections of documents; the Archives of Abdin Palace, and the Egyptian Archives. Following Turkish usage, the Egyptian Archives have also been called the Archives of the Daftarkhanah—literally, the chamber of registers. In pure Arabic, the same daftarkhanah has been officially called Dar-al-Mahfuzat al-Misriyyah—the chamber of Egyptian archives.

For the history of the Egyptian Expedition to Syria the author has found about 15000 documents in the Royal Archives of Egypt. As this paper deals with the causes of the Expedition to Syria, the author has naturally concentrated his attention on the papers of the first three years (1831-1833), Abd. Nos. 231-243.¹ He has also studied five registers which contain orders emanating from Mehemet Ali Pasha, and notes from some of his officials, to prominent personalities in the Egyptian Army of Occupation and the Egyptian Administration, Abd. No. 3, 210-214. He has also found valuable information in the section of the Egyptian Archives entitled "Bahr Barr", and in the registers of the Khedivial Council.

The documents in general deal with a wide variety of subjects. They consist of military, naval, and ad-

(1) In his references to the Archives, the author follows the system devised by Professor Jean Deny and described in his book *Les Archives Turques du Caire* (Cairo, 1930), pp. 227-239.

ministrative letters, army bulletins, plans of battle, political reports, statements of spies, intercepted enemy correspondence, and daily journals of events. The principal signatories of these documents and register pieces are Mehemet Ali Pasha and his son Ibrahim Pasha. Other important signatories are Abdullah Pasha of Acre, Ahmad Khulusi of Constantinople, Allush Pasha of Damascus, Ahmad Menekli Pasha of the cavalry corps, Amir Bashir Shihab II of Mt. Lebanon, Muhammad Sharif Pasha, Uthman Nur-al-Din Bey of the Egyptian Navy, Salim Sati Bey of the Egyptian Artillery Corps, Sami Bey of the Khedivial Council, Muhammad Munib Effendi, Wahid Effendi, Shauqi Effendi, Hanna Bahri Bey, Mikhail Aura,² and Yusuf Ayrut.


As for the authenticity of this correspondence it is unquestionable. The paper on which it is written and the ink with which it is recorded are the paper and ink of the first half of the Nineteenth Century. This technical judgement is made on the basis of several thousand documents which date from the period under consideration and which come from various centers of population throughout Syria and Palestine. It is usually strong linen paper that carries the most common water marks of the period 1800-1850. The ink is often a mixture of carbon, gum Arabic,

(2) "Aura" and not "Oda" as Professor Deny reads it—op. cit., p. 302. The Aura family of Acre had already been in the secretarial service of the government for many years. They were, therefore, indispensable for the Egyptian Administration. See our notes on Akka and Its Defences under Ibrahim Pasha (Beirut, 1926), Appendix I. Read also Cheikho (Father Louis), *La Littérature Arabe au XIX Siècle* (Beirut, 1910), I, p. 106.

and water. In the same way, there is nothing in the size of paper, kind of margin, or style of handwriting to arouse the least suspicion. Prologues, epilogues, invocations, addresses, greetings, proems, dispositions, sanctions, places of signature, dates, and seals, all seem to agree, fairly well, with the general practice of the day.

Before any further advance is made in the study of these Archives it must be noted that an important portion of the correspondence of the day seems to have been delivered verbally. In one of his communications to the Sublime Porte, Mehemet Ali Pasha says, "The delegate has been told every thing verbally and he will undoubtedly bring them to your attention".³ Similarly, under date of Muharram 9, 1249, Mehemet Ali Pasha stated in his official gazette that Rashid Bey went to Constantinople to express himself verbally on some points of the negotiations. Noteworthy in this respect, and bearing on the same point, is the absence from these archives of any important political message signed by Amir Bashir II. He seems to have been too cunning to tie himself down to written correspondence. Much of his agreements with Mehemet Ali Pasha must have been accomplished in verbal fashion.

(3) Abd. case 3, doc. 1, Shaban 5, 1247.




THE CAUSES OF THE EGYPTIAN EXPEDITION
TO SYRIA
1831 - 1841

A. Official Causes

1. The Case of Abdullah Pasha of Acre
2. The Regeneration and Reform of the Turkish Empire

B. Real Causes

1. The Evil Intentions of the Sublime Porte
2. The Independence of Egypt
3. The Insufficiency of the Nile Valley
4. Egypt and Syria One Physical Geographical Unit
5. The Nationalistic Aspects of the Struggle



I

THE CASE OF ABDULLAH PASHA

According to the Royal Archives of Egypt there were two official causes for the Egyptian Expedition to Syria. There was, in the first place, the case of Abdullah Pasha of Acre.

Born in Acre about 1799, Abdullah Pasha had had a happy and prosperous career. His father—Ali Pasha al-Khazindar—had been both honest and conscientious. He had taken great pains to set a good example to his son, and to give him the best education of the day. While yet a boy, Abdullah had perfected the three R's. He had then studied the Holy Quran and the Sacred Law. Anxious to give his son practical training in the art of government, Ali Pasha had associated young Abdullah with him in office. Unfortunately, however, the father had died in 1814, at a time when his fatherly advice had been still very necessary. The mother, a descendent of the Prophet from the House of Nurallah in Jablah, had apparently failed to replace the father in her counsel and advice. The young man Abdullah had thus been left to himself at the early age of seventeen. Surrounded by wealth, social standing, and obsequiousness on every side, Abdullah had rapidly become spoiled. When he had come to office, as governor of the Syrian coast, at the early age of nineteen, he had had every thing he had ever wished or wanted.

Having had an exaggerated and erroneous conception of his own power and importance, he had soon coveted the neighbouring province of Damascus.⁴

As early as 1821 Abdullah Pasha had naturally fallen into trouble with the Sublime Porte. Pressed and besieged by the troops of the pashas of Damascus, Aleppo, and Adana, he had shut himself up in the fortress of Acre for a period of nine months. His enemies in the region of Tripoli had gained the upper hand; they had snatched away first the harbour quarter, then the town proper, and his agent Mustafa Barbar had been forced to take refuge within the fort of Saint-Gilles.⁵ Beirut too had taken sides against him and had refused to give protection to his men. In the Lebanon, his great supporter Bashir II, who

(4) For details concerning the early life of Abdullah Pasha see Aura (Ibrahim), *Life of Sulayman Pasha*, pp. 28, 287-305. *Catalogue Raisonné des Manuscrits Historiques de la Bibliothèque Orientale de l'Université St. Joseph de Beyrouth* No. 45. See also Mushaqaq (Mikhail), *Reminiscences of*, pp. 146, 176, American University of Beirut, Arabic Manuscript No. 48532, and Cadelvène et Barrault, *Histoire de la Guerre de Méhémed Ali contre la Porte Ottomane* (Paris, 1837), pp. 21, 24-25. For the main facts of his later life see our own work, *Le Liban à l'Epoque des Amirs Chihab*, under Abdullah Pasha in the general index. Particularly valuable in this respect is a collection of the administrative correspondence of Abdullah Pasha which is preserved in the library of the American University of Beirut. Read, likewise, Consul Catafago's estimate of Abdullah Pasha in the following publications: (a) *La Revue Syrienne* (Cairo, 1929-1930), III, 599-600; IV, 9-16, 113-120, 161-164. (b) Michaud et Poujoulat, *Correspondance d'Orient*, (Paris, 1834), IV, 131-145.

(5) Abdullah Pasha to Mehemet Ali Pasha, Abd. (Bahr Bar) VIII, 54, Dhu-l-Qida, 18, 1237.

had threatened Damascus in his behalf, had been forced to leave the Mountain and to seek protection in Egypt. Sidon had been occupied by his enemies, and Tyre had made no effort at resistance. To cap the climax, the inhabitants of his own "malikanah"—Jaffa, Ramlah, and Gaza—had allied themselves with the Bedouin Tribes of these regions, had driven his agent from Gaza, and had declared themselves in open revolt.⁶ In dire distress Abdullah had begged for assistance from Cairo. Writing to Mehemet Ali Pasha on this subject, Abdallah Pasha assured him that under God he had no helper nor succor saving only his kingly favour and his royal compassion; that in any case he could claim nothing so long as Mehemet Ali Pasha lived. Abdullah Pasha's land was Mehemet Ali's country and Saint-Jean d'Acre was his stronghold. In addition, Abdullah Pasha's entire household was Mehemet Ali's family. Toward the close of this letter Abdullah Pasha stated that his situation had become intolerable and that Mehemet Ali Pasha was bound to help him because he had overwhelmed him with gratitude.⁷ A week later, imploring again for help, Abdullah Pasha declared that Mehemet Ali's power and domination could shake the mountains and inspire whole peoples with reverence and awe; that by the mere report of the arrival of Egyptian cavalry consternation and dismay would seize all his opponents, that it would render more trac-

(6) Abdullah Pasha to Mehemet Ali Pasha, Abd. (Bahr Barr) VIII, 46, Shawwal 8, 1237.

(7) Abdullah Pasha to Mehemet Ali Pasha Abd. (Bahr Barr) VIII, 54, 55, Dhu-l-Qida, 18 and 25, 1237.

table his own soldiers, and would strengthen and fortify his own courage.⁸

In response to this appeal, and in spite of protests to the contrary from Mustafa Pasha of Aleppo, Mehemet Ali Pasha had kept his harbours open to the ships of Abdullah Pasha and had allowed the exportation of provisions to Acre.⁹ In addition, he had urged Salih Pasha of Hama to write to Constantinople and plead for mercy toward Abdullah Pasha, and had very emphatically done the same himself.¹⁰ Acting upon the suggestion of Mehemet Ali Pasha the Sublime Porte had not only forgiven Abdullah Pasha for his acts of treason but had reinstated him in his office.

In return for these valuable services Abdullah Pasha seems to have made certain promises of a military and political nature. In one of the letters referred to above he had declared that his provinces were Mehemet Ali's, and that the fortress of Saint-Jean d'Acre was the stronghold of the ruler of Egypt. Then in one of his letters which were written toward the close of the scene, Abdullah Pasha referring to the "matter which was wot" had re-

(8) Abdullah Pasha to Mehemet Ali Pasha, Abd. (Bahr Barr) VIII, 55, Dhu-l-Qida, 25, 1237.

(9) Mustafa Pasha to Mehmeet Ali Pasha, Abd. (Bahr Barr) VIII, 94, Rabi II, 5, 1238.

(10) Salih Pasha to Mehemet Ali Pasha, Abd. (Bahr Barr) VIII, 124, Shaban 3, 1238.

newed the "covenant" that he was "Mehemet Ali's creature".¹¹

These vague but important references to the understanding between the Pasha of Egypt and the Pasha of Acre are, unfortunately, not clarified by the consular correspondence of the period. Neither Mimault nor Acerbi seem to have given this matter serious consideration. The British Consul John Farren, however, who intermediated between Abdullah Pasha and Ibrahim Pasha after the siege of Acre had begun, and who thus had a chance to know the truth, expresses himself as follows: "Mehemet Ali Pasha had for several years been laying measures for rendering the Pachalic of Acre subservient to his ultimate designs and frontier policy. Abdallah Pacha a very weak, but not very ill-disposed young man, succeeded Suleiman Pacha in the government of Acre, and having been instigated by his vanity and by Mehemet Ali, as he affirmed, to seek the annexation of Damascus to his power, he forged a firman, or corresponding appointment, from the Porte, and ordered the Emir Beshir to make a levy of mountaineers, and march against that city. The Emir did so, and advancing to the gates of Damascus, burned the village of Mezzy which was near them. This rebellion having been denounced by the Porte, and the Pachas of Aleppo, Tripoli, Damascus, and Cesarea, having united their forces to repress it, the Emir fled and abandoning Syria, took refuge

(11) Abdullah Pasha to Mehemet Ali Pasha, Abd. (Bahr Barr) VIII, 127, Shaban 23, 1238.

with Mehemet Ali, while Abdallah Pacha shut himself up within the walls of Acre, where well supplied with provisions and means of defence, he sustained a ten months siege. Mehemet Ali advocated their cause at the Porte;—the siege seemed helpless,—the affairs of Greece claimed immediate attention, and bribery and submissive assurances prevailed : Abdallah Pacha and the Emir Beshir were pardoned and restored to their governments, and Mehemet Ali regarded his policy as consummated in the bonds of gratitude and service by which he bound their influence to his interests.”¹² Farren thus seems to approach the truth more closely than any other of his consular colleagues, but does not reach it. Cadalvene and Barrault, however, are quite definite. In their famous work “*La Guerre de Mehemet Ali contre la Port Ottomane*” they say, “*Abdallah souscrivit à Mehemet Ali lui-même des conditions qu’il ne pouvait ni remplir ni violer sans se déclarer le protégé ou l’ennemi du pacha d’Égypte.*”¹³

To come back to Abdullah Pasha, he seems to have had “too vain and erroneous a conception of his own power and station to submit, when not under an obvious and impending necessity, to the dictates of one whose rank in the scale of official dignity was not higher than his own.”¹⁴ He had been the only son of his father, and

(12) *The Prospects and Present State of Syria*, by John W. Farren, annexed to Lord Lindsay, *Letters on Eg., Edom, and the Holy Land* (London, 1838) Vol. II, pp. 257-258.

(13) *Op. cit.* p. 34.

(14) Lord Lindsay, *op. cit.*, II, 259.

had had his own way throughout life. Surrounded by his father's admirers and flatterers, and by officials who sought Ali Pasha's good will, Abdullah Pasha (the son of Ali Pasha) had practically always gone at large and had grown up with an exaggerated idea of his own importance. According to one of his proclamations to the inhabitants of Gaza he seems to have given undue importance to his connections with the family of the Prophet, his "Grand Father". Local tradition in Acre preserves his determination to supplant Mahmud II as the rightful caliph of Islam. In a public gathering of the learned theologians of the town, in which Shaykh Said al-Sadi was present, Abdullah Pasha announced the fulfillment of the conditions of the true caliphate in himself and requested the learned theologians of his town to proclaim him as such.¹⁵

This erroneous conception of his own power and station, moreover, seems to have been nurtured, protected, and aided by the Sublime Porte. In his famous interview with the Grand Vizier, after the battle of Qonieh, Wahid Effendi assured his guest of honour that the intercepted correspondence of the Sublime Porte with Abdullah Pasha showed, very definitely, the mal-intentions of the Imperial Government. The Qaim-maqam of the Grand Vizier, Khesrew Pasha himself, and others had authorized Abdullah Pasha to work against the in-

(15) Reported to the author by Shaykh Asad al-Shuqairi who learned it from Hajj Abdullah al-Sadi the son of Shaykh Said. On Abdullah Pasha's connection with the Prophet see Abd. (Bahr Barr), VIII, 46, Shawwal 8, 1237.

terests of Egypt. "Had we not marched against Acre Abdullah Pasha would have taken the initiative himself, and, acting under the influence of the Sublime Porte, would have taken us unawares."¹⁶

This view of the situation is strengthened, in a way, by the declarations of the dragoman of Abdullah Pasha. Addressing himself to the Baron de Boislecomte in June of 1833, this dragoman said, "La querelle qui est survenue entre Abdallah Pacha et Mehemet Ali a servi à la fois de prétexte, et plus encore de moyen d'exécution à une entreprise qui était préparée depuis longtemps; je dois vous en retracer l'origine. La seule force militaire qui existât en Syrie était celle de l'Emir Béchir, le prince des Druses et des Maronites. Ce fut avec lui que s'entendit Mehemet Ali, décidé à se rendre assez puissant pour que son existence cessât de dépendre de la bonne ou de la mauvaise volonté de la Porte. Des intelligences furent établies entre eux, principalement par l'intermédiaire de M. Bianchi, agent consulaire sarde à Beyrouth, et par celle de M. Bosio, médecin sarde, que l'on eut l'adresse de placer auprès d'Abdallah Pacha lui-même. La correspondance qui passait par ce canal fut saisie en 1828 par Abdallah; son Altesse l'envoya aussitôt à la Porte. Celle-ci, tout occupée alors de ses troubles intérieurs, ajourna son ressentiment, mais elle prescrivit de rompre avec Mehemet Ali et de cesser toute relation avec lui. Le Sultan lui promit, s'il se conformait à cet ordre, de joindre Tripoli à son pachalik. Abdallah se trouva

(16) Army Bulletin, Abd. case no. 242, doc. no. 41, Shaban 4, 1248.

alors dans une grande perplexité; il sentait qu'une rupture entre la Porte et Mehemet Ali était inévitable, il se décida pour son souverain, rompit avec Mehemet Ali et reçut l'adjonction de Tripoli au pachalik de St. Jean d'Acre. Mehemet Ali fut d'autant plus blessé de l'abandon d'Abdallah qu'il lui avait rendu, en d'autres circonstances, des services importants. Une occasion se présenta de lui en témoigner son mecontentement. Plusieurs Egyptiens se réfugièrent en Syrie. Mehemet Ali demanda avec hauteur à Abdallah pourquoi il lui débauchait ses sujets? Abdallah répondit que ce n'était pas sa faute s'il y avait des hommes qui se trouvaient mieux en Syrie qu'en Egypte, et que le moyen de les retenir était de les bien traiter.¹⁷ Thus it became apparent that as long as the Pasha of Acre could continue to count on the good will of the Sublime Porte he could entertain no fear of Mehemet Ali Pasha.¹⁸

From the position of creature of Mehemet Ali Pasha, Abdallah Pasha, in no time, became his equal. Acting, it would seem, under false pretences, he sequestered capital which belonged to Egyptian merchants.¹⁹ The case of the Egyptian Refugees in the Pashalik of Acre became another source of complaint and irritation. Owing to some of the reforms of Mehemet Ali Pasha several

(17) Douin, Georges, *La Mission du Baron de Boislecomte* etc. (Cairo, 1927), pp. 65-66.

(18) Qaim-maqam of Grand Vizier (Ahmad Khulusi) to Wali of Damascus, Abd. case no. 231, doc. 2, Rabi I, 3, 1247.

(19) Qaim-maqam of Grand Vizier (Ahmad Khulusi) to Mehemet Ali Pasha, Abd. Bahr Barr XVII, 2, ——— 11, 1247.

thousand Egyptian peasants, from the region of al-Sharqiyyah, crossed the Egyptian frontier and took refuge in the districts of Jerusalem, Nablus, and Gaza. On being told that the shaykhs of Southern Palestine were making it difficult for the refugees to go back to Egypt, Mehemet Ali Pasha threatened to send his own agents to Palestine to fetch the refugees as well as the village shaykhs themselves. In reply, Abdullah Pasha wrote a very polite but stiff note in which he assured Mehemet Ali Pasha that he would do his best to send all the refugees back to Egypt. At the same time, he reminded Mehemet Ali Pasha that former practice and precedent dictated non-interference, and that the Sublime Porte would not be pleased to see one provincial governor intermeddle in the affairs of another. Then, in place of the usual compliments and expressions of affection, gratitude, and servitude which have been noted previously, Abdullah Pasha began this letter and ended it politely but rigorously.²⁰ It is to be noted in this connection, however, that it was not the mere lack of courtesy that made Mehemet Ali Pasha indignant; nor does it seem to have been disappointment on account of ingratitude. Abdullah Pasha seems to have broken a very serious military and political engagement with the Pasha of Egypt. Consul Farren would add that Abdullah Pasha had actually secured possession of some intercepted correspondence of a treasonable nature between Mehemet Ali and the Greek chiefs, which he transmitted to the Porte; that the Porte

(20) Abdullah Pasha to Mehemet Ali Pasha, Abd. Bahr Barr, XIII, 69, Shawwal 14, 1245.

had imprudently sacrificed its agent to its resentment; and reproaching the Pasha of Egypt with the discovery it had acquired, all relations with Abdullah were denounced by him, and the two chiefs became implacable enemies. Now, as it was not prudent that Mehemet Ali Pasha should have disclosed any of his secret understandings with Abdullah Pasha the diplomatic corps naturally remained ignorant of their existence, and Mehemet Ali Pasha had to insist on the injustice which Abdullah Pasha had done to the Egyptian merchants, and on the fact that he had been insolent and disrespectful, and that he had thus "insulted his white beard."²¹

The Royal Archives of Egypt do not seem to contain information on other grievances between Mehemet Ali Pasha and Abdullah Pasha. The author has not yet been able to find any reference to the debt which Abdullah Pasha was supposed to have contracted from Mehemet Ali Pasha in 1821 or 1823, and which he refused to pay to his former benefactor. According to Cadalvene et Barrault, this debt had, by 1831, reached the serious figure of 11,000,000 piasters.²² There is, likewise, no mention of a discord between the two pashas arising out of a need on the part of Mehemet Ali Pasha for Syrian timber, silkworms, or horses. The trade in contraband between Egypt and Syria is also not mentioned.²³

(21) Lord Lindsay, *op. cit.*, II, p. 259. See also Abd. Bahr Barr, XVII, 2; and Douin, *guerre de Syrie*, I, p. 64.

(22) Cadalvene et Barrault, *op. cit.* p. 47.

(23) Lord Lindsay, *op. cit.*, II, 259; Mushaqah, *op. cit.*, 224; Paton, A. A., *Egyptian Revolution*, II, 94. See also Izzeddine, Ibrahim Pasha in Syria, (Beirut, 1929), pp. 56-58.

As for Abdullah Pasha's treasure, and the desire on the part of Mehemet Ali Pasha to secure it for himself, it is hardly noticeable in these archives. Both Acerbi and Mimault, however, express themselves clearly on this subject. Writing to Sebastiani on the 19th of May, 1831, Mimault says, "Un si faible ennemi n'exigerait pas un tel développement de forces, mais l'espoir de s'emparer du trésor d'Abdallah, que l'on évalue à une trentaine de millions de francs, espoir qui entre pour beaucoup dans le project d'expédition, a fait prendre la resolution d'en employer trop, pour être toujours sûr d'en avoir assez. Quoi qu'en dise pourtant le vice-roi, je ne serais pas étonné que le bruit répandu des préparatifs de l'expédition, qui ne peut manquer d'arriver bientôt à St. Jean d'Acre par les indiscretions de la Cour du Caire, portât le pacha menacé à mettre ses trésors en lieu de sûreté hors de la Syrie, au lieu de s'ensevelir avec eux comme on croit ici qu'il aura la niaiserie de le faire."²⁴ Consul Acerbi also expresses himself in the same way to Prince Metternich. Writing from Alexandria in November of the same year he says, "Le point le plus important est qu'il y ait un trésor auprès d'Abdallah Pacha, et que Ibrahim Pacha puisse s'emparer. Vingt millions de tallaris étaient assez. Avec de l'argent Mehmet Aly fera de grandes choses; il trouvera en effet plus de cent mille hommes en Syrie prêts à le suivre et seconder ses projets. Si le trésor d'Abdallah Pacha n'est qu'un rêve, tout peut avoir des resultats ruineux. L'Opinion générale à l'égard du trésor d'Abdallah Pacha est partagée en deux. Le Vice-

(24) Douin, op. cit. I, 31-32.

roi est du nombre de ceux qui croient a un trésor de 20 à 30 millions de tallaris, à peu près. Les autres opinent au million tout au plus, et un million ne payerait pas les dépenses du siège."²⁵

To be fair to the truth we must also consult other archives than those of France and Austria. Writing to Boutenieff on the tenth of November, 1831, Edouard Lavison, dragoman to the Russian Consulate in Alexandria, says, "Revenant encore de lui-même sur l'expédition contre Abdallah Pacha, Mohammed Aly termina en me disant : "On présume que mon fils Ibrahim trouvera des trésors à Acre, et on se trompe : sous le gouvernement de Giezzar Pacha, il y avait des fonds considérables en réserve, mais le Divan a su peu à peu les attirer à Constantinople, et je sais de bonne source qu'Abdallah n'a pas en caisse 2,000,000 de talers; je ne trouverai pas là de quoi couvrir les frais".²⁶

The relative silence of the Royal Archives of Egypt is even more significant. It is a well established fact that Bahri Bey and Munib Effendi kept complete record of all the important events of the Egyptian Expedition to Syria in the course of its first campaign. Reading their daily journals one can not fail to be impressed with

(25) Sammarco, Angelo, *Il Regno di Mohammed Ali nei Documenti Diplomatici Italiani Inediti*, (Rome, 1931), Vol. VIII, p. 135.

(26) Cattai, René, *Le Règne de Mohamed Aly d'après les Archives Russes en Égypte* (Cairo, 1931), Vol. I, p. 447.

their details and their completeness.²⁷ The events of the surrender of Abdallah Pasha are noted down very faithfully, and a complete account of the first two or three inspections of his headquarters is also given, yet no special importance seems to have been attached to his treasure or to his personal property.²⁸ Had the treasure of Abdallah Pasha been as important to Mehemet Ali Pasha as Mimault and Acerbi made it to be, surely either Bahri Bey, or Munib Effendi, or some other official of rank, would have given it special attention in the daily journals which were prepared especially for the information of the Great Pasha. Ibrahim Pasha would have, likewise, given importance to it in his confidential correspondence with his father.

Coming to the recent works of Dodwell, Driault, Izzeddine, Rafii, and Sabry²⁹ on various phases of the period of Mehemet Ali Pasha, and comparing their conclusions regarding the case of Abdallah Pasha with the contents of the Archives in Abdin Palace, we would note the following : In the first place, there is enough in these

(27) Cf. with report of Wahid Effendi, Jean Deny, *op. cit.* pls. XV and XVI. None of the reports of Bahri Bey and Munib Effendi has, as yet, been published.

(28) Abd. case No. 3, doc. No. 204; case 234, doc. 133, 152; case 235, doc. 65, 129, 130.

(29) Dodwell, Henry, *The Founder of Modern Egypt*, Cambridge, 1931, p. 109; Driault, Edouard, *Précis de l'Histoire d'Égypte par divers Historiens et Archéologues* (Cairo, 1933), Col. III, p. 289; Izzeddine, Sulayman, *op. cit.* pp. 48-51; Rafii, Abd-al-Rahman, *Egyptian Nationalism* (Cairo, 1930), Vol. III, pp. 235-236; Sabry, M., *op. cit.* p. 191.

archives to show that the case of Abdullah Pasha served as the pretext for the war of 1831. To stop, however, at this point is to leave the truth half told. The case of Abdullah Pasha does not seem to have been only a pretext for war. Judging from the engagements into which Abdullah Pasha had entered in 1821, and reckoning on the declarations of the same pasha to the Baron de Boislecomte in 1833, and depending upon the statements of Ibrahim Pasha and other contemporaries regarding the relations of Mehemet Ali Pasha with various dignitaries in Syria and throughout the Empire,³⁰ it would seem that the whole Turkish Empire had been rapidly ranging itself into two hostile camps—the partisans of Mehemet Ali Pasha and the supporters of Sultan Mahmud and Khesrew Pasha. By failing to support the engagement into which he had entered out of his own free accord in 1821, Abdullah Pasha was ipso facto defending the cause of Khesrew and the Sultan. The case of Abdullah Pasha was, thus, inextricably bound up with the real causes of the war.

Before closing this discussion the author would disagree again with Professor Dodwell on one other point. Referring to Abdullah Pasha's behaviour with Mehemet Ali Pasha, Professor Dodwell says, "Abdullah may not

(30) Mimault to Sebastiani, March 30, 1831, Douin, Georges, *op. cit.* I, pp. 11-18. Read especially the letter of Mehemet Ali Pasha to Ibrahim regarding Amin Hasan Pasha of Adana and his readiness to block the retreat of Turkish troops from Syria. Abd. case 3, doc. 89, Dhu-l-Qida 17, 1247. See also verbal reply of Amir Bashir II to courier from Constantinople in our *Corpus of Arabic Documents etc.*, Vol. I, p. 98.

have been very honest or very wise, but he was a brave and resolute man.³¹ In the light of the correspondence which was exchanged between the two pashas in 1821 and 1823, and in view of the engagement into which Abdullah Pasha entered with the Pasha of Egypt, and of his conduct after 1828, there does not seem to be much ground left for Professor Dodwell's hesitation regarding either the honesty or the wisdom of Abdullah Pasha.

The same evidence refutes the excuses which are put forward by the late Sulayman Bey Izzeddine regarding the charges of ingratitude which have been made by many authors against the Pasha of Acre.³²

(31) Dodwell, H., op. cit. p. 109.

(32)

« قد اوضحنا قبلاً ان محمد علي والي مصر كان طامعاً في سوريا ولا يجد فرصة الا اغتصبها لتمهيد السبيل للحصول عليها فتدخل لدى الباب العالي لاجل جسم التراع والعفو عن عبد الله باشا وهو يظن ان بتدخله في الامر والحصول على رضا الدولة العثمانية عن عبد الله باشا وحملها على استبقائه في ولاية صيدا يصبح عبد الله باشا صنيعته ويكون معيناً له على تحقيق امانيه في سوريا . الا ان ظنه هذا لم يصب اذ تبين له عندما ان اوان تنفيذ مطامعه ان عبد الله باشا كان اشد المقاومين لها ولذلك قد نسب الى عبد الله باشا عدم الوفاء ونكران الجميل على انه ليس من الانصاف الصافي هذه التهمة به بدون بحث ولا تحقيق. فترى من هذا ان عبد الله باشا ادرك منذ سنة ١٨٢٣ ان توسط محمد علي لدى الدولة العثمانية لم يكن مزمعاً عن غاية شخصية بل كان يرمي الى استصناعه وتسخيره لمطامع يودى تحقيقها الى زوال نعمته وزحزحته عن كرسي ولاية صيدا التي كان يحكمها حكماً يكاد يكون مطلقاً . ومع هذا فان خطة التسامح التي جرى عليها مع محمد علي بعد استصدار العفو عنه تدل على شعوره بالجميل . ففي اثناء حرب المورة طلب محمد علي منه خمسة عشرة الف مقاتل من لبنان لانقاذ ولده ابراهيم فتلقى الطلب بالقبول على انه لم يطلب منه تفديده . ثم لما وقع التراع بين الامير بشير صديق محمد علي وبين الشيخ بشير

II

THE REFORM AND REGENERATION OF THE EMPIRE

The Royal Archives of Egypt yield light on yet another official cause of war. When, in the course of the siege of Acre, the Sublime Porte finally declared itself openly against him, Mehemet Ali Pasha assumed the pious duty of reform and proclaimed his determination to rectify the mistakes and abuses of the Sultan and his government. Five days after the capture of Acre, Mehemet Ali Pasha wrote to Ibrahim Pasha asking him to address himself in such terms to Allush Pasha of Latakiah in the hope of winning him over to the side of Egypt.³³ About a month later, Ibrahim Pasha, taking advantage of his victory at Hims, wrote to Allush Pasha "urging him to join the Orthodox Moslems who were anxious to free Islam from the Christian practices which had been imposed upon it by Sultan Mahmud."³⁴ Then after the fall of Aleppo

جنبلط كتب الى عبد الله باشا يستحثه على انجاد الامير بشير فلي عبد الله باشا هذا الطالب.
ثم عاد محمد علي فارسل الى لبنان شريعة كشافة واعداً حملة لتأييد حزب الامير بشير
..... رضي عبد الله باشا بهذه الامور وامثالها مع انها تحط من هيئته وتجعله بالنسبة الى
محمد علي بمنزلة التابع من المتبوع ولا يخاله انه كان يرضى بذلك لولا رغبته باظهار شعوره

بحسن الصنيع» Izzidnine, S., op. cit., pp. 48-51.

(33) Mehemet Ali Pasha to Ibrahim Pasha, Abd. case 3, doc. 185, Muharram 4, 1248.

(34) [Ibrahim Pasha] to Allush Pasha, Abd. case 236, doc. 66, an undated preliminary draft.

into Egyptian hands, Ibrahim Pasha wrote a long letter to Muhammad Pasha of Aleppo "pressing upon his attention the need for cooperation to rescue the nation from the evils with which it had been afflicted."³⁵ After the battle of Beylan the Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian forces expressed himself more officially and publicly. He issued an order (*buyulurdu*) to the Judge of Khadim,³⁶ in Southern Asia Minor, in which he denounced the evil practices of the Ottoman Government and announced the divine mission of his father Mehemet Ali Pasha. The following is the substance of this *buyulurdu*: "In as much as the Ottoman Government has, in the course of the past few years, gone astray by establishing unsound observances, baseless innovations, excessive impositions, and unprecedented taxes; and in as much as the same government aims to reject Moslem customs and traditions and to embrace European forms and practices, which action would lead to the loss of its Moslem identity and its incorporation into European circles; and in as much as the Ottoman Government has also been ill-disposed toward Egypt and has been working for its deceit; in view of all this, Almighty Wisdom has elected our benefactor (Mehemet Ali Pasha) to shake off these injustices, sup-

(35) Army bulletin, prepared by Wahid Effendi, and dated Safar 20, 1248—Abd. case 236, doc. 119.

(36) Khadim is a town in Asia Minor, in the district of Adalia. As for the person referred to in the passage above, he seems to have been the Judge of Khadim, and not as Prof. Sabri says "Moufti-Khadem (sort de Prélat)" — *op. cit.* p. 211. He signs thus: "Al-Sayyid Ahmad, the Mulla-Khil-afah of the judicial district of Khadim."

port our faith, and purify it from treacherous deceit".³⁷ Other judges, throughout the Empire, may have also received similar communications.

Then, soon after the collapse of the Ottoman Army at Konieh, and the capture of the Grand Vizier Muhammad Rashid Pasha, Ibrahim Pasha addressed himself to the muftis of the Empire in the following manner: "Question:—If the Imam of the Moslem Community is guilty of unrighteousness, has that community the legal right to rise against him and depose him? Answer:—It is lawful, on condition that the number of those agreeing upon this measure shall not fall below 12000 combatants, acting with the will of one man."³⁸ Mehemet Ali Pasha and his son Ibrahim Pasha were thus engaged in a sacred war to purge the Sublime Porte of its evil practices and to help regenerate the leading Moslem state of the world.

Was it only a pretext for war, or was it one of the real causes of the contest? In his book "The Egyptian Empire under Mohamed Ali" Professor Muhammad Sabry, who has had access to the archives in Abdin Palace seems to think that it was more than a mere pretext. He takes his departure from the communication of Mehemet Ali to a certain "Shaykh Effendi" at Constantinople possib-

(37) Al-Sayyid Ahmad (Mula-Khilafah of Khadim) to [Ibrahim Pasha], Abd. case 240, doc. 112, Jumada-l-Akhirah 15, 1248.

(38) Army bulletin, prepared by Wahid Effendi, Abd. case 242, doc. 41, Shaban 4, 1248.

ly the same Ahmad Najib of Tripolitza who was the father of Sami Bey, Abd-ul-Baqi Effendi, and Khayrullah Effendi.³⁹ "Je vous ai déjà dit, que notre sort tient à un fil, voulant dire par là qu'il s'agit précisément de parer aux conséquences dangereuses qui menacent l'existence de la nation et de la religion mahométane. Quand à la dignité que vous invoquez, on ne se l'attribue pas, mais on l'acquiert par des actes qui mettent l'âme en quelque sorte à la peine, et qui tendent à consolider l'Etat et à développer ses ressources et sa puissance par un vaste effort que rien ne rebute. Il est bien possible que les préceptes de notre religion ne nous autorisent pas à conclure la paix, cependant, nous ne devons pas ignorer que Mahomet, la gloire du monde, a fait la paix avec ses ennemis et nous a laissé ainsi une tradition qu'il faudrait, à ce qu'il me semble, suivre et respecter. Voilà pour le côté spirituel de la question. Reste le côté temporel, comme vous le dites : Vous reconnaissez vous-mêmes que nous ne sommes pas à même de nous mesurer contre les trois puissances à la fois, que nous ne pouvons faire face qu'à l'une d'entre elles. Or, sachant bien cela et connaissant bien notre faiblesse, la force de trois Etats et l'étendue de leur puissance militaire, est-il préférable d'être nous-mêmes la cause de nos malheurs ou d'ajourner la guerre à une époque ultérieure, afin que nous puissions faire nos préparatifs, mettre sur pied des armées innombrables, multiplier nos ressources et être en mesure de faire face à nos ennemis ? De la sorte, la paix prompte nous permettra de réorganiser nos forces et d'éviter bien des mal-

(39) Deny, J., op. cit. p. 234, note 1.

heurs. Nul doute que le besoin du relèvement ne se fasse sentir d'une manière aigüe, dans tous les pays de l'Islam. Nul doute que notre nation, dans son apathie actuelle, ne vive comme les troupeaux. Laissez donc de côté, de grâce, l'égoïsme, l'emportement et l'excès de zèle, et réfléchissez un peu à l'état de détresse et de misère où se trouvent actuellement les nations musulmanes. Rendez vous à l'évidence de mon raisonnement. Revenons à la sagesse et faisons une paix qui soit plutôt une trêve. Du reste, quelle nécessité et quelle loi nous poussent à désespérer de notre cause et à précipiter ainsi et notre Etat et notre religion dans un abîme qui est là sous nos yeux ? N'en serions nous pas responsables le jour suprême ? Peut-être direz-vous que l'Europe ne nous laisserait pas le temps de réparer nos forces et de consolider notre puissance. Vous avez raison. Il faut remarquer, cependant, que les événements de ce monde ont prouvé que chaque heure qui passe apporte avec elle une force nouvelle; d'autant plus que les puissances européennes, et l'expérience l'a prouvé, ne restent pas toujours d'accord entre elles et que si nous ne pouvons pas arriver par la division à nous débarrasser des trois puissances à la fois, toujours est-il que nous n'aurons contre nous qu'une seule puissance, ce qui simplifiera singulièrement notre tâche et allègera la charge qui pèse sur nos épaules. Vous dites encore dans votre lettre que tous les grands dignitaires de l'Anatolie et de la Roumélie ont été convoqués par un tartar à Constantinople pour aider de leurs lumières et de leurs expériences dans une consultation générale au cours d'un grand conseil. . . . Fort bien ! Mais vous n'ignorez pas que ces hommes sont, après tous,

des esprits simples qui n'ont ni puissance ni richesse, et que, par conséquent, ils ne peuvent opiner que suivant leur force de raisonnement et leur degré d'intelligence. Or, pour terminer la guerre et préparer les voies de la paix, ce n'est pas aux pauvres qu'il faut avoir recours, mais aux riches et puissants de l'Empire. Du reste le Kabo-Kathoda (mon représentant à Constantinople) a déjà suggéré aux dirigeants du pouvoir de nous confier l'administration de la Syrie en nous engageant à recruter une armée de trente à quarante mille hommes et de charger en même temps notre fils Ibrahim des affaires de la Roumélie ou il assumerait le pouvoir d'accord avec les dignes serviteurs de la Porte.... Livrés ainsi à nous-mêmes pendant un certain laps de temps, nous pourrions y acquérir des ressources et des revenus qui nous aideraient à former une armée imposante bien instruite et bien équipée sur le modèle européen. Etant donné que nos différents pays sont pauvres en hommes et en ressources et incapables de se diriger eux-mêmes, nous choisirons tous les jeunes gens qui savent lire et écrire en Anatolie et en Roumélie; nous les ferons initier aux principes de la guerre moderne et aux sciences mathématiques, militaires et autres, afin de former des cadres pour la nouvelle armée dont la première tâche consistera à élever partout des fortifications et à se préparer solidement en vue de futures éventualités. Sur cet exemple travailleront énergiquement tous les serviteurs de l'Empire dans un même élan d'union et de fraternité dans le devoir; et ainsi les provinces de l'Anatolie et de la Roumélie entreront de plain-pied dans la voie de la prospérité et de la civilisation.... Et si, entre temps, comme vous le pensez, nos

ennemis nous tombaient sur le dos pour arrêter notre relèvement, alors, d'accord avec mon fils, nous prendrions immédiatement, dans la Roumélie comme en Syrie, les mesures indispensables pour mettre de l'ordre dans l'administration fiscale et accélérer le recrutement des soldats et l'accumulation des provisions nécessaires. Mais on voudra bien alors nous adjoindre à chacun de nous, mon fils et moi, trois ou cinq ministres de l'Empire pour collaborer, sous le signe de l'union sacrée, à l'organisation générale qui, seule, nous fournirait les moyens les plus efficaces pour combattre nos ennemis. Ainsi, plutôt que de mourir sottement, d'une mort sans tache comme vous le pensiez, dans l'unique vue d'éviter la malédiction et la colère de la nation musulmane et des générations à venir, il vaudrait mieux mille fois vivre et servir, de cette manière, notre patrie et notre religion et mourir ensuite de la mort des vrais fidèles, en laissant après nous une oeuvre durable.... Il est grand temps de me mettre, ainsi que mon fils, au service de l'Etat et de la religion....."⁴⁰


Taking as his point of departure, this declaration of Mehemet Ali Pasha to Cheikh Effendi, Professor Sabry says, "Il ressort de cette lettre que le vice-roi renonce à son indépendance, du moins nominale, et pense désormais à constituer un empire indépendant de fait dans le cadre de l'Empire Ottoman. Voyant qu'il ne pouvait se séparer de l'Empire Turc, tant qu'il restait incertain sur l'attitude de l'Europe, il croyait trouver, dans le lien qui attachait l'Egypte à l'Empire, une garantie contre une invasion

(40) Sabry, M. op. cit. pp. 152-155.

étrangère, la question du partage de l'Empire étant toujours ajournée sine die, faute d'entente entre les puissances. Mais puisque l'Égypte était condamnée à faire partie de cet empire, de par la volonté de l'Europe, Mohamed Ali s'efforçait de trouver une garantie positive pour sa sécurité dans la régénération de l'Empire Ottoman dont il entendait constituer un bloc vivant qu'il opposerait à la menace de l'Europe. Cette idée de régénération, si chère à Mohamed-Ali, l'exaltait, le fascinait sans cesse. Il voulait mettre les réserves d'énergie farouche qu'il avait toujours en lui au service de l'Empire."⁴¹


Then picking up the same thread of discourse on page 183 of the same work, he says, "Le projet syrien était d'autant plus tentant qu'il répondait davantage à son plan de régénération de l'Empire Ottoman, dont la Syrie était une des parties essentielles. En outre, une guerre de Syrie, en se développant, pouvait amener une révolution à Constantinople et y installer Mohammed Ali avant les Russes". Again, on page 184 of the same work he says, "Il y a toutefois un point capital qui ressort de la correspondance privée de Mohamed-Ali; ce point, qui était à la base de sa politique d'agrandissement, résidait dans ses sentiments religieux. Car, tout en montrant une tolérance qui l'honore à l'égard des chrétiens répandus dans ses domaines, le vice-roi était assez bon musulman pour ne pas laisser les Etats chrétiens partager les pays de l'Islam et abaisser ce qu'il appelait "sa nation", c'est-à-dire la nation mahométane. C'est pourquoi, en cherchant à conquérir les pays convoités par les puissances chré-

(41) Sabry, M., op. cit. pp. 155-156.




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


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نموده اند تا بعد از تکمیل طریقه بند با ناپویب سر و سامان و بیکی اوزده اولیای اودقی بیل برده اند
 اودینفند منجید زبیلد ویرای جده مصلحتی کوی و یکایک عکسگر لیسز افانده و شش تپوچه بر ساحت اود که در دست
 افاده بدیده است، بلیکند بر زرقی باد، هیز، خدوخی در بند و شد، بویان کویه مک ایلم تحسین کویان
 نکر زنده انقادی اضمینده هم جور بر نیز مرز افاده سالدر سر از اوزده مک و نه غمناک کوفه در دست با کز
 هر جاده پاکر اودوت بچینه بیجا اشفت لوزمه حالین اودینفند شمدینا سجو زبیلدینت و دوزخ کویه مک
 و از ده جو در زیر ابراهه ملاقات فریفته در دست جور بدیند اودنقه موافقت و بیجا بیلیک مدینه کویه مک

شیخ الفکر با زنده ای



tiennes, il pensait les sauver, les régénérer et y répandre la gloire de l'islamisme."

He finally ends his chapter on the eve of the Turco-Egyptian conflict in the following manner : "Il convient de remarquer que la question de l'indépendance était posée en même temps que d'autres questions puisque Mohamed-Ali cherchait l'alliance de l'Angleterre pour entreprendre d'accord avec elle la régénération de l'Empire Ottoman."⁴²

A more detailed and more intimate study of the Archives, however, leads to a revision of Professor Sabry's view of the matter. It remains to be seen whether this second official cause of the Expedition to Syria was actually one of its real motives. The same conversation between the Grand Vizier and Ibrahim Pasha which is reproduced on the margin of pages 217 and 218 of Professor Sabry's book, deserves serious attention. As Professor Sabry has selected from this conversation the section which bears out his general thesis, and has overlooked an important declaration on the part of the Grand Vizier, it is necessary to reproduce this declaration in the interests of the truth. In reply to Ibrahim Pasha's declaration that he had gone to war to uplift his nation, the Grand Vizier said, "If this is really your object then we have nothing to say about it. The current report, however, is different. It is believed that Mehemet Ali Pasha aims to control the Sultanate, and to hold it in-

(42) Sabry, M., *op. cit.* pp. 189-190. Mr. Athanase Politis also shares the same view with Prof. Sabry, *Le Conflit Turco-Egyptien*, pp. ix-xii.

dependently of others." Ibrahim Pasha then reassured the Grand Vizier saying that "his sole aim and that of his father's were to put an end to the Sultan's folly, injustice, and disregard of the interests of the nation."⁴³

The same archives also preserve another conversation which took place between the same Grand Vizier and Wahid Effendi, official and confidential recorder at the General Headquarters of the Egyptian Army. This conversation, like the previous one, turned around the same general subject of reform and regeneration of the Empire. The Grand Vizier assured Wahid Effendi that he was not aware of the inner aspects of the struggle and that both parties acted from hidden motives. When cornered by the Grand Vizier, Wahid Effendi finally admitted that the Egyptians were fighting in self-defence.⁴⁴

Then, in one of his confidential letters to his father, Ibrahim Pasha, referring to the mission of Nazif Effendi and the political tricks of the Sublime Porte, and aiming, as it would seem, to outwit her, advised his father "to deny all material gain and to speak in terms of reform and regeneration."⁴⁵

In addition to all this, it must be remembered that the famous declaration of Mehemet Ali Pasha to Cheikh

(43) Army bulletin, prepared by Wahid Effendi, Abd. case 242, doc. 248.

(44) Army bulletin, prepared by Wahid Effendi, Abd. case 242, doc. 41, Shaban 4, 1248.

(45) Ibrahim Pasha to Mehemet Ali Pasha, Abd. case 232, doc. 58, Ramadan 23, 1247.

Effendi needs critical evaluation. In this case Mehemet Ali Pasha is not expressing himself confidentially to his son, or vice versa. Through Cheikh Effendi he is communicating a diplomatic message to an unfriendly government—the Sublime Porte. Was he, therefore, seeking to gain a practical advantage for himself? As this question may be answered in the affirmative, we find it difficult to accept the famous declaration on its face value. It must be noted, furthermore, that Professor Muhammad Sabry has again failed to take in the whole field of vision. He has overlooked some passages in the communication to Shaykh Effendi, and has, thereby, left out important portions which possesses a determining significance as regards the object of investigation. The Sublime Porte, according to these passages, had decided to turn down the mediation of the Powers in the Greek Question and to resort to war. Mehemet Ali Pasha had apparently advised the Sultan's Government to accept the terms of the Great Powers and had been misunderstood at Constantinople. He, therefore, determined to write again on the same subject explaining his position and assuring all parties concerned that he had been, and would continue to be, the most faithful servant of the Sultan; and that the best interests of the Empire dictated a temporary acceptance of the terms which the Powers offered and an immediate attention to internal reform and regeneration. Anxious, it would seem, to clear up the misunderstanding at Constantinople, and desirous to insure his good standing at the Turkish Capital, Mehemet Ali Pasha was, thus, willing to participate effectively in such a movement for reform. The reader who is interested in seeing the exact

words of Mehemet Ali Pasha summarized above will find the whole document inserted in this paper in facsimile. It must be also noted, that this declaration to Shaykh Effendi was made four years before the outbreak of hostilities, and that Mehemet Ali Pasha, in case he ever cherished its contents, may have changed his mind with a change in political circumstances. Political declarations of this kind have usually, in both East as well as West, spoken of the past and the present but rarely of the future. Under these circumstances, and in the absence of more convincing evidence, the author finds it difficult to agree with Professor Sabry.

To appreciate the position of Mehemet Ali Pasha in this respect we must remember that the world in which he found himself was still medieval in the widest and most inclusive sense of the term. Life here below was but a brief preliminary for the real life to come. Men's main objective was the assurance of Paradise and the escape from Hell. The Church—the Moslem Church—was then supreme, and Islam was the *focal factor* in society. "Such are the religious prejudices of these people", Mehemet Ali Pasha once said to Salt, "that they all desert a pasha when once under interdiction of the Head of the Church. To oppose the Sultan with effect, a pasha must be strong enough to command public opinion, and that is not an easy matter." The troops of Mehemet Ali Pasha, like those of the rebel pasha in Kurdistan, might fall away from him "like sand from a pilgrim's feet".⁴⁶ It was

(46) Salt, Memorandum, January 20, 1827, enc. in despatch of February 10, 1827 (F.O. 78-160)—quoted by Dodwell, H. op. cit. p. 107, note 3.

not easy, therefore, for a Moslem governor, ruling over Moslems, to declare war against the Caliph, the successor of the Prophet in society. This was particularly true of Mehemet Ali Pasha, as he does not seem to have been sure of the good will of the Moslems of Syria and Asia Minor. It would be a mistake to say with Professor Sabry⁴⁷ that Ibrahim Pasha was admired and was regarded every where in Syria and Asia Minor as a saviour. There is repeated reference in Ibrahim's correspondence with his father to his suspicion and distrust of the Moslems in Jerusalem, Nablus, Damascus, and other places.⁴⁸ Thus, to insure himself against public censure and possible revolt against his rule, Mehemet Ali Pasha had to find valid religious reason for open war against the Caliph. Viewed in this light, his declarations to the Consular Corps in June of 1832 that "he remained at heart a humble servant of the Turkish Empire, that he was acting only for the advantage and glory of the Sublime Porte, that he had no views of independence, and that he was conquering Syria merely in order to consolidate Turkish Power", cease to be paradoxical as Professor Dodwell sees them, and become official causes of the struggle with

(47) Sabry, M., *op. cit.* p. 198.

(48) Ibrahim Pasha to Sami Bey, Abd. case 236, doc. 65, Safar 12, 1248. Ibrahim Pasha to Mehemet Ali Pasha, Abd. case 238, doc. 72, Rabi II, 9, 1248. Commandant of Brigade Hasan [Bey] to Ibrahim Pasha, Abd. case 239, doc. 23, Jumada I, 3, 1248. See also Abd. case 240, doc. 148. Cf. Sammarco, A. *Il Regno de Mohammed Ali nei Doc. Dip. Italiani Inediti*, VIII, pp. 129-130, 134.

Constantinople.⁴⁹ Whether or not, in so doing, Mehemet Ali Pasha was trying to make his aggrandizement less alarming in Western eyes, remains to be seen. On this point the Archives in Abdin Palace seem to be silent.

(49) Dodwell, H., *op. cit.* p. 113; Douin, G., *op. cit.* I, 239; Sammarco, A., *op. cit.* IX, 367.

III

THE EVIL INTENTIONS OF THE SUBLIME PORTE

The real causes of the Egyptian Expedition to Syria, according to the Royal Archives of Egypt, are five in number. There is, in the first place, repeated reference to the evil intentions of the Ottoman Government. Writing to his father on the peaceful mission of Nazif Effendi, Ibrahim Pasha saw "evil and deceit behind these negotiations and declared them to be a necessary measure for the final blow which was being prepared at Constantinople against himself and his father."⁵⁰ Early in the year 1248, Mehemet Ali Pasha complained twice to the Grand Admiral Khalil Pasha of the conspiracies which "were gradually maturing at the Turkish capital against himself and his family."⁵¹ Even after the three victories of Acre, Hims, and Beylan, Ibrahim Pasha was still "certain that defeat in Anatolia would snatch Egypt away

(50) Ibrahim Pasha to Mehemet Ali Pasha, Abd. case 232, doc. 58, Ramadan 23, 1247.

(51) Mehemet Ali Pasha to Kapudan Pasha, Abd. case 3, doc. 9-10, Rabi I, 25 and Jumada I, 2, 1248.

from the hands of his family."⁵² He had no hope for real peace "as long as the accursed Sultan Mahmud continued to exist".⁵³

Ever since 1805, when the Sultan sanctioned his hold upon the government of Egypt, Mehemet Ali Pasha had had every reason to mistrust the "good" intentions of the Government of Constantinople. In 1806 the Sublime Porte had tried to transfer him to the Pashalik of Salonika. Musa, Pasha of Salonika, had actually gone to Egypt in order to fulfill the edicts of the Sultan.⁵⁴ In 1813, the case of Latif Pasha had increased the worries and suspicions of the Ruler of Egypt. Latif Bey, one of his own mamelukes whom he had sent to Constantinople to present the keys of Mecca and Medina to the Sublime Porte, had been raised to the dignity of Pasha by that Government, and had returned to Cairo filled with arrogance and with a spirit of disobedience. In the course of his short stay at the Turkish Capital Latif Bey had held frequent conferences with certain dignitaries who were not the friends of the Pasha of Egypt. In certain circles in Cairo, it had even been reported that Latif Pasha had come back from the Turkish capital armed with an Imperial Firman to

(52) Ibrahim Pasha to Mehemet Ali Pasha, Abd. case 241, doc. 43, Rajab 19, 1248.

(53) Ibrahim Pasha to Mehemet Ali Pasha, Abd. case 242, doc. 155, Shaban 19, 1248.

(54) Douin, G., *L'Angleterre et l'Égypte (1803-1807)*, Vol. II, pp. 275, 291, 295. Paton, A. A. op. cit. II, 22. *Quarterly Review* Vol. 67, p. 267. Wilkinson, Sir Gardner, *Modern Egypt and Thebes*, Vol. II, p. 534.

carry out a coup d'état in Egypt.⁵⁵ In 1829, to divide father from son, the Government of Constantinople had appointed Ibrahim Pasha and not Mehemet Ali Pasha to the government of Mecca, the most honourable provincial post in the Empire. In 1830, the Sultan had intimated to Mehemet Ali Pasha to assign the government of Alexandria, Damietta, and Rosetta to the immediate management of the Kapudan Pasha, his old enemy.⁵⁶ According to Poujoulat, Mahmud had even tried to poison Mehemet through a Georgian slave girl whom he had sent to him as a present.⁵⁷

General Boyer bears very clear testimony to this interpretation of the Egyptian policy of the Sublime Porte. In one of his letters to General Beillard, dated August 10, 1825, he says, "Si malheureusement pour le pacha d'Égypte, quelque grande catastrophe arrivait à son fils et à son expedition, comment se justifierait-il vis-à-vis de la Porte, puissance jalouse, cruelle et ingrate, qui abhorre autant les succès de ses lieutenants qu'elle venge les revers qu'ils éprouvent?"⁵⁸ On page 101 of this same publication of the Royal Geographical Society of Egypt we find Beillard saying, "Le but de la Porte est

(55) Driault, Edouard, Mohamed Aly et Napoleon (1807-1814), pp. 233-239. P. et H., *L'Égypte sous la Domination de Mehemet Ali*, p. 7. Wilkinson, Sir Gardner, *op. cit.* II, 534.

(56) *Spectator*, 1840, 1057.

(57) Michaud et Poujoulat, *Correspondance d'Orient*, V, 263. Athenaeum, 1835, 69.

(58) Douin, G., *Une Mission Militaire Française auprès de Mohammed Aly*, 58-59.

de faire dépenser en pure perte au vice-roi ses trésors, ses troupes, sa population, pour affaiblir et annuler même sa puissance”.

Mahmud II had actually crushed the Dereh Beys of Anatolia, Daud Pasha of Bagdad, and Ali Pasha of Janina. Elated by his success in the destruction of the Janissaries he had let fall certain menacing expressions against Mehemet Ali Pasha which had not been unknown at Alexandria. To crown his opposition to the Pasha of Egypt, Sultan Mahmud had always shown special attention to Khesrew Pasha, the personal enemy of Mehemet Ali Pasha, and had even appointed him Grand Vizier of the Empire. Thus, in his struggle with Sultan Mahmud II, Mehemet Ali Pasha fought for his wealth, for his position and prestige, and very probably for his life also.

IV

THE INDEPENDENCE OF EGYPT

In addition to this general fear of the evil intentions of the Sublime Porte, both Mehemet Ali Pasha and his son Ibrahim Pasha seem to have cherished a hope for independence from Turkish control. This struggle for independence is mentioned in the intercepted correspondence of the Sublime Porte with its officials in Syria, and in the confidential letters of Ibrahim Pasha with his father. Writing to the Governor of Damascus on the relations of Mehemet Ali Pasha with the Sublime Porte, the Acting-Grand Vizier of the day saw in the manœuvres of the Pasha of Egypt, as early as the third of Ramadan, 1247, an attempt at independence.⁵⁹ In his effort to win Amir Bashir II to the side of the Turkish Government, Osman Pasha emphasized not only the Amir's wisdom and honesty but his faithfulness and sincere devotion to the Sublime Porte. Having laid out this political preamble, in one of his letters to the Amir, Osman Pasha then proceeded very tactfully to the question of independence and stated categorically that the Amir "could

(59) Qaim-maqam of Grand-Vizier to Wali of Damascus, Abd. case 231, doc. 2, Rabi I, 3, 1247.

never, under any circumstance, wish to separate himself from the body of the Empire".⁶⁰

Abdullah Pasha in his turn naturally capitalized these charges against Mehemet Ali Pasha and called upon all Moslems to obey the word of God and help to enforce it. To him, Mehemet Ali Pasha was a rebel and an outlaw who was aiming at independence.⁶¹

On this subject Ibrahim Pasha was certainly outspoken. Writing from Aleppo to the Turkish Governor of Aleppo, the same Muhammad Pasha whom he had defeated at Hims, Ibrahim Pasha announced "his determination to seize Arab lands and to sever completely their connection with the Turkish Government".⁶² A few days later, he declared to Amir Bashir his determination "to occupy Adana and, thus, to shut up the gateway to Constantinople".⁶³ In the course of another month and a half, Ibrahim Pasha addressing his father by the words "Your Majesty" offers to sacrifice his best in the interests of "Independent Egypt".⁶⁴ In another confidential report


(60) Uthman Pasha to Amir Bashir II, Abd. case 232, doc. 12, Ramadan 6, 1247.

(61) Rustum, A. J., *Corpus of Arabic Documents etc.* Vol. I, pp. 64-67.

(62) Army bulletin, prepared by Wahid Effendi, Abd. case 236, doc. 119, Safar 20, 1248.

(63) Army bulletin, prepared by Bahri Bey, Abd. case 237, doc. 4, Rabi I, 1, 1248.

(64) Ibrahim Pasha to Mehemet Ali Pasha, Abd. case 238, doc. 72, Rabi II, 9, 1248. For the use of the terms "Your Majesty" see also Abd. case 238, doc. 126, 221; case 239, doc. 84.



to his father, Ibrahim Pasha referred to the sincere efforts which he had made for the "establishment of their dynasty".⁶⁵ Finally, after the battle of Konieh and before the occupation of Kutahiah, while the negotiations for peace were still in progress, Ibrahim Pasha submitted the following statements to his father :

- A. "My Merciful Lord, Who Has Made Possible All that I Have Attained, Though on Him I Have No Claim" :

"By the will of God, Most High, we have begun to move today, Thursday, from Konieh, and have sent the brigade of Your servant Ahmad Bey Menekli together with one battery. We have, in accordance with the same policy, decided to send tomorrow the Thirteenth Division of Infantry and the rest of the Army. In the course of five or six days, Your servant, (Ibrahim Pasha), together with the remainder of the troops, will have also started on the journey. We shall all meet at Aqshehir, and from there all of us will advance together. The reason for not moving the Army all at one time, and of sending it forward in sections, thus, is the lack of sufficient camels and the necessity of collecting them from various points; and especially on account of an unusually cold type of weather which has not been seen in Konieh in the course of the past fifteen or twenty years. As the temperature has dropped to sixteen below zero, most of our camels have given out, and many are still perishing

(65) Ibrahim Pasha to Mehemet Ali Pasha, Abd, case 240, doc. 190, Jumada II, 27, 1248.

from the excessive cold. The sole reason why Your servant has not moved forward with the van of the Army, but has lagged behind until the mass of the troops should have moved forward, is because there is no one who is competent to carry out this programme and to prepare all that is necessary to facilitate the departure of the remainder of the Army.

“Judging by the statement of the postal couriers who arrived today from Constantinople carrying despatches to Your servant and to our Most Honoured Benefactor, it would seem that there is no body of troops along the whole way capable of withstanding our advance, and that there are no preparations at Constantinople to interfere with our progress. It would also seem as though they (Sultan and his party) have lost all hope of interfering with our policy, unless possibly it should be through the mediation of Khalil Pasha. Now, although it is clear that they will be able, through the mediation of the afore-said Pasha, to make peace in their favour, yet it would seem to the incompetent mind of Your humble servant that as long as the accursed Sultan Mahmud continues to exist this question can not be brought to a truly acceptable close. Notwithstanding conditions and opportunities which may seem favourable, he will make every effort to complete his unjust plans, in as much as he can not leave our Moslem people in peace. Thus our religious and personal obligations to the Muhammadan World demand of us that we should not think of our interests alone, on the other hand, they demand of us to take into account the welfare and happiness of all Islamic people. Accordingly we should endeavor to expel this accursed individual

and to seat the heir-apparent on the throne of the Ottoman Sultanate, in accordance with our previous policy. By taking these steps it may be possible to arouse our Islamic people.

"If, on the other hand, it should occur to any one, that this arrangement will not meet with the approval of the European Governments, there is indeed no fear of their interference. Even should they not be pleased with our course, they will nevertheless be unable to block it. And when they learn of it subsequently, they will not be able to alter what has become a fait accompli.

"However, if they should undertake to break up the Ottoman State, we can say nothing against that, in view of their policy since the year eighty four (1184 A.H.) other than to say "God help us". Let matters take their course in the shortest time possible in order to bring to an issue this problem, and to expel all fear.


"As for me, myself, having taken all this into consideration, I am proceeding in the direction of Brussa and Mudania. Now that the postal couriers have appeared, and lest I should receive instructions from Your Highness or from Constantinople to halt, I shall advance with the greatest speed.

"Furthermore, another reason for this policy, is that up to the present, it is with the greatest difficulty that we can get sufficient supplies; and we see, moreover, that these regions can not support our forces. Should we remain here a further period of time our forces would be reduced to great straits.

"In explanation of these statements it should be remembered that the district of Konieh is only a collection of a few poor villages that have been burdened with supplying our necessities. The food supplies of these villages are already consumed while at the same time fresh troops continue to catch up with us and increase our number. Although we have at present a store of sufficient supplies in Tarsus, nevertheless, the lack of pack animals and the excessive cold prevent us from drawing on these supplies. There remains accordingly no source of supply except Brussa. When we shall finally arrive there, by the favour of God, we shall at once send the Keeper of the seal of the Grand Vizier to the presence of Your Gracious Self and shall keep You informed of our condition.

"We have brought these facts to Your attention in the hope that You will be fully aware that we shall shape our course according to the circumstances then existing. It is Yours to command and direct in all that has been thus set forth, as all authority rests in You.

"Marginal Note : My Lord and Benefactor; Through an oversight, I have stated in the text of this petition, that I shall send the Keeper of the seal of the Grand Vizier to Your Highness. The truth is that he shall be sent ahead of us(in the direction of Brussa) in order to announce the reason for our advance. In case some one should inquire about the motives for such an advance he would say, "We have come to Brussa on account of the insufficiency of the supplies in Konieh; we have not come to fight, we are only anxious to insure



our supplies". In view of the forth coming arrival of the Mahrदार at Brussa, and of the fact that the news of peace have become known, I have taken advantage of this happy opportunity and have commissioned the aforesaid messenger, to represent for consideration my desire to kiss the footstool of my Benefactor (the Sultan), and my determination to visit the capital of the Sultanate under the Shadow of His Imperial Presence, and, at the same time, to pay my respects to my colleagues there. In case we should reach as far as Iskidar, and should have succeeded in allaying the fears of the inhabitants of Constantinople, we would have arrived at our object. Should we fail, however, to quiet their fears, and should we feel compelled to make war, we shall certainly fight without warning. We fully intend to satisfy our interests in the best way and according to our desires".⁶⁶

B. "To the Gracious Presence of Him Who Made Possible All that I Have Attained, though on Him I Have No Claim Except His Good Will.

"Sir :

"The fact that Khalil Pasha and General Mouravieff have determined to consult with you is a positive evidence that they intend to pursue a policy that will tend to establish a favorable peace. Thus we see that the prosperity and progress of Egypt depend upon your steady adherence to a definite policy. Indeed, it is entirely unnecessary for one in my position to bring this matter to the attention of one so exalted as Your Grace. Yet I

(66) Abd. case 242, doc. 155, Shaban 19, 1248.

realize that it is one of the duties of Your humble servant to lay before You for consideration the following points :

“In the first place, that you demand independence.

“Secondly, the demand that Cyprus, and the districts of Adalia, Alaia, and Itch Ili be annexed to Egypt.

“Thirdly, that you do your best to include Tunis and Tripolitana in this arrangement.

“According to my humble advice, in no one of these points, which are so essential to our interests, should we make the least concession. Unless we demand resolutely complete independence, all our efforts hitherto will go for naught. We shall not be able to deliver ourselves from the oppression of that treacherous Government, and from its continuous demands for tribute, and we can never escape from this unfortunate position except by the attaining of independence.

“As for demanding possession of the three districts of Adalia, Alaia, and Itch Ili, it is based on the fact that they are well wooded regions; and verily the nation which possesses no timbered land will find excessive difficulty in maintaining her fleet. All this is self-evident. As you well know, England is a poorly wooded country, and when it sought to obtain timber from Austria, the latter country rejected the request. Indeed Egypt is in the same position. In confirmation of my suggestion is the instruction I previously received from You in which you said, “My son give as much care to the matter of timber as you would to crippling the army of Constantinople”.

“As for the inclusion of the island of Cyprus in the

control of the Egyptian Government, by this means indeed is a service to our fleet, and it will aid in bringing to an end the strong bond that unites that island with the Turkish Government.

"In case you should discuss with Khalil Pasha and General Mouravieff the matter of Bagdad, there is no objection to allowing the matter to be brought up for discussion, even though later it should seem best to surrender Bagdad altogether. Upon my word, Bagdad is as unimportant as the district of Sennar. It is not worth the expenses involved in retaining it. It is, moreover, very far from Egypt and does not yield an income. Indeed you are not unaware that the former wali of Bagdad, having failed to run his government on local revenue, had sought from the Central Government authority to issue additional currency, or else, that the necessary funds be sent to him.

"These are the important points that have occurred to Your humble servant, and which I desire to present to Your attention. In any case, it is your right to command in these matters."⁶⁷

Just exactly how much of this desire for independence was actually shared by Mehemet Ali Pasha it is yet difficult to tell. The Great Pasha had surely spoken of independence as early as 1825. In one of his letters to General Beillard, dated July 18, 1825, General Boyer says, "I have already written to you at some length in connection with the success of Ibrahim Pasha in Greece.

(67) Abd. case 243, doc. 85, Ramadan 13, 1248.

I have now to inform you of a secret conversation which I had with the Pasha in the course of which he disclosed to me his hopes and his aspirations. He said, "Je sais bien que l'Empire marche journellement à sa perte; qu'il me sera difficile de le sauver, et pourquoi irais-je tenter l'impossible avec mes moyens? Mais sur ses débris je fonderai un vaste royaume. . . . mon fils le Victorieux partira sous un an et ira accomplir les destins sur les bords de l'Euphrate et du Tigre, limite sûre des états que je lui destine et que son grand courage saura conquérir."⁶⁸ On the 26th of February, 1826, Boyer wrote again as follows: "C'est alors que dans une conjoncture semblable, il—Mehemet Ali Pasha—arriverait promptement à ses fins et à son but favori: celui de fonder un empire sur les débris de celui de son maître."⁶⁹

In his confidential correspondence with his son, five or six years later, Mehemet Ali Pasha hesitated before he finally gave his benediction to Ibrahim's plans for the fulfillment of the independence of Egypt. At the beginning of the first Syrian campaign he did not seem to think that the Sublime Porte would actually declare war against Egypt; "She would only confuse and confound the Egyptians."⁷⁰ In June of 1832, the Great Pasha censured his son Ibrahim Pasha for having adopted the title "Commander-in-Chief of the Arab Lands", and urged him to be satisfied with his own name Ibrahim, just as he himself

(68) Douin, G., *Une Mission Militaire* etc. p. 50

(69) Douin, G., *op. cit.* p. 107.

(70) Mehemet Ali Pasha to Ibrahim Pasha, Abd. case 3, doc. 56, Shawwal 1, 1247.

had always been contented with the simple name Mehemet Ali.⁷¹ About the same time one of the imams of Damascus was flogged only a few hours after its capture by the Egyptians because he had hesitated to mention the name of Sultan Mahmud II in the public prayer at the Big Mosque.⁷²

It was not until March of the following year that Mehemet Ali Pasha decided to use the tactics of his son. Writing to him from Egypt on this subject he said, "Je suis d'avis que si nous nous hâtons de faire le siège de Constantinople sans perdre de temps et si nous forçons la Porte à conclure avec nous une paix honorable, il n'y aurait pas la moindre chance pour une intervention de l'Europe ou d'une puissance quelconque. Il est même probable qu'une telle paix, aussi promptement réglée, obtienne l'approbation des puissances, quelles que fussent ses conditions."⁷³

What was the cause of all this hesitation on the part of Mehemet Ali Pasha? Was it a fundamental disagreement with his son on the question of independence itself, or was it simply a difference of opinion on the means to

(71) Mehemet Ali Pasha to Ibrahim Pasha, Abd. case 3, doc. 196, Muharram 7, 1248.

(72) « ونحار الجمعة وقت الصلاة توقفوا واحتراروا في اسم من يخطبوا باسم السلطان ام في اسم محمد علي باشا فاستاذنوا فجاءهم انه هو عبد السلطان ويخطبوا باسمه ان ويدعوا الى محمد علي باشا »

Anonymous, Damascus chronicle, American University of Beirut, Arabic Manuscript No. 28424, p. 16.

(73) Sabry, M., op. cit. p. 235.

be used for reaching one and the same end ? These and similar questions can not be answered fully at the present stage of our knowledge of the Great Pasha. We must again suspend our judgement until all the evidence has been brought to light and collected together.

V

THE INSUFFICIENCY OF EGYPT

In addition to their fear of the evil intentions of the Sublime Porte, and their desire to become independent, Mehemet Ali Pasha and his son Ibrahim Pasha seem to have felt a pressing need for the control and the permanent occupation of Syria.

In spite of the great fertility of its soil, Egypt, a hundred years ago, was not self-sufficing. Its sycamore, acacia, and palm trees provided very little for the needs of its Great Pasha. The timber which he used for construction purposes, and even much of his fuel and his charcoal, he imported from foreign countries. He was, moreover, sole proprietor in the Nile Valley, and, as such, needed a large number of merchant vessels to transport the produce of his soil. He also needed many military transports and men of war.

Egypt itself was too fertile and too remunerative in food products and in cotton and indigo to be afforested. Some sections of its irrigated soil were, moreover, too salty to be fit for the growth of forest trees. His newly conquered province of the Sudan, was, likewise, out of the question. Its timber was very probably beyond the Sudd,

in the regions of Mongalla, and, as such, was not of much use to the Pasha. But even if it had been a little closer to Cairo, Mehemet Ali Pasha would have still found it very difficult to transport it to his capital. The suddes and the cataracts of the Nile would have prevented him from floating his logs down to the delta, while the innundation of the river, between April and September, would have distributed his timber almost everywhere. Mehemet Ali Pasha recognized these difficulties and actually set himself to overcome them. At the suggestion of Mahou Bey he commissioned a native Egyptian engineer to work on the cataract of Aswan with the view of making it more navigable. After two years of work, however, this enterprise was given up, and the cataract remained both dangerous and unnavigable.⁷⁴

Like Thotmes III and Ramses II of Ancient Times, and Ibn Tulun of the Middle Ages, Mehemet Ali Pasha was forced to look to Syria and Caramania for his wood. The forests of Syria, a hundred years ago, were much more extensive than they are now. In the southern sections of the country travellers could still see large traces of the famous old forest of Sharon. De Salles, who passed through Syria in 1837, mentions one big remnant of this forest between Jaffa and Arsuf.⁷⁵ Copse, undergrowth, and larger trees covered the whole of Mount Carmel, and the plain connecting it with Nazareth, and even one or two of the approaches to the city of Jerusalem. Dwarf

(74) Hamont, P. N., *L'Égypte sous Mehemet Ali*, I, 217-218.

(75) De Salle, *Pérégrinations en Orient*, I, 407.

oak, terebinth, and pine were, likewise, common on the eastern hills of Galilee and on the western slopes of Gilead and Ajlun.⁷⁶ The hills of the Lebanon to the north and to the south of Beirut were covered by forests of oak and pine under which travellers marched for hours "in breezy and fragrant shade". The juniper forests of the Anti-Lebanon, were likewise one of Syria's best sylvan features. The hills of Antioch and Latakiah were clothed from summit to foot with larch, oak, and fir;⁷⁷ and the slopes of the Amanus were covered with very thick forests. As for the regions of Adana, they must have contained over 500,000 hectares of forest land. Moreover, the sycamores and mulberry trees of Syria and Cilicia were an important attraction in themselves. Sycamore wood, in those days, was very useful in Egypt; it was employed in the manufacture of the hammers for the rice fabrics of the Pasha,⁷⁸ and in the making of khazirir for his hydraulic machines.⁷⁹ Relatively speaking, Egypt produced very little of this kind of wood, and, as a consequence, its Syrian and Cilician supply was essential to the Pasha. The hundreds of thousands of mulberry trees in the Lebanon were, likewise, very useful to him; their

(76) Post, George, *Palestine Exploration Fund Quarterly Statement*, 1888, 200.

(77) Kelly, Walter, *Syria and the Holy Land, Their Scenery and Their People*, 266.

(78) Guys, Henri, *Beyrout et le Liban, Relation d'un séjour de Plusieurs années dans ce Pays*, I, 39-40.

(79) Hamont, P. N., *op. cit.* I, 165.

charcoal was essential to the success of his saltpetre works.⁸⁰

The importance of this Syro-Cilician source of wood supply to Mehemet Ali Pasha can, perhaps, be measured best by the extent to which it was exploited by his administration between 1831 and 1833. A month after the capture of Acre, Mehemet Ali Pasha ordered a thorough search for elm wood (*dardar*) in the district of Acre.⁸¹ As this kind of wood seems to have been needed in the shipyards of the Pasha and in his cannon-foundries repeated reference to it occurs in the archives of these early years.⁸² Some kinds of oak and walnut were desirable.⁸³ In addition, large quantities of firewood were frequently ordered.⁸⁴ Roads were constructed to connect the forests with the coast, and expert officials were

(80) See also P. et H. op. cit. 13; Hamont, op. cit. II, 370, 382; Clot Bey, *Aperçu Général sur l'Égypte*, I, 79-96; Vaulabelle, A., *Hist. Moderne de l'Égypte*, II, 416.

(81) Muhammad Munib Bey to Sami Bey, Abd. case 236, doc. 28, Safar 5, 1248.

(82) Muhammad Munib Bey to Sami Bey, Abd. case 236, doc. 102, 175, 199, Safar 18, [20], [28] 1248.

Binbashi Hasan to [Ibrahim Pasha], Abd. case 237, doc. 45, Rabi I, 6, 1248. Army Bulletin, prepared by Wahid Effendi, Abd. case 237, doc. 149, Rabi I, 17, 1248. Ibrahim Pasha to Sami Bey, Abd. case 237, doc. 207, [end] of Rabi I, 1248.

(83) Ibrahim Pasha to Mehemet Ali Pasha, Abd. case 238, doc. 221, Rabi II, 23, 1248.

(84) Muhammad Munib Bey to Sami Bey, Abd. case 236, doc. 102, Safar 18, 1248.

appointed to superintend the work of felling.⁸⁵ Very prominent in this connection is a certain Shaykh Ismail, a Druze by origin, who seems to have gained the confidence of the Egyptian Administration. His activity seems to have been confined to the hilly region of Jabal Musa behind the Arsuz harbour.⁸⁶ Trees for naval construction were cut down on the hills East of the river Jihan, and in the region East of Latakiah.⁸⁷ As for firewood, it seems to have been cut down almost every where in Syria and Palestine. Throughout this early period the Great Pasha never ceased to insist on daily reports regarding the progress of this work.⁸⁸ Writing at one time to Ibrahim Pasha he said, "My son give as much care to the matter of timber as you would to crippling the army of Constantinople."⁸⁹

But this was not all. The Great Pasha did not have men enough to till his soil for him and, at the same time to fight his wars. His big drafts for the army, and his losses in Arabia, in the Sudan, and in the Morea interfered very

(85) Army Bulletin, by Wahid Effendi, Abd. case 237, doc. 198 and 258, Rabi II, 23, and 29, 1248. See also St. John, Egypt and Mohammed Aly, II, 507.

(86) Rashid. . . . to Ibrahim Pasha, Abd. case 238, doc. 127, Rabi II, 14, 1248.

(87) Binbashi Hasan to Abd. case 239, doc. 50, Jumada I, 1248. Najm-al-Din to Ibrahim Pasha, Abd. case 240, doc. 93, Jumada II, 13, 1248.

(88) Abd. case 240, doc. 135; case 241, doc. 4, 34, 70, 102, 119.

(89) Abd. case 243, doc. 85, Ramadan 13, 1248.

seriously with his agricultural and industrial enterprises.⁹⁰ In the course of time some of his fields were left uncultivated, and Mehemet Ali Pasha became convinced of the existence of defects in his system. He naturally turned to the Sudan for help and the Sudan, again, failed to provide for his needs.

Like the American Indian of the last century, the Sudanese was not able to stand the change in his mode of living. When he came up to Egypt to serve in the armies of Mehemet Ali Pasha he found it very difficult to habituate himself to the exertions of modern military life. He, moreover, missed very badly life in the open air, and, before very long, succumbed to the diseases of the Nile Valley. Many of the Sudanese died under virulent attacks of tuberculosis.⁹¹ When Ibrahim Pasha undertook the expedition to the Morea, he was accompanied by six or eight hundred black soldiers, whom he intended to constitute his body-guard; but on account of the change in their mode of living the greater number of them died during the voyage.⁹² The plan which was recommended by Felix Mengin of keeping up the country population of Egypt by importations of blacks from the South was likewise unsuccessful.⁹³ St. John who passed through Egypt in the year 1832-1833 tells us that even the animals of the Sudan were unable to endure an Egyptian winter.⁹⁴

(90) Hamont, P. N., op. cit. I, 45.

(91) Hamont, P. N., op. cit. I, 494, II, 18-19.

(92) St. John, op. cit. II, 475.

(93) Mengin, F., *Histoire de l'Égypte sous le gouvernement de Mohammed-Aly*, II, 320.

(94) St. John, op. cit. II, 476.

Having failed to secure the necessary help from the Sudan, Mehemet Ali Pasha again turned to Syria. Owing to the fertility of its soil and the climatic changes of its physical surroundings Syria had always had a relatively high population. Some of the travellers of the early part of the Nineteenth Century made its population equal to that of Egypt in those days—2,000,000 souls.⁹⁵ It possessed, moreover, not only a large population but a warlike one as well.⁹⁶ The corrugated areas of Ajlun and Gilead, and the broken hills of Moab, Nablus, Bilad Bisharah, and the Nusayriyyah Region supplied refuge for robbers and developed plundering habits. Since, moreover, some of the high ranges of Mount Amanus permitted no easy passage, and since there were to be reckoned into account such influences of separation as deep valleys and steep inclines, it need surprise no one that the highlander type of man was developed among many of the elements of the population. In the absence of a strong governmental authority in the country, a spirit of clan exclusiveness and of glorification of fighting was developed. In addition to all this, the warlike elements of the population of Syria had become famous for their bravery throughout the entire length and breadth of the Levant. Famous al-Jabarti bears definite testimony to their courage in the last volume of his history of Egypt.⁹⁷

(95) The Lebanon alone was "supposed" to be able to furnish an army of one hundred thousand men. Guys, H. op. cit. I, 275-276; II, 209-210.

(96) Hamont, op. cit. II, 382.

(97) Ajaib al-Athar fi-t-Tarajim wa-l-Akhbar, IV, 241-242.

We need not be surprised, therefore, if we find Mehemet Ali Pasha counting on their support, in his struggle with the Sublime Porte, as early as 1825. General Boyer again preserves the Pasha's own words on this subject : "Les peuples du Liban me fourniront des levées d'hommes; j'organiserai une grande armée et ne m'arrêterai que sur les bords du Tigre et de l'Euphrate."⁹⁸ After the capture of Aleppo, and before Ibrahim Pasha had had a chance to cross the mountains into Cilicia, Mehemet Ali Pasha ordered a temporary halt at Alexandretta in order to raise a new army in Syria. If need be, Mehemet Ali Pasha was willing to attend to the work of organization in person.⁹⁹

But all these needs of the Pasha would not have been so imperative had he had the means to meet them. Mehemet needed money. He had fought in Arabia, in the Sudan, and in the Morea, and had practically always maintained a minimum of 20,000 men under arms. He had once bought a whole naval squadron from Europe, and after its destruction at Navarino he had begun to construct his own ships at Alexandria. He had to pay a heavy yearly tribute to the Porte and an equally weighty sum to its employees in the form of bribes. Mehemet, therefore, had to fill his coffers in case he desired to

(98) Douin, G., *Mission Militaire*, 79; Sammarco, *Doc. Dip. Italiani op. cit.* VIII, pp. 129-130, 134.

(99) Ibrahim Pasha to Mehemet Ali Pasha, *Abd. case* 238, *doc.* 72, *Rabi II*, 9, 1248.

succeed in his struggle with Mahmud his suzerain.¹⁰⁰

Syria and Cilicia again offered to him an endless number of possibilities. There was then no Suez Canal and no steamships to connect Egypt with Europe and the Far East. There were no automobiles and railways to penetrate the heart of the African continent. In those days Syria and Egypt were commercially interdependent. Egypt provided Syria with rice, sugar, dates, wheat, sesame, indigo, straw-mats, salted fish, mother of pearl, aqua rosa, and a number of varieties of cotton and woolen cloth.¹⁰¹ In return Syria exported silk, cotton, olives, olive oil, soap, tobacco, dried fruits, wine, bee wax, goat-skins, madder root, gall-nuts, clogs, horses, grindstones, and many of the commodities of Central Asia, India, and China.¹⁰² Mehemet had become the only merchant in Egypt, and had, as a consequence, made large sums of

(100) It is important to note in this connection Mehemet's indifference to money in itself. He did not even long for the finer luxuries and elegancies that go with wealth. He wore no jewels on his person when Puckler Muskau visited him. (Aus Mohammed Ali's Reich, I, 176). He was temperate in his food and moderate in his equipment. Of a total of 420,505 purses which made up his budget for the year 1833 only 4000 were set apart for his household expenses—Bowring Report, 45.

(101) Jabarti, op. cit., IV, 149, 165; De Salle, *Pérégrinations*; I, 113; *Description de l'Égypte etc., etc.*, XVII, 218-220, 238, 250, 314.

(102) Jabarti, IV, 246-247; De Salle, op. cit. I, 214; Carne, *Letters from the East*, 175; Guys, op. cit., I, 341; P. et H., 132; Stanhope, *Memoirs*, III, 115-116; Tarabulsi, *Kashf-ul-Litham etc.*, 468; Hamont, op. cit., II, 38-39, 382, 529-530; *Description de l'Égypte*, XVII, 125, 233, 308.

money. He now desired to become sole merchant in Syria in order to draw a similar revenue.

Syrian raw silk and silk cloth were especially attractive. At the time of the French invasion of Egypt the trade was, relatively speaking, very extensive. In addition to its own supply of this silk Egypt imported that of Tunis, Algiers, and Morocco. In 1789-99, Latakiah exported 29,000 rotles of raw silk to the Nile Valley, and Beirut and Tripoli together over 320,000 rotles. As for Sidon and Tripoli, they exported about 40,500 rotles. Of the manufactured silk, Damascus, alone, exported over 1000 pieces of Kuraysh, 20,000 pieces of Alajah, and 10,000 pieces of the Kutni kind.¹⁰³ Beirut silk coffers were famous in Egypt in the days of Mehemet Ali and the gold and silk cloth of Aleppo had an enviable reputation.¹⁰⁴ In addition to what has been said above there was another reason for Mehemet's interest in Syrian silk. In his efforts to render his country independent of foreign industries he had tried hard to introduce sericulture into the Nile Valley, and had failed. Egypt seemed to him to be too warm for the rearing of silkworms. Many times the eggs hatched before the mulberry leaves came out.¹⁰⁵ The worms were, as a consequence, fed on mallow leaves and quantities of them perished.¹⁰⁶ The Khamsin wind also did considerable damage. The fine particles of

(103) Description de l'Égypte, XVII, 303-305, 309-310.

(104) Guys, *op. cit.* I, 168; Perrier, F., *La Syrie sous le gouvernement de Mehemet Ali*, 89.

(105) Hamont, *op. cit.* I, 38.

(106) *Ibid.*

sand and the sudden changes of temperature which usually came with this kind of wind were very unwholesome in their effects. Diseases often followed and large quantities of silk worms died every year.¹⁰⁷ Syria, on the other hand, was very well suited to siriculture. Its climate was quite favorable. Eggs and mulberry leaves came out together, and the silk worm was not exposed to the fungi and bacteria of the warmer climate of Egypt.¹⁰⁸

Equally attractive to Mehemet Ali Pasha and important to his country was the soap of many of the Syrian towns. For centuries past the Syrians had been manufacturing this commodity for the inhabitants of the Nile Valley, and in 1799, Palestine alone had exported some 9000 kantars of it.¹⁰⁹ Beirut and Tripoli had also been engaged in the same trade with Egypt. The Pasha needed soap very badly not only for his soldiers and sailors but for some of his factories as well.¹¹⁰ His own palaces also consumed large quantities of it every year.¹¹¹ Egypt was also dependent, to a certain extent, upon Syria for its olives and olive oil. The Fayyum olives and those which Ibrahim Pasha planted in the neighborhood of Cairo were too aqueous to produce the Syrian or Greek kind of olive

(107) P. et H. 154.

(108) For the causes of the failure of siriculture in Egypt see Hamont, *op. cit.* I, 38.

(109) *Description de l'Égypte*, XVII, 306-307.

(110) Large quantities of it were used every year at the Tarbush factory of Fouah—Mengin, *Histoire sommaire de l'Égypte sous le Gouvernement de Mohammed Aly*, 206.

(111) Jabarti, IV, 333.

oil.¹¹² The olive tree is, by its natural constitution, adopted to a well-drained calcereous soil like that of Syria, and not to flat alluvial lands. Egypt was, moreover, too remunerative in other products to be devoted to the growth of olive trees, and, as a consequence, had to import large quantities of its olives from foreign countries.

The interdiction of wine and other intoxicating liquors in Moslem Egypt caused a great many of its inhabitants to become, sometimes, immoderately addicted to the use of tobacco. And although its lawfulness had been warmly disputed in Egypt in the course of the Seventeenth Century, by the beginning of the Nineteenth, its use had become very general. Carne who passed through Egypt at about 1820 tells us that it had become quite popular even among ladies in Cairo.¹¹³ For some reason which is unknown to the writer of these lines Syrian tobacco was very much more popular in Egypt in the days of Mehemet Ali than the native kind. Egypt imported considerable quantities of it every year. In 1799, 4000 bales of 400 rotles each were imported from Latakiah alone.¹¹⁴ Tyre exported in the same year to Egypt between 400 and 500 bales.¹¹⁵ Both St. John and De Salles

(112) Hamont, *op. cit.*, I, 176-177. Soon after his return from the Morea, Ibrahim Pasha planted some 180,000 olive trees in the neighborhood of his own divan at Cairo and on his grounds at Koobah—St. John, II, 445.

(113) Carne, *op. cit.*, III-III2.

(114) *Description de l'Égypte*, XVII, 311.

(115) *Ibid.*

who passed through Egypt in the thirties of the last century corroborate this truth in its general features.¹¹⁶

For ages past, Syria had also been one of the main outlets for the commerce of Central Asia, of India, and of large sections of Mesopotamia and of Asia Minor. The gum of Persia, the rhubarb of Chnia, the kirmiz of Northern Mesopotamia and Lesser Armenia, and the gallnuts of Asia Minor had all found their way to Egypt and to the other countries of the Mediterranean world through Syria.¹¹⁷ The names of a number of our present day silk cloths form a sufficient indication of our medieval and modern connections with Central Asia. Our modern taffeta and our satin bear, in all probability, Central Asiatic origins.¹¹⁸ Many of the precious stones of the Levantine market in the days of Mehemet Ali and before his time came, likewise, from Persia and Central Asia. Many of these commodities were not very bulky and so they could be transported by the pilgrims on their way to the Hajj. Huge numbers of these pilgrims gathered every year at Damascus and from there marched together to Medinah and Mecca. Sometimes they stayed a whole month or two in Syria, and, in so doing, added a great impetus to its trade and to its industries.¹¹⁹ Syria, thus,

(116) St. John, *Egypt*, 72; Kelly, *Syria*, 130; De Salle, I, 233.

(117) Kremer, *Culturgeschichte des Orients*, II, 325; Istakhri, 88.

(118) Kremer, *op. cit.* II, 339; Ibn Batutah, IV, 269; Devic, *Dictionnaire des mots francs d'origine orientale*.

(119) Kasatli, *Ar-Roudat-ul-Ghanna etc.*, 124-125; Guys, *op. cit.*, I, 236-237.

supplemented Egypt in a number of its economic necessities and offered an endless number of possibilities for the monopolies of the Pasha.

VI
EGYPT AND SYRIA
ONE PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHICAL UNIT

In addition to all this, a number of facts connected with physical geography seem to have made Syria and Cilicia absolutely essential to the Pasha of Egypt. Since time immemorial the rulers of Egypt had found it very difficult to control their Siniatic desert frontier. During the period of French Occupation the bedwin of Sinai had carried on a large trade in contraband material between Egypt and Syria, and, owing to the nature of the country, the French had found very difficult to stop it.¹²⁰ When Mehemet Ali Pasha came to power this condition of things had not materially changed. At times, the Arabs became even more troublesome than they had been during the French Administration of the Nile Valley. In 1812, they plundered the Pasha's own caravan while it was on its way from Suez to Cairo, and ran away with both camel and merchandise. And when Mehemet Ali Pasha tried to punish them for their crime they took refuge within the

(120) Girard, M.P.S., *Mémoire sur l'Agriculture, l'Industrie et le Commerce de l'Égypte—Description de l'Égypte* (Paris, 1824), Vol. XVII, pp. 317-318.

Syrian border.¹²¹ Mehemet Ali Pasha's own subjects, and a large number of his personal enemies, often evaded his punishment by a similar line of procedure. The case of the few thousand fellahin who fled across the Syrian border in 1829 and took refuge within the limits of the Pashalik of Acre was only one of a larger number of its kind. All this was no mere pretext for the war of 1831. Viewed in this light it becomes one of its real causes. Writing to his accredited agent before the Sublime Porte, on the third of Muharram, 1248, Mehemet Ali Pasha stated that Syria was essential "for the safety of Egypt".¹²² Thus in the interests of order and security Mehemet Ali Pasha found himself forced to annex Southern Syria to Egypt.

Furthermore, Mehemet Ali Pasha had always felt the presence of a strong party of opposition to his rule within the walls of his own capital, the city of Cairo.¹²³ He knew very well that the fallah did not like his new nizam regime, that some of the Egyptians hated his new agricultural reforms, and that the more fanatic elements of the population were not favorable to a number of his social reforms. He was well aware of the existence of a number of influential personal enemies who had been estranged from him by his policy in the preceding twenty years, and who only waited for an opportunity to rise against him. In view of all this, Mehemet Ali Pasha was very anxious to

(121) Jabarti, *op. cit.* IV, 160.

(122) Mehemet Ali Pasha to Najib Effendi, Abd. case 3, doc. 8, Muharram 3, 1248.

(123) Mehemet Ali Pasha to Habib Effendi, Abd. case 3, doc. 57, Shawwal 5, 1247.

fight his life and death struggle with Sultan Mahmud II away from Egypt and from its opposition, and in a strange country like that of Syria, where he could be more sure of the support of its Christian population.

But this was not all. Hilly Syria and Cilicia formed an excellent frontier belt to his possessions in Africa. Of the 52,000,000 denums that made up pre-war Adana, 31,000,000 were mountainous, and 9,000,000 were marshy, while only 20,000,000 were suitable for agricultural purposes on a large scale. Syria, likewise, had its high mountain ranges, its deep valleys, and its narrow passes. They all formed an impediment to the advance of Sultan Mahmud southward. There were then no good roads anywhere in these two countries, and that made them dangerous to a hostile army. A Turkish army invading an Egyptian Syria had, moreover, to cross the Taurus by only one or two roads, a fact which would cause serious delay in its progress. It had to transport practically all its supplies along a road beset with obstacles. If it were compelled to retreat such a Turkish army would, also, run the risk of disaster in recrossing the Taurus range. Addressing himself to Khalil Pasha on the 7th of Dhu-l-Hijjah, 1248, Mehemet Ali Pasha saw in Kaulak Boghaz a "frontier that was safe for both parties".¹²⁴

Behind this first line of defence another was possible in the region of Mount Lebanon where Mehemet Ali Pasha could count on the support of the Christian highlander. In the course of the siege of Acre and before the


(124) Mehemet Ali Pasha to Khalil Pasha, Abd. case 3, doc. 72.

Egyptians had had a chance to be within reach of victory Ibrahim Pasha inquired from Amir Bashir II whether it was possible to make of Mount Lebanon a place of refuge and last resort for the Egyptians.¹²⁵ For similar reasons, a third line of defence was also possible at Carmel. The Sinaitic Desert was enough of a barrier to form a fourth line of defence to the African possessions of the Pasha. A great part of the coast of Syria was, moreover, naturally inhospitable. There were a few forward rocks here and there, but for the greater part of its length it was fairly straight. Its irregular sections were close enough to the steep hills of the neighbourhood to be easily defended by them. Thus by acquiring Syria, Mehemet Ali Pasha did not necessarily expose his flank to the attack of the Imperial Navy. Almost all invaders of Syria have avoided landing troops until the country behind the coast was already in their power. On the contrary, a coast like that of Syria, was a decided advantage to Mehemet Ali Pasha in his struggle with Constantinople. With the help of a naval base in Cyprus or Crete, and one in Alexandretta or Acre, Mehemet Ali Pasha could defend the maritime approaches of Egypt itself.

Syria was also a highway between Asia and Africa, a great bridge that connected the territories of Mehemet Ali Pasha with those of Sultan Mahmud, and as such, had to be controlled by the warring Pasha of Egypt. A hundred years ago, Syria and Egypt formed one economic unit, and, in a certain sense one physical geographical

(125) Army Bulletin, prepared possibly by Bahri Bey, Abd. case 232, doc. 73, Ramadan 26, 1247.

unit. Mehemet Ali Pasha recognized these facts early in his term of office, and desired to make of the two one political unit.



THE NATIONALISTIC ASPECTS OF THE STRUGGLE

According to Emile Barrault and Lucien Davesiès de Pontès, the struggle between Mehemet Ali Pasha and Sultan Mahmud II was one of Arabs versus Turks.¹²⁶ To these writers Mehemet Ali Pasha was the champion of the oppressed Arabs who, like the Greeks and Serbians before them, had, by 1831, finally decided to throw off the heavy yoke of Turkish vassalage. At the opposite pole are a number of other writers who insist that Mehemet Ali Pasha was a Turk, and that he wished and hoped to remain a pasha in a Turkish Empire.¹²⁷

It is important to note in this connection that all the native historians are absolutely silent on this phase of the struggle. Equally significant are Mehemet Ali's orders to his police force in Cairo and Alexandria between 1831 and 1833.

While the siege of St. Jean-d'Acre was still in progress, an insurrection was organized against him in

(126) *Revue des deux mondes*, 1839, II, 619; Lucien Davesiès de Pontès, *Études sur l'Orient et l'Égypte* (Paris, 1869), 205-206. See also *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 1835, I, 458.

(127) Among others, this group of writers includes Girardin who expressed himself in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, of 1840 (III, 642), and P. and H. who wrote the section on Mehemet Ali in Marcel's work on the general history of Egypt.—*L'Univers Pittoresque*, *l'Égypte sous la domination de Mehemet Ali*, 31.

Cairo. Learning all about it sufficiently ahead of time Mehemet gave strict orders to his police force to seize and cast into prison all the malcontents. He was, moreover, forced to resort to nightly executions before he was able to repress the disposition of the Cairenes to revolt.¹²⁸ His subjects in the city of Alexandria were, likewise, not allowed to talk about the progress of the campaign in Syria. If we are to accept Tarabulsi literally the Alexandrians were not allowed to mention the "mere name of the city of Akka" in the course of their conversation.¹²⁹ The Cairenes and Alexandrian Arabs would certainly have behaved differently had they been filled with genuine hatred for Constantinople and its Turkish lords.

Turn next to military service in the Valley of the Nile in 1830, 1831, and 1832. Many of the young men of Egypt blinded themselves with arsenic in order to avoid conscription. Some Egyptians chopped off the forefinger of the right hand and others drew their teeth and broke their arms. Scores of fellahin fled across the border to Syria. Had the indigenous elements of the population of Egypt been struggling for their liberty and their independence in 1831-32 they would certainly have behaved

(128) St. John, *Egypt and Mohammed Ali* (London, 1834), II, 492.

(129) حتى انه صدر الامر القاطع بان لا احد في مصر يذكر اسم بر الشام مطلقاً (129) وخاصة عكة وتزايد التشديد حتى كان احد المتسببين في ذات يوم يفتح دكانه صباحاً فتعاصى عليه القفل فلطم الباب وقال ويلك انت سور عكة فلم يلبث ان قبضت عليه الضابطة واخذوه الى الحكومة فترتب جزاؤه بالقتل. (الكلية ج ١١ ص. ٢) Cf. Abd. case 3, doc. 57—Mehemet Ali Pasha to Habib Effendi.

differently when their country needed them.¹³⁰

But this is not all. An Arab racial movement in Egypt and Syria a hundred years ago would have been contrary to the whole trend of Oriental thought in those days. The world in which Mehemet Ali found himself was medieval in the widest and most inclusive sense of the word: All true believers were members of one big fraternity, and they were all equal. To be sure, there were Moslems who spoke Arabic and others who spoke Turkish, but there were no Arabs and Turks who were Arabs or Turks in the first place and Moslems second. Orientals then were Moslems first and foremost. No, the world in which Mehemet Ali lived was neither racial nor national—it was not international—it was a non-national Moslem world. We do not mean to say that the Moslems of the first quarter of the Nineteenth Century never fought against one another; we only intend to make clear the fact that lines of cleavage in political and military matters ran far away from both race and nationality.

Furthermore, the forces which have since produced the present Pan-Arab feeling had not, as yet, begun to operate in the Arab World. Means of communication were still very primitive. To be sure, the wheel was known, but its application in the field of public and even private conveyance was practically nil. "Looking for an omnibus, perhaps, or expecting the cars to overtake us? Not just that. I know that such things are not yet found in Syria; but I am greatly surprised at the absence of all

(130) St. John, Egypt, 286-288; Georges Douin, *une Mission militaire française auprès de Mohammed Ali* (Cairo, 1923), 57.

wheeled vehicles, and look around at every fresh noise, expecting to see a cart, or dray, or wagon, but am always disappointed. And will be. There is nothing of the sort in Syria; neither is there street or road for them in any part of the land." Such is the testimony of William Thomson of Beirut, given on the twenty fourth of January, 1857.¹³¹ In his book "Syria and the Holy Land" Walter Kelly preserves other interesting details. "Travelling in Syria is always performed on the backs of mules or horses, except in the desert and its confines, where camels are employed. Wheel-carriages are unknown, and rarely is there even a cart to be seen in the whole country. When ladies, children or aged persons make long journeys, they are accommodated with a litter, called a tackterwan; and this is also used, for the more state, by pashas and other great men. Sometimes the tackterwan assumes the form of a covered palanquin or sedan chair; but the bearers are horses or mules, not men; sometimes a pair of tilted crates are slung on the back of an animal, one on each side, and these are packed with the more precious porcelain of human clay.

"You can have no conception of the character of the roads in the Lebanon. It is an incessant clambering over rocks, in which the horse has often to mount or descend two or three feet at a step; the track is sometimes strewn with loose rolling stones, sometimes it runs jaggedly and unevenly along the verge of a precipice. Marshy places too are not unfrequent, through which the horse, sinking almost to its belly, has to labour for half an hour long.

(131) The Land and the Book etc. (London, 1872), 20.

"Perils by flood as well as by field await the Syrian wayfarer. Many brooks and rivers must be forded, and this is often an exploit of great danger in the spring season, when the volume of the waters has been swollen by the winter rains and by the melted snows, and every rill and every channel that lay dry and stony in summer, becomes a foaming torrent."¹³²

Before the days of Mehemet Ali Pasha, carriages were practically unknown in the Nile Valley. "On citait comme une chose très-remarquable un carrosse qu'Ibrahim-Bey avait reçu de France, et, pendant l'expédition française, la voiture de Napoléon, attelée de six chevaux et parcourant les rues étroites du Caire et de Boulac, était l'une des curiosités du pays et surprenait fort les Egyptiens. Depuis lors le vice-roi a commencé le premier à employer des équipages pour son service et celui de son harem. Après lui Ibrahim Pacha, Abbas Pacha, et toute sa famille ont adopté cet usage commode. Il ne se serait pas popularisé néanmoins, car, réservé à la famille régnante, personne n'eût osé se l'approprier, si le vice-roi n'avait donné lui-même des carrosses en cadeau à plusieurs de ses ministres."¹³³

On account of this handicap in the means of communication, the Arabs, a hundred years ago, had not become sufficiently developed to overcome their local village

(132) Kelly, Walter, *Syria and the Holy Land* (London, 1844), 61, 62, 63-64.

(133) Clot-Bey, *Aperçu Général sur l'Égypte*, (Paris, 1840), Vol. II, 456-457.

or city feeling and to realize that they were members of a bigger Arab unit. There are scores of adult Syrians, at the present time, who have never left the village in which they were born. One often wonders whether Egypt and Iraq do not yet contain many whose world is still only as big as their physical horizon allows it to be.

Education with all that comes in its train was also primitive and scarce. Although schools in the larger towns were relatively numerous, the schoolmasters were mostly persons of very little learning. Few of them were acquainted with any writings except the Quran and certain prayers, which, as well as the contents of the sacred volume, they were hired to recite on particular occasions. "I was lately told of a man who could neither read nor write succeeding to the office of a schoolmaster in my neighbourhood. Being able to recite the whole of the Quran, he could hear the boys repeat their lessons : to write them, he employed the "areef" (or head-boy and monitor in the school), pretending that his eyes were weak Some parents employ a sheykh or fikee to teach their boys at home. The father usually teaches his son to perform the wudoo and other ablutions, and to say his prayers, and instructs him in other religious and moral duties to the best of his ability. The female children are very seldom taught to read or write; and not many of them even among the higher orders learn to say their prayers. Some of the rich engage a shaykhah to visit the hareem daily; to teach their daughters and female slaves to say their prayers, and to recite a few chapters

of the Kuran; and sometimes to instruct them in reading and writing."¹³⁴

"Avec les califes croulèrent les institutions scientifiques qui avaient fait la gloire de leur domination. Les dynasties qui occupèrent le pouvoir après eux, trop peu solidement assises, laissèrent dépérir la culture intellectuelle. . . . Sous eux, il n'y eut plus à peu près qu'une étude, ce fut celle du Coran; les Egyptiens perdirent tout souvenir, même vague, du passé de leur pays. Lors de l'expédition française, étonnés de la curiosité avec laquelle nos compatriotes allaient visiter les pyramides, ils s'imaginèrent qu'elles avaient été construites par un peuple dont les Francs étaient descendus. Auparavant ils les prenaient, hormis les plus savants, pour une production de la nature."¹³⁵

The Lebanon was not more advanced than Egypt. Although the clergy were more educated than the laity, they were still very backward. Henri Guys who was French consul at Beirut records an interesting anecdote. He had received the forty sixth number of the *Journal Asiatique*; and, as it contained an account in Arabic of the judge Muhammad Ibn Muqatil, he showed it to a Maronite monk, "qui se mit aussitôt à le lire en commençant par la fin, parce qu'il était imprimé, d'après le système français, de gauche à droite, et il en continua la lecture sans s'arrêter aux contresens extraordinaires qu'il

(134) Lane, Edward, *Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians*, (London, 1871), Vol. I, 76-78.

(135) Clot-Bey, *op. cit.*, II, 332.

devait rencontrer chaque fois qu'il passait d'une page à l'autre."¹³⁶

To the famous missionary William Thomson, the letter-writer of Beirut, whom he saw seated by the entrance to the mosque, was a sort of a Moslem confessor "whose head was crammed with the secrets and the scandal of half the city."¹³⁷

Although one printing press had existed in Shwayr, Mt. Lebanon, for about a hundred years, still its activity had been strictly limited to sacred books and pamphlets; and from this point of view the Arab East had been still dormant, living in a medieval world of "manuscript" literature. As for the Bulaq Press, it had hardly had sufficient time to become an effective influence in popular education.¹³⁸

Should we now turn to newspapers and magazines we would find ourselves entirely forsaken. *Al-Waqai-al-Misriyyah*, the organ of the Egyptian Government, was extremely official. It was concerned almost exclusively with governmental questions of a routine nature; and was destined to remain the only newspaper in the Arabic speaking world for many years to come. The first popular

(136) Guys, Henri, *Un Séjour de Plusieurs Années à Beyrout et au Liban*, (Paris, 1850), Vol. II, 185.

(137) *The Land and the Book*, p. 29.

(138) Cheikho, L., *History of the Art of Printing in the East*, (in Arabic) *Al-Mashriq*, Vol. III, 359-362. See also *Journal Asiatique* 1843, 24-61; *Bulletin de l'Institut Égyptien*, 5e serie, I, 133-157.

magazine was *Majmu Fawaid* of the American Mission in Beirut, while the first newspaper in Arabic was *Mirat al-Ahwal* which appeared in Beirut in 1855.¹³⁹

Furthermore, as the government of the day was extremely decentralized and distinctly weak its influence for unity and mutual understanding was naturally of no account. "Such is the nominal division of Syria. But the power of the Porte in this country has been so much upon the decline, particularly since the time of Djezzar Pacha of Akka, that a number of petty independent chiefs have sprung up, who defy their sovereign. . . . The Pashas themselves follow the same practice; it is true that neither the Pasha of Damascus nor that of Akka has yet dared openly to erect the standard of rebellion; they enjoy all the benefits of the protection of the supreme government, but depend much more upon their own strength, than on the caprice of the Sultan, or on their intrigues in the seraglio for the continuance of their power. The policy of the Porte is to flatter and load with honours those whom she can not ruin, and to wait for some lucky accident by which she may regain her power; but, above all, to avoid a formal rupture, which would only serve to expose her own weakness and to familiarize the Pashas and their subjects with the ideas of rebellion."¹⁴⁰

In addition, the Turk himself had not, as yet, come to feel his superiority to other races of the Empire and

(139) Terrazi, Viscount Philip, *History of Arabic Journalism* (in Arabic), (Beirut, 1913), I, 49-50, 53-55.

(140) Burckhardt, John, *Travels in Syria and the Holy Land*, (London, 1822), 648.

thus charge the Arab with that negative nationalism which pervades the Syrian and Iraqi atmospheres at the present time. In French and British diplomatic circles the fear of German influence was still non-existent, and therefore, had not as yet caused these two governments to make use of native nationalism as an instrument of their policies in the Levant.

It is quite likely, therefore, that the struggle between Mehemet Ali Pasha and Sultan Mahmud II was not racial, and that its causes have to be sought elsewhere. Both Emile Barrault and Lucien Davesiès de Pontès seem to have been quite ignorant of Oriental psychology in those days. They were both enthusiastic Saint-Simonians who were anxious to resuscitate the Arab Race, and to fraternize with it. Moreover, as they both lived in an age in Europe when nationalism was before the public eye, they may have watched events in the Near East through nationalistic spectacles:

This represents in a very general way the position which the author took before the International Geographical Congress of 1925 in Cairo.¹⁴¹ The Opening up of the

(141) It has also been, practically, the position of Professor Dodwell on the same subject. Writing, six years later, Professor Dodwell says, "Islam is a faith that has never encouraged the growth of nationality. Its universal character has toned down, rather than accentuated, racial and cultural differences that might have hardened into national qualities; and it is noteworthy that even a century afterwards, even under the prolonged influence of Western education and ideas, nationalist rulers have been rather hindered than assisted by its unlimited catholic claims. Nor was that all. The only common factors in the Arab World were unity

Royal Archives of Egypt has now revealed a number of important facts. It is now quite apparent that Ibrahim Pasha would have supported the author's interpretation of public opinion in those days. Writing to his father, in the course of the first campaign in Syria, Ibrahim Pasha frankly admitted the fact that the Syrians were "undependable" in the struggle with "Constantinople," and that he had to rely on his own force.¹⁴² Mehemet Ali Pasha in his turn, would have expressed himself in similar terms with regard to the Egyptian public.¹⁴³

The same archives, however, show very plainly that Ibrahim Pasha was moved by forces other than material.

of language and unity of subjection. The Syrian and the Egyptian, the nomad and the fellah, the learned and the populace, were too much divided by customs, by ideas, by tradition, to be at all willing to recognize anything common but religion. So that Muhammad Ali found himself obliged to pose as the champion of the Muslim "nation", not of an Arab nation, which indeed he could not even imagine. As Ibrahim was to find, the differences between Syrian and Egyptian were far too strong and deep for any assimilation to be possible; and the attraction for Muhammad Ali of the territories occupied by the speakers of the Arabic tongue lay in his just sense of their strategic importance rather than in any anticipation of conditions which in his day were scarcely conceivable. The idea of an Arab nationality has been begotten and brought forth only in our own day, under the pressure of Western influence, of the spread of education, of a popular press, and above all, of an extraordinary development of communications." *The Founder of Modern Egypt*, pp. 127-128.

(142) Ibrahim Pasha to Mehemet Ali Pasha, Abd. case 238, doc. 72, Rabi II, 9, 1248.

(143) Mehemet Ali Pasha to Habib Effendi, Abd. case 3, doc. 57, Shawwal 5, 1247.

In his confidential correspondence with his father he saw in the war with Constantinople "a national and racial struggle in which the individual must sacrifice his life for his people."¹⁴⁴ On another occasion, he spoke of his determination to exalt the position and power of his people"—meaning the Egyptians.¹⁴⁵ A month later, writing again confidentially to his father, "he thanked God because his patriotic hopes for the independence of his family and for the freedom of Egypt had begun to be realized."¹⁴⁶

Viewed in this light, his words to the Baron de Boislecomte in 1833 deserve serious attention. "Je ne suis pas Turc, reprit vivement Ibrahim; je suis venu enfant en Egypte et, depuis ce temps, le soleil de l'Egypte a changé mon sang et l'a fait tout Arabe". Baron de Boislecomte, in his turn, is also clear. Referring to Ibrahim's interest in Arab nationalism Boislecomte says, "Il annonce ouvertement l'intention de faire revivre une nationalité arabe, de rendre véritablement une patrie aux Arabes, des les admettre à toutes les places, soit dans l'administration intérieure, soit dans l'armée; d'en faire un peuple existant par lui-même, prenant part à la jouissance des revenus publics, et à l'exercice de pouvoir, comme aux charges que necessite l'entretien de l'Etat. C'est dans

(144) Ibrahim Pasha to Mehemet Ali Pasha, Abd. case 236, doc. 144, Safar 23, 1248.

(145) Ibrahim Pasha to Mehemet Ali Pasha, Abd. case 236, doc. 65, Safar 12, 1248.

(146) Ibrahim Pasha to Mehemet Ali Pasha, Abd. case 237, doc. 262, Rabi I, 29, 1248.

cette idée que ses proclamations rappelaient à son armée, pendant la dernière guerre, les beaux jours et la gloire de la nation arabe; c'est dans la même idée qu'il répète fréquemment que tout ce qui parle la langue arabe doit être soumis à son père; que déjà maître de l'Égypte, de la Nubie et de la Syrie, il m'exprimait le désir de le devenir du pachalik de Bagdad et me disait que l'Arabie appartenait à Mehemet Ali qui s'occupait en ce moment d'en achever la conquête."¹⁴⁷

In the same way, the statements of the British Consul Richard Wood, on the political aims and aspirations of Mehemet Ali Pasha in the Arab World, become significant. "On communicating these events (Troubles in the Lebanon) to Lord Ponsonby I was ordered by His Lordship to proceed to the Turkish Army, which was supposed to be in Mesopotamia but which I found engaged in hostilities in the heart of Kurdistan, in order to ascertain its force and position, and, above all, the loyalty of its commander Reshid Mehemet Pasha respecting whom serious doubts were entertained, as well as to report on the encroachment of the Egyptians on the left bank of the Euphrates towards Bagdad, in pursuance of the then plan of Mehemet Ali, encouraged by France, to erect the Peninsula of Arabia into an Independent Empire."¹⁴⁸


(147) Douin, Georges, *Mission du Baron de Boislecomte*, p. 249.

(148) Memorandum on Mr. Consul Wood's Services, Damascus, March 28, 1853, F. O. 78/961. For the text of this memorandum, I am indebted to my friend Professor Harold Temperly of Cambridge University.

Through his contact with Europe and European officers Ibrahim Pasha seems to have been personally convinced of the soundness of the nationalistic philosophy of the day, and to have been determined to try it. In this sense Ibrahim Pasha certainly deserves the place of honour in the history of nationalism in the Arab East. He is the first Moslem of rank in the Arab World who conceived of an Arab Nationalist Movement and who was determined to make it effectual.

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
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
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
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