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
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
JUDAEA AND
MEDITERRANEAN POLITICS
219 TO 161 B.C.E.





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JUDAEA AND
MEDITERRANEAN POLITICS
219 TO 161 B.C.E.

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JUDAEA AND
MEDITERRANEAN POLITICS
219 TO 161 B.C.E.

BY

DOV GERA



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
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For My Parents



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ABBREVIATIONS

- AASOR *Annual of the American Schools of Oriental Research*
 AC *L'Antiquité classique*
 AIPhO *Annuaire de l'Institut de Philologie et d'Histoire Orientales et Slaves*
 Anc. Soc. *Ancient Society*
 ANS MN *American Numismatic Society: Museum Notes*
 APF *Archiv für Papyrusforschung und verwandte Gebiete*
 ASAA *Annuario della Scuola Archeologica di Atene e delle missioni italiane in oriente*
 BASOR *Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research*
 BCH *Bulletin de correspondance hellénique*
 Bull. épigr. *Bulletin épigraphique* (in REG)
 CE *Chronique d'Égypte*
 CIG *Corpus inscriptionum graecarum*
 CIJ *Corpus inscriptionum judaicarum*
 C. Ord. Ptol. M. T. Lenger, *Corpus des ordonnances des Ptolémées*², Brussels, 1980
 CPh *Classical Philology*
 C. P. Jud. V. Tcherikover, A. Fuks, & M. Stern, *Corpus papyrorum judaicarum*, 3 vols., Cambridge, Mass., 1957-64
 CRAI *Comptes rendus de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres*
 FGH F. Jacoby, *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*, Berlin - Leiden, 1923-
 FHG C. Müller & T. Müller, *Fragmenta historicorum graecorum*, 5 vols., Paris, 1841-70
 I. Délos *Inscriptions de Délos*
 IEJ *Israel Exploration Journal*
 IG *Inscriptiones graecae*
 IGRR *Inscriptiones graecae ad res romanas pertinentes*
 I. Iasos W. Blümel, *Die Inschriften von Iasos (Inschriften griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien, 28)*, 2 vols., Bonn, 1985
 I. Iliou P. Frisch, *Die Inschriften von Iliou (Inschriften griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien, 3)*, Bonn, 1975
 I. Lampsakos P. Frisch, *Die Inschriften von Lampsakos (Inschriften griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien, 6)*, Bonn, 1978
 I. Pergamon M. Fränkel & C. Habicht, *Die Inschriften von Pergamon (Allertümer von Pergamon, VIII)*, 3 vols., Berlin, 1890-1969
 JBL *Journal of Biblical Literature*
 JEA *Journal of Egyptian Archaeology*
 JJS *Journal of Jewish Studies*
 JRS *Journal of Roman Studies*
 LASBF *Liber annuus Studii Biblici Franciscani*
 LCL Loeb Classical Library
 LSJ H. G. Liddell, R. Scott, & H. S. Jones, *A Greek-English Lexicon*, 9th edition, Oxford 1925-40, rev. supplement 1996
 MDAI(A) *Mitteilungen des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts (Athenische Abteilung)*
 Milet T. Wiegand, *Milet: Ergebnisse der Ausgrabungen und Untersuchungen seit dem Jahre 1899*, 3 vols., each in several parts, Berlin, 1906-29
 NC *Numismatic Chronicle*

- OGIS W. Dittenberger, *Orientalis graeci inscriptiones selectae*, 2 vols., Leipzig, 1903-5
- PCZ *Catalogue général des antiquités égyptiennes du Musée du Caire, Zenon Papyri*, ed. C. C. Edgar, 4 vols., Cairo, 1925-31; vol. V eds. O. Guéraud & P. Jouguet, Cairo, 1940
- P. Enteux. ENTEΥΞΕΙΣ: *Requêtes et plaintes adressées au roi d'Égypte au III^e siècle avant J.-C.*, ed. O. Guéraud, Cairo, 1931-32
- P. Herc. 1044 *Papyrus Herculanensis 1044* in: I. Gallo, *Frammenti biografici da papiri*, II, 21-166, Rome, 1980
- P. Lond. *Greek Papyri in the British Museum* (now the British Library), eds. F.G. Kenyon, H. I. Bell, & T. C. Skeat, 7 vols., London, 1893-1974
- Pros. Ptol. W. Peremans, E. Van't Dack, et alii, *Prosopographia Ptolemaica*, 8 vols. (*Studia Hellenistica* 6, 8, 11, 12, 13, 17, 20, 21), Louvain, 1950-75
- P. Ryl. *Catalogue of the Greek Papyri in the John Rylands Library*, Manchester, 4 vols., eds. A. S. Hunt et alii, Manchester, 1911-52
- PSI *Papiri greci e latini: Pubblicazioni della Società Italiana per la ricerca dei Papiri greci e latini in Egitto*, 14 vols., eds. G. Vitelli et alii, Florence, 1912-57
- P. Tebt. *The Tebtunis Papyri*, 4 vols., eds. B. P. Grenfell et alii, London, 1902-76
- RB *Revue biblique*
- RC C. B. Welles, *Royal Correspondence in the Hellenistic Period*, New Haven, 1934
- RE *Paulys Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, rev. G. Wissowa et alii, Stuttgart - Munich, 1893-1980
- REG *Revue des études grecques*
- RFIC *Rivista di filologia e di istruzione classica*
- RN *Revue numismatique*
- RPh *Revue de philologie, de littérature et d'histoire anciennes*
- SB F. Preisigke et alii, *Sammelbuch griechischer Urkunden aus Ägypten*, Strassburg - Berlin - Leipzig etc., 1915-
- SB Berl. Akad. *Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, phil.-hist. Klasse*
- SCI *Scripta classica israelica*
- SEG *Supplementum epigraphicum graecum*
- Syll³ W. Dittenberger, *Sylloge inscriptionum graecarum*³, 4 vols., Leipzig, 1915-24
- UPZ U. Wilcken, *Urkunden der Ptolemäerzeit*, 2 vols., Berlin - Leipzig, 1922-57
- ZPE *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik*

INTRODUCTION

The two principal sources for the Hasmonaean revolt are the First and Second Books of Maccabees. These sources contain valuable material, but are highly tendentious in their explanation of the confrontation between the Seleucid kingdom and the Jews. Thus, 1 Maccabees presents the view that the various members of the Hasmonaean family brought deliverance to their people, while 2 Maccabees links the successes and tribulations of the Jews to their adherence to ancestral laws. Both these approaches, the one seeking to glorify the Hasmonaean dynasty, the other to extol God, do not satisfactorily explain the circumstances which enabled the Jews to liberate themselves from Seleucid rule. The perspective chosen here, one which hopefully provides a broader point of view, is based on a study of the international scene of the period, which is used as a backdrop against which the success of the Maccabean revolt can be understood. This approach can serve as a corrective to the outlooks found in 1 and 2 Maccabees, and elucidate the wider political arena within which the Maccabean rebels acted.

One of the salient features of the period is Rome's growing involvement in the affairs of the eastern Mediterranean. We shall therefore examine the process by which Roman contacts with the kingdoms of this region intensified, and the effects of these contacts on the international standing and internal stability of the Attalid, Seleucid and Ptolemaic kingdoms. With the balance of power in the eastern Mediterranean thus mapped out, the international background to the Maccabean revolt will become clear, as will the Roman motives for signing a treaty with the Jews in 161.

The compact of 161 points not only to Roman involvement in Syrian affairs, but to Jewish readiness to forge connections with a foreign power. We shall try to determine whether this willingness to pursue an independent political course and initiate an alliance with a foreign state was a relatively new element in the Jews' dealings with the outside world, a by product of the Maccabean revolt. How, from the last quarter of the third century onwards, did Jews living in Judaea behave under their foreign masters, the

Ptolemies and the Seleucids, when events beyond their control threatened to affect their lives?

The year 219, which marks the beginning of the Fourth Syrian War, has been chosen as a starting point for this examination. This is because almost nothing is reported about the attitude of the Jews in Judaea towards the struggles of Ptolemies and Seleucids in the first eight decades of the third century, while we do possess material relating to the Fourth Syrian War and later events. This information offers grounds for the investigation of changing attitudes in Judaea during a period of more than fifty years, down to the beginning of the Maccabean revolt. Our discussion will end with the year 161/0, some two decades before the Jews formally gained their independence. Seemingly, this year marks Jewish failure, not success, because of the death of Judas Maccabaeus on the battlefield. Yet, we shall argue for the crucial importance of the Jewish alliance with Rome, within the context of the Republic's policy of weakening the Seleucid kingdom. The defeat of Judas, and Roman recognition of Demetrius somewhat later, were setbacks for the Jews, but the road to liberation had already been paved.

CHAPTER ONE

BETWEEN PTOLEMIES AND SELEUCIDS

1. *The Ptolemaic and Seleucid Claims to Palestine and Phoenicia*

The ongoing conflict between the Ptolemaic and Seleucid monarchies had great impact on Judaeon politics. These two monarchies clashed in several areas, the most important of which were Asia Minor, Thrace, Syria, and Palestine. Clearly, the way of life and political status of Palestinian Jewry were influenced most directly by the wars which took place within Palestine proper. The Fourth Syrian War (219–217) was, as far as we know, the first war between the Ptolemaic and Seleucid kingdoms to be fought in Palestine. This war, like the later ones, stemmed from the annexation of Palestine by Ptolemy son of Lagus, some hundred years earlier.¹ Since the manner in which Ptolemy I annexed Syria and Phoenicia to his kingdom was the root cause of the protracted struggle for sovereignty over this strip of land, we must first examine the events following the death of Alexander the Great.

With the death of Alexander in 323, his mighty kingdom began to disintegrate. Formally, the process of disintegration ended in 306–304, when Alexander's leading generals crowned themselves kings. Antigonus Monophthalmus and his son Demetrius, who together controlled Syria, Palestine, Cyprus, and the shores of Asia Minor, were the first to proclaim themselves kings. Ptolemy son of Lagus, who ruled Egypt, followed in their footsteps. Finally, Cassander became king of Macedon, Lysimachus the monarch of Thrace, and Seleucus the sovereign of Babylonia and Iran.²

¹ As a rule, I will refer to Palestine by the administrative term used at the period being discussed. At the time of Ptolemaic rule, it was called Syria and Phoenicia. See *OGIS* 54 11. 6-7, 56 1. 17; *SB* 8008 11. 33-34, 51, 56, fr. b-c 1. 12, cf. *C. Ord. Ptol.* 22. For the name of the province after the Seleucid occupation, see below p. 25 n. 75, and see Bickerman 1947; Sartre 1988.

² *Diod.* 20.53.2-4; *Plut. Demetr.* 17.1-18.2; *Justin* 15.2.10-12; *Appian, Syr.* 54; *Marmor Parium, FGH* 239 B 23. See Ed. Will 1979-82: I. 65-77.

The Battle of Ipsus

Shortly thereafter, in 302, Cassander approached Lysimachus and together they contacted Ptolemy I and Seleucus I. Their goal was to forge an alliance which would be capable of defeating Antigonus (Diod. 20.106). Lysimachus, aided by Cassander's expeditionary force, invaded Asia Minor. His military successes forced Antigonus to summon his son, Demetrius, and Demetrius' army from Greece. At the same time, Seleucus' forces advanced into Asia Minor and Ptolemy temporarily occupied parts of the Syrian satrapy.³ The decisive battle between the army of Antigonus and Demetrius and the joint army of Lysimachus, Cassander, and Seleucus took place at Ipsus in Phrygia in 301. In this battle Antigonus was killed and his army defeated.⁴

It is likely that Ptolemy himself intended to join in the battle against Antigonus. His army occupied the southern part of the Syrian satrapy in 302 and reached the gates of Sidon, on its way to the battle site. But when Ptolemy heard false rumors about the defeat of his allies, he withdrew to Egypt with most of his army, leaving garrisons in the cities he had captured.⁵ Ptolemy thus missed his golden opportunity to share in the victory over Antigonus and Demetrius.

When the three victorious kings divided Antigonus' kingdom among themselves, Seleucus was allotted the Syrian satrapy. Ptolemy, who had been absent from the battlefield, received nothing. He managed, however, to regain control over the southern part of the Syrian satrapy before Seleucus appeared. Seleucus demanded that Ptolemy I withdraw, but when he refused, Seleucus decided not to use force in order to conquer Phoenicia and Palestine. Nonetheless, Seleucus did not waive his claim to ownership of the southern section of the Syrian satrapy.⁶

³ Diod. 20.107.1-20.113.5; Plut. *Demetr.* 28.1-2.

⁴ Diod. 21.1.1-4b; Plut. *Demetr.* 28.3-29.5; Paus. 1.6.7; Appian, *Syr.* 55; Justin 15.4.22; Trogus, *Prolog.* 15; Arrian, *Anab.* 7.18.5; Hieronymus of Cardia, *FGH* 154F 8.

⁵ Diod. 20.113.1-2. Grainger 1990: 121, contends unconvincingly that Ptolemy had no intention of helping the other kings against Antigonus. Jos. C. *Apionem* 1.205-11; *Ant.* 12.5-6 (paraphrasing Agatharchides of Cnidus) and Appian, *Syr.* 50, tell of the capture of Jerusalem by Ptolemy I. Tcherikover 1959: 57-58, thinks that these accounts refer to the campaign of 302. Some scholars link these sources to the events of 319 or 312, other occasions when Ptolemy son of Lagus captured the southern part of the Syrian satrapy; see Droysen 1952: 103; Meyer 1921: 24.

⁶ Diod. 21.1.5; Polyb. 5.67.8, 28.20.7; Plut. *Demetr.* 30.1; Appian, *Syr.* 55;

Consequently the Syrian satrapy was divided, as of 301. Seleucus held its northern part, while Ptolemy held the southern section. Wedged between them was Demetrius, who ruled the cities of Tyre and Sidon.⁷ Demetrius' rule over Tyre and Sidon was short-lived. Eventually, the northern section of the satrapy was held by Seleucus and the southern section, including Tyre and Sidon, was in Ptolemy's hands. This division of the Syrian satrapy led to constant claims and counter-claims for sovereignty over the Ptolemaic area of Syria and Phoenicia.

The Legal Dispute

The heirs of Seleucus I continued to view Syria and Phoenicia as their legal property. Seleucid diplomacy during the Fourth and Sixth Syrian Wars justified the occupation of Palestine by declaring that the Seleucid kings had ownership rights after the battle of Ipsus, since Seleucus I, who took part in that battle, had been allotted Syria and Phoenicia.⁸ His ownership was based on Antigonus' original conquest of Palestine, which rendered the territory 'spear-won land.'⁹ According to the rules of war, the victors were entitled to the defeated enemy's possessions, and Lysimachus and Cassander, Seleucus' partners in the victory at Ipsus, had agreed to give him control over the Syrian satrapy. Ptolemy, who was absent from the battlefield, had no such right.¹⁰

The Ptolemaic court presented two arguments in response to this claim. Their first point was that after the battle of Ipsus, Seleucus found Syria and Phoenicia under Ptolemy's control. Therefore, Ptolemy's claim to Syria and Phoenicia was based upon the 'spear-won land' principle, since he was the occupying king, and not Seleucus. The second argument was that Ptolemy had, in fact,

Paus. 1.6.8.

⁷ Plut. *Demetr.* 32.4, 33.1. See Newell 1923: 5-8, 12-15. Some scholars assert that Seleucus I became master of Palestine in 301, and that continuous Ptolemaic rule over Syria and Phoenicia began somewhat later; see Niese 1893-1903: I. 387; Meyer 1921: 3. This is, however, incorrect—see Tcherikover 1959: 53-55, 101.

⁸ Polyb. 5.67.6-8, 28.20.6-7. On the kingdom as the kings' private property, see Préaux 1978: I. 189-91.

⁹ Polyb. 5.67.6, 28.20.7; see Walbank 1957-79: I. 592-93. For occupation as a legal basis for sovereignty, see Préaux 1978: I. 187-89.

¹⁰ Diod. 21.1.5. Antiochus III expressed a similar line of reasoning in relation to his rights to Thrace and Chersonesus; see Polyb. 18.51.4.

participated in the war against Antigonus.¹¹ The Ptolemaic diplomats probably did not go so far as to assert that Ptolemy actually took part in the battle of Ipsus, but attempted to portray Ptolemy I's military activities as actions which contributed to the victory over Antigonus.

The Seleucid response to the first argument was that Ptolemy had conquered the land on behalf of Seleucus (Polyb. 5.67.7). This reply is deeply flawed, since it acknowledges, in part, Ptolemy's contribution to the struggle against Antigonus. It also justifies another Ptolemaic claim: representatives of the Ptolemaic dynasty maintained that the decision of the three kings after the battle of Ipsus violated a prior agreement which had stated that Ptolemy would rule the disputed territory.¹² If Polybius' report on the negotiations in the Fourth Syrian war is reliable, then we must assume that Antiochus III acknowledged the existence of a prior agreement on how the spoils were to be divided. Nonetheless, in the eyes of the Seleucid dynasty, Ptolemy I's absence from the battlefield at Ipsus nullified the validity of the pre-battle accord.¹³

Legal wrangling aside, the Ptolemies and Seleucids were interested in Palestine for several concrete reasons. Their conflict stemmed, in part, from their position as heirs of Alexander. Scholars usually divide the *Diadochi* into two groups: those whose ambition was to possess the entire kingdom of Alexander and those who were satisfied with holding only part of the huge realm conquered by the Macedonian king. Perdiccas and Antigonus, for example, are assigned to the first group, while Ptolemy belongs to the second.¹⁴ The *Diadochi* who saw themselves as following in Alexander's footsteps felt that they had to occupy all parts of Alexander's kingdom. Thus Antigonus' occupation of the Syrian satrapy was part of his master plan to rule all of the Macedonian's realm. The second group of *Diadochi*, who did not aspire to govern

¹¹ See the words attributed to Ptolemy in Diod. 21.1.5; cf. too Polyb. 5.67.10: συμπολεμήσαι Σελεύκῳ Πτολεμαίων.

¹² Polyb. 5.67.10. Droysen 1952: 342, argues that Ptolemy, Seleucus, Lysimachus and Cassander all signed the prior agreement, while Otto 1928: 18-19, raises the possibility that Seleucus and Ptolemy alone signed this accord. Seibert 1969: 233-34, completely rejects the existence of a prior agreement to divide Antigonus' kingdom. In his opinion, the references to such an arrangement are a product of late Ptolemaic propaganda.

¹³ See Walbank 1957-79: I. 592-93; Tcherikover 1959: 54-55.

¹⁴ See e.g. Ed. Will 1979-82: I. 34, 36-37, 45.

the entire Macedonian empire, could not, however, refrain from wars. All of Alexander's heirs were dependent on their armies. The glory of victory and the resulting war plunder were important elements in preserving the army's loyalty to their commander-in-chief, and Hellenistic kings were judged in accordance with their behavior and accomplishments on the battlefield. Rulers could not survive without their armies and it is difficult to visualize the Hellenistic world without the military campaigns of the *Diadochi* and their heirs.¹⁵ In other words, even with no legal basis for their quarrel, the Ptolemies and Seleucids were bound to clash.

The Strategic Importance of Syria and Phoenicia

Both parties also had a specific interest in the land of Syria and Phoenicia. Ptolemy son of Lagus ruled from Egypt. Anyone who wished to invade Egypt had to pass along the Palestinian coast; this was true of the campaigns of both Perdiccas and Antigonus.¹⁶ Conversely, Ptolemy I and his heirs viewed Syria and Phoenicia as a forward defense position. They could also use the region as a launching point for offensives, with Mesopotamia in the northeast and Asia Minor in the north as possible targets.¹⁷

The well-established Phoenician navies made the ports of the Phoenician coast extremely important to anyone who wanted to rule the eastern basin of the Mediterranean.¹⁸ In addition, wood for shipbuilding was plentiful on the nearby Mount Lebanon. The ports were therefore vital both to Ptolemy and to his adversaries. The cities of Phoenicia, with their shipyards, ships, and seamen, became a target for the military campaigns of Alexander's heirs during the wars of the *Diadochi*.¹⁹

¹⁵ Préaux 1978: I. 181-86, 295-97.

¹⁶ For Perdiccas' campaign, see Diod. 18.33.1-18.36.7; Justin 13.8.1-2 and 10; Plut. *Eum.* 8.2; Arrian, *FGH* 156 F 9.28-29; Paus. 1.6.3; Strabo 17.1.8 (C794). For Antigonus' campaign, see Diod. 20.73.1-20.76.7; Plut. *Demetr.* 19.1-2.

¹⁷ Diod. 18.43.1; Appian, *Syr.* 52. See Volkmann 1959a: 1611-12; Moser 1914: 24-25.

¹⁸ When Xerxes I invaded Greece, the Phoenician navy was an important contingent in his navy; see Hdt. 7.89-96. Herodotus, however, greatly exaggerates the size of the Persian navy. The navies of the Phoenician cities served Darius III during his war with Alexander the Great: Arrian, *Anab.* 2.13.7, 2.20.1.

¹⁹ Diod. 18.63.6, 19.58.1-4.

As soon as Ptolemy son of Lagus became satrap of Egypt, he made an effort to establish alliances with some of the kings of Cyprus. Later, he even conquered the island, which remained in Ptolemaic control until the middle of the first century. Ptolemy was also able to extend his control to parts of Asia Minor and the Aegean Sea, but this empire lacked territorial continuity.²⁰ Only command of the sea could guarantee a link between Alexandria and the distant territories controlled by Ptolemy. Holding Phoenicia, which was a reservoir of ships, skilled manpower, and raw materials for shipbuilding, was therefore important to Ptolemy I, and later to his heirs.

We should also bear in mind that in ancient times, ships could sail only a relatively short distance. This was especially true of warships.²¹ The Ptolemaic kings' control over Phoenicia assured their ships a shorter sailing route in the open sea. Though the ships were forced to lengthen their route, and sail from Alexandria to the Phoenician coast, and from there to Cyprus, this sailing route was safer. For example, the distance from Alexandria to Amathus in southern Cyprus is about 500 kilometers on open seas, while sailing from Amathus to Tyre in Phoenicia meant navigating only about 250 kilometers in open waters. Ptolemaic sovereignty over Syria and Phoenicia thus ensured a much better military and commercial link between the center of the empire in Alexandria and its distant parts.²² The port cities of Palestine, and to a greater extent, those of the Phoenician coast, connected Alexandria of Egypt to Ptolemaic possessions across the sea.

Another commercial route tied Gaza with Eilat. This route was used to import goods—principally spices and incense—from the Arabian peninsula.²³ During the hundred years of Ptolemaic rule over Syria and Phoenicia, the Ptolemies recognized the economic advantages which they could reap from the area. The Zenon papyri attest to the export of slaves, grain and olive oil from Syria and Phoenicia to Egypt.²⁴

²⁰ See Ed. Will 1979-82: I. 36, 39, 59-60, 62-64, 67-74. On the Ptolemaic possessions, see Bagnall 1976.

²¹ Morrison & Williams 1968: 311; Casson 1971: 90.

²² See Moser 1914: 24-25; Seibert 1969: 133.

²³ Glueck 1940; Glueck 1945: 112-13. The economic importance of Syria and Phoenicia for the Ptolemies is stressed by Jähne 1974: 501-5. For the importance of the Palestinian and Phoenician ports, see also Seibert 1969: 132-35.

²⁴ Tcherikover 1959: 67-70.

In sum, the original events surrounding the battle of Ipsus led to conflicting claims over the ownership of Palestine. The military character of Hellenistic kingship and the economic and strategic advantages of the area played a decisive role in perpetuating the conflict between the Ptolemaic and Seleucid monarchies over Syria and Phoenicia.

2. *The Fourth Syrian War and the Jews*

The events of 301 left Syria and Phoenicia in the hands of Ptolemy I, with northern Syria held by Seleucus. Tyre and Sidon, however, stayed in the hands of Demetrius Poliorcetes. When Demetrius was forced to abandon these two important port cities, Ptolemy I conquered them, and from that time on Tyre and Sidon were part of the Ptolemaic area of Syria and Phoenicia.²⁵ After Tyre and Sidon were annexed to the Ptolemaic district of Syria and Phoenicia, the border between the Ptolemaic and Seleucid kingdoms was drawn along the Eleutherus River. This border was to last until the outbreak of the Fourth—and perhaps the Fifth—Syrian War.²⁶ The exact boundary of the province east of the Eleutherus River is unclear, but Damascus seems to have been close to the borderline.²⁷

We know of no military activity of the Seleucid army south of Damascus during the first three Syrian Wars and it seems that the Ptolemaic control of Syria and Phoenicia did not face a serious

²⁵ We have no precise information on the date that Demetrius abandoned the two cities, but Demetrius' raid on Samaria in 296 serves as a *terminus post quem*. See Jerome, *Chron.*, ed. Helm pp. 127-28. Merker 1974, asserts that the change of rule occurred in 296/5, while Newell 1923: 15-23, dates the end of Demetrius' rule at Tyre (and therefore at Sidon as well) to 286/5. Newell also concludes, on pp. 14-15, that Tyre passed directly from Demetrius to Ptolemy I.

²⁶ This is not the opinion of Kahrstedt 1926: 14-34, who tries to reconstruct three distinct borders during the third century. But see the criticism of Otto 1928: 37-40; Tschirikower 1937: 32-36; Bagnall 1976: 12-13. For the border along the Eleutherus river, see Seyrig 1951: 208-12; Seyrig 1964: 43-46.

²⁷ Antiochus I captured Damascus from Ptolemy II during the First Syrian War—see Polyæn. 4.15—and this city seems to have remained in the possession of the Seleucids at least until the Third Syrian War when Antiochus II Callinicus held the city. See Porphyry, *FGH* 260 F 32.8. Various scholars, however, have argued that Damascus changed hands more than the one time attested in our sources. See the views of Beloch 1912-27: IV/1. 585, IV/2. 323; Otto 1928: 40-41; Tschirikower 1937: 35-36.

threat until the outbreak of the Fourth Syrian War.²⁸ Hence the first three Syrian wars need not concern us here.²⁹

Antiochus III's Campaigns

The first real attempt to capture Syria and Phoenicia was made by Antiochus III in 221, shortly after he took the throne. His older brother and predecessor, Seleucus III, may have planned to attack the area, but the evidence is uncertain.³⁰ Despite Molon's rebellion in the East (Polyb. 5.41.1-5.46.5), young Antiochus III, accompanied by his chief minister Hermias, embarked on a campaign against the Ptolemaic monarchy. The Seleucid army left Apamea, traveled by way of Laodiceia-by-Libanus, and tried to enter the territory of Syria and Phoenicia through the valley between the Lebanon and the Anti-Lebanon. But the governor of Syria and Phoenicia, Theodotus the Aetolian, blocked the valley and delayed the Seleucid army (Polyb. 5.45.6-5.46.4). News of Molon's victory in the East prompted the Seleucid king and Hermias to turn their attention in that direction. The Seleucid army retreated and the attempt to capture Syria and Phoenicia was postponed.³¹

Two years later, in 219, Antiochus initiated another campaign to capture Syria and Phoenicia, known as the Fourth Syrian War. At the outset, the Seleucid army captured the port city of Antioch, Seleuceia, which had been held by the Ptolemaic kings since the Third Syrian War (Polyb. 5.58.2-5.61.2). In the meantime, Theodotus the Aetolian, the governor of Syria and Phoenicia, decided to betray his king. When he defected, he handed over Tyre and

²⁸ For the course of the first three Syrian Wars, see Ed. Will 1979-82: I. 146-50, 243-61 and Will's bibliography. For additional discussion of the First Syrian War, see Bernard 1990: 532-36. Bernard revives the idea that Ptolemy II's campaign to 'Persia' (mentioned in the Pithom stele) in the course of this war refers to Syria and Palestine. This remains to be proven.

²⁹ Some scholars believe that the refusal of the high priest Onias II to pay taxes to King Ptolemy, mentioned in Jos. *Ant.* 12.158, is related to the events of the Third Syrian War; cf. below Ch.II.

³⁰ Porphyry, *FGH* 260 F 44. For skepticism about the reliability of Porphyry here, see Jacoby's commentary *ad loc.* Seyrig 1971: 7-11, tries to find a connection between Porphyry's information and two coins of Seleucus III minted at Simyra, a city of the Aradian Peraea. He suggests that the coins in question constitute evidence for military preparations on the southern border of the Seleucid kingdom.

³¹ Cf. Huss 1976: 32-33.

Ptolemais to Antiochus III.³² From Ptolemais, the army of Antiochus III apparently turned south towards Dor. Dor was placed under siege, but refused to surrender and with the siege of Dor, the military activities of 219 came to a close.³³

The next campaigning season opened in Phoenicia. The Ptolemaic commander Nicolaus encamped in the narrow pass on the shore between Beirut and Sidon. Nicolaus was defeated in battle and the Seleucid army was able to circumvent Sidon and invade Palestine. Next Antiochus III accepted the surrender of Philoteria and Scythopolis and stationed garrisons there. His army then took the fortress on Mount Tabor. At this point, Antiochus III turned east with his troops, crossed the Jordan River, reached Galaaditis and advanced southward, capturing Abila, Gadara and Philadelphia. From Philadelphia, the king sent 5,000 troops to conquer the region of Samaria. Antiochus III and most of his army marched to Ptolemais to their winter quarters.³⁴

In the third year of the campaign, Ptolemy IV Philopator left Pelusium at the head of a fresh army which had been trained in Egypt over the two preceding years. The Ptolemaic army was positioned west of Raphia and opposite the Seleucid army.³⁵ After a few days of limited encounters between the rival forces, during which time Theodotus the Aetolian made an unsuccessful attempt to kill Ptolemy IV, the armies prepared for a decisive confrontation. The Ptolemaic army, which included a Greek phalanx unit of 25,000 soldiers and an Egyptian phalanx unit of 20,000 soldiers, was the larger of the two. This superiority was particularly evident in relation to the phalangites and other heavily armed foot-soldiers. The center of the Ptolemaic battle line, which included the two phalanx units, determined the outcome of the battle in favor of Ptolemy IV and his troops.³⁶

³² Polyb. 4.37.5, 5.40.1-3, 5.61.3-5.62.3.

³³ Polyb. 5.66.1-2. Shatzman 1995: 66-67, tentatively suggests linking a group of artillery stone-balls found at ancient Dor with this siege or with the campaign of Antiochus VII against Tryphon.

³⁴ Polyb. 5.68.1-5.70.9, 5.70.12-5.71.12. See Huss 1976: 51-55.

³⁵ The sources on the preparations for battle and the battle itself are: Polyb. 5.63.1-5.65.11, 5.79.1-5.86.6, 5.107.1-3; 3 Macc. 1.1-5; Justin 30.1.4-6. See also ll. 10-14 of the Demotic text in the Raphia stele in H. Gauthier & H. Sottas 1925, and the definitive edition of Thissen 1966. For a discussion of the historical implications of this inscription, see Momigliano 1929.

³⁶ For the course of the battle, see Huss 1976: 55-68; Bar-Kochva 1976: 128-41; Galili 1976/7.

Ptolemy IV's Victory at Raphia

The Ptolemaic victory at Raphia and the Seleucid army's flight enabled Ptolemy IV to recapture Syria and Phoenicia. The Ptolemaic king spent three months in Syria and Phoenicia, visiting different cities in an effort to muster support for his rule.³⁷ Ptolemy's troops then invaded the Seleucid kingdom. The Egyptian army erected a camp across the border, and from there raided a number of Seleucid cities. Ptolemy may have succeeded in annexing bits of Seleucid territory, which remained in his hands until the Fifth Syrian War.³⁸ These raids, in any event, soon led to a peace agreement between the Ptolemaic and the Seleucid kingdoms.³⁹ Following the agreement with Antiochus III, Ptolemy returned to Egypt, after an absence of four months.

3 Maccabees and Polybius on the Fourth Syrian War

What was the position of the Jews vis-à-vis the antagonists in the Fourth Syrian War? 3 Maccabees is the only source on the behavior of the Jews during this war.⁴⁰ This work tells us, *inter alia*, about the enthusiastic reception which the residents of Jerusalem

³⁷ Polyb. 5.85.13-5.86.11, 5.87.6; 3 Macc. 1.6-2.24; the Demotic text in the Raphia stele, ll. 12-23 (Thissen 1966: 15, 17, 19). See also Otto 1928: 85. Several inscriptions dedicated to Ptolemy IV and his sister Arsinoe, apparently dating to 217, have been discovered in Syria and Phoenicia: see Clermont-Ganneau 1900: 536-38 (two inscriptions from Marisa); SEG XX 467 (Joppa); SEG VII 326 (vicinity of Tyre). It is possible that SEG XX 389 (from around Tyre) also dates to the reign of Ptolemy IV.

³⁸ Polyb. 5.87.3-7 and Justin 30.1.4-7, both accuse Ptolemy IV of not taking full advantage of his victory, and of being satisfied with recapturing Syria and Phoenicia. Otto 1928: 84-85, is probably right in preferring the evidence of the Demotic text in the Raphia stele (ll. 23-25; Thissen 1966: 19) that Ptolemy captured additional territories as well. Seyrig 1951: 217-18, claimed that numismatic evidence points to Ptolemaic control of the Aradian Peraea between the Fourth and Fifth Syrian Wars, thus substantiating the Demotic text, but later changed his mind (Seyrig 1964: 45-46).

³⁹ According to Otto 1928: 84-85, the Ptolemaic army's invasion violated the one-year armistice mentioned by Polybius (5.87.4), while the peace agreement mentioned in the Raphia stele is identical with the final peace (Polyb. 5.87.8, 15.25.13). Momigliano 1929: 184-86, identifies the peace agreement in the inscription with the one-year armistice.

⁴⁰ The Raphia stele has no bearing on the Jews. Sottas in H. Gauthier & H. Sottas 1925: 54-56, claims that the Demotic text mentions "Eléazar et ses partisans," but this reading is apparently incorrect; see Tcherikover 1959: 435 n. 97. For attempts to link Josephus' story of the Tobiads with the Fourth Syrian War, see below Ch.II.

gave to Ptolemy IV Philopator after his victory at Raphia. But the celebration quickly turned sour when the king tried to enter the Holy of Holies (3 Macc. 1.1-2.24). Nineteenth-century scholars have claimed that the first part of 3 Maccabees, which discusses the battle of Raphia, is based on the section of Polybius describing the Fourth Syrian War, and this view, although unpopular today, deserves to be reinforced.⁴¹ How does 3 Maccabees compare, in fact, to the earlier composition by Polybius? Where do the similarities lie? Why did differences emerge?

According to Polybius (5.80.1-4) the Ptolemaic army was the first armed force to encamp near Raphia and only later did the Seleucid army reach the area. In the Jewish source the order of events is just the reverse. There, the troops of Antiochus III were the ones to choose the battle site and Ptolemy IV appeared with his army in response to the Seleucid's arrival (3 Macc. 1.1).

3 Maccabees opens, in essence, with the battle of Raphia. The first two years of the war, when the Seleucid army captured most of Syria and Phoenicia, are summarized in a short sentence.⁴² We are simply informed that Ptolemy Philopator heard that parts of his kingdom had been captured by Antiochus III and consequently gathered his troops and went to battle. When telling of the order in which the troops arrived at Raphia, the author of 3 Maccabees deliberately places the Seleucid king first on the scene, in order to emphasize that the initiative for the war was that of Antiochus III, as we know from Polybius (5.58).

Dositheus son of Drimylus

Both Polybius and 3 Maccabees tell of Theodotus the Aetolian's unsuccessful attempt on the life of Ptolemy IV Philopator. Polybius states that Theodotus initially served as the Ptolemaic governor of Syria and Phoenicia, but with the start of the Fourth Syrian War, in 219, he defected and joined the Seleucid camp (5.81). Theodotus'

⁴¹ Willrich 1895: 38; Niese 1893-1903: II. 407 n. 4. For the more prevalent view, see Tcherikover 1961c: 3, who stresses the points of disagreement between Polybius and 3 Maccabees, but concludes that the author of 3 Maccabees relied here on a reliable Greek historian who may have been Polybius' source as well. Cf. Emmet 1913: 159; Hadas 1953: 17; Nickelsburg 1984: 80-81.

⁴² It is my opinion that 3 Maccabees does indeed begin here, cf. Emmet 1913: 161, but some scholars suggest that the first part of the work has been lost. See Hadas 1953: 4-5.

defection to the camp of Antiochus III is more equivocal in the Jewish source. Here we are told that Theodotus took with him the stronger members of the Ptolemaic troops who had previously been under his command παραλαβὼν τῶν προϋποτεταγμένων αὐτῷ ὅπλων Πτολεμαϊκῶν τὰ κράτιστα. He tried to kill the king, but Dositheus son of Drimylus, a Jew, heard of the plot and foiled it (3 Macc. 1.2-3). The reader gets the impression that at the time of the assassination attempt, Theodotus was a Ptolemaic military man who was aided and abetted by soldiers who had previously served in his unit. The blurring of Theodotus' allegiance to the Seleucid camp in 217 allows the author of 3 Maccabees to present the attempt on Ptolemy's life as an internal court conspiracy.⁴³ Polybius, on the other hand, attributes Theodotus' failure to faulty information: Theodotus and his men thought that the king slept in the tent where he conducted his official business (Polyb. 5.81.2-7). Another inconsistency between the two versions is that Polybius writes that Theodotus and his men killed Andreas, the king's physician (5.81.6). In 3 Maccabees, the person killed is an unknown man (1.3: ἄσημόν τινα). This difference results from crediting Dositheus with foiling the conspiracy. Since Dositheus knew in advance of the attempt to kill the king, he would not have left a high ranking man in the tent as bait. Changing the status of the victim also emphasizes the failure of Theodotus, who took upon himself to assassinate a king and killed an anonymous person.

We know that Dositheus was a historical figure who served in Ptolemy IV's court.⁴⁴ He was, we are told, a Jew by birth who subsequently (ὑστερον δέ) renounced the Law and abandoned his ancestral beliefs (3 Macc. 1.3). When did this change or conversion take place? One possibility is that Dositheus converted before the battle of Raphia, and as a "renegade Jew" supposedly saved Ptolemy's life at Raphia.⁴⁵ This scenario presents no factual

⁴³ 3 Macc. 1.2. Hadas 1953: 31, rejects this interpretation, because he accepts the reading ὡς μόνος κτείνειν and regards the ὅπλα as weapons, not soldiers. There is little sense in this. I prefer the reading ὡς μόνον κτείνειν attested in some manuscripts; see Hanhart's edition of 3 Maccabees, *ad loc.*

⁴⁴ Dositheus son of Drimylus is mentioned in *C. P. Jud.* 127a-c; *P. Vindob. Gr.* 40588 (Liesker & Tromp 1986: 82-86). See Fuks 1953-54; Méléze-Modrzejewski 1991: 50-55. Méléze-Modrzejewski identifies the Dositheus mentioned in *P. Ryf.* 576, with the son of Drimylus.

⁴⁵ See Fuks 1953-54: 205; Hadas 1953: 32. This kind of explanation obviously seeks to harmonize the passage from 3 Maccabees with the evidence, mentioned in the following note, which indicates that Dositheus son of Drimylus

difficulties, but we can only wonder why the Jewish author of 3 Maccabees would go to such pains to emphasize that the king was saved by a Jewish apostate. Another possibility (and one which seems to convey the natural meaning of the Greek) would be that Dositheus son of Drimylus, a Jew by birth, saved the life of Ptolemy IV at the time of the battle of Raphia. Only later, after 217, did Dositheus convert.

This second interpretation is to be preferred. Dositheus saved the king before he renounced his Judaism, and the author of 3 Maccabees can be proud of the deed performed by his fellow Jew; his allusion to Dositheus' apostasy refers to a subsequent event. We later hear of a few Jews who agreed to the king's initiative and converted (3 Macc. 2.31-33, 3.23); Dositheus could well be one of them. Furthermore, Ptolemy IV Philopator, although saved by a Jew in the battle of Raphia, proves himself ungrateful almost immediately afterwards through his attempt to defile the Temple in Jerusalem. Unfortunately, the papyri evidence demonstrates that five years before Raphia, in 223/2, Dositheus son of Drimylus served as priest at the official cult of Alexander and the Ptolemaic kings.⁴⁶ This is not the act of a Jew. Perhaps the author of 3 Maccabees did not know the precise date of Dositheus' conversion, but it is even more likely that he was not interested in the exact sequence of events. There are many other instances of such carelessness with historical facts in 3 Maccabees.⁴⁷ If Dositheus was a Jew at the time that he saved Ptolemy's life, then we have a story of a Jewish courtier thwarting an attempt on a non-Jewish king's life. This is reminiscent of the tale told in the Book of Esther, in which Mordecai the Jew foils an attempt to kill Ahasuerus.⁴⁸ The literary dependence of 3 Maccabees on the Book of Esther (and the addenda to Esther in the Septuagint) is more than likely,⁴⁹ and it is

was a practising pagan before the battle of Raphia.

⁴⁶ *C. P. Jud.* 127d-e; *P. Vindob. Gr.* 40588 (Liesker & Tromp 1986: 82-86).

⁴⁷ See Tcherikover 1961c: 5-11; Hadas 1953: 5 ff.; Schürer 1973-87: III/1. 537-39, *contra* Kasher 1985: 211 ff. Méléze-Modrzejewski 1991: 117-27, takes a middle view, arguing that the story in 3 Maccabees of the attempt of Ptolemy IV to exterminate the Alexandrian Jews rests on a real event which acquired legendary proportions by the time it was taken up by the author of 3 Maccabees.

⁴⁸ Esther 2.21-23. See Willrich 1900: 19-20; Willrich 1904: 257.

⁴⁹ Hadas 1953: 6-8; Moore 1977: 197-99; Motzo 1924: 272-90. Motzo maintains that 3 Maccabees was written before the addenda to the Book of Esther, but this does not rule out the possibility of 3 Maccabees being dependent on

probable that the author of 3 Maccabees adapted the story of the assassination attempt found in Polybius, under the influence of the Book of Esther. In fact, the author of 3 Maccabees may have presented Theodotus the Aetolian as still being a member of the king's court in 217, because this would make the conspiracy against the king an internal one, as in the Book of Esther.

Arsinoe and Esther

The portrayal of Queen Arsinoe in 3 Maccabees seems to be another instance of the influence of the Book of Esther. Polybius tells us that when Ptolemy IV Philopator exhorted his soldiers before battle, he was accompanied by two of his commanders and by his sister Arsinoe. Arsinoe is also said to be present when the signal to join battle is given (5.83.1-3, 5.84.1); we can therefore assume that she participated in the battle itself. Polybius adds that the king appeared among the soldiers during the actual battle and this encouraged them immensely (5.85.8). The author of 3 Maccabees ascribes the exhortation of the soldiers to Arsinoe, rather than her brother (1.4); here the sister is glorified at the expense of her brother, the king. Queen Arsinoe in 3 Maccabees parallels the character of Queen Esther, for each queen saves her nation. The author of 3 Maccabees embellishes Polybius' story, telling of the queen's tousled tresses, her promise to pay the soldiers, and her plea that they fight for their families. These details add nothing essential to the information that Polybius provides, but lend color and vivacity to the story. In essence, the author of 3 Maccabees tells of historical figures, placed in authentic settings, but attributes to them fictitious actions. We shall see in the following chapter that this combination of historical figures and backgrounds with imaginary exploits is found in other Jewish writings of the period, such as the Letter of Aristeas and the story of the Tobiads.

Diverting attention from the king to Arsinoe serves another purpose as well. The author of 3 Maccabees does not want to praise Ptolemy IV, since later in the story he accuses the king of

the Book of Esther itself: see Hadas 1953: 8. Moreover, the colophon to the Septuagint version of Esther enables us to determine that the latest date for the composition of the addenda was 78/7. 3 Maccabees was composed later, at about 20, so that it postdates the addenda to the Book of Esther as well. See Bickerman 1944: 346-47; Tcherikover 1961c: 11-18.

attempting to enter the Holy of Holies in the Temple of Jerusalem. He also attributes to Ptolemy a plot to annihilate all of Egyptian Jewry. Polybius' statement that the soldiers of Ptolemy's army were encouraged when their king joined their ranks and then attacked the enemy with renewed vigor allows Ptolemy IV to play an important role in their victory. But when 3 Maccabees attributes the king's role to Arsinoe, Ptolemy IV is left with no share in the triumph of his men over the Seleucid army at Raphia.

Parallels in Polybius and 3 Maccabees

When describing the course of the battle, both our sources are essentially in agreement. We are told that initially the tide of battle favored the side of Antiochus III, but eventually the Ptolemies prevailed. During the course of the war, many Seleucid soldiers were killed, and many others were taken prisoner.⁵⁰ Polybius and the author of 3 Maccabees give us identical information about Ptolemy IV's activities in Syria and Phoenicia after the victory at Raphia. The king visited cities in Syria and Phoenicia, and one of his goals was to support and strengthen the cities and their inhabitants.⁵¹

According to the Jewish source, the Jews sent a delegation to greet Ptolemy IV and present him with gifts (3 Macc. 1.8). Polybius relates that all the cities of Syria and Phoenicia wanted to express their loyalty to the Ptolemaic king as quickly as possible and they all presented him with various honors (5.86.8 and 11). The depiction of the behavior of the people of Jerusalem in 3 Maccabees is, then, apparently based on Polybius' more general account. One way the residents of Syria and Phoenicia honored their king was to offer sacrifices to him (Polyb. 5.86.11). For obvious reasons, the Jewish author changes the scenario and has the king offer a sacrifice to God (3 Macc. 1.9).

To sum up, a comparison of the two sources, 3 Maccabees and Polybius, indicates that the narrative in 3 Maccabees parallels Polybius' presentation. The Jewish author does not add any objective information to the work of the Achaean historian. The two

⁵⁰ Polyb. 5.84.1-5.85.13, 5.86.5; 3 Macc. 1.4-5.

⁵¹ Polyb. 5.86.8, 5.87.6; 3 Macc. 1.6-7. For Méléze-Modrzejewski 1991: 123, the similarity of these two sources is an indication that Philopator did visit Jerusalem at this time.

major additions of 3 Maccabees—the role of Dositheus son of Drimylus in foiling the attempt on the life of Ptolemy IV, and the contribution of Arsinoe to the victory at Raphia—have a literary bias and are heavily influenced by the Book of Esther and the addenda to Esther. It seems reasonable to conclude that the description of the battle of Raphia and Ptolemy's subsequent visit to Jerusalem are merely an adaptation of Polybius' narrative.⁵² In addition, the account in 3 Maccabees of Ptolemy's attempt to loot the Temple in Jerusalem does not reflect historical events but is related to the fable-like character of that work. Stories of this type apparently became popular after Antiochus IV looted the Temple in 169. We have no real evidence, in fact, of any visit by Ptolemy IV to Jerusalem in 217. Polybius' description of the king's visits to different cities can only point to the possibility that Ptolemy did visit Jerusalem, but does not establish that he actually did so. Similarly, we have no direct evidence of the Jews' attitude towards the Ptolemaic government—or to the Seleucid government—during the Fourth Syrian War.

Popular Support for the Ptolemies

Our principal source on the history of the Fourth Syrian War is, then, Polybius. This historian emphasizes that after the victory at Raphia, different cities competed with one another in expressing their loyalty to the Ptolemaic king. This was natural, Polybius explains, in view of the circumstances, and the people of the area were uniquely accustomed to adjusting to changing times. Nonetheless, he adds, the loyalty of the inhabitants of Coele-Syria should not be doubted. The masses (*ὄχλοι*) of Coele-Syria had always preferred the Ptolemaic dynasty, so it was natural for them to express their loyalty to Ptolemy IV (Polyb. 5.86.8-10).

Polybius' description of the people's enthusiasm for the Ptolemies has given scholars the impression that while the masses supported the Ptolemaic dynasty, the aristocracy supported the

⁵² While the above discussion has posited that the account of the battle of Raphia in 3 Maccabees stems from Polybius' description of the same engagement, there may have been a common source for both Polybius and the author of 3 Maccabees (cf. above p. 13 n. 41). Polybius' version would then be much closer to this hypothetical source, for the differences between Polybius and 3 Maccabees in their descriptions of the battle of Raphia are the result of the preoccupations of the Jewish author.

Seleucids. Tarn, using the writings of Jesus Sirach, who expresses animosity for the Ptolemies, argues that Jesus Sirach represents the hostility of the upper echelons of Jewish society towards Ptolemy IV and his kingdom.⁵³ Rostovtzeff, on the other hand, maintains that Jesus Sirach's hostility to Ptolemaic rule reflects the resentment felt by Jewish farmers. The urban masses, according to Rostovtzeff, supported Ptolemy IV and his dynasty.⁵⁴ Jesus Sirach, however, wrote shortly after the Fifth Syrian War, at a time when the leaders of the aristocracy were more clearly pro-Seleucid. There is no evidence that they felt this way twenty years earlier, at the time of the Fourth Syrian War. Moreover, the enthusiastic reception of Ptolemy IV described by Polybius—the dedication of crowns, sacrifices, and altars to the king—was at the instigation of the urban authorities, i.e. the local aristocrats, with the masses joining in.⁵⁵ Polybius, when talking of the masses, is actually describing all walks of society. Neither Polybius nor Jesus Sirach provide any real evidence that certain social classes of the Jewish nation supported or opposed the Ptolemies during the Fourth Syrian War.

When he describes the attitude of the people of Syria and Phoenicia towards the Ptolemies at the end of the Fourth Syrian War, Polybius is not altogether consistent. The picture of the inordinate love of the masses in Syria and Phoenicia for the Ptolemaic dynasty, which the Achaean historian includes in the fifth book of his *Histories*, is followed immediately by the suggestion that their attitude resulted from expediency. It was certainly wiser to support the victorious king than to arouse his hostility, and this pragmatic explanation supplied by Polybius seems more credible than his glowing report of the enthusiastic populace. Later, when telling of the Fifth Syrian War, Polybius emphasizes the loyalty of the people of Gaza to the Ptolemaic dynasty and remarks that in this respect, they differed from the other people of Syria and Phoenicia. The people of Gaza, we are told, supported Ptolemaic rule and fought ceaselessly on behalf of the dynasty; the other residents of the area did not (16.22a). In other words, by Polybius' own account, the inhabitants of Syria and Phoenicia were not particularly loyal subjects of the Ptolemies. Their support for the Ptolemaic dynasty

⁵³ Tarn & Griffith 1952: 212-13. Both Tarn and Rostovtzeff (see following note) apparently rely on Sir. 10.8-10.

⁵⁴ Rostovtzeff 1953: I. 350, III. 1403 n. 147.

⁵⁵ Polyb. 5.86.11. Cf. Walbank 1957-79: I. 615-16.

in 217, while perhaps the product of the benign rule of Ptolemy IV's predecessors, was above all expedient. Since reliable information on the behavior of the Jewish population of Syria and Phoenicia during the Fourth Syrian War is virtually non-existent, we can only make use of these general, rather dissatisfying conclusions in relation to the Jews as well.

3. *Ptolemy son of Thraseas and the Jews*

The struggle for control over Syria and Phoenicia did not end with the decisive Ptolemaic victory at Raphia. Antiochus III turned his attention to rebuilding his kingdom and reviving the operational strength of his army. In the years following the battle of Raphia, Antiochus III's victory over his rebellious relative Achaeus in Asia Minor and over the Parthians and the Bactrians in the East re-established the status of the Seleucid kingdom.⁵⁶ The Ptolemaic kingdom, on the other hand, encountered serious difficulties. The revolt of the non-Greek population in Egypt led to the formation of an independent kingdom in upper Egypt, headed by Hurgonaphor. The earliest evidence for the existence of this kingdom is from October 205. At the same time, the local population of the Nile delta revolted.⁵⁷ These events probably forced the Ptolemaic government to concentrate its military forces in Egypt, transferring army units from the Ptolemaic possessions outside of Egypt.

The Ptolemaic Kingdom Weakened

King Ptolemy IV Philopator died shortly after upper Egypt was cut off from his kingdom. According to one report, the king's death was not disclosed for a considerable length of time (Justin 30.2.6). Papyrological evidence does not corroborate this and indicates that the king's death was hidden, if at all, for only a short period. Sosibius and Agathocles, Ptolemy IV Philopator's omnipotent ministers, made use of this brief interlude to assassinate Queen

⁵⁶ Schmitt 1964: 43, 264-67; Ed. Will 1979-82: II. 47-69. P. Gauthier 1989: 13-19, brings evidence for the date of the capture of Achaeus and his stronghold, Sardis.

⁵⁷ In earlier literature Hurgonaphor is named Harmachis; see Turner 1984: 163 n. 132. For the local rebellions, see Préaux 1936: 528-34; Alliot 1951: 421-32; Pestman 1965; Peremans 1975.

Arsinoe.⁵⁸ The two ministers then crowned Ptolemy V Epiphanes, who was five years old at the time, as king (Polyb. 15.25.3-6). These events—the death of Ptolemy IV Philopator and his son's ascent to the throne—took place between March and August 204.⁵⁹ Shortly thereafter, Sosibius apparently died.⁶⁰ Agathocles, left alone at the zenith of power, was not able to fortify his position. In Alexandria, opposition to Agathocles materialized from various quarters: the royal bodyguards (θεραπεία), members of the king's personal staff (σωματοφύλακες), and the masses. Outside of the capital, Tlepolemus, the governor of Pelusium, emerged as a tenacious rival. It was not long before the Alexandrian masses arose and slaughtered Agathocles and his supporters.⁶¹

With the death of Agathocles, the key positions in the Ptolemaic court were held by Tlepolemus and the sons of Sosibius the elder, namely Ptolemy and Sosibius the younger. Eventually Tlepolemus took charge of the Ptolemaic kingdom on his own (Polyb. 16.21-22). Thus, the Ptolemaic kingdom was weakened, not only because of rebellious natives, but also due to the constant infighting and lack of stability within the Ptolemaic court.

A Pact Between Antiochus III and Philip V

Antiochus III's improved position, combined with the weakness of the Ptolemaic kingdom, convinced the Seleucid king that the time was ripe to renew his operations against the Ptolemies. The Ptolemaic court, however, became aware of the Seleucid's intentions to recommence the war and make a fresh attempt to conquer Syria and Phoenicia (Polyb. 15.25.13). In the spring of 203, Antiochus III took control of Amyzon, Alinda, Labraunda and Mylasa in Asia Minor.⁶² Shortly after Antiochus III annexed these Asiatic cities to his kingdom, he seems to have formed a clandestine alliance with

⁵⁸ See Schmitt 1964: 199-213, and the references in the following note. On Sosibius, see *Pros. Ptol.* VI 14631 and 17239. On Agathocles, *Pros. Ptol.* V 14169a, VI 14576 and 16813; see too Huss 1976: 242-53.

⁵⁹ Walbank 1936a; Walbank 1957-79: II. 435-37; Bikerman 1940; Samuel 1962: 108-14; Schmitt 1964: 191-92.

⁶⁰ Maas 1949: 444, 446-47.

⁶¹ Polyb. 15.25.1-15.35.7; Justin 30.2.6-7; Porphyry, *FGH* 260 F 45. See Volkman 1959c: 1692-93; Jähne 1976; Fraser 1972: I. 80-82.

⁶² See J. Robert & L. Robert 1983: 132-41. Herrmann 1965a: 93-97, maintains that Teos too was taken by Antiochus III at this time, but the capture of the city took place in 197, see Piejko 1991b: 14-27; cf. *SEG* XLI 1003.

Philip V, king of Macedon. Presumably, their secret agreement promised both kings the freedom to take action against Ptolemaic possessions.⁶³

Although many sources refer to the secret pact between Antiochus III and Philip V, there are scholars who maintain that there was no such agreement. These scholars assert that the story of such an alliance was a product of Rhodian propaganda against Philip V. In their desire to persuade Rome that the Macedonian ruler threatened Roman interests, the people of Rhodes invented an imaginary alliance between Philip V and Antiochus III, underlining the Macedonian king's expansionist ambitions. According to this line of reasoning, the charges brought by the representatives of Rhodes in Rome were preserved in the writings of Rhodian historians and Polybius' information comes from these sources.⁶⁴

Despite these arguments, it appears that there was indeed a pact between Philip V and Antiochus III. Its exact details remain obscure because the establishment of the alliance was shrouded in secrecy.⁶⁵ The clandestine agreement between the two kings was signed in 203/2.⁶⁶ Soon afterwards, in the course of the year 202/1, the two parties began simultaneously to realize their aggressive policies against the Ptolemaic kingdom.⁶⁷ Philip V launched an

⁶³ Polyb. 3.2.8, 15.20.1-8, 16.1.8-9, 16.24.6; Livy 31.14.5; Trogus, *Prol.* 30; Justin 30.2.8; Appian, *Mae.* 4.1; John Antioch. fr. 54 (*FGH* IV. 558); Porphyry, *FGH* 260 F 45.

⁶⁴ Magie 1939; De Regibus 1952; Errington 1971.

⁶⁵ See Walbank 1940: 113-14, 128; Walbank 1957-79: II. 471-73; Schmitt 1964: 237-61; Dahlheim 1968: 235 n. 6; Briscoe 1973: 37-39. Gruen 1984: I. 387-88, accepts the secret pact as authentic, but argues that it was ineffective. For the identity of those who reported the existence of the treaty to Rome, see Ch. III/1.

⁶⁶ Holleaux 1938-68: III. 319-20, believes that the pact was concluded in the winter of that year and that Antiochus III began attacking Syria and Phoenicia in the following spring (202). However, it is not certain that the pact was concluded during the winter. See De Sanctis 1907-23: IV/1. 4 n. 10; Walbank 1957-79: II. 472-73; Schmitt 1964: 226. Hence Holleaux's widely accepted dating of the opening of the Fifth Syrian War is not conclusive and the spring of the following year is also a possibility. See the deliberations of Schmitt 1964: 235, and the following note.

⁶⁷ Polyb. 3.2.8, points that this was the true state of affairs. Polybius says ... συμφρονήσαντες Ἀντίοχος καὶ Φίλιππος ἐπὶ διαιρέσει τῆς τοῦ καταλειμμένου παιδὸς ἀρχῆς ἤρξαντο κακοπραγμονεῖν καὶ τὰς χεῖρας ἐπιβάλλειν Φίλιππος μὲν τοῖς κατ' Αἴγυπτον καὶ Καρίαν καὶ Σάμον, Ἀντίοχος δὲ τοῖς κατὰ Κοίλην Συρίαν καὶ Φοινίκην. The reading of the MSS. κατ' Αἴγυπτον has been questioned, and alternative readings offered: κατ' Αἴγαιον and κατὰ Κίον, see Holleaux 1938-68: III. 70 n. 1, IV. 162 n. 3. Pédech 1954: 391-93, gives good reasons for rejecting these emendations. Furthermore, Pédech shows that this is not the only section in

attack on the Ptolemaic island of Samos,⁶⁸ while Antiochus III commenced the Fifth Syrian War by invading Syria and Phoenicia.⁶⁹ This war began then in 202/1, presumably in the spring, and not in the previous spring as is commonly held.

The Fifth Syrian War

In the first stage of the war, Antiochus III laid siege to the city of Gaza. Polybius considers the siege of Gaza one of the most famous of all sieges, and praises the people of Gaza for remaining faithful to the Ptolemaic dynasty. It is clear, then, that the siege was a

Polybius where it is claimed that Philip had designs on Egypt. Such a plan may be inferred from Polyb. 5.102.1 and 15.24.6, which tell of the Macedonian king's ambitions for world dominion, and consequently of Egypt as well. More specifically, Polyb. 16.10.1, links Philip to a plan to attack Egypt, stating that the king could have sailed to Alexandria after Lade. Errington 1971: 338-39, argues that Polyb. 3.2.8, refers to two phases: an initial agreement made by the Macedonian and Seleucid kings to divide the spoils of the Ptolemaic kingdom and a later stage at which the two kings actually took to the field and invaded various territories of Ptolemy V Epiphanes. Since Philip V only planned to attack Egypt, but never actually made the attempt, Errington argues that κατ' Αἴγυπτον must be incorrect. However the two infinitives ἤρξαντο κατοπραγμαίνειν καὶ τὰς χεῖρας ἐπιβάλλειν are not synonymous, but complementary, for κατοπραγμαίνεω in Polybius can mean "to devise evil, plan mischief"—see Polyb. 4.15.8. I therefore suggest that the second stage mentioned in Polyb. 3.2.8 should be translated as follows: "and they began to plot and attack: Philip concerning himself with Egypt, Caria and Samos while Antiochus was busy with Coele-Syria and Phoenicia." During this second stage, both kings evolved ways to attack and annex the territories specified, along the lines of the agreement they had reached earlier. With the MSS. reading of κατ' Αἴγυπτον thus assured, Polybius refers here to the plans and activities of Philip V all of which belong to the *res Macedoniae* of 202/1: Egypt (16.10.1 -with Pédech), Caria (16.11.1-16.12.11) and Samos (16.2.4 and 9). Since Philip V is linked with Antiochus III at Polybius 3.2.8, it is obvious that the Seleucid king too began his attack in 202/1. The earliest report on Antiochus III's attack upon Coele-Syria also belongs to the events of 202/1 (Polyb. 16.22a), and serves as further proof for the date. Thus the long neglected suggestion of a 201 date for the opening of the Fifth Syrian War, Niese 1893-1903: II. 578, can now be accepted.

⁶⁸ Polyb. 3.2.8 and Appian, *Mac.* 4.1 (inaccurate). That Samos was held by Philip V can be perceived from Polyb. 16.2.4 and 9; Livy 31.31.4. The Egyptian seamen captured at the battle of Chios, Polyb. 16.7.6, served under Philip V on board ships confiscated by the Macedonian king at Samos. See Walbank 1957-79: II. 505-6, 510. Holleaux 1938-68: IV. 233-34 and 312, V. 336 n. 1 and 448, suggests that Philip V annexed Samos peacefully, and hurried to return the island to its Ptolemaic masters at the end of the campaign season of 201, but this is to be rejected. For the violent occupation of Samos, see Habicht 1957b: 233-41 no. 64.

⁶⁹ Polyb. 3.2.8; Jos. *Ant.* 12.131; Justin 31.1.1-2; Porphyry, *FGH* 260 F 45.

lengthy one, but since the fall of the city is described in the sixteenth book of Polybius, Gaza must have been captured no later than the beginning of the autumn of 201. Polybius states that the people of Gaza were unique in their loyalty to Ptolemaic rule, so that we can assume that the rest of the inhabitants of Syria and Phoenicia showed little or no resistance to the advancing Seleucid army: perhaps they even supported Antiochus III. Thanks to this kind of behavior by the local population, the Seleucids were able to invade Syria and Phoenicia quickly.⁷⁰ While the success of the Seleucid offensive characterized the first stage of the war, in the second phase there was a Ptolemaic counter-attack, under the leadership of Scopas the Aetolian. Many cities fell to the Aetolian commander in this offensive, and in the winter of 201/200 Judaea was captured, and Jerusalem surrendered to Scopas. After the capture of Jerusalem, Scopas returned to Egypt; he renewed his counter-offensive in the spring or summer of 200. Since after the battle of Panium Antiochus III had to reconquer the region of Samaria, the cities of Abila and Gadara, and the Bashan (Batanea), it would seem that during the second phase of the war Scopas seized control of these areas.⁷¹ This phase of the campaign ended in the summer of 200 with the Seleucid army overpowering the Ptolemaic army at the battle of Panium.⁷²

After the battle of Panium, the Ptolemaic army, under the command of Scopas, retreated to Sidon, which became the principal Ptolemaic stronghold. The final stage of the Fifth Syrian War is, in fact, characterized by the withdrawal of the Ptolemaic army from open country to the supposed safety of walled cities. Seleucid forces besieged the city of Sidon and three Ptolemaic commanders attempted to break through enemy lines, but failed to rescue Scopas

⁷⁰ For the capture of Gaza, see Polyb. 16.18.2, 16.22a.1-7, 29.12.8. See Niese 1893-1903: II. 578; Walbank 1957-79: II. 523, 527; Holleaux 1938-68: III. 320-21. I cannot find any evidence for Holleaux's claim that the Seleucid army encountered some opposition even before reaching Gaza. The disaffection of the majority of the local population of Syria and Phoenicia towards the Ptolemies supports the view that the siege of Gaza took place within the first campaigning season of the war, that is in 202/1.

⁷¹ Porphyry, *FGH* 260 F 45; *Jos. Ant.* 12.131-33, 12.135-36 (=Polyb. 16.39.1 and 3-4. Polyb. 16.39.2, is a fragment taken from the Suda and it is doubtful whether it belongs here). See Holleaux 1938-68: III. 325 n. 2.

⁷² Polyb. 16.18.1-16.19.11, 16.39.3 (= *Jos. Ant.* 12.136), 28.1.3; *Jos. Ant.* 12.132; Porphyry, *FGH* 260 F 46. For the course of the events, see Holleaux 1938-68: III. 321-26; Niese 1893-1903: II. 578-79. Bar-Kochva 1976: 146-57, offers a reconstruction of the battle.

and his ten thousand soldiers. The Ptolemaic commander was finally forced to surrender when his army began to suffer from starvation. Scopas and his entourage were allowed to depart from Sidon, but most of the Ptolemaic soldiers were taken prisoner. We have no precise information about the duration of the siege of Sidon, but the start of the siege can be dated to the aftermath of the battle of Panium, i.e. to the summer or autumn of 200. Scopas probably surrendered soon afterwards, since we know that by the spring or early summer of 199 he was back in Greece, enlisting fresh mercenaries for the Ptolemaic army.⁷³

After his victory at Panium, Antiochus III sent military units to occupy the various parts of Syria and Phoenicia. The Seleucid king regained control of the Bashan area, the cities of Abila and Gadara in Trans-Jordan, as well as the region of Samaria and Jerusalem. Other Ptolemaic strongholds, among them Sidon and Joppa, nonetheless continued to hold their own after 200.⁷⁴ These Ptolemaic garrisons managed to slow down the Seleucid onslaught, but by 198 Antiochus III achieved complete sovereignty over the Ptolemaic province of Syria and Phoenicia, which was soon to be renamed Coele-Syria and Phoenicia. With these goals achieved, the Seleucid king could now return to his capital, Antioch.⁷⁵

Scopas and the Jews

What was the attitude of the Jews towards the two opposing camps in the Fifth Syrian War? Jerome speaks of a split within the Jewish community: while Antiochus the Great and the generals of Ptolemy V Epiphanes were fighting one another, Judaea, situated in the middle, was divided into opposing camps—some were in favor of Antiochus, while others supported Ptolemy.⁷⁶ Jerome is

⁷³ Porphyry, *FGH* 260 F 46; Livy 31.43.5, 31.44.1. See Holleaux 1938-68: III. 321-27, 329-31.

⁷⁴ For Joppa, see Mørkholm 1981: 5-6, 8; cf. Mørkholm 1983.

⁷⁵ Livy 33.19.8; see Holleaux 1938-68: III. 327; Niese 1893-1903: II. 578 n. 6; Briscoe 1973: 285. The Ptolemaic name Syria and Phoenicia was still used by the new Seleucid government in the Hefzibah inscription (*SEG* XLI 1574 I. 15). The new administrative term for the district, Coele-Syria and Phoenicia, makes its first appearance in an inscription from Soli, *OGIS* 230, which is slightly later than the Hefzibah inscription in date; cf. Bickerman 1976-86: II. 46 n. 3 (a revised version of his 1935 study).

⁷⁶ Jerome, *In Daniele* 11.14b, ed. Glorie p. 908: *Pugnantibus autem contra se Magno Antiocho et ducibus Ptolemaei, in medio Iudaea posita in contraria studia*

silent about the followers of Antiochus III, but tells us who supported Ptolemy. He discusses two instances of support: the first incident concerns Onias IV, who fled to Egypt and erected a temple there, but this occurred some thirty years after the Fifth Syrian War and need not concern us here.

Jerome's second reference to pro-Ptolemaic factions in Judaea is related to Scopas' counter-attack and conquest of Judaea in the second phase of the Fifth Syrian War. He tells us, quoting Porphyry of Tyre, that after the capture of Judaea, Scopas took the heads of the pro-Ptolemaic faction in Judaea along with him to Egypt: *missus Scopas Aet[h]olus dux Ptolemaei partium adversus Antiochum fortiter dimicavit, cepitque Iudaeam et optimates Ptolemaei partium secum abducens in Aegyptum reversus est* (Porphyry, *FGH* 260 F 45). How are we to understand this passage? If we accept it at face value,⁷⁷ the passage does not make much sense. Scopas would not have taken to Egypt the very people who would best serve his aims by remaining in their homeland. The heads of the pro-Ptolemaic aristocracy could have helped the commander rally support for the Ptolemaic regime among the Jewish population as a whole.⁷⁸ Men in authority, such as Scopas, recognized the importance of the role played by the local population: thus Ptolemy IV Philopator, after his victory at Raphia, made a tour of inspection of Syria and Phoenicia in order to generate support for the Ptolemaic royal house (above p. 17). In the Fifth Syrian War, the local population's lack of enthusiasm for the Ptolemies contributed much to the initial success of Antiochus III, while the steadfastness of the people of Gaza probably gave the Ptolemaic regime time to reorganize its forces for Scopas' counter-offensive. We shall also see that at the final conquest of Jerusalem in this war, Antiochus III was helped by the Jews when capturing the city's Ptolemaic citadel. The Seleucid king duly expressed his gratitude by issuing a charter favorable to the Jews (*Jos. Ant.* 12.138-44). Thus, while the decisive factor in determining the outcome of the war was, of course, the relative strength of the contesting armies, the attitude of the local population was a factor which could not be neglected. Furthermore, at the time of Scopas' return to Egypt, Ptolemaic prospects seemed to be much brighter, and the Aetolian general had no need to

scindebatur, aliis Antiocho aliis Ptolemaeo faventibus.

⁷⁷ As does E. Bevan 1927: 258.

⁷⁸ Compare Hitzig 1850: 197.

evacuate his supporters from Palestine. Scopas had just completed the recapture of the southern half of Syria and Phoenicia, and intended to continue the Ptolemaic campaign northward.

An alternative explanation, suggested by Taeubler, seems to eliminate the difficulties in this passage of Porphyry as quoted by Jerome. The heads of the pro-Ptolemaic faction, he argues, were evacuated from their land and brought to Egypt only after the battle of Panium. The pro-Ptolemaic aristocrats were in need of political asylum and their patron could provide it. We have seen, however, that after the battle of Panium, Scopas did not have the opportunity to evacuate the Jewish leadership from Jerusalem. Scopas and his troops retreated from Panium to Sidon and at Sidon they were besieged by the Seleucids. With the surrender of the Ptolemaic forces, Scopas and his entourage were granted safe conduct, apparently to Egypt. Taeubler contends that other Ptolemaic commanders brought the heads of the Jewish aristocracy to a secure place. This evacuation of the Jews supposedly took place in 198, when the Seleucid army captured Syria and Phoenicia in its entirety, and not at the time of the Ptolemaic conquest of Judaea of 201/200.⁷⁹

Taeubler's interpretation of the passage implies that (1) Jerome inadvertently took an event which had taken place after the battle of Panium and dated it to the time of Scopas' offensive which preceded it, and (2) Jerome assigned Scopas a role in events in which he played no part. It is unreasonable to assume that Jerome's source, Porphyry, was guilty of two mistakes here. While this author is not always an accurate historian, this section of *In Daniele* contains unique and very valuable information. Each and every passage in Jerome needs to be evaluated on its own merits.

The Pro-Seleucid Factor in Judaea

Porphyry is based on a reliable source and complements Polybius' account. Polybius relates that Scopas conquered Judaea in the winter (16.39.1 = *Jos. Ant.* 12.135). Scopas may have found it easier to recapture parts of Syria and Phoenicia during the winter, in view of Antiochus III's habit of withdrawing the Seleucid army to its winter quarters in the north each year.⁸⁰ In all likelihood, the

⁷⁹ Taeubler 1946/7: 14-15.

⁸⁰ For Antiochus III's custom of withdrawing his troops to winter quarters, see Polyb. 5.51.1 (221/0), 5.57.1 (220/19), 5.66.5 (219/8—to Seleucia-in-

Ptolemaic commander then brought most of his fighting forces back to Egypt in order to regroup in *their* winter quarters. Obviously, Scopas had to leave strong garrisons in the cities he occupied.⁸¹ If we combine Polybius' narrative of Scopas' winter offensive with the account of the Actolian's subsequent return to Egypt, a coherent picture emerges. Josephus' description of the Fifth Syrian War, based in part on Polybius, furnishes further details of Scopas' counter-offensive in the winter of 201/200. Josephus states that when Scopas proceeded north, he met with resistance from the Jews, and the Ptolemaic army had to retake Judaea by force (*Ant.* 12.135 = Polyb. 16.39.1). We can surmise from this that Jewish leadership at the time was pro-Seleucid. Other passages in the *Antiquities* (12.131 and 138) confirm this point, for we are told that the Jews assisted Antiochus III at the very first stage of the war.

This information helps us to understand Daniel 11.14: "The children of the violent among thy people shall lift themselves up to establish the vision: but they shall fall." While we do not know what vision Daniel is referring to, we can conjecture that the failure of the children of the violent is the defeat of the pro-Seleucid faction in Judaea, when the Ptolemaic army, under Scopas, captured Palestine.⁸² After Judaea had been retaken, Scopas decided to punish the children of the violent, i.e. the heads of the pro-Seleucid faction in Judaea. Jerome's commentary on Daniel 11.14, which is based on Porphyry, reveals what their punishment was. Scopas exiled the *optimates Ptolemaei partium*. He took them with him to Egypt when he led his army to their winter quarters.

Ptolemy son of Thraseas

Why did Jerome use the term *optimates Ptolemaei partium* for the heads of the pro-Seleucid faction? It would seem that the Ptolemy mentioned here is not Ptolemy V Epiphanes, but rather Ptolemy

Pieria), 5.71.12 (218/7—to Ptolemais), 5.107.4 (217/6). For Scopas taking advantage of this in the winter, see Meyer 1921: 123.

⁸¹ Holleaux 1938-68: III. 326. Grainger 1990: 121, plausibly argues that Ptolemy Soter's withdrawal from Phoenicia in 302 coincided with the onset of winter. See also *P. Enteux*. 48 and Guéraud's commentary *ad loc.*, for what seems to be an instance of Ptolemaic soldiers returning to their winter quarters in Egypt during the Fourth Syrian War.

⁸² Hitzig 1850: 197; A. Bevan 1892: 180-81; Driver 1900: 171-72; Plöger 1965: 160-61.

son of Thraseas, the last Ptolemaic governor of Syria and Phoenicia who became its first Seleucid *strategos*. Jerome, who based his work *In Daniele* on Porphyry, apparently confused Ptolemy the governor and Ptolemy the king. Hence he ascribed the fidelity of the Jewish aristocracy to the wrong man. The Jewish leaders were devoted to Ptolemy the governor; Jerome thought that they were loyal to Ptolemy V.

In recent years a great deal has been learned about Ptolemy son of Thraseas' origins and family background, thanks to an inscription from Arsinoe in Cilicia and a subsequent study of the inscription by Jones and Habicht.⁸³ This new evidence indicates that Ptolemy's grandfather, Aetus son of Apollonius, was a citizen of the city Aspendus and served as the Ptolemaic governor of Cilicia during the reign of Ptolemy II Philadelphus, sometime between 279 and 253.⁸⁴ In 253/2 Aetus was in Alexandria acting as the eponymous priest of Alexander the Great and the *Theoi Adelphoi*.⁸⁵ Thraseas was one of Aetus' sons, and like his father, he served as governor of Cilicia. He held office sometime after 238, during the reign of Ptolemy III Euergetes.⁸⁶ Yet another recent inscription, from Tyre, indicates that after governing Cilicia, Thraseas had a second term as governor, this time in Syria and Phoenicia. He became *strategos* of this province some time after 217, in the days of Ptolemy IV Philopator.⁸⁷ Both Aetus and his son seem to have accumulated multiple citizenship of various cities (which they then, in all likelihood, passed on to their descendants). Aetus was not only a citizen of his native city, Aspendus, but also of the Cilician city of Nagidos. His son Thraseas became a citizen of Athens and Alexandria as well.⁸⁸

Thraseas' son, Ptolemy, is first mentioned by Polybius when the historian describes the preparations of the Ptolemaic army in Egypt, in 219, for the crucial battle against the Seleucid army

⁸³ For the original publication of this inscription see Kirsten & Opelt 1989. For further discussion, see Jones & Habicht 1989; cf. SEG XXXIX 1426.

⁸⁴ SEG XXXIX 1426 ll. 19-20; see Jones & Habicht 1989: 318, 336-37.

⁸⁵ Ijsewijn 1961: 25 no. 33; Clarysse & van der Veken 1983: 8 no. 38.

⁸⁶ SEG XXXIX 1426 ll. 1 and 19-25; see Jones & Habicht 1989: 318, 335-37. Habicht also discusses other members of this family, see pp. 343-45.

⁸⁷ SEG XXXIX 1596b; see Rey-Coquais 1989: 614-17; Habicht in Jones & Habicht 1989: 345-46.

⁸⁸ SEG XXXIX 1426 ll. 19-20 (Aspendus and Nagidos); IG II² 836 (Athens); SEG XXXIX 1596b (Alexandria). See Habicht in Jones & Habicht 1989: 342-43, 346; Rey-Coquais 1989: 614.

(5.63.8-5.65.10). Polybius indicates that three men were responsible for training the Greek mercenaries and the Macedonian phalanx: Phoxidas, Andromachus, and Ptolemy. Andromachus and Ptolemy were joint commanders of the Macedonian phalanx, but the former seems to have been superior in rank.⁸⁹ Both commanders were of Aspendian origin, but Polybius speaks only of Andromachus' Aspendian descent, and omits any reference to Ptolemy's origins. Of the eleven foreign officers mentioned by Polybius in this passage (5.63-65), only Ptolemy son of Thraseas appears without his place of origin and this led Habicht to find fault with Polybius' text.⁹⁰ However, Habicht himself plausibly suggests that Ptolemy's family moved from Asia Minor to Alexandria ca. 253/2, when Ptolemy's grandfather, Aetus, served as the eponymous priest of Alexander the Great and the *Theoi Adelphoi*.⁹¹ We have already seen that Thraseas (and most probably Ptolemy as well) held Alexandrian citizenship. It seems likely, then, that Polybius erred and thought that Ptolemy's family was Alexandrian. Since in 5.63-65 Polybius stresses the Greek contribution to the Ptolemaic military effort, he did not choose to mention the (supposed) Egyptian origins of one of the commanders.⁹²

In 218, a year after the reorganization of the Ptolemaic army began, many Ptolemaic officers deserted to the side of Antiochus III (Polyb. 5.70.10-11). In the following year, the battle of Raphia took place. Although Polybius describes the engagement in great detail (5.80.3-5.86.2), he does not mention Ptolemy son of Thraseas even once. Since an inscription from Soli (*OGIS* 230) establishes that Ptolemy son of Thraseas was the Seleucid governor of Coele-Syria and Phoenicia, many scholars have concluded that Ptolemy was one of the officers who deserted during the Fourth Syrian War.⁹³ But it is likely that Ptolemy son of Thraseas defected only later and did participate in the battle of Raphia, as one of the two commanders of the Greek phalanx in the Ptolemaic army.

⁸⁹ Polyb. 5.65.3-4. See Huss 1976: 61 n. 258; Gera 1987: 70.

⁹⁰ Habicht in Jones & Habicht 1989: 339.

⁹¹ In Jones & Habicht 1989: 346.

⁹² On the Greek contribution to the preparations undertaken by the Ptolemaic army, see especially Polyb. 5.63.13, 5.64.4-5. For Polybius' contempt for Egyptians, whether natives or of Greek stock, see Walbank 1957-79: III. 312.

⁹³ Launey 1949: 187; Bar-Kochva 1976: 87-88. Beloch 1912-27: IV/2. 356 n. 2; Bengtson 1944: 161 n. 3, and others, see 219 as a *terminus post quem* for Ptolemy's desertion.

Polybius is silent about his participation in the battle, simply because when military units had two commanders, the historian often omitted the name of one of them.⁹⁴

After the Ptolemaic victory at Raphia, Ptolemy IV Philopator appointed Andromachus governor of Syria and Phoenicia (Polyb. 5.87.6), and subsequently, as we now know from the new inscription from Tyre, Thraseas became *strategos* in his stead. It seems likely that Thraseas' son Ptolemy followed in his father's footsteps and served as the very last governor of Ptolemaic Syria and Phoenicia. Shortly before or during the Fifth Syrian War, Ptolemy defected to the Seleucid side.⁹⁵ There are several factors which may have led to Ptolemy's defection. The Ptolemaic *strategos* probably sensed that his rule over Syria and Phoenicia, as well as his own private property, were in danger. The success of Antiochus III's campaign in the East was evidence of the Seleucid kingdom's new found strength. It seemed apparent that Antiochus would renew his war on the Ptolemaic kingdom, and it was clear that Syria and Phoenicia would be one of his principal targets (Polyb. 15.25.13; see above p. 21). The local rebellions in Egypt and the internal power struggle in the Ptolemaic court demonstrated that it would be easy to defeat the Ptolemies at this stage.

Furthermore, Ptolemy son of Thraseas may have had reason to believe that his position was imperiled by members of the Alexandrian court. In view of their service to Ptolemy IV Philopator, both Ptolemy and his father must have had strong ties with the dominant personalities at court, Sosibius and Agathocles. After the death of Ptolemy IV, these two highly influential ministers vanished. The new leading figures in Alexandria, headed by Tlepolemus, were less committed to the men associated with the rule of Ptolemy IV Philopator. It was not unlikely that these new leaders at court would consider replacing Ptolemy son of Thraseas with a man more to their liking.⁹⁶ Another factor which may have influenced Ptolemy's decision to defect was the Seleucid king's benevolent treatment of Ptolemaic defectors (such as Theodotus the

⁹⁴ Huss 1976: 61 n. 258; Gera 1987: 69-70. Habicht in Jones & Habicht 1989: 339-40 n. 67, draws attention to Volkmann 1959b: 1682, who rejected the view that Ptolemy son of Thraseas deserted in 218; cf. however Volkmann 1959d.

⁹⁵ Taylor 1979: 122-26; Gera 1987: 67-70.

⁹⁶ See the tentative sketch of Ptolemy son of Thraseas' position in the Alexandrian court in Gera 1987: 71-73; Habicht in Jones & Habicht 1989: 341.

Aetolian) during the Fourth Syrian War. The son of Thraseas had reason to believe that he, too, would be given a favorable reception.

It would appear that Ptolemy son of Thraseas served as the Seleucid governor of Coele-Syria and Phoenicia by the year 201. An inscription from Soli in Cilicia shows him to be the Seleucid *strategos* and high priest of Coele-Syria and Phoenicia sometime between 197–187.⁹⁷ Another inscription, found at Hefzibah in the Beth-Shean valley, contains two memoranda sent by a Seleucid governor named Ptolemy, to the king, Antiochus III. The king's response to these memoranda also appears in the inscription.⁹⁸ The Ptolemy mentioned in this inscription from Hefzibah is without a doubt Ptolemy son of Thraseas,⁹⁹ but it is difficult to decipher the dates found in the inscription. The first editor of the Hefzibah inscription read the dates 111, 112, and 117 of the Seleucid era, i.e. 202/1, 201/200, and 195 respectively.¹⁰⁰ If this reading is correct, then Ptolemy son of Thraseas already served as governor of the new Seleucid district in 202/1. According to a different reading of the inscription, the dates are the years 114 and 117 of the Seleucid era (199/8 and 195).¹⁰¹ In this case, the earliest proven date we have for Ptolemy's term as *strategos* is 199/8, but it is likely that he took office as Seleucid governor of Syria and Phoenicia two or three years earlier.

There is one further bit of evidence indicating that at about 201, Ptolemy son of Thraseas was already governor on behalf of Antiochus III. In the *Antiquities* (12.138–44), Josephus quotes a *prostagma* or charter of Antiochus III, which is addressed to a Seleucid official named Ptolemy and this Ptolemy is again clearly the son of Thraseas.¹⁰² One of Antiochus III's main concerns in the *prostagma* is the rebuilding of Jerusalem, so the charter must date to after the

⁹⁷ *OGIS* 230. See Radet 1893: 62; Holleaux 1938–68: III. 161. Grandjean & Rougemont 1972: 109–11 no. 15, re-edited the inscription. Ptolemy's presence in Cilicia at this time suggests that Antiochus III may have wanted to make use of the family connections of his governor, whose father and grandfather had been the *stratego*i of Cilicia under the Ptolemies.

⁹⁸ First published by Landau 1966. For subsequent discussions of the text, see Fischer 1979; Bertrand 1982; Piejko 1991a; cf. *SEG* XLI 1574. There is a possibility that the first memorandum in the inscription was addressed to Antiochus' oldest, homonymous son; see Landau 1966: 67.

⁹⁹ Landau 1966: 66.

¹⁰⁰ Landau 1966: 58–60 ll. 4, 9, 19, 36.

¹⁰¹ Fischer 1979: 131–33 ll. 4, 10, 20, 37; cf. *SEG* XLI 1574.

¹⁰² See Radet 1893: 61; Bickerman 1976–86: II. 46; Tcherikover 1959: 82, 438 n. 115.

final capture of Jerusalem by the Seleucids. Polybius mentions this conquest in book 16 which means that by autumn of 200 Jerusalem must have been in Seleucid hands.¹⁰³ It is reasonable to assume that Antiochus III issued this *prostagma* soon after the capture of Jerusalem, i.e. in 200/199, but a slightly later date cannot be excluded.¹⁰⁴

Why does Jerome term the pro-Seleucid faction in Judaea supporters of Ptolemy son of Thraseas, rather than supporters of Antiochus III? At first sight it would seem more natural to link these Jewish supporters directly with the king, but, in fact, the heads of the Jewish aristocracy probably supported the Seleucid king because they were influenced by Ptolemy son of Thraseas.¹⁰⁵ Since Ptolemy son of Thraseas succeeded his father as governor of Syria and Phoenicia, he must have wielded considerable influence in the area. He would be able to make use of the ties that Thraseas had established during his tenure, in addition to forging relationships with the residents and leaders of Syria and Phoenicia on his own. Ptolemy not only inherited useful connections in the area; his father also bequeathed him an estate in the province, near Scythopolis.¹⁰⁶ When shifting his allegiance to Antiochus III, Ptolemy could use his ties with the local populace to expedite the capture of the area. His support of Antiochus III would have prompted the local populace to give their blessing to the Seleucid conqueror. The Jews probably responded favorably to the governor's lobbying; we have seen (above p. 28), in any event, that by the first stage of the Fifth Syrian War, they were fighting for Antiochus III. After the Ptolemaic counter-offensive, which led to the capture of Judaea in the winter of 201/200, the Jewish leaders were punished for their support of Ptolemy son of Thraseas and Antiochus III. Scopas elected to exile them to Egypt. But the Jewish support of the Seleucid king and his governor did not wane.

¹⁰³ Polyb. 16.39.3-4 = Jos. *Ant.* 12.136. For the date see Holleaux 1938-68: III. 326.

¹⁰⁴ Bickerman 1976-86: II. 84, dates the *prostagma* to 200-197.

¹⁰⁵ Analogously, the leading men in Phocaea supported Antiochus III in 190 on account of their loyalty to his son Seleucus (later, Seleucus IV)—ἴδιοι μὲν τοῦ Σελεύκου καὶ ταύτης τῆς ὑποθέσεως, Polyb. 21.6.4. Seleucus served in the same year as the commander of Aeolis—cf. Livy 37.8.5.

¹⁰⁶ SEG XLI 1574 ll. 23-24. Woodhead (quoted by Landau 1966: 66 n. 14) was the first to see this as evidence that Ptolemy son of Thraseas inherited these possessions. See also Bagnall 1976: 15-16; Habicht in Jones & Habicht 1989: 346.

When the Seleucid army advanced to Jerusalem in the third stage of the Fifth Syrian War, the Jews supported Antiochus III and helped the Seleucid army take control of the citadel in Jerusalem where the Ptolemaic garrison was encamped.¹⁰⁷ This continued support for Antiochus III, even after the heads of the pro-Seleucid faction were exiled, is significant. The high priest Simon and the heads of the Jerusalem *gerousia* succeeded the "children of the violent" alluded to in the book of Daniel, and they too backed Antiochus III.¹⁰⁸ The influence of the governor, coupled with the prestige of the Seleucid kingdom at the time and the weakness of the Ptolemaic kingdom, convinced the Jews to side with Antiochus III. The Jews were not alone in endorsing Antiochus III, for Polybius tells us that almost none of the people of Syria and Phoenicia remained loyal to Ptolemy V Epiphanes (16.22a). Support of the victorious Seleucids was well rewarded. In the case of the Jews, we know that Antiochus III, through his governor Ptolemy, extended the rights of the priestly class and members of the *gerousia*, and buttressed their position at the head of Jewish society.¹⁰⁹

4. Conclusions

In conclusion, we have seen that the sources which discuss the behavior of the Jews in the Fourth and Fifth Syrian Wars do not allow us to postulate the existence of Jewish factions which consistently supported either the Ptolemaic or the Seleucid dynasty. The account in 3 Maccabees of the warm reception that Ptole-

¹⁰⁷ Jos. *Ant.* 12.133 and 138; Polyb. 16.39.3-4 (= Jos. *Ant.* 12.136); Porphyry, *FGH* 260 F 46.

¹⁰⁸ For the members of the pro-Seleucid party at the final phase of this war, see Tcherikover 1959: 79-82. Tcherikover considers the Tobiads to be among the leaders of the pro-Seleucid faction, and associates their brother, Hyrcanus, with the supporters of the Ptolemaic dynasty; cf. below, Ch. II.

¹⁰⁹ Bickerman 1976-86: II. 68-69, 82-83; Tcherikover 1959: 88. See also Jos. *Ant.* 12.145-46, a proclamation of Antiochus III which forbids gentiles to enter the Temple and bans the introduction of impure animals, their skin, and their meat, into Jerusalem. The authenticity of this document has been accepted by Bickerman 1946-48, but he was unable to explain satisfactorily the prohibitions relating to impure animals, because these bans do not conform to the Pharisaic point of view. We now know that such prohibitions were followed by the sectarians at Qumran, apparently in agreement with the Halakha of the Sadducees. See 11QT^a 51.4-5; 4QMMT B 21-22, 58-62. Cf. Baumgarten 1980: 161-63; Qimron 1994: 155, 162-64; Sussman 1994: 189-90.

my IV received from the residents of Jerusalem is merely an adaptation of what Polybius wrote about the reception that the Ptolemaic king enjoyed throughout Syria and Phoenicia. We can only assume that the attitude of the Jews to the Ptolemaic monarch was no different from that of the populace in general, which enthusiastically received the victorious king, primarily for practical reasons. The results of the battle of Raphia and the Seleucid army's rapid retreat from Syria and Phoenicia made it clear to the local populace that the Ptolemies were likely to rule them for the foreseeable future. It was in their best interest that the renewed relationship with the Ptolemaic leadership be based on an attitude of goodwill.

In the Fifth Syrian War, on the other hand, the Jews did not limit themselves to expressing support passively for one or another of the rival kings, but actually assisted Antiochus III. Here, too, the behavior of the Jews was consistent with that of most of the residents of the area, who deserted the Ptolemaic cause. The Jews' support of Antiochus III can be explained in light of the special ties which were forged between the Jewish leadership and Ptolemy son of Thraseas. Ptolemy, who was the last Ptolemaic governor of Syria and Phoenicia, defected to the Seleucid camp and, in all likelihood, convinced the Jews to cooperate with his new master. Once again, the behavior of the Jews, like that of most of their neighbors, did not indicate an ideological commitment or a continued loyalty to the Ptolemaic or Seleucid monarchy. The strength of the Seleucid kingdom (in comparison to the weaker Ptolemaic rule) coupled with the influence of Ptolemy son of Thraseas, convinced the Jewish populace and most of their non-Jewish neighbors as well, to shift their allegiance to Antiochus III.

CHAPTER TWO

THE TOBIADS: FICTION AND HISTORY

1. *The Story of the Tobiads*

Our discussion of Jewish political alignments in the course of the fourth quarter of the third century has pointed to the existence of pro-Seleucid groups within Judaea who supported the cause of Antiochus III during the Fifth Syrian War. Reliable evidence for the existence of a rival Jewish faction which upheld the Ptolemaic cause has not surfaced, although it is likely that in the earlier conflict of the Fourth Syrian War, the Jews of Syria and Phoenicia did express their loyalty to Ptolemy IV Philopator once the battle of Raphia had been won.

The story of Joseph the Tobiad and his son Hyrcanus has, however, been seen by many as reflecting the tensions among the Jewish leadership of Syria and Phoenicia, against the backdrop of the Syrian wars. This narrative is embedded in Josephus' *Antiquities* (12.156-222 and 228-36), but the Jewish historian must have taken it from an earlier source. The unique nature of this account is such that it merits special treatment.

Misleading Chronology in Josephus

Before plunging into a detailed discussion of this story, it is necessary to clarify some points of chronology. Josephus, in an attempt to arrange his material chronologically, has placed the beginning of the story after the marriage of Ptolemy V Epiphanes to Cleopatra I, the daughter of Antiochus III, in 194/3.¹ This cannot be correct, for the heroes of our tale, Joseph son of Tobiah and his son Hyrcanus, maintain close contacts with the Ptolemaic court in Alexandria.² The whole of Joseph's career and the early part of his son's must have preceded the final occupation of Syria and Phoenicia by

¹ *Jos. Ant.* 12.154. Cf. Livy 35.13.4; Porphyry, *FGH* 260 F 47; Appian, *Syr.* 5.

² *Jos. Ant.* 12.158-87, 12.196-221. See Büchler 1899: 47-54; Holleaux 1938-68: III. 342-45; Tcherikover 1959: 128.

Antiochus III in the Fifth Syrian War.³ The reason for Josephus' mistake here is his source, which depicts Hyrcanus as a contemporary of Seleucus IV (*Jos. Ant.* 12.234). This led to a simple but erroneous conclusion: the respective parents must have been contemporaries as well. Josephus still had to forge a connection between this assumption and the links Joseph and Hyrcanus had with Alexandria. The Jewish historian must have found in one of his Hellenistic sources a misleading statement, which also made its way to later sources, i.e. that Antiochus relinquished his possession of Coele-Syria and gave it to Ptolemy as a dowry. Josephus prefixed this report to the story of Joseph and Hyrcanus, and in doing so sought to explain the attachment of these Jewish dignitaries to the Ptolemaic kingdom.⁴ Since the account of the two Tobiads mentions that the Ptolemaic king and queen of the story had each enjoyed a share in the revenues from Coele-Syria, Josephus concluded that under the terms of their marriage agreement, Cleopatra I shared with Ptolemy V Epiphanes the income from the land which had been given to her husband as a dowry. Josephus therefore took the statement about this division of proceeds between the king and queen from the Tobiad account and wrongly assigned it to the two royals, namely Cleopatra I and Ptolemy V.⁵ Josephus' chronological framework for the story may therefore be ignored.

The Two Sections of the Tale

The division of the story into two separate sections also stems from Josephus' preoccupation with chronology.⁶ The book of I Maccabees, an important source of Josephus, contains a letter of Jonathan the Hasmonaean to the Spartans, to which an earlier

³ Polyb. 28.1.3, attests to the continued Seleucid possession of Syria and Phoenicia from 200 until the Sixth Syrian War. To the corroborative evidence assembled by Holleaux 1938-68: III. 339-40 n. 3, add now Eshel & Kloner 1996, on Marisa, and Le Rider 1992b: 39-42, on Ptolemais.

⁴ *Jos. Ant.* 12.154. Cf. Appian, *Syr.* 5; Porphyry, *FGH* 260 F 47. Appian is independent of Josephus.

⁵ The key passages are *Jos. Ant.* 12.155 and 177-78. See the brilliant discussion of Holleaux 1938-68: III. 337-55.

⁶ Cf. Tcherikover 1959: 462 n. 54: "The whole mélange was caused by Josephus' decision to interrupt the narrative for chronological reasons in the middle, and to tell the reader what happened in the reign of Seleucus IV and in the time of the High Priest Simon, the son of Onias."

communication, from the Spartan king Areus to the high priest Onias, is appended (12.6-23). Josephus identified this Onias with Onias III. According to the information available to Josephus, Onias III died at the very beginning of the reign of Antiochus IV.⁷ Consequently, the historian had to assign the Spartan king's epistle to Onias to the reign of Seleucus IV. Since Seleucus is mentioned in connection with Hyrcanus, Josephus found no alternative but to insert the letter to Onias into the middle of his Hyrcanus narrative. He chose to introduce this passage at a point which would least disturb the unity of the Tobiad story, by inserting it after the conclusion of the account of Joseph the Tobiad, that is after Hyrcanus' youthful exploits had been told, but before embarking on his performance as an independent dynast.⁸ By doing so, Josephus divided the story of Joseph the Tobiad and his son into two different sections. The intervening passage has the Areus letter as its nucleus, but includes additional information, which is designed to have the story move from Antiochus III to Seleucus IV, and from Onias III's predecessors until his own time (Jos. *Ant.* 12.223-28).⁹

The Tale of the Tobiads

Let us turn now to the story of the two Tobiads. The narrative tells of the high priest Onias II's refusal to pay taxes to King Ptolemy. Joseph son of Tobiah (who through his mother was a nephew of the high priest) successfully intercedes, and thus punitive steps from the king are averted. Joseph becomes the leader (προστάτης) of his people. While attending the annual auction of taxes in Alexandria, Joseph outbids the heads of the cities of Syria and Phoenicia and becomes the tax-farmer for the entire province. Joseph is now able to exert his authority over the cities of Ascalon and Scythopolis. The story goes on to describe the hostility between Joseph's seven older sons and his youngest and most

⁷ Jos. *Ant.* 12.237. 2 Macc. 4.7-13, gives the same date for the end of Onias III's term as high priest, but dates his death later on, in 170.

⁸ Here again Josephus fails. The high priest Simon II is mentioned both before and after Onias III, Jos. *Ant.* 12.224-29.

⁹ Consequently, the two passages do not reflect two different sources as claimed by Otto 1914: 528-32, and Momigliano 1975b: 607-10; both scholars adduce further arguments. Most significantly, each of the two passages tells of a war between Hyrcanus and his brothers after which Hyrcanus was forced to retire east of the Jordan. In my previous discussion of the story, Gera 1990: 35-36, the unifying elements in the two passages have been pointed out.

beloved son, Hyrcanus, the child of his second wife. A son is then born to King Ptolemy and personal congratulations are in order. Since Hyrcanus' father is too old to make the journey, and his brothers are unwilling to go, Hyrcanus goes to Alexandria to represent the father. At Alexandria, he gains the favor of the king, the queen, and their retinue. Hyrcanus' accomplishments in Alexandria arouse further envy among his brothers, who wage war against him upon his return. Joseph is angry at his beloved son for depleting his resources in Alexandria and does not intervene. Hyrcanus kills two of his brothers, but is unable to return to Jerusalem, which is held by his father and brothers. He then crosses the Jordan River, and levies taxes on the local barbarians there (Jos. *Ant.* 12.156-222).

The second passage again tells of a war between Hyrcanus and his brothers. Here, the high priest and most of the local populace support the brothers, and Hyrcanus is forced to retire across the Jordan River, where he fights unceasingly against the Arabs. There he builds a strong fort ($\beta\acute{\alpha}\rho\iota\varsigma$),¹⁰ adorns it with statues of animals, hews caves in the rock, and installs water works. Hyrcanus rules his domain, which was called Tyrus, for seven years. According to Josephus, he reigned during exactly the same period in which Seleucus IV ruled over Syria. With the death of the Seleucid king, Hyrcanus fears that the powerful new king will punish him for his treatment of the neighboring Arabs. He therefore chooses to commit suicide, and his property falls into the hands of Antiochus IV (Jos. *Ant.* 12.228-36).

This is the essence of the story as told by Josephus. Which source did Josephus use here? Is it reliable? Although scholars such as Willrich and Wellhausen have expressed grave doubts concerning the historicity of the story,¹¹ many historians accept this tale of the Tobiads as essentially true. Three main points are considered to be factual: Joseph son of Tobiah, was the chief tax-farmer of Syria and Phoenicia;¹² Hyrcanus, Joseph's son, was an

¹⁰ Ern. Will 1987, in his study of the word *baris* concludes that it applies to installations devoid of military value. This makes little sense. The military nature of the *baris* in Jos. *Ant.* 12.229-30, is apparent from the accompanying adjective ισχυρά , as well as from the context, Hyrcanus' wars against the Arabs. The meaning "strong fort" for *baris* is confirmed by Jos. *Vita* 246. Cf. Zaccagnini 1980: 139-44.

¹¹ Willrich 1895: 91-95; Wellhausen 1921: 229-32.

¹² Préaux 1939: 456-57; Tcherikover 1959: 127, 132-34; Hengel 1974: I. 27-28.

independent ruler in territories to the east of the Jordan, and virtually rebelled against the Seleucid king;¹³ both father and son made visits to the court of Ptolemy.¹⁴ Some scholars maintain that the tension between the story's protagonists arises from contradictory political attitudes towards the Syrian wars. The refusal of Onias II to pay taxes to King Ptolemy is seen as evidence of Onias II's pro-Seleucid leanings; the success of Joseph son of Tobiah in allaying the king's rage is thought to indicate that Joseph belonged to the opposite camp. Similarly, the struggle between Hyrcanus and his brothers, which followed Joseph's death, is sometimes associated with the political tensions stemming from the Fifth Syrian War. Hyrcanus is seen as supporting Ptolemaic rule over Syria and Phoenicia, while his brothers supposedly defended the Seleucid cause.¹⁵

This chapter will demonstrate that the story of the Tobiads, as reported to us by Josephus, is far from reliable.

2. *Hyrcanus and Araq el Emir*

Hyrcanus and his fort is an appropriate starting point. It is clear from a reference in an independent source, 2 Macc. 3.11, where Hyrcanus is mentioned as an important figure active during the reign of Seleucus IV, that Hyrcanus is a historical figure. Indeed, the positive identification of the area of the fort Hyrcanus is said to have built with the site of Araq el Emir would seem to dispel any doubts about the reliability of Josephus' report on Hyrcanus' activity east of the Jordan. The location and description of the fort itself seem to fit the site and physical remains of Araq el Emir.¹⁶ In addition, two inscriptions consisting of the one word "Tobiah" have been found there.¹⁷ Hyrcanus' grandfather was named Tobiah (Jos. *Ant.* 12.160) and one of his ancestors was Tobiah, the

270-71; Bagnall 1976: 20-21; Bickerman 1988: 120.

¹³ Tcherikover 1959: 127-28, 137-38; Momigliano 1975b: 615-16. Momigliano accepts Hyrcanus' rule as historical, but dates it to 175-168, i.e. to the reign of Antiochus IV Epiphanes rather than to the reign of his brother Seleucus IV, as stated in Jos. *Ant.* 12.234-36.

¹⁴ Tcherikover 1959: 133, 135.

¹⁵ Zeitlin 1933: 179-81, 184; Tcherikover 1959: 137; M. Stern 1962: 42-47.

¹⁶ Irby & Mangles 1823: 473-74; Conder 1889: 65 ff.; Butler 1919; Mazar 1957: 140-41.

¹⁷ *CIF* 868; cf. Littmann 1921: 1-6.

Ammonite servant.¹⁸ Furthermore, the site of Araq el Emir can be linked to the Land of Tobiah situated east of the Jordan, and mentioned in the Zenon papyri.¹⁹ Another of the Zenon papyri alludes to a certain βίρτα τῆς Ἀμμανίτιδος and to a number of Tobiah's soldiers found there (*C. P. Jud.* 1). Therefore, the *birta* must have been located within the boundaries of the Land of Tobiah.²⁰ Since *birta*, like *baris*, means "fort," scholars have suggested that it should be identified with the *baris* mentioned in Josephus and hence with the site of Araq el Emir itself.²¹

However, the *birta* is mentioned in connection with Tobiah, Hyrcanus' grandfather, and was already standing in 259. Thus, it is clear that Hyrcanus could not have built it. The "Tobiah" inscriptions found at the opening of the caves show that the caves were hewn by a Tobiah. It is patently wrong to attribute this feat to Hyrcanus.²² In fact, epigraphists tend to date the Tobiah

¹⁸ Meyer 1921: 133-35; Mazar 1957: 143-45 and 229-38, further attempts to identify the pre-exilic ancestors of the Tobiads, but this is rejected by Hengel 1974: II. 178 n. 68.

¹⁹ *C. P. Jud.* 2d. The complete text was published by T. C. Skeat as *P. Lond.* 1930. Mazar 1957: 140, argues for the identification of Sorabitta, mentioned in *P. Lond.* 1930 I. 175 and in PCZ 59004 (*C. P. Jud.* 2a I. 6), with Hyrcanus' fort, Tyrus; Tcherikover 1957: 116, accepts this. However, we are told that Zenon's party arrived in Sorabitta on the twenty-eighth of the month Dystros and came to the Land of Tobiah only on the next day (*P. Lond.* 1930 II. 171-76). Sorabitta must have been outside the Land of Tobiah, but adjacent to it. Tcherikover's original view (1937: 58, 87-88 n. 97) should be retained; cf. Skeat's note *ad P. Lond.* 1930 I. 175. The identification of Sorabitta is complicated by the large number of sites around Araq el Emir whose names use components like Sour, Sar and Sarabit. Nevertheless, I suggest identifying Sorabitta with the Hellenistic and Herodian site of Khirbet al Sour, four kilometers southwest of Araq el Emir on the way from Jericho. See Villeneuve 1988: 261-62, 280-82.

²⁰ This conclusion is rejected by Mittmann 1970: 208-9, who identifies the *birta* with Amman; cf. Ern. Will 1982; Villeneuve 1986: 159; Zayadine 1991: 11. If that were true, the *birta* would have been mentioned as being in Rabatammana in the province of Ammanitis. See the use of such a formula in Ezra 6.2, for Ecbatana, and in Cross 1985: 11, for Samaria. (*PSI* 616, one of the Zenon papyri, actually mentions Rabatammana). βίρτα τῆς Ἀμμανίτιδος must therefore be a fort in a rural area, akin to the ones discussed by L. Robert 1970: 589 and 598-602. Furthermore, the "Tobiah" inscriptions of Araq el Emir tie in nicely with the soldiers under the command of a Tobiah. This latter Tobiah may either be the man of the inscription, or another family member.

²¹ Meaning of *birta*: Kaufman 1974: 44; Hoftijzer & Jongeling 1995: I. 155. Identification: Momigliano 1975b: 601-2; Tcherikover 1957: 116; Mazar 1957: 140-41.

²² Momigliano 1975b: 601-3.

inscriptions to the fourth or early third century.²³ It should also be borne in mind that the position of the inscriptions in relation to the caves makes it clear that the grottos were hewn in the rock either earlier than, or at the same time as, the incision of the "Tobiah" inscriptions. Thus the caves were hewn by a Tobiah some three generations before Hyrcanus. These arguments, first formulated by Momigliano, refute two major claims concerning Hyrcanus, i.e. that he built the *baris* and that he hewed the caves of Araq el Emir.

Archaeological digging at this site, near the famous building known as Qasr el Abd, uncovered a monumental gateway as well as two floors connected to the gate. Six Antiochus III coins, dating from ca. 208–200 were found on the upper floor. The archaeologists concluded that these coins set a *terminus post quem* for the building of the gateway.²⁴ However, dated artifacts on a floor attest to the *latest* period in which the floor was in use.²⁵ We can deduce, therefore, that this floor and the one below it were in use until the end of the third century.²⁶ A number of artifacts, mainly Ptolemaic coins dating to the third century, were found in a small mound further north on the site.²⁷ This is an indication that another section of the site, namely the mound, was inhabited during the third century.²⁸

²³ Albright 1932: 222 n. 111; Cross 1961: 191 n. 13. Cf. Naveh 1970: 63, who says that "the inscription appears to be of the fourth century B.C.E." Naveh was reluctant to take a firm position because P. Lapp's excavations at Araq el Emir did not seem to yield material predating the second century, but see our discussion below. Mazar 1957: 141-42, dated these inscriptions to the fifth century but later changed his mind. See Mazar 1980: 275-76.

²⁴ Dentzer, Villeneuve, Larché & Zayadine 1982, especially on pp. 309-11, 320; cf. Dentzer, Villeneuve & Larché 1982; Dentzer, Villeneuve & Larché 1983.

²⁵ Albright 1943: 2 n. 1; Kenyon 1964: 146.

²⁶ See now Zayadine 1991: 17, who makes a step in that direction, dating both the Qasr el Abd and the gate to the very end of the third century.

²⁷ A Rhodian jar-handle dated to 280-220: N. Lapp 1983b: 24 no. 292, fig. 10/6. Ptolemaic coins: N. Lapp 1983a: 14 no. 28, fig. 7/1; Larché, Villeneuve & Zayadine 1982: 496. Cf. Villeneuve 1988: 261.

²⁸ Ern. Will 1991b: 97 and 101, states that the archaeological data does not allow a more precise date than the Hellenistic period for the Qasr el Abd. The dating of this building to the beginning of the second century is, it seems, based on the conviction that the untimely death of Hyrcanus explains why the building of the Qasr remained unfinished. See P. Lapp 1963: 24-26, and Ern. Will 1991b: 93-95, who for this reason vindicate Josephus' accuracy. If Josephus' language is pressed, the opposite may be maintained. The act of building is mentioned in the *aorist*, $\phi\kappa\omicron\delta\delta\omicron\mu\eta\sigma\epsilon$ i.e. Hyrcanus is said to have completed the *baris*, *Ant.* 12.230. Those who maintain that the Qasr is the *baris* have to explain this incongruity. Other reasons, not necessarily connected with the story in the *Antiquities*—such as lack of funds—could also account

The Baris and the Mound

The mound is situated 200 meters from the cliffs of Araq el Emir, in which the caves are found, and faces the cliffs; Qasr el Abd, which most scholars identify with Hyrcanus' *baris*, is situated 600 meters to the south of the cliffs.²⁹ Josephus relates that the caves were hewn in the rock facing the *baris* (*Ant.* 12.231). This description fits the identification of the mound with Josephus' *baris*, rather than Qasr el Abd. Furthermore, the location of the Qasr, as well as the nature of the building itself, rule out the possibility that the Qasr el Abd was built for military purposes.³⁰ The mound, on the other hand, dominates the valley of Araq el Emir, and is strategically placed in relation to the area outside the valley. The southern and eastern slopes of the mound descend rather steeply towards the outlying territory, making an attack from these directions difficult. The more gentle slopes of the western and northern sides of the hill face the interior of the valley of Araq el Emir and thus are protected by mound itself. Two routes lead into the valley, one on the southern flank of the hill and one on its northern side, and both are dominated by the mound. The northern entrance is also protected by the cliffs opposite the mound and their double tier of caves. In other words, the northern entrance to the valley is flanked by two natural features, the cliffs and the mound, which together provide defense against potential invaders. Finally, to the east of the mound and below it lies Wadi es-Sir, a natural route from Jericho across the Jordan river to Philadelphia, or to the northern parts of Trans-Jordan.³¹ The site of the mound is in a key position for the defense of Araq el Emir from outside attacks. No wonder, then, that excavations have revealed that during the Hellenistic period the hill was fortified by defensive walls in two successive stages.³² Earlier excavations have uncovered traces of

for the unfinished state of the Qasr. At any rate, Momigliano's arguments, as well as those adduced here, disprove the claim found in Josephus' text, that it was Hyrcanus who built the *baris*. Moreover, we will show that Josephus' statement that the domain of Hyrcanus was confiscated by Antiochus IV after his ascension to the throne, is also misleading.

²⁹ See Ern. Will & F. Larché 1991: II. pl. 1.

³⁰ Villeneuve 1986: 160; Ern. Will 1987: 255.

³¹ Villeneuve 1986: 161, 164. See Ern. Will & F. Larché 1991: I. pl. A 1/1, II. pl. 1.

³² Larché, Villeneuve & Zayadine 1981: 339-40; Villeneuve 1986: 162-63.

enclosures which could have served as living quarters.³³ One further find on the mound was a sculptured head of a lion. The implication of the lion is unclear because this piece of sculpture was found in secondary use.³⁴ All these elements—the strategic importance of the mound, its defensive walls, the position of the mound opposite the cliffs, the presence of third century artifacts, and the feline sculpture which may have originated from the hill—point to one solution: the *mound* is the site of the fort mentioned in the Zenon papyri and Josephus' text. The Qasr, which was surrounded by an artificial lake, should be identified with the palace (αὐλή) into which Hyrcanus is reported to have introduced an abundance of running water.³⁵

Josephus' source was wrong in attributing the building of the *baris* and the hewing of the caves to Hyrcanus, even though his description of the site is fairly accurate. The source also describes Hyrcanus' settlement to the east of the Jordan as the first connection of a Tobiad with the region (Jos. *Ant.* 12.229), but it is clear from the Zenon papyri and from the Book of Nehemiah that Hyrcanus dwelt in his ancestral domain. In all likelihood, these inaccuracies were not the product of ignorance, but stem from the author's desire to glorify his hero. The source used by Josephus ignores the part played by others in constructing the fort and chooses to present Araq el Emir as Hyrcanus' private undertaking.³⁶

Hyrcanus and the Tobiad Jews

According to Josephus' story, Hyrcanus controls an independent domain dominated by a fort, and throughout the reign of Seleucus IV he constantly engages in warfare with his neighbors. Hence, it is generally assumed that Hyrcanus rebelled against the Seleucid king.³⁷ Does this picture tally with the description of Hyrcanus found in 2 Maccabees? There, the high priest Onias III uses two arguments in his effort to convince Heliodorus not to despoil the temple. His objection, on moral grounds, is that some of the

³³ See P. Lapp 1962: 19-24; P. Lapp 1963: 8-20.

³⁴ Zayadine 1991: 8.

³⁵ Jos. *Ant.* 12.231. On the lake, see Ern. Will 1991a: 37-38. For αὐλή as palace see Polyb. 30.27.3, and Walbank 1957-79: III. 454. Ern. Will 1991c, proves the Qasr was a palace.

³⁶ M. Stern 1962: 38.

³⁷ Jos. *Ant.* 12.229-36. Above, p. 40.

money belongs to orphans and widows; his practical argument is that the remainder belongs to Hyrcanus, a man of high standing (3.10-11). If Hyrcanus had rebelled against the Seleucid authority, he would not have deposited money in this temple, which was under the king's control. Furthermore, even if having Hyrcanus deposit money in the temple is an invention of the writer behind this section of 2 Maccabees, be it Jason of Cyrene or his epitomator, it is still significant that the writer views Hyrcanus as a respectable figure, a person any reasonable Seleucid official would avoid injuring. The Hyrcanus of 2 Maccabees is not a rebel, but a respected leader in Seleucid Coele-Syria.

Another detail found in the Tobiad story is that Hyrcanus' military colony ceased to exist after Seleucus IV died and was succeeded by Antiochus IV in 175. This element, too, is misleading.³⁸ When 1 Maccabees describes the wars fought east of the Jordan in 163,³⁹ it refers to "those dwelling in the Land of Tobiah" (5.13). Scholars have identified this group either with inhabitants of the biblical Land of Tov,⁴⁰ or with a band of Hyrcanus' soldiers who moved to another settlement after their commander's suicide.⁴¹ It is clear that the reference is to Hyrcanus' men, because they are described by the Greek military term *chiliarchy* (1 Macc. 5.13). Did these followers of Hyrcanus actually leave Araq el Emir? The reference to οἱ ὄντες ἐν τοῖς Τουβίου is found in a letter which Jewish refugees in Datema wrote to Judas Maccabaeus, telling of the cruel fate that had already befallen those dwelling in the Land of Tobiah and requesting immediate military assistance (1 Macc. 5.9-13). Using this letter, scholars have generally assumed that the

³⁸ The following argument also refutes Momigliano's claim that the colony ceased to exist in 168 (cf. above p. 40 n. 13).

³⁹ The *terminus post quem* for the skirmishes mentioned in 1 Macc. 5.1 ff., is the re-dedication of the Temple in December 164. By then Antiochus IV Epiphanes was already dead. His death became known in Babylon between November 20 and December 18, 164. Cf. Sachs & Wiseman 1954: 208-9.

⁴⁰ Judg. 11.3-5. See Meyer 1921: 134 n. 1; Abel 1949: 93, 436; Dancy 1954: 104.

⁴¹ Hengel 1974: I. 276; Goldstein 1976: 298-99. Goldstein translates οἱ ὄντες ἐν τοῖς Τουβίου as those "who were members of Tobias' troop." This is unacceptable. ἐν τοῖς Τουβίου is the equivalent of ἐν τῇ Τουβίου (*P. Lond.* 1930 I. 176); cf. Tcherikover 1957: 116. "Members of Tobias' troop" would have been referred to either as τῶν Τουβίου (cf. *C. P. Jud.* I ll. 6, 7, 17, 19) or, according to the language of 1 Maccabees as ἡ παρεμβολὴ Τουβίου (cf. 4.21 and 34 etc.); οἱ παρὰ Τουβίου (cf. 4.13, 7.32 etc.); οἱ μετὰ Τουβίου (cf. 4.8, 7.25 etc.)

dwellers ἐν τοῖς Τουβίου were in the immediate neighborhood of Datema. While the precise location of Datema is not known, it is usually thought to be situated in the Hauran rather than in the vicinity of Araq el Emir.⁴² Consequently, it is claimed that Hyrcanus' men were to be found in the northern region of Trans-Jordan.⁴³ If that were the case, then these same people could not be known as those dwelling ἐν τοῖς Τουβίου in the Land of Tobiah.

Moreover, the entire passage relating to Datema in 1 Maccabees bears a suspicious resemblance in content and wording to Josh. 10.6, where the people of Gibeon request aid from Joshua. The parallels are too striking to be coincidental, and the letter in 1 Maccabees is in all probability fictitious, designed to glorify Judas Maccabaeus, who comes to the rescue in a time of great crisis.⁴⁴ The only conclusion which can rightly be drawn from the passage in 1 Maccabees is that in the year 163, some twelve years after the death of Seleucus IV, the military colony of Tobiah and his descendants at Araq el Emir was struck a severe blow.

What can be learned about the Tobian Jews, who are mentioned twice in Chapter 12 of 2 Maccabees?⁴⁵ The first reference is to one of the Tobiads, a Jewish cavalryman named Dositheus, who tries unsuccessfully to capture Gorgias (12.35). Since the Zenon papyri show that Tobiah had cavalrymen (*C. P. Jud.* 1) it would be reasonable to identify Dositheus as a member of the military colony of the Tobiads.⁴⁶ The second significant passage, which tells of the wars of the Jews in Trans-Jordan in 163, states that Judas' army marched 750 *stadia* (approximately 142.5 kilometers) from Kaspin

⁴² Dama: Grimm 1853: 81. Tel Hamad: Abel 1949: 98.

⁴³ Abel 1949: 93, 436, identifies the Land of Tov with Et-Taiyibeh. Goldstein 1983: 440, thinks that the Tobian Jews resettled at the time, at or near Datema.

⁴⁴ Josh. 10.6: וישלחו אנשי גבעון אל יהושע אל המחנה הגלגלה לאמר אל תרחק ידיך מעבדיך עלה אלינו מחרה והושיעה לנו ועורנו כי נקבצו אלינו כל מלכי האמרי וישבי הדור; cf. 1 Macc. 5.10: καὶ ἀπέστειλαν γράμματα πρὸς Ἰούδαν καὶ τοὺς ἀδελφοὺς αὐτοῦ λέγοντες Ἐπισυνηγμένα ἐστὶν ἐφ' ἡμῶν τὰ ἔθνη τὰ κύκλω ἡμῶν τοῦ ἐξῆραι ἡμᾶς. The γράμματα are an invention derived from the verb וישלחו. In this very section of 1 Maccabees, we find that a single verse, 1 Macc. 5.14, has close parallels with three biblical passages: 1 Kings 1.22 and 42, and Job 1.15-19, which deal with disastrous tidings. But unlike these biblical models, Judas and his brothers are victorious, 1 Macc. 5.16-54.

⁴⁵ The events discussed in 2 Macc. 12.2 ff., are the same as those narrated in 1 Macc. 5.1 ff., see Bunge 1971: 246-52. This means that we are dealing with the events of 163; see above p. 45 n. 39.

⁴⁶ For the reading Δωσίθεος δὲ τις τῶν Τουβιτηνῶν ἔφιππος ἀνὴρ, see Niese 1900: 527; Habicht 1976a: 264-65 n. 35b; Bar-Kochva 1976: 197.

to the *charax* of the Tobian Jews. Kaspin is identified with Khispin in the Golan Heights,⁴⁷ located 170-180 kilometers north of Araq el Emir. While the information in 2 Maccabees is not completely accurate, it provides a good approximation of the real distance between Araq el Emir and Khispin.⁴⁸ Araq el Emir, the only site in Trans-Jordan known to have been connected with the Tobiads, is the place where Judas and his men were heading.⁴⁹

Equally significant is the fact that the word *charax*, which is generally translated "palisaded camp," also means "fort."⁵⁰ Indeed, words such as *charax* often designate a place name and/or a noun.⁵¹ We can conclude, then, that in 163 the Tobian Jews lived in a fort, just as the soldiers of Tobiah had done a century earlier: the Tobian Jews continued to live in the place called *charax* or *baris* (Aramaic: *Birta*; Hebrew: Tyrus). 2 Maccabees confirms the information derived from 1 Maccabees, namely that the Land of Tobiah, with its military settlers and its fort, continued to exist until 163.

There is, however, a discrepancy regarding the fate of the Jewish soldiers in the Land of Tobiah. According to 1 Maccabees 5.13, the military colony was destroyed in 163, but 2 Maccabees 12.17-18 tells us that Timotheus, the enemy commander, was unable to defeat the so-called Tobian Jews living in the *charax* and was forced to retreat. This difference between the two sources can be attributed to the tendency of 2 Maccabees to ignore or gloss over Jewish military defeats.⁵²

⁴⁷ 2 Macc. 12.13 and 17. For the identification of Kaspin, see Abel 1949: 436.

⁴⁸ The distance of the sites mentioned above in nn. 42-43, from Khispin is as follows: Et-Taiyibeh—75.5 kilometers; Tel Hamad—33.5 kilometers; Dama—76.5 kilometers. These sites are much too close to Khispin to be identified as the *charax*, the home of the Tobian Jews. This would also apply to El Kerak identified by Abel 1949: 93 and 436, with the *charax*, and placed 62.5 kilometers from Khispin.

⁴⁹ Therefore, the identification of the *charax* with Amman, by Zayadine 1991: 19, or with Khirbet al Sour by Villeneuve 1988: 282, are to be rejected.

⁵⁰ *Charax* = palisaded camp: see *LSJ*, s.v. *χάραξ* II. 2; *charax* = fort: see Holleaux 1916: 32; L. Robert 1963: 79; L. Robert 1970: 598-99 n. 12.

⁵¹ Habicht 1976a: 262 n. 17b, objects to the *charax* of 2 Macc. 12.17, being a place name because it is preceded by a definite article. However, since the place name is derived from a noun, it can take a definite article. Thus the place name *charax* is consistently preceded by a definite article in 1. 1 ff. of the Ephesian decree in Holleaux 1916: 30. See also the parallel cases of τὸ χωρίον and ἡ κέτρα discussed respectively by L. Robert 1963: 79 and Piejko 1991a: 252-54.

⁵² Thus the defeat of Beth-Zachariah in 1 Macc. 6.47, is turned into a

Here we should bear in mind a report found in 2 Maccabees, telling of a Jewish military unit under the command of Sosipater and (a different) Dositheus.⁵³ The men of this unit took Timotheus prisoner, but were forced to release him in order to save their own parents and brothers. The implication is that Dositheus and Sosipater's soldiers were from Trans-Jordan, and they were probably members of the Tobiad military colony.⁵⁴ Their relatives, held hostage by Timotheus, apparently were captured when the *charax* fell. We can assume, then, that Dositheus and Sosipater led a military unit of Tobian Jews which was absent from the *charax* at the very time it was attacked by Timotheus and his men.

We can glean more concrete information as to what happened to the military colony in the Land of Tobiah. 1 Maccabees recounts that the Tobian women and children were taken prisoner by the enemy, along with their baggage, while the men were killed. 2 Maccabees denies that the *charax* fell, but hastens to report that Timotheus, apprehensive about Judas Maccabaeus' imminent arrival on the scene, sent the women and children to a safe place with their baggage (12.21). In other words, Timotheus did succeed in occupying the *charax* of the Tobian Jews, and indeed, the plunder he took is mentioned in both sources. We should remember that the author of 1 Maccabees emphasizes the calamity that befell the Tobian Jews in order to highlight the danger facing the Jews of Trans-Jordan. Hence it is likely that his assertion that all of the men in the Land of Tobiah were killed is an exaggeration.

When the fort was captured, Timotheus took prisoner not only women and children, but also the elderly, and perhaps even men of military age. Ironically, their brothers, whose duties took them far away from the military colony, were saved. These soldiers served in the very same military unit which Tobiah had already organized a century earlier.

It is now clear that the *banis* was not destroyed in 175 but in 163. Had Hyrcanus indeed been a rebel, as implied in the *Antiquities*, Antiochus IV would surely have punished Hyrcanus' soldiers when he took control of his land, disbanding them and replacing

victory by 2 Macc. 13.15-17. According to 1 Macc. 6.49-50, Antiochus V established a garrison in Beth-Zur; this fact is glossed over in 2 Macc. 13.19-22.

⁵³ 2 Macc. 12.19 and 24-25. On Sosipater and the two military men named Dositheus, see Habicht 1976a: 264 n. 35a; Bar-Kochva 1989: 82.

⁵⁴ Shatzman 1991: 21.

them with non-Jewish soldiers. The very fact that the military colony continued to exist beyond Antiochus' reign demonstrates that there was no need to punish Hyrcanus' soldiers, simply because there had been no rebellion. Polybius, who speaks of uninterrupted Seleucid dominion over all the regions of Coele-Syria from the time of the battle of Panium until the opening of the Sixth Syrian War (28.1.3), lends some support to this conclusion. Hyrcanus' alleged suicide is similarly fictitious and this episode should, perhaps, be compared with the murder of Onias III.⁵⁵ In short, Josephus' source created a completely fictitious story—with Hyrcanus erecting the *baris*, rebelling against the Seleucid king, and finally committing suicide—and then set it in a known site, Araq el Emir, which he described with considerable accuracy.

3. *Biblical Parallels to the Story of the Tobiads*

What can be learned from the first Tobiad passage in Josephus, *Ant.* 12.156-222, which tells of Hyrcanus' father Joseph? Some manuscripts of Josephus actually include the name of the king with whom Joseph son of Tobiah gained favor. He is identified as Ptolemy Euergetes, the father of Philopator. Since Joseph's father, Tobiah, was a contemporary of Ptolemy II Philadelphus, it is plausible that their sons were contemporaries as well.⁵⁶ While the historical setting of the story is convincing, the actions attributed to the heroes are not. Willrich has established that various elements of the tale are modeled on biblical stories of the patriarch Jacob and his son Joseph.⁵⁷ This scholar shows that Joseph son of Tobiah's rise to power in the Ptolemaic court is parallel to that of the biblical Joseph. In addition, the hatred between Hyrcanus and his half-brothers resembles the hatred shown to Joseph son of Rachel by his half-brothers. So too Joseph son of Tobiah was tricked into taking his niece as a wife rather than the Egyptian dancer with whom he had fallen in love, just as Laban tricked Jacob into marrying Leah instead of his beloved Rachel.

⁵⁵ For the fictional nature of the murder of Onias III, narrated in 2 Macc. 4.30-38, see Wellhausen 1905: 125-28; Momigliano 1968: 38-39. Tcherikover 1959: 469-70 n. 40, accepts the story.

⁵⁶ See the MS tradition at *Ant.* 12.158 and 163. Cf. Meyer 1921: 129 n. 1; Momigliano 1975b: 607 and 610-12; Tcherikover 1959: 129 with 458 n. 32.

⁵⁷ Willrich 1895: 94-95.

In addition to these three points of similarity pointed out by Willrich, there are several other biblical parallels.

1) Joseph son of Tobiah did not observe that his niece was substituted for the dancer because he was drunk (*Jos. Ant.* 12.188). Of Laban's deception we are told: "So Laban gathered together all the men of the place and made a drinking party (משנה). In the evening he took his daughter Leah and brought her to him. And he went in to her" (*Gen.* 29.22-23). The word translated here as drinking party is associated with wine and drunkenness. The biblical story hints that Jacob the patriarch was drunk on his wedding night and could not distinguish between Rachel and Leah and indeed Josephus says as much in his paraphrase of the tale.⁵⁸ Our story is, then, probably based on a popular midrash. Initially, it might seem that our story differs from the biblical Jacob-Rachel model, because Joseph son of Tobiah marries his niece rather than his cousin. However, when Jacob first meets Rachel, he "kissed her and wept aloud. And Jacob told her that he was her father's brother, the son of Rebecca" (*Gen.* 29.11-12). In other words, Jacob seems to introduce himself as her uncle.

2) Joseph son of Tobiah is warmly recommended by Athenion, the king's friend (*Jos. Ant.* 12.167 and 171). The biblical Joseph was recommended by one of Pharaoh's ministers (*Gen.* 41.9-14).

3) Joseph son of Tobiah is invited to mount the royal chariot (*Jos. Ant.* 12.172), just as Pharaoh has Joseph ride on a royal chariot (*Gen.* 41.43).

4) The biblical Joseph had an army with him when he brought his father's body back to the land of Canaan (*Gen.* 50.9). His namesake did the same (*Jos. Ant.* 12.180).

Hyrchanus' visit to the Ptolemaic king on the occasion of the birth of the king's son also includes elements which seem to be based on the biblical story of Joseph.

1) Hyrchanus goes to Alexandria because his father is too old and his brothers are reluctant to do so. One should remember that on one occasion the sons of Jacob refused to go to Egypt without Benjamin (*Gen.* 43.1-10) and that Jacob by that time was quite old (*Gen.* 42.38, 43.27). No wonder, then, that our Joseph, too, has reached a ripe old age even though Hyrchanus' visit took place at most twenty two years after Joseph began his tax-farming career as

⁵⁸ *Ant.* 1.301. See Diamond 1984.

a young man.⁵⁹ Indeed the twenty two years assigned to Joseph the Tobiad as a tax-farmer seem also to be borrowed from a midrashic tradition on the biblical Joseph, who is said to have been separated from his father Jacob for the same number of years.⁶⁰ Just as during this period the son of Jacob becomes second only to Pharaoh, his namesake spends twenty two years as the trusted courtier of the Ptolemaic king of Egypt.

2) In Alexandria, Hyrcanus has Joseph's disobedient *oikonomos* Arion put in prison (Jos. *Ant.* 12.199-207), for he considers himself Arion's master (Jos. *Ant.* 12.207). This detail is modeled on the imprisonment of Joseph by his master Potiphar. Joseph is virtually the *oikonomos* of Potiphar's household.⁶¹

3) The war between Hyrcanus and his brothers recalls Jacob's fear that his brother Esau would fight against him (Gen. 32.4-33.16). Indeed this motif is developed into an actual war in the Book of Jubilees and in one of the midrashim.⁶² In these two sources we are told that Jacob and his sons fought against Esau: Jacob kills Esau and another person, just as Hyrcanus kills two of his brothers (Jos. *Ant.* 12.222).

4) Hyrcanus' flight to the east of the Jordan is reminiscent of Jacob's escape from his brother (Gen. 29.1).

5) The tax that Hyrcanus levied on the barbarians can be likened to the tax that Jacob and his sons exacted from the Edomites.⁶³

The essential points of the story of Joseph son of Tobiah—his family ties, the personal relations between various figures, seemingly factual statements about wars and court visits—are, in fact, based on the biblical stories of Jacob and Joseph and related midrashic tradition.⁶⁴ In this respect our story brings to mind other

⁵⁹ Jos. *Ant.* 12.160, 12.186, 12.224. For attempts to solve this problem, see Hitzig 1869: 350-51; M. Stern 1962: 42-47; Tcherikover 1959: 128-37. Tcherikover observes correctly on p. 130, that one cannot reconcile the details concerning the age of Joseph son of Tobiah with the twenty two years assigned to him as a tax-farmer.

⁶⁰ BT *Megillah* 17a; *Genesis Rabbah* 84.20, eds. Theodor & Albeck p. 1026; *Seder Olam Rabbah* ch. 2.

⁶¹ Gen. 39.4 and 20. Philo, *De Iosepho* 37-39, writes of the biblical Joseph as an *oikonomos*.

⁶² Jubilees 38.1-14; *Midrash Wa-Yissa'u* in *Yalkut Shim'oni* Gen. 138. Cf. Ginzberg 1909-28: I. 417-21, V. 321-22 n. 317.

⁶³ See previous note.

⁶⁴ It is argued below that Josephus' source was an Egyptian Jew, of the second or first century. For familiarity with—and use of—midrashic tradi-

Jewish compositions of the Second Temple period which retell the deeds of biblical heroes. Joseph, the son of Jacob, seems to have been quite a popular figure in tales of this sort.⁶⁵

The compelling biblical parallels are not the only reason to question the historicity of what we are told about Joseph the Tobiad and Hyrcanus, for the careers of father and son are remarkably alike. Both heroes start out as young men who win the favor of the king, despite opposition at court. Both are willing to spend great sums of money, while their opponents are old and miserly.⁶⁶

4. *The Author of the Tobiads' Story*

At the very beginning of the first passage of the Tobiad tale we are told that the Samaritans, who prospered during the time of Onias II, oppressed the Jews. Several scholars have asserted that this sentence is not related to our story,⁶⁷ while others have seen it as evidence that the tale of Joseph and Hyrcanus stems from a Samaritan source.⁶⁸ This passage should, however, be understood in conjunction with the eulogy of Joseph found in the intermediate section separating the two Tobiad portions, where we are told: "And then also died Hyrcanus' father Joseph who had been an excellent and high-minded man and had brought the Jewish people from poverty and a state of weakness to more splendid opportunities of life when he controlled the taxes of Syria and Phoenicia and Samaria" (*Ant.* 12.224). The author clearly intends to glorify his hero Joseph, who improved both the Jews' economic status and their military position. Because of Joseph, the Samaritans' harassment of the Jews became a thing of the past.⁶⁹ We also hear that

tion by Egyptian Jews during this period, see Jacobson 1983: 20-23; see there pp. 90-95, 107-9, 125-29 for specific examples.

⁶⁵ See Bickerman 1988: 206-7. D. Schwartz 1990: 34, discusses the parallels between the biblical story of Joseph and that of Agrippa I in Josephus, and see there pp. 35-36 n. 51 for additional examples and bibliography. Cf. below p. 57 n. 91 on the Letter of Aristeas.

⁶⁶ Wellhausen 1921: 231; Niditch 1981.

⁶⁷ *Jos. Ant.* 12.156. Momigliano 1975b: 607, is of the opinion that the story starts at *Ant.* 12.158; cf. Goldstein 1975: 86.

⁶⁸ Büchler 1899: 86-88; Willrich 1895: 99-100.

⁶⁹ Coggins 1975: 85, thinks that *Jos. Ant.* 12.156, refers to the Samaritans, i.e. to the Macedonian colonists at Samaria rather than the Samaritans, since the word Σαμαρείς is used. It should be noted, however, that Josephus uses both Σαμαρείς and Σαμαρείται in reference to the Samaritans; see *Ant.* 9.290 vs.

Joseph, at the very beginning of his career, had borrowed money from his Samaritan friends, money he used to purchase all that was needed for his journey to Alexandria (Jos. *Ant.* 12.168). Thus the Samaritans supplied our hero with the means by which he was able to present himself at court, and with an opportunity to make a name for himself. Yet Joseph was not grateful for the loan he had received, and once in a position of influence, the Tobiad used it to deliver the Jews from the yoke of his benefactors. Joseph was, it seems, free from moral constraints.

Joseph is described in our story not only as the secular leader of the Jews—*prostates*⁷⁰—but the virtual master of the non-Jews in Syria and Phoenicia, since his role as tax collector gave him the power to execute the leaders of Ascalon and Scythopolis (Jos. *Ant.* 12.181-83). These enemies of Joseph seem to be part of a wider group which initially sought to bid for the collection of taxes in Syria and Phoenicia. In our story they are termed the "chief men" and "magistrates of the cities of Syria and Phoenicia" and "the powerful men in each city."⁷¹ These influential citizens of their cities not only fail in their bid, thus making way for Joseph who becomes chief tax-collector in the province (Jos. *Ant.* 12.169-79), they are also outwitted by a man of rustic origin who proves himself to be more urbane than they are.⁷² Joseph is glorified yet further when we are told that he reached his high position solely through his own actions and powerful character. Despite the fact that Joseph's father Tobiah was a man of high standing who corresponded with Ptolemy II Philadelphus and Apollonius the *dioiketes* (*C. P. Jud.* 4-5), and the fact that his uncle was the high priest Onias II, Joseph is portrayed as a self-made man (Jos. *Ant.* 12.160).

Papyri and inscriptions relating to tax-farming in Ptolemaic Egypt corroborate many of the details about tax-farming found in our tale.⁷³ This, no doubt, is what led many scholars to accept the

10.184, 11.340 vs. 11.341, 12.10 vs. 13.74-75. The tone of our story clearly suggests that the Samaritans are meant.

⁷⁰ For the *prostates* as a political leader, see Momigliano 1975b: 612-14; Tcherikover 1959: 132-33; cf. Marcus' note *ad* Jos. *Ant.* 12.161 (LCL).

⁷¹ Jos. *Ant.* 12.169: ἔτυχε δὲ κατ' ἐκεῖνον τὸν καιρὸν πάντας ἀναβαίνειν τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν πόλεων τῶν τῆς Συρίας καὶ Φοινίκης πρώτους καὶ τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν τελῶν ὄνην. κατ' ἔτος δὲ ταῦτα τοῖς δυνατοῖς τῶν ἐν ἑκάστη πόλει ἐπίπρασκεν ὁ βασιλεὺς. Cf. Jos. *Ant.* 12.174-75, 12.179, 12.196 and 210.

⁷² Jos. *Ant.* 12.160, 12.177: σφόδρ' ἀστεῖως ἀπεκρίνατο.

⁷³ Annual auction of taxes (Jos. *Ant.* 12.169): see *P. Tebt.* 8 11. 15-16. Auction held in Alexandria (Jos. *Ant.* 12.168-69); *P. Tebt.* 8. with Rostovtzeff 1953: I.

story as historical. Nonetheless, only one detail related to tax-farming is essential to the story, and this detail is inaccurate. Joseph is reported to have used an army to collect money from the inhabitants of Syria and Phoenicia. In fact, tax-farmers simply determined the rate of tax to be paid by auction, and state officials, acting under the local *oikonomoi*, carried out the actual collection of taxes.⁷⁴ Similarly, the power to confiscate property was in the hands of the *oikonomos* (*OGIS* 59), rather than vested in tax-farmers such as Joseph. Indeed, a papyrus dated to 261/0 shows that *oikonomoi* as well as a *dioiketes* served in the Ptolemaic province of Syria and Phoenicia (*C. Ord. Ptol.* 21-22), and these officials must have been the ones who collected taxes in this province.⁷⁵ Once again, the change introduced into the story is consistent with the author's intention to glorify Joseph, and should not be accepted as factual.

The inaccurate detail found in our story is not the result of the author's ignorance of Ptolemaic practices, but is a deliberate deviation from the truth. The writer uses the story of the high priest's refusal to pay taxes as a vehicle which allows him to have Joseph become the leader of the Jews, while the auction of taxes in Alexandria is utilized to make his hero the virtual ruler of the non-Jews in Syria and Phoenicia. Indeed, once the scene shifts from Jerusalem to Alexandria, Onias II's refusal to pay taxes is referred to by a brief joke at his expense and nothing more (*Jos. Ant.* 12.172).

We can now characterize the author of the Tobiad story. His choice of Jewish heroes, Joseph and Hyrcanus, whom he glorifies, points to his Jewish origins. This conclusion is further substantiated by the writer's knowledge of the Book of Genesis and related midrashim, and by his hatred of the non-Jewish population of Syria and Phoenicia. Joseph is able to overturn Samaritan domination, and to exert punitive measures against the Scythopolitans and the Ascalonites, while Hyrcanus is described as an enemy of the local Arabs. The author also displays a thorough acquaintance with Ptolemaic tax-farming methods, uses the official Ptolemaic

338. The king himself sells the taxes (*Jos. Ant.* 12.169): *UPZ* 112 col. I l. 1, and see Wilcken's note *ad loc.*; Préaux 1939: 451 n. 2. Tax-farmers must have guarantors (*Jos. Ant.* 12.177-78): Harper 1934a; Préaux 1939: 452-53. Confiscation of property (*Jos. Ant.* 12.181 and 183): *OGIS* 59; *SEG IX* 5 11. 46-71.

⁷⁴ Harper 1934b; Préaux 1939: 450-59.

⁷⁵ Cf. Bagnall 1976: 18-21 and 228-29.

term Syria and Phoenicia,⁷⁶ knows that the Ptolemaic rulers often stayed in Memphis,⁷⁷ and emphasizes the friendship between his heroes and the Ptolemaic royal couple and their courtiers.⁷⁸ Our writer clearly possesses some knowledge of Ptolemaic history, for he knows that Ptolemy V Epiphanes was survived by two young sons.⁷⁹ He apparently had pro-Ptolemaic leanings, since he attributes this tendency to his hero, Hyrcanus.⁸⁰ We can conclude, then, that the author, Josephus' source, was a Jewish resident of Ptolemaic Egypt.

What indications are there as to the date of Josephus' source? In our story, the wife of Ptolemy Euergetes I is called Cleopatra (Jos. *Ant.* 12.167), while her name was in fact Berenice. This mistake could not have been made before the middle of the second century, when Cleopatras had sat on the throne for at least forty uninterrupted years.⁸¹ The joint role assigned to the king and queen also leads to a *terminus post quem* in the second century,⁸² as does the fact that the tale of the end of Hyrcanus' domain could not have been concocted before its actual destruction in 163. The knowledge of Ptolemaic institutions and the stress placed on friendship with the Ptolemaic king indicate that the story was written before the Ptolemaic dynasty came to an end.

The story reveals familiarity with Ptolemaic Egypt and sympathy towards its kings. The heroes' high positions are the result of their own actions, and are not due to their descent from the Tobiads of Trans-Jordan or their family connections with the high priests of Jerusalem. In the first passage from Josephus, the author's

⁷⁶ Jos. *Ant.* 12.169; see M. Stern 1962: 39.

⁷⁷ D. Thompson 1988: 149-54, and see pp. 16-17 and 39, on the royal palace and gardens of Memphis.

⁷⁸ Jos. *Ant.* 12.172-73, 12.177-78, 12.219-20.

⁷⁹ See Otto 1934: 3 ff.

⁸⁰ He writes, for instance, that Hyrcanus was forced to commit suicide because his Ptolemaic protector had died, leaving no strong successor to deal with a very powerful Seleucid king, Antiochus IV (Jos. *Ant.* 12.234-36). Here the author seems to mislead the reader intentionally, for the death of Ptolemy V Epiphanes (180) preceded that of Seleucus IV by five years. This is probably the reason that Josephus' source assigned seven years to the reign of Seleucus IV (Jos. *Ant.* 12.234) rather than the actual twelve. In this way the king's reign, which began in 187, conveniently ends in 180, the year in which Ptolemy V Epiphanes died.

⁸¹ Momigliano 1975b: 607. Tcherikover 1959: 129, attributes this mistake to Josephus, rather than his source.

⁸² Jos. *Ant.* 12.155 and 177-78. See M. Stern 1962: 38 n. 21, *contra* Holleaux 1938-68: III. 348-50.

impressive knowledge of Ptolemaic tax-farming methods is utilized to create the impression that Joseph was the virtual ruler of all non-Jews in Syria and Phoenicia. In the second passage, a detailed and fairly accurate description of Araq el Emir is employed to foster the illusion that the site was founded and built by Hyrcanus.

Again and again, we see how Josephus' source cleverly uses the raw material of history and his intimate knowledge of the period when describing his heroes' fictional exploits. It is no coincidence that the story jumps from Ptolemy Euergetes I to Ptolemy V Epiphanes, for the missing link, Ptolemy IV Philopator, was infamous for his depraved lifestyle, and best ignored.⁸³ Similarly, the author attributes Hyrcanus' fictitious rebellion to the time of Seleucus IV, because this king was known to be a weak and indecisive figure, as can be seen from the account of his contemporary, Polybius.⁸⁴ Our writer's original readers would have found it easy to believe that Hyrcanus was able to hold out against Seleucus IV for seven years. So too the responsibility for Hyrcanus' tragic death is assigned to Antiochus IV, because this suits his image as the strongest Hellenistic king of his age,⁸⁵ who managed to conquer most of Egypt and was hated by Egyptian Jewry.⁸⁶

The Letter of Aristeas

It is worth noting the similarities between this secular story of the Tobiads and the deeply religious Letter of Aristeas.⁸⁷ The two works are the products of Egyptian Jews living at approximately the same time. In both accounts, fictional events are placed in a concrete historical setting.⁸⁸ The friendship between the Ptolemaic king and the Jewish leaders who come to court by invitation of the king or his messengers is also stressed in the two works.⁸⁹ In

⁸³ On Ptolemy IV Philopator see e.g. Athen. 7.276a-c; Polyb. 5.34.1-11, 5.40.1, 5.87.3, 14.11.1-5, 14.12.3; Strabo 17.1.11 (C 796). We have seen (above pp. 16-17) that Ptolemy IV is the arch-villain of 3 Maccabees.

⁸⁴ Polyb. fr. 96 with Diod. 29.24; cf. Appian, *Syr.* 66.

⁸⁵ Diod. 31.17a (probably from Polybius); Appian, *Syr.* 45; 2 Macc. 1.13.

⁸⁶ *Orac. Sib.* 3.388-94, 3.611-15. These verses probably originated in Alexandria—cf. Fraser 1972: I. 708-13, II. 995 n. 233 and 998 n. 242; Nikiprowetzky 1970: 196-97, 227-29, 344-45.

⁸⁷ Zuntz 1959: 126, has a brief comparison of the two works.

⁸⁸ For these elements in Ps.-Arist., see Fraser 1972: I. 696-703; Hadas 1951: 1 ff.

⁸⁹ *Jos. Ant.* 12.165-79, 12.185 and 204-20—Ps.-Arist. 33-82, 173-294, 304, 317-

addition, the authors of both compositions are knowledgeable in Egyptian affairs and are strongly influenced by the text of the Pentateuch,⁹⁰ particularly by the story of the biblical Joseph.⁹¹ They also betray animosity towards the non-Jewish population of Coele-Syria. Joseph son of Tobiah rules and punishes the non-Jews; in the Letter of Aristeas, four major Hellenistic seaports are added to Judaea.⁹² Both authors are keen to display Jewish wealth. In the story preserved by Josephus, the heroes present sumptuous gifts to the king, queen and court; in the Letter of Aristeas, it is the Jews who receive munificent presents from the king.⁹³ Finally, both authors use the number seven several times and have a penchant for doublets.⁹⁴ This resemblance between the Tobiad story in Josephus and the Letter of Aristeas cannot be coincidental.

In sum, the story of Joseph the Tobiad and his son Hyrcanus is not an accurate historical account,⁹⁵ but a piece of propaganda

21. On *Ant.* 12.234-36, see above p. 55 n. 80.

⁹⁰ See above, pp. 49-52—for the Letter of Aristeas, see Tcherikover 1958: 77-78, and Hadas 1951, on Ps.-Arist. 51-72, 96-99.

⁹¹ Above pp. 49-51. The following is a partial list of comparisons between Ps.-Arist. and the story in Genesis:

<u>Genesis</u>	<u>Ps.-Arist.</u>
a) LXX 45.1: ἀλλ' εἶπεν Ἐξαποστείλατε πάντας ἀπ' ἐμοῦ	a) 174: ἐκέλευσε τοὺς λοιποὺς πάντας ἀπολύσαι
b) LXX 43.15: λαβόντες δὲ οἱ ἄνδρες τὰ δῶρα	b) 176: παρελθόντων δὲ σὺν τοῖς ἀπεσταλμένοις δῶροις
c) LXX 43.16: μετ' ἐμοῦ γὰρ φάγονται οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἄρτους τὴν μεσημβρίαν	c) 180: διὸ καὶ δειπνήσαι σήμερον μεθ' ὑμῶν βουλήσομαι
d) 43.16: a servant is told to prepare a meal	d) 182: Dorotheus is in charge of preparing a meal
e) 43.32: separate meals for Jews and Egyptians	e) 182: different regulations concerning food for different peoples
f) 43.33: seating arrangements according to age	f) 187: seating arrangements according to age

⁹² See above p. 52-53—Ps.-Arist. 115.

⁹³ *Jos. Ant.* 12.165, 12.181, 12.184-85, 12.208-9, 12.215-18—Ps.-Arist. 33, 51-82, 319-20. Compare likewise Ps.-Arist. 294 with *Jos. Ant.* 12.217.

⁹⁴ Number seven: *Jos. Ant.* 12.186 and 234 (but see above p. 55 n. 80)—Ps.-Arist. 27, 177, 275. Doublets: see above p. 38 n. 9—Ps.-Arist. 10-11 vs. 30, 32-33, 38; 12-14 vs. 35-36; 31 vs. 312-13; 121 vs. 172. Cf. Zuntz 1959: 109-10.

⁹⁵ Hence it should not be used as evidence for the spread of Hellenism among the Jews before the reign of Antiochus IV Epiphanes, despite the efforts of Tcherikover, Hengel and others; cf. Momigliano 1988: 250-51. Millar 1978: 6-12, shows how un-Hellenized Judaea remained up to the reign of Antiochus IV.

written by a Jew of Ptolemaic Egypt in the second or first century. The tale of the Tobiads was intended for Jews and non-Jews alike. It was designed to stimulate the self-confidence of the Jews of Ptolemaic Egypt and to demonstrate that in the past Jews had played an important role in the service of Ptolemaic kings.⁹⁶ The implicit message was that Jews should play such a role once again. The anonymous source of Josephus' story takes pains to present his heroes, first Joseph and then Hyrcanus, as staunch supporters of the Ptolemaic kingdom. This picture has more to do with the preoccupations of a Jew living in Ptolemaic Egypt than with the political alignments of the people of Judaea. The tale of the Tobiads is, then, of little or no help in any attempt to determine where Jewish loyalties lay in the period between the Third and the Sixth Syrian Wars.

⁹⁶ This is another point in common with Ps.-Arist. There is, of course, a gap between Greeks and Jews. In the Letter of Aristeas, this gulf is bridged by the king and his friends, while in the Tobiad story the Jewish heroes behave like non-Jews. Joseph and his son Hyrcanus betray no scruples about dining with non-Jews or maintaining sexual relationships with them. This neglect of religious prohibitions is intended to give lie to Greek accusations of Jewish unsociability and misanthropy. For full documentation of such allegations, see M. Stern 1974-84, and see there e.g. Hecataeus (fr. 11), Poseidonius (fr. 44), and Apollonius Molon (frr. 49-50).

CHAPTER THREE

ROME AND THE KINGDOMS OF THE EAST: 201-175

1. *The Impact of the Second Macedonian War*

This chapter focuses on the changes that took place in the status of the Ptolemaic and Seleucid monarchies at the end of the third century and the first quarter of the second century. These years were characterized, *inter alia*, by Rome's ever growing involvement in the affairs of the eastern Mediterranean. Before this, at the time of the First Macedonian War (215-205), Rome fought the Macedonian king, Philip V, and allied herself with the Aetolian League, Attalus I, king of Pergamum, and other states in and around Greece. Yet, the Romans fought half-heartedly, and in 205, after Aetolia had pulled out of the war and made a separate peace with Philip V, they too were ready to conclude a peace treaty with the Macedonian king, which was signed at Phoenice. Thus the First Macedonian War ended without a clear-cut victory for any of the participants.¹ Soon thereafter, the Romans evacuated their troops from Illyria, thus indicating their lack of enthusiasm for further involvement in the affairs of Illyria and Greece. It was only after Rome's victory over Carthage in the battle of Zama, which brought the Second Punic War to a close, that the Romans could direct the lion's share of their efforts eastward. A more intense relationship with the Ptolemaic and Seleucid monarchies was a by-product of Rome's growing involvement with Macedon and Greece after 202, and these contacts with the two eastern kingdoms enable us to estimate their relative strength, as well as trace the gradual changes that transpired in Roman policy towards them.

Agathocles' Ambassadors

In the Ptolemaic kingdom, it will be remembered, the most powerful role in the court of Ptolemy V Epiphanes was assumed by

¹ For the history of the war, see Ed. Will 1979-82: II. 82-100; Green 1990: 297-300; Gruen 1984: II. 375-81; Hammond 1988: 393-410; Errington 1990: 192-96.

Agathocles after the deaths of Ptolemy IV Philopator and Sosibius son of Dioscurides. In view of the threat posed to the Ptolemaic kingdom by Antiochus the Great, a threat accentuated by the fact that a young boy of five was now the Ptolemaic king, Agathocles concentrated his efforts towards preventing Seleucid aggression. Consequently he sent three high placed courtiers on diplomatic missions. One of these, Pelops son of Pelops, was dispatched to the court of Antiochus III to convince the Seleucid king to honor his friendship with the Ptolemaic kingdom and not to renounce the treaty concluded by himself and Ptolemy IV at the close of the Fourth Syrian War. Pelops was expected no doubt to keep his eyes and ears open and learn about Antiochus III's intentions and plans. The second ambassador, Ptolemy son of Sosibius, was sent to Philip V to arrange a political marriage between the child-king Ptolemy V Epiphanes and a daughter of the Macedonian king. Ptolemy son of Sosibius was also instructed to receive assurances from Philip V that he would come to the aid of the Ptolemaic kingdom, should it be attacked by Antiochus III. By giving these instructions to Ptolemy son of Sosibius, Agathocles was trying to pursue a policy of Ptolemaic-Macedonian cooperation against the Seleucid kingdom, thus apparently continuing the policies of Ptolemy IV.² The third emissary was destined to go to Rome. Polybius, in contrast to the relatively detailed manner in which he describes the responsibilities of the first two diplomatic representatives, provides no information about what tasks the third ambassador, Ptolemy son of Agesarchus of Megalopolis, was supposed to perform.³ The Megalopolitan would certainly have been expected to announce the accession of the new king and to convey the new regime's hopes of renewing the *amicitia* with Rome.⁴ In view of the tasks assigned to the other emissaries, it seems more than likely that Ptolemy son of Agesarchus was instructed to communicate to the Roman

² Polyb. 15.25.13. The date is 204-203, cf. Walbank 1957-79: II. 484. On earlier Ptolemaic-Macedonian cooperation, see Huss 1976: 127-29.

³ Polyb. 15.25.14, states that Agathocles sent the ambassador to Rome: οὐχ ὡς ἐπισπεύσοντα τὴν πρεσβείαν, ἀλλ' ὡς, ἂν ἄφηται τῆς Ἑλλάδος καὶ συμμίξει τοῖς ἐκεῖ φίλοις καὶ συγγενέσιν, αὐτοῦ καταμενοῦντα. Gruen 1984: II. 679, sees this as an indication that Ptolemy son of Agesarchus was instructed to dally in Greece for a while before going on to Rome. However the passage should be viewed as part of Polybius' accusations that Agathocles' actions stemmed from self-interest: namely, to rid himself of potential rivals. Cf. Polyb. 15.25.15-20.

⁴ On Rome's earlier contacts with the Ptolemaic kingdom, see Manni 1949: 79-95; Heinen 1972: 634-41; Gruen 1984: II. 673-78.

Senate Alexandria's concerns about Antiochus III's aggressive intentions, and to ask for political support.⁵ The outcome of Ptolemy son of Agesarchus' mission is unclear; we do not even know if he went on to Rome. Consequently, we obviously have no information about a Roman response to him.

An Alexandrian Delegation to Rome

This gap in our knowledge concerning the arrival of Ptolemy son of Agesarchus at Rome could be bridged if we identify the embassy headed by Ptolemy of Megalopolis with an Alexandrian delegation to Rome mentioned by Justin. Yet the identification of the two missions, first suggested by Holleaux, robs the Justin passage of its historical value. The epitomist's statement that the Alexandrian envoys informed Rome of the secret pact between Antiochus III and Philip V to divide the Ptolemaic kingdom could not be true, because one of the other ambassadors to leave Egypt with Ptolemy son of Agesarchus was instructed to recruit the support of Philip V against Antiochus III, i.e. the ambassadors left Egypt at a time when the Ptolemaic government was aware only of Seleucid hostility.⁶ Holleaux's suggestion that the two Alexandrian embassies are one and the same is further weakened by the fact that Ptolemy son of Agesarchus received his appointment from Agathocles, whereas the embassy mentioned by Justin was sent on its way only after the collapse of Agathocles' regime. There seems, then, little point in amalgamating these two reports.⁷

Justin's account is criticized by scholars. His tone in the passage is sensational on the whole, and his report is marred by errors and propagandistic elements.⁸ Thus commentators prefer Appian's version of events, according to which Rome first became aware of

⁵ Cf. Holleaux 1938-68: V. 332-33; Winkler 1933: 12-13; Manni 1949: 96-97; Heinen 1972: 644.

⁶ Justin 30.2.8: *morte regis, supplicio meretricum velut expiata regni infamia legatos Alexandrini ad Romanos miser, orantes ut tutelam pupilli susciperent tuerenturque regnum Aegypti, quod iam Philippum et Antiochum facta inter se pactione divisisse dicebant.* See Holleaux 1921: 72 n. 2, 290-91 n. 1.

⁷ Justin 30.2. See too Schmitt 1964: 258 n. 2; Heinen 1972: 644-45; Gruen 1984: II. 615 n. 17.

⁸ Mistakes: Arsinoe is named Eurydice. Propaganda: Alexandria requested Roman guardianship for Ptolemy V Epiphanes (below p. 69). For criticism of Justin, see Walbank 1940: 314 n. 1; Magie 1939: 33 n. 6; Errington 1971: 343-45.

the pact between Antiochus III and Philip V only through a joint appeal to the Senate by Rhodian and Pergamene diplomats.⁹ Yet Appian seems no more trustworthy than his rival source,¹⁰ and Justin and Livy are unanimous in stating that the diplomats from Rhodes and Pergamum were concerned solely with their own immediate problems in their corner of the world, making it unlikely that the Rhodians were the ones who informed Rome of the secret pact.¹¹ Rhodes had little to complain of against the Seleucid monarch and Justin's version, according to which the injured party, the Alexandrians, bring news of the pact to Rome makes better sense.¹²

Justin tell us that the Alexandrian diplomats were given an audience in Rome at about the same time as their Rhodian and Pergamene colleagues (Justin 30.2.8-30.3.5). Polybius also speaks in a general way of embassies against Philip which reached Rome in the summer or autumn of 201. While these embassies are usually thought to be from Rhodes and Pergamum, the historian may well be referring to a Ptolemaic mission as well.¹³ Now an

⁹ Appian, *Mac.* 4, mentions only the Rhodians. But as Livy 31.2.1, and Justin 30.3.5, speak of both Rhodian and Pergamene envoys, these two embassies would have informed Rome of the pact together. So Holleaux 1938-68: V. 339-40; McDonald in McDonald & Walbank 1937: 187; Briscoe 1973: 45; Hammond 1988: 416. Magie 1939: 42-43, denies the authenticity of the pact, yet attributes its fabrication to the Rhodians who, together with Pergamene diplomats, misinformed the Romans.

¹⁰ Appian, *Mac.* 4. Mistakes: Ptolemy V is named Ptolemy IV Philopator; Philip V succeeds in capturing Chios. That the Macedonian king was supposed to conquer Cyrene with the help of Antiochus III seems farfetched. For criticism of Appian, see Magie 1939: 32-33; Walbank 1957-79: II. 504; Errington 1971: 345-47.

¹¹ Justin 30.3.5: *dum haec aguntur, interim legationes Attali regis et Rhodiorum iniurias Philippi querentes Romam venerunt.* Livy 31.2.1: *sub idem fere tempus et ab Attalo rege et Rhodiis legati venerunt nuntiantes Asiae quoque civitates sollicitari.* The similarity here suggests that the source used by Livy, like the one employed by Pompeius Trogus, first referred to an Egyptian delegation in Rome and then to the embassies of Pergamum and Rhodes. Livy, however, refrains from mentioning the Egyptian embassy, and this may be a result of his tendency (or that of his annalistic source) to divorce the decision-making process in Rome from the political scene in the east. On this see Bickerman 1945; Briscoe 1973: 39-47. It seems no accident that although Livy 31.14.5 refers to the pact between Antiochus III and Philip V, he mentions it not in a political context, but as an incidental part of his description of the Macedonian king.

¹² See too Schmitt 1964: 241-42.

¹³ Polyb. 16.24.1-3: *ὅτι Φίλιππος ὁ βασιλεὺς τοῦ χειμῶνος ἤδη καταρχομένου, ... οὐδ' ἠγνόει τὰς ἐξαποστελλομένας κατ' αὐτοῦ πρεσβείας εἰς Ῥώμην.* These unnamed embassies reached Rome by November-December 200 (Julian), if not earlier.

Alexandrian delegation in Rome at this time, whose brief was to ask for Roman aid and support in the face of a joint Macedonian-Seleucid plan to carve up the Ptolemaic kingdom, is consistent with the outbreak of the Fifth Syrian War in 202/1. Furthermore, the success of the Seleucid offensive in Syria and Phoenicia became apparent quite soon after it had been launched (see above pp. 23-24). This situation would have forced the Ptolemaic government to seek political and military support. If, as seems likely, Antiochus the Great took his army to the field in the spring of 201, the Ptolemaic envoys would have been sent out by the early summer. By December of that year, at the latest, they would have reached their final destination, Rome. Thus the members of the Ptolemaic delegation would have presented their case at Rome after being on the road some six to eight months. It is quite possible that even before they left Alexandria, word had come that Philip V had captured Samos by force.¹⁴ Since Rome's involvement with the affairs of the eastern Mediterranean was rather limited up to the year 201, the Alexandrian court would not rely solely on Rome to pull Ptolemaic chestnuts out of the fire. The ambassadors would have been instructed to canvass for support among traditional friends of the Ptolemaic kingdom who were closer by, such as Achaëa, and only then proceed to Rome. Thus, if news of the Macedonian assault on Samos was disseminated only after the departure of the ambassadors from Alexandria, it would have reached them in Asia Minor or Greece. By the time the Ptolemaic embassy made its appearance in Rome, its members were armed with the knowledge that their kingdom had been attacked simultaneously by Antiochus III in Syria and Phoenicia and by Philip V at Samos. The conclusion was inevitable even if proof was lacking: the two monarchs were cooperating against the Ptolemaic kingdom.¹⁵

See Walbank 1957-79: II. 530-31; Briscoe 1977: 249; Gruen 1984: II. 534. The bibliography quoted demonstrates the general tendency to identify the unnamed embassies with those sent by Attalus II and the Rhodians; Aetolia too has sometimes been invoked. Yet, there is nothing to prevent the assumption that one of these unspecified delegations was Egyptian.

¹⁴ Philip V attacked Samos in the spring. See above p. 23 with n. 68.

¹⁵ Similarly Habicht 1957b: 240. He refrains however from identifying Rome's source of information.

A Roman Delegation to the East

Justin's report about the Alexandrian diplomats is further substantiated by the decision of the Roman Senate to send a three-man mission, C. Claudius Nero, M. Aemilius Lepidus, and P. Sempromnius Tuditanus, to the eastern Mediterranean.¹⁶ The Roman ambassadors apparently were appointed and sent on their way before the beginning of the consular year of 200, and as the Roman calendar was running ahead of the Julian calendar by approximately two months at this time, their departure occurred no later than January or February of 200 (Julian calendar).¹⁷ This date comes shortly after representations were made to the Senate by the Alexandrian, Pergamene, and Rhodian embassies. Later on, the Roman ambassadors are reported to have left Athens with the object of bringing about a settlement between Antiochus III and Ptolemy V, and they were obviously commissioned by the Senate to mediate between the two kings.¹⁸ At about September 200, we find one of the *legati*, M. Aemilius Lepidus, confronting Philip V outside the walls of Abydus, and advising him not to oppose a *senatus consultum* according to which the king was not to attack any of Ptolemy's possessions.¹⁹ The cumulative import of these two notices concerning the Roman ambassadors is clear: they were

¹⁶ Our discussion of this embassy will be based on the view that its activities, as reported by Polybius, are completely divorced from the war vote in Rome and the implementation of fetial procedure for declaring war, for which our source is Livy 31.6.1, 31.6.3-31.8.4. For this position see Rich 1976: 78-87; Balsdon 1954: 38-42; Bickerman 1945: 139; Gruen 1984: II. 395. The most powerful exponent of the opposite view is Walbank in McDonald & Walbank 1937: 192-97.

¹⁷ Livy 31.2.1-4; Justin 30.2.8-30.3.5; Appian, *Mac.* 4. For the date see Briscoe 1973: 44, whose discussion is based on Livy. This provides further support for Justin's report on the Alexandrian embassy.

¹⁸ Polyb. 16.27.5: ... ὡς Ἀντίοχον καὶ Πτολεμαῖον ἐπὶ τὰς διαλύσεις. See already Bickerman 1945: 140 n. 31. Justin 30.3.3, and Appian, *Mac.* 4, depict a more one-sided Roman position: the ambassadors were to warn off Egypt's enemies. Despite this difference, it appears from both Justin and Appian that the Roman Senate was acting in response to calls for help from Alexandria. Livy 31.2.3-4, is alone in assigning a purely formal mission to the Roman embassy, one bearing no relevance to the political situation.

¹⁹ Polyb. 16.34.3: διεσάφει τῷ βασιλεῖ διότι δέδοκται τῇ συγκλήτῳ παρακαλεῖν αὐτὸν... μήτε τοῖς Πτολεμαίου πράγμασιν ἐπιβάλλειν τὰς χεῖρας. Livy 31.18.1-4, on the meeting between Philip V and Aemilius Lepidus, is based on Polybius, but Livy omits several points mentioned by his source, and changes a few others; see Briscoe 1973: 105-6. Thus Livy expunges any allusion to Philip's aggression against the Ptolemaic kingdom, in accordance with his version of the instructions given to the Roman embassy.

authorized by the Senate to assist the Ptolemaic kingdom vis-à-vis its two aggressive neighbors: Antiochus III and Philip V. These instructions must have been the Senate's response to the appeal made by the Alexandrian embassy which had come to Rome in the autumn of 201. This delegation had informed the *patres* of a secret pact between Antiochus III and Philip V to divide the Ptolemaic kingdom between themselves.

Macedonian Aggression

How did the Roman embassy go about implementing the Senate's instructions concerning the Ptolemaic kingdom? Was the safeguarding of Ptolemaic interests an important and urgent task in the eyes of these ambassadors (and presumably in the eyes of the Senate as well), or was it of minor concern to them?²⁰ After landing in Greece, the ambassadors traveled through Epirus, Athamania, Aetolia, and Achaëa. The *legati* informed these states that the Senate's view was that Philip V should refrain from going to war with the Greeks and that the king should pay an indemnity to Attalus I of Pergamum. The Roman ambassadors were undoubtedly trying to rally these Greek states behind Rome, promising them assistance against any Macedonian incursions. The Roman legation then arrived at Athens. The city was subsequently attacked by a Macedonian army under the command of Nicanor, and the envoys, who were still present in Athens at the time of the Macedonian raid, quickly obtained an interview with Nicanor. The Romans made the Senate's position clear to the Macedonian officer. Once he heard the Roman message, Nicanor retreated from Athens, no doubt in order to apprise the king of its contents (Polyb. 16.27.1-4). The warning conveyed to Nicanor made no mention of any demand that Philip V vacate the Ptolemaic island of Samos which he had captured the year before, nor was the Macedonian king warned that he must refrain from attacking other Ptolemaic domains. In other words, the Roman ambassadors did not attempt to impose a settlement upon Philip and Ptolemy V Epiphanes, even though the later encounter between Aemilius Lepidus and Philip V at Abydus indicates that the ambassadors had been empowered by a *senatus consultum* to defend the integrity

²⁰ For a similar approach, see Gruen 1984: II. 393-98, who focuses his attention on Roman policy towards Philip V.

of the Ptolemaic kingdom (Polyb. 16.34.3). The delegation's silence on the subject of Macedonian aggression against Ptolemy, when informing Nicanor of the Senate's views, may well have been a hint to the Macedonian king that if he were to abstain from any incursions within Greece proper, Rome would not object to his continued hold on Samos.

At this juncture, Polybius discusses the Romans' departure from Athens, on their way to meet with Antiochus III and Ptolemy V, in an attempt to arrange a compromise between the two kings (16.27.5). Since the Roman emissaries arrived in Athens sometime during the spring of 200, one would have expected them to have reached Antioch and Alexandria by the summer.²¹ The fact that they did not is illustrated by developments which took place after the Roman delegation departed from Athens. We hear that after the Romans left, Philip V sent additional Macedonian forces, under the command of Philocles, to attack Athens. The king himself left for Thrace, where he captured various cities, including Aenus and Maronea. From Thrace, the Macedonian army advanced into Chersonesus, seizing, among other cities, Callipolis and Sestus. After the conquest of these cities, most of them Ptolemaic, Philip imposed a siege on the free city of Abydus.²²

M. Aemilius Lepidus Meets Philip V

While Philip was engaged in his campaign against Abydus, the Roman consul P. Sulpicius Galba and his army landed in north-west Greece. The season was *autumno ferme exacto*, when winter was about to begin. The Roman army's arrival in Greece can therefore be fixed to ca. October 200, and the conclusion of Philip's

²¹ Arrival at Athens in spring: Holleaux 1938-68: IV. 290-91, followed by McDonald in McDonald & Walbank 1937: 189; Walbank 1940: 314. The relatively long time it took the *legati* to reach Athens suggests that their pace was leisurely, as it was after they left Athens. They may have crossed the Adriatic a few months after they left Rome. Briscoe 1973: 44 (cf. Briscoe 1977: 249), argues that the Roman envoys arrived in Athens at the beginning of 200. This seems too early, but if Briscoe is right, then the argument for Roman apathy towards Ptolemaic interests becomes even stronger.

²² Livy 31.16.2-6; Polyb. 16.29.2-16.30.1. Balsdon 1954: 39, and others, identify Nicanor's campaign with that of Philocles. For the rejection of this view, see Walbank in McDonald & Walbank 1937: 192 n. 75; Briscoe 1973: 100. Occupation of Sestus: Holleaux 1938-68: IV. 129 n. 4, 317 n. 2. On the Ptolemaic cities in Thrace, see Ed. Will 1979-82: I. 261; Bagnall 1976: 160-68.

campaign against Abydus would not have preceded that date.²³ At this time, when the destiny of Abydus was still undecided, the Roman emissary M. Aemilius Lepidus left Rhodes, where he and his colleagues had been staying. He appeared before Philip V by the walls of the besieged city in order to convey to him the contents of a *senatus consultum*. This meeting must have taken place around September 200.²⁴ Philip was to refrain from attacking either the Greeks or the domains of Ptolemy Epiphanes. The king was also required to pay indemnities to Attalus I of Pergamum and to Rhodes. Acceptance of the Senate's demands by Philip would lead to peace between the king and Rome, while any opposition to the Senate's terms would bring about a state of war between the two states.²⁵ Aemilius Lepidus raised before the Macedonian king two points which had not been mentioned when the entire senatorial mission confronted Nicanor at Athens. One of these, the ban on Macedonian aggression against the Ptolemaic kingdom, had now become an issue because of the recent Macedonian conquests of Ptolemaic territory in Thrace. The second Roman demand must have been made to satisfy the wishes of Rhodes, the island from which Aemilius Lepidus had departed to meet Philip V at Abydus, and to which he was to return. Polybius makes it clear that while the timing of these demands was left up to the members of the Roman embassy, the *legati* had already been empowered by the Senate to discuss these matters before they left Rome (16.34.3). Since the delegates departed from Rome before Philip's Thracian expedition, it is obvious that the embassy's terms of reference were the complaints made against Philip in the previous year by the Pergamene, Rhodian, and Ptolemaic missions. Roman concern for the Ptolemaic kingdom, as expressed in Aemilius Lepidus' interview with the king, was motivated more by fears of Philip's expansionist policies than by a real commitment to defend the possessions of Ptolemy V.

M. Aemilius Lepidus' meeting with Philip failed and he returned to Rhodes. We might have expected the Roman ambassadors to turn now towards Antioch and Alexandria to complete their other task, mediation between Antiochus III and Ptolemy V Epiphanes. Instead, we find them staying on at Rhodes, trying to

²³ Livy 31.14.1-4, 31.22.4. For the date, see Briscoe 1977: 250.

²⁴ Walbank 1940: 316; Balsdon 1954: 39.

²⁵ Polyb. 16.34.1-7; Livy 31.18.1-5.

convince the islanders to persevere in their armed struggle against Macedon (Polyb. 16.35). It would appear that the members of the delegation were monitoring the developments in Greece and Asia Minor closely, and only after they learned of the landing of C. Sulpicius Galba and his army did they have reason to think that their work in the region was complete. Philip V heard of the Roman army's arrival in Greece after his return to his kingdom, following the fall of Abydus (Livy 31.18.9), and the *legati* would have heard the news even later. They had spent approximately ten months traveling—at first from Rome to Greece, visiting the northwestern and the western parts of Greece, and then moving on to Athens and Rhodes. In all this time their concern for the interests of the Ptolemaic kingdom had been minimal, and their belated warning to Philip at Abydus against attacking Ptolemy came as a reaction to Philip's successful campaign in Thrace and Chersonesus.

The next stop of the Roman ambassadors is Antioch. According to our most trusted source, the *legati* had been instructed to offer their good services and bring about a reconciliation between Antiochus III and Ptolemy V, while other authorities attribute to the Roman delegation the task of offering unqualified assistance to the Ptolemaic kingdom.²⁶ The envoys apparently did neither of these things. Instead, we find them establishing *amicitia* with Antiochus III. The king reciprocated by sending a delegation of his own to Rome.²⁷ This development is to be understood in light of the arrival of the *legati* at Antioch in the early winter of 200/199. By that time, the battle of Panium had already been won and in its aftermath the victorious Seleucid army was conducting mopping up operations in order to gain full control of Syria and Phoenicia. A Roman attempt to mediate between Antiochus III and Ptolemy V at this time would have been interpreted by Antiochus as an effort to deny him the fruits of victory. Had the embassy behaved in such a manner, the Seleucid king might have been tempted to oppose Rome in league with Philip V. The previous activities of the embassy demonstrate that its main concern was to promote enmity towards Macedon and isolate the kingdom. Consequently, the ambassadors deviated from their official brief and established a formal friendship with the king, after making certain that he

²⁶ See above p. 64 n. 18.

²⁷ Livy 32.8.13, 33.20.8-9, 33.34.2-3.

would not assist Philip V in his war with Rome.²⁸ This meeting of the Roman *legati* with the Seleucid king in Antioch typifies their concerns throughout their mission. Above all, the Romans were to try to contain the power of Philip V. Their interest in the Ptolemaic kingdom was only secondary, and while Roman help might be offered, the lack of any serious commitment to the Ptolemaic kingdom precluded the possibility of such help being genuinely effective.

This assessment of the Republic's indifference to the fortunes of the Ptolemaic kingdom is at odds with a Roman tradition which assigns the responsibility of protecting the child of Ptolemy Philopator to Rome. This task, so we are told, was entrusted by the Senate to a member of the Roman mission, M. Aemilius Lepidus, who became the tutor of Ptolemy V Epiphanes.²⁹ In addition, a Roman coin minted around the year 61 bears the inscription ALEXANDREA TUTOR REG. S. C. PONF. MAX. M. LEPIDUS. This coin, which seemingly supports the story that the Senate sought to defend a Ptolemaic king by appointing him a Roman tutor, was issued by M. Aemilius Lepidus, the later *triumvir*, who was a descendant of the ambassador to the east.³⁰ Despite the abundance of sources, the notion that M. Aemilius Lepidus was appointed by the Senate to act as guardian for Ptolemy V Epiphanes must be rejected. In the years following 200, when Aemilius Lepidus could have first stepped into the role of tutor to the king, Ptolemy V was surrounded by a series of influential figures such as Tlepolemus, Scopas the Aetolian, and Aristomenes.³¹ The activities of these men alongside the young king leave Aemilius Lepidus without any role to fill in the Ptolemaic court. In addition, our primary sources for the period, Polybius and Livy, know nothing of any appointment of Aemilius Lepidus as guardian of Ptolemy V Epiphanes. Also relevant is the fact that in 200 Lepidus was at the beginning of his senatorial career and was still quite young.³² Had the Senate nominated a guardian to Ptolemy V and

²⁸ See Holleaux 1938-68: V. 345-51; McDonald in McDonald & Walbank 1937: 204-5; Walbank 1940: 316-17; Badian 1964: 113-14.

²⁹ Justin 30.2.8-30.3.4, 31.1.1-2. Tac. *Ann.* 2.67.2 and V. Max. 6.6.1, offer variations on the story, cf. Gruen 1984: II. 680-81.

³⁰ See Crawford 1974: I. 443 no. 419/2, II. pl. LI/9.

³¹ Polyb. 16.21-22, 18.53-55.

³² For Lepidus' youth, see Polyb. 16.34.1 and 6; Livy 31.18.1 and 3. Rich 1976: 128-37, argues that in 200 Lepidus was a senator, and that he was about

his kingdom, it is likely that a senior man would have been selected. The reports concerning Aemilius Lepidus' *tutela* seem to have originated among the descendants of M. Aemilius Lepidus. The ambassador of 200 had developed an interest in Ptolemaic Egypt, as is evident from his private contacts with a Ptolemaic embassy which came to Rome thirty years later (Polyb. 28.1.8). Lepidus' visit to Egypt, and his later connections with the Ptolemaic court, formed the basis of a tradition, nurtured by his descendants, which magnified the *persona* of their ancestor. In substance, however, the story is of little value, and does not point to any Roman undertaking to look after the Ptolemaic kingdom and defend its interests.³³ Indeed, our survey of Roman diplomatic efforts indicates that the embassy of 200, of which Aemilius Lepidus was a member, tried little and achieved even less in defending the Ptolemaic kingdom against the attacks of Philip V and Antiochus III on Ptolemaic territory.

The Ptolemaic Kingdom and Rome

At the same time that the Roman embassy was closely monitoring the advance of the Macedonian army in Thrace and Chersonesus, another Ptolemaic embassy reached Rome. Its mission, if we are to trust Livy, had nothing to do with the Ptolemies' own struggle against Macedon and Antiochus III. The ambassadors notified the Senate that their king had been approached by the city of Athens, which required military assistance against the king of Macedon. Ptolemy was ready to send troops to defend the Athenians but would withdraw his offer of military aid if the Senate wished him to do so. The Senate then made it clear that Rome would not shirk her responsibilities towards her allies, and the interview ended with polite expressions of gratitude and the allocation of *munera* to the ambassadors (Livy 31.9.1-5). Pausanias also attests to the Athenian appeal to the Ptolemaic kingdom, when recording the deeds of the Athenian leader Cephisodorus. Cephisodorus, we are told, attempted to protect his city from Macedonian aggression and sought an alliance with Ptolemy V. However, since military assistance from Ptolemy V Epiphanes and other quarters was late

twenty seven years old.

³³ For the rejection of Lepidus' *tutela*, see Huss 1976: 168-70; Goodyear 1981: 404-5; Gruen 1984: II. 680-82, against Heinen 1972: 647-49.

in coming, Cephisodorus went as an ambassador to Rome. He secured Roman support and saw his policies triumph when the Republic dispatched an army and a general to save Athens.³⁴ In light of Pausanias' testimony, Livy's report on the aim of the Ptolemaic embassy appears to be correct.³⁵ The failure of the Ptolemaic kingdom to supply Athens with troops, and the successful efforts of its diplomats to persuade Rome to send soldiers in its stead, reflect the military constraints on the kingdom. Faced with a war with two of the major powers of the time, the Ptolemaic kingdom was unable to offer military assistance to outsiders. The gravity of the Ptolemaic situation makes it likely that their embassy came to Rome not only to discuss the question of military assistance to Athens, but other topics of a more immediate nature as well. The Ptolemaic counter offensive of 201/200 in Syria and Phoenicia was going well, but the Ptolemaic ambassadors probably asked Rome to assist in the restoration of the Ptolemaic domains lost to Philip, even if further details of the meeting elude us.³⁶

After the opening of the Second Macedonian War, the subject of the Ptolemaic kingdom was raised yet again.³⁷ The future of the Ptolemaic possessions seized by Philip V was discussed during the Locris conference of 198. This conference was convened at the bidding of Philip V, whose lackluster performance on the field had prompted him to seek an agreement with Rome. The Roman commander, T. Quinctius Flamininus, submitted a number of demands during the conference, including the request that all Ptolemaic lands seized by Philip V after the death of Ptolemy IV be returned to his son, Ptolemy V Epiphanes. According to this stipulation, Philip was to surrender his territorial acquisitions in Thrace, as well as the island of Samos.³⁸ The Roman position at

³⁴ Paus. 1.36.5-6. *SEG* XXV 112 ll. 17-23, first published by Meritt 1936: 419-28, records Cephisodorus' initiative in acquiring new allies for Athens. The Ptolemaic kingdom would have been one such ally.

³⁵ Cf. Walbank 1940: 313; Balsdon 1954: 36; Manni 1949: 103 n. 1; Heinen 1972: 646-47.

³⁶ Cf. McDonald in McDonald & Walbank 1937: 203.

³⁷ A detailed account of the war will not be offered here, as it did not directly affect the history of the Ptolemaic and Seleucid kingdoms. For such an account, see Walbank 1940: 138-85; Ed. Will 1979-82: II. 149-64; Hammond 1988: 416-43.

³⁸ Polyb. 18.1.14:... Πτολεμαίῳ τὰς πόλεις ἀποκαταστήσαι πάσας, ἃς παρήρηται μετὰ τὸν Πτολεμαίου τοῦ Φιλοπάτορος θάνατον; Livy 32.33.4. See Walbank 1957-79: II. 552. Gruen 1984: II. 682-83, is wrong in stating that Flamininus did not specify what the future of those cities would be.

Locris, as represented by Flamininus, was, then, in favor of restoring his lost possessions to Ptolemy V, but the conference failed to yield immediate results. A year later, in 197, in the aftermath of the Macedonian defeat at Cynoscephalae, Philip V agreed to all the demands put forth by Flamininus at Locris. Philip V's surrender, and his belated acceptance of Flamininus' conditions, appeared to guarantee that the occupied Ptolemaic lands in Thrace would be returned to Ptolemy V Epiphanes. Yet the ultimate decision was to be taken at Rome, where the Senate would either approve or reject the peace treaty, based on the terms offered by Flamininus.³⁹ In 196, less than two years after the meeting between Flamininus and the Macedonian king, the Senate declared its conditions for peace with Philip V. The king was to hand over to Rome the territories he had captured during the war, and this surrender was to take place before the opening of the Isthmian games at Corinth.⁴⁰ The *patres* and Flamininus added to this *senatus consultum* a declaration which Flamininus would make public at Corinth. There, before a large crowd which included representatives from the whole of Greece, Flamininus made his dramatic announcement on behalf of the Senate, granting freedom to those communities in Greece which had previously been subject to Macedonian rule.⁴¹ The *senatus consultum* also listed by name a group of cities which were held by Philip V. The Macedonian king was now instructed to grant these cities their freedom, after evacuating his garrisons from them. The majority of the cities listed were in Asia Minor, but Perinthus on the European coast of the Propontis, and Myrina on the Aegean island of Lemnos also figure in the list.⁴² Rome's policy towards the cities and peoples taken by Philip V was essentially consistent. The Republic's declared position was that all the Greeks who had been conquered by Philip were to be set free. In keeping with this policy, one of the ten Roman commissioners who came to Greece to help Flamininus with the implementation of the *senatus consultum* was dispatched to liberate the Asiatic city of Bargylia, while another, L. Stertinius, went to free Hephaestia, Thasos, and Philip's Thracian conquests.⁴³ The liberation of

³⁹ Polyb. 18.38.1-18.39.7; Livy 33.13.1-15; Appian, *Mac.* 9.1-3.

⁴⁰ Polyb. 18.44.3; Livy 33.30.2; Appian, *Mac.* 9.3. Cf. Larsen 1936: 344-45.

⁴¹ Polyb. 18.44.3, 18.46.5; Livy 33.30.2, 33.32.5; Appian, *Mac.* 9.3-4; Plut. *Flam.* 10.3-4; V. Max. 4.8.5.

⁴² Polyb. 18.44.4; Livy 33.30.3-4.

⁴³ Polyb. 18.48.1-2; Livy 33.35.1-2; Plut. *Flam.* 12.1.

Philip's Thracian possessions, which the Macedonian king had earlier seized from the Ptolemaic kingdom, conforms to the spirit of the *senatus consultum*, but runs completely counter to Flamininus' demand from Philip V at Locris. At that time, Flamininus had, in essence, committed himself to work for the return of Ptolemy V Epiphanes' occupied possessions in Thrace.⁴⁴ However, when the contents of the *senatus consultum* became known in 196, the Aetolians had called the sincerity of Rome into question, imputing that Greece had merely exchanged masters, with Rome in charge instead of Philip.⁴⁵ It was essential for Rome to refute such accusations and demonstrate its commitment to the idea of Greek freedom, and one way of doing so was to liberate as many Greek communities as possible. This, in turn, meant that the promises which had been made earlier to the Alexandrian court had to be abandoned.

Seleucid Conquests

By 196, the future of the Ptolemaic possessions in Thrace captured by Philip V was not the only issue to engage both the Alexandrian court and Rome. In the previous year, Antiochus III had launched a campaign along the coasts of Asia Minor. Cilicia was the king's first objective and the Seleucid army captured many Ptolemaic cities there, including Zephyrium and Soli. Further to the west lay Lycia, and there too the Seleucid army managed to seize Ptolemaic-controlled towns, such as Limyra, Patara, and Xanthus.⁴⁶ After the conquest of these areas, parts of Caria, including the city of Iasus, were also forced to acknowledge the supremacy of the Seleucid king.⁴⁷ By the end of the year's campaign, Antiochus III

⁴⁴ Rome's breach of its promise suggests that the *senatus consultum* deliberately refrained from alluding to the liberation of the Thracian cities, cf. Briscoe 1973: 305-6. This seems preferable to the claim that such an item was part of the *senatus consultum*, but was omitted by Polybius. This is the view put forth in Holleaux 1938-68: IV. 320 and Walbank 1957-79: II. 609.

⁴⁵ For Aetolian criticism and its impact on Flamininus and the ten commissioners, see Polyb. 18.45; Livy 33.31.

⁴⁶ For Antiochus' campaign in these areas, see Porphyry, *FGH* 260 F 46-47; Livy 33.19.9-33.20.5. For Xanthus, see also *OGIS* 746. Schmitt 1964: 278-81, discusses in detail the sites captured by Antiochus.

⁴⁷ Livy 33.19.11, attributes to Antiochus the intention of invading Caria. Iasus demonstrates this: Pugliese Carratelli 1967-68: 445-48 no. 2; *OGIS* 237 (the two inscriptions have been published as one in *I. Iasos* 4, following the suggestion of J. Robert & L. Robert, *Bull. épigr.* 1971: no. 621, that they originate

seized the important city of Ephesus and captured Teos. Although Smyrna and Lampsacus were firm in their resolve to oppose the Seleucid army, they could not prevent advance units of the Seleucid army from reaching as far as Abydus. In sum, in the course of the 197 campaign, the Seleucid king managed to seize much of Asia Minor's coastal regions, and his army now seemed poised to continue its advance across the Hellespontus to Europe.⁴⁸

The Seleucid campaign of 197 led the helpless Ptolemaic kingdom to appeal to Rome for help for the fourth time since 204/3. This appeal was made as soon as Cilicia was captured by the Seleucid army,⁴⁹ and the initial Roman response was, in fact, encouraging. The Senate sent L. Cornelius Lentulus to moderate between the Ptolemaic and Seleucid monarchies.⁵⁰ Cornelius Lentulus must have departed to the eastern Mediterranean in the spring of 196 and by that time the Senate was increasingly preoccupied by the news of further conquests by Antiochus III. Smyrna, Lampsacus, and possibly Alexandria Troas as well, appealed for Roman aid by late 197. The details concerning the movements of the Lampsacene embassy are known from an inscription of that city honoring its chief ambassador. This man, Hegesias, first went to Greece, where he met with Flamininus' brother, L. Quinctius Flamininus, the commander of the Roman naval force in Greece. From there, Hegesias proceeded to Massalia, and after gaining the support of that city, he traveled to Rome, where he appeared before the Senate. Hegesias then returned to Greece and met with T. Quinctius Flamininus himself.⁵¹ Alarming information regarding the

from the same stone. Crowther 1989, stresses the differences between them); *I. Iasos* 5; Livy 37.17.3.

⁴⁸ Ephesus: Polyb. 18.41a.2; Frontin. *Strat.* 3.9.10; Porphyry, *FGH* 260 F 46; Livy 33.38.1. Teos: Piejko 1991b: 14-27, argues for its occupation by Antiochus III in 197/6, relying on the city's decree in honor of the king, *SEG* XLI 1003. Opposition of Smyrna and Lampsacus: Livy 33.38.3; Appian, *Syr.* 2. For the capture of Abydus at the end of the 197 campaign, see Ed. Will 1979-82: II, 183. For the whole conduct of the campaign and the extent of Antiochus' conquests, see Schmitt 1964: 278-95; Mastrocinque 1976: 307-18; J. Robert & L. Robert 1983: 156-61.

⁴⁹ Appian, *Syr.* 2; cf. Schmitt 1964: 258 n. 2. Holleaux 1921: 50 n. 3 and 72 n. 2, identifies this Ptolemaic delegation with that mentioned by Justin 30.2.8, and the delegation of Ptolemy son of Agesarchus, discussed above.

⁵⁰ Polyb. 18.49.2-3; Livy 33.39.1-2. See also Appian, *Syr.* 2-3, where the ambassador's name is given as Cn. Cornelius.

⁵¹ See Appian, *Syr.* 2. The case for Alexandria Troas is based on Diod. 29.7, with supporting evidence from Polyb. 21.13.3, and Livy 35.42.2. Cf. Magie 1950: II. 947 n. 52. For Lampsacus' efforts to gain Roman support, see

Seleucid advance would have also come from various other quarters. Eumenes II of Pergamum, whose father, recently dead, had been a loyal ally of Rome, had legitimate cause for concern. If the Seleucid success were to continue, Eumenes might find Pergamum cut off from the harbors of the Mediterranean and the Propontis; ultimately, the very existence of his kingdom might be in jeopardy. A Pergamene embassy was probably present in Rome at the beginning of 196, together with other representatives of Rome's allies in the Second Macedonian War (Polyb. 18.42.1), and this embassy would have had the opportunity to express Eumenes' concern over the campaign of Antiochus III.

The Senate had its own reasons to be worried by the news. The possibility of a Seleucid landing in Europe and a further advance to Greece could not be discounted. Such Seleucid forces might clash with Roman troops which were stationed in Greece in the wake of the Second Macedonian War. More serious still was the fear that Philip V would use this new situation to his own advantage, in order to revoke the peace terms which he had agreed upon with Rome and ally himself with Antiochus III.⁵² The Senate also had to consider the possibility that the presence of the head of a formidable Hellenistic kingdom in Greece or its vicinity would influence at least some of Rome's allies in the Second Macedonian War. These allies might now turn to Antiochus III for cooperation, assistance, and patronage. The swift progress made by the Seleucid army in its offensive of 197 had brought on a radically new situation and Rome could not but address herself to the new reality.

Rome and Greek Freedom

The vehicle chosen for the Senate's response to this challenge was the *senatus consultum* of 196. This decision was primarily concerned with the future of the Greeks who had been under the control of Philip V, but it also dealt with the Greeks of Asia Minor and Europe, who had not been conquered by the Macedonian king. The Senate solemnly declared that these Greeks were to live

³ Syll. 591 (cf. *I. Lampsakos* 4), with the discussion of Bickermann 1932b.

⁵² Later in 196, the Senate had its representative, Cn. Cornelius Lentulus, apply pressure on Philip to ask for an alliance with Rome, precisely in order to allay such suspicions, Polyb. 18.48.3-4.

in freedom and under their own laws.⁵³ Another article of the *senatus consultum* obligated Philip V to give a group of cities found outside Greece proper their freedom, and the combination of these two statements must have been intended as a warning to Antiochus III against subjugating any of these communities. The Greek cities of Asia Minor and Europe were meant to be a buffer zone in which the Seleucid king could not exercise his authority. However, since the *patres* must have known that some of these cities had already been captured, the *senatus consultum* was, in fact, a demand that Antiochus give up his recent conquests.⁵⁴ The *patres* must have hoped that the Seleucid king would comply with their decision, but they could not depend on such an eventuality. The declaration was intended not just for the ears of Antiochus, but also for cities such as Smyrna and Lampsacus. The victors of Cynoscephalae let it be known that they would support any city which chose to oppose the Seleucid army. By promising such political assistance, the Senate was trying to foment resistance in Asia Minor and to slow down, indeed even stop, the advance of Antiochus III. The Seleucid king coupled his military campaign with lofty pronouncements on giving "freedom" to the cities he had just conquered.⁵⁵ The Republic, too, offered to liberate these Greeks, and the two powers vied with one another in an attempt to extend their influence and protection over the "liberated" cities.

Antiochus had crossed over to Europe in the spring of 196, before any word of the *senatus consultum* could have reached him. The cities of the Chersonesus surrendered to his army and parts of Thrace also came under his control. The king busied himself with

⁵³ Polyb. 18.44.2: "...τοὺς μὲν ἄλλοις Ἕλληνας πάντας, τοὺς τε κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν καὶ κατὰ τὴν Εὐρώπην, ἐλευθέρους ὑπάρχειν καὶ νόμοις χρῆσθαι τοῖς ἰδίοις. Cf. Livy 33.30.2, who misrepresents Polybius; see Briscoe 1973: 304-5. The case of Bargylia demonstrates that the former Macedonian possessions were also to be freed, but by the Romans, Polyb. 18.48.2.

⁵⁴ Cf. Badian 1958: 72-73; Ed. Will 1979-82: II. 167, 186; Walbank 1957-79: II. 610; Ferrary 1988: 141 n. 33. Gruen 1984: II. 620-21, does not think that this article of the *senatus consultum* is related to Antiochus' campaign.

⁵⁵ Iasus: Pugliese Carratelli 1967-68: 445-48 no. 2, col. I ll. 8-11, 47-48; *OGIS* 237 l. 2. Teos: *SEG* XLI 1003 I ll. 18-20, 33-34, 47-48, 50-52. Lysimacheia, captured by Antiochus in 196, is another example. See Appian, *Syr.* 1, telling of the city's refoundation with *I. Iliion* 45, and especially ll. 11-15, which records a treaty between the king and the city, and therefore assumes its "independence." For Rome's adoption of the Greek slogan of ἐλευθερία, see Gruen 1984: I. 132-57.

the rebuilding of Lysimacheia to serve as his chief city in the region.⁵⁶ Soon after, Seleucid ambassadors came to Corinth where they met T. Quinctius Flamininus and the ten commissioners. Rome was given her first opportunity to express opposition to the recent Seleucid territorial acquisitions. Flamininus and the commissioners ordered the king to keep his distance from the autonomous cities of Asia and not to attack them. He was also told to withdraw from the cities which had formerly been subject to Ptolemaic or Macedonian rule.⁵⁷ Later, at Lysimacheia, Antiochus III met with a Roman delegation, headed by L. Cornelius Lentulus, and the Romans reiterated the warnings which Antiochus' ambassadors had heard at Corinth. These demands were, in fact, an amplification of the *senatus consultum* of 196 and the accompanying statement by Flamininus which committed the Republic to the principle of freedom for the Greeks both in Europe and in Asia. L. Cornelius, whose mission to mediate between the Ptolemaic and the Seleucid kingdoms had originated from a Ptolemaic plea for help, did not order the king to return the Ptolemaic cities to Ptolemy V Epiphanes but simply to evacuate them. In other words, Rome was now demanding the liberation of the Ptolemaic cities of Asia Minor.⁵⁸ The Republic, in its efforts to push the Seleucid kingdom as far away as possible from Greece, was now publicly committed to the freedom of all Greek cities in Asia Minor and Europe. If the Romans were to be taken sincerely by the Asiatic Greeks, Rome could not openly support the return of Greek cities in Asia Minor to the Ptolemaic kingdom. The Republic's demand, presented at Corinth as well as Lysimacheia, that Antiochus abstain from attacking autonomous cities and that he evacuate other cities which had previously been in the possession of either Philip V or the Ptolemaic kingdom, made it clear that Rome was now the protector of these cities.⁵⁹ In the eyes of Rome, the

⁵⁶ Livy 33.38.8-14; Polyb. 18.49.2; Appian, *Syr.* 1; Zon. 9.18.

⁵⁷ Polyb. 18.47.1; Livy 33.34.3.

⁵⁸ See Polyb. 18.50.5-6; Diod. 28.12. Other sources state that the Roman ambassadors demanded that Antiochus III return to Ptolemy V the cities he had captured from him, Livy 33.39.4; Appian, *Syr.* 3; Justin 31.1.3, accepted by Badian 1958: 75-76. Of these, Livy is based on Polybius, cf. Briscoe 1973: 323. Livy's deviation from his source is a distortion stemming from his desire to present the Romans as loyal to their friends. The same motive should be ascribed to Appian and Justin as well.

⁵⁹ The Roman demands reveal their position as protectors. See Badian 1958: 68; Ferrary 1988: 48, 142. Both Ferrary and Badian 1964: 120, wrongly

Ptolemaic kingdom had no further role to play in Europe and Asia Minor.

Ptolemaic Isolation

In the years 204/3-196, the Ptolemaic kingdom gradually became more dependent on Rome for support and succor in its foreign policy. The Republic, in turn, was ready to offer its good services, at least from 201 onwards. In practice, though, Rome's warning to Philip not to attack Ptolemaic possessions came only after the king had already captured the Thracian domains of the Ptolemaic kingdom. The subsequent Roman demand from the Macedonian king, as voiced by Flamininus, that he return to Ptolemy V Epiphanes the territories taken from him, was later ignored by the Senate's commissioners, for they liberated the Thracian cities rather than return them to Ptolemaic control. Similarly, Rome's initial promise to mediate between the Ptolemaic and Seleucid kingdoms came to naught. Instead, Roman envoys established *amicitia* with Antiochus III, and later, when the Seleucid king marched to Asia Minor and then to Chersonesus, the Senate virtually encouraged the remaining Ptolemaic cities in the region to break their ties with Alexandria. Thus Roman policy towards Ptolemy V Epiphanes underscored the weakness and isolation of the Ptolemaic kingdom. The kingdom was left to face the potential threat of Antiochus III, who could not be trusted to discontinue his acts of belligerency against the Ptolemaic kingdom, and who was apparently prepared to do away with it altogether.

Antiochus III must have been cognizant of the helpless position of the Ptolemaic kingdom, and of its disappointment with Rome. He could now enter the picture and extricate the Ptolemaic monarchy from its political isolation. Thus, when L. Cornelius demanded of Antiochus III that he retire from the former Ptolemaic cities in Asia Minor now in his possession, the king responded that he was no longer an enemy of Ptolemy. He was, in fact, ready to offer friendship to Ptolemy Epiphanes, and to form an alliance with him by giving his daughter as a bride to the young king. Antiochus' rebuttal was intended to demonstrate that the Republic had no right to order him to evacuate these Ptolemaic

assume that Rome continued to present itself as protecting Ptolemaic interests.

cities. Surely, if he were about to forge a marriage alliance with Ptolemy V, such a union would be a clear sign that the Ptolemaic court had waived its claim to those cities. Nor was the king worried in the least that his approach might be rejected by Ptolemy V and his advisors. After all, the Ptolemaic kingdom was left without any allies to speak of, and a snub to Antiochus III might provoke the Seleucid king and cause him to turn his attention to what remained of the Ptolemaic kingdom.⁶⁰

Antiochus III's overwhelming advantage over the Ptolemaic kingdom in 196 was not due solely to the Ptolemies' abandonment by Rome. In the years prior to 196, Ptolemy V lost all his possessions in Coele-Syria and Phoenicia as well as in Thrace, and the majority of Ptolemaic holdings in Asia Minor had already fallen to Antiochus III. Ptolemy V also faced grave domestic problems. In the years following the death of Ptolemy IV, there were continual power struggles in the king's court in Alexandria. These intrigues initially led to the murder of Agathocles; later, Tlepolemus became the most powerful among the king's men, and after a power struggle with Sosibius son of Sosibius, he managed to neutralize the latter's influence in court. The intrigues in the Alexandrian court continued after 201. Tlepolemus, in turn, lost his position and was replaced by Scopas the Aetolian and Aristomenes. These two men constantly tried to undermine one another and their struggle ended with the execution of the Aetolian commander.⁶¹ In addition, the rebellion of the local Egyptian population against the Ptolemaic regime, which had broken out towards the end of the period of Ptolemy IV's rule, was still a threat. While the uprising in the Nile delta was quashed, the independent Egyptian kingdom in Upper Egypt continued to exist under the leadership of a new Pharaoh, Chaonnophris, who replaced Hurgonaphor.⁶²

The crumbling Ptolemaic regime had to contend with the Seleucid kingdom, then at the height of its prestige. Its king, Antiochus III, had erased all memory of the defeat at Raphia through his extensive conquests in the East and his successful campaigns in Coele-Syria and Phoenicia and Asia Minor. Because of the

⁶⁰ Polyb. 18.50.5-6, 18.51.10; Livy 33.39.4, 33.40.3; Diod. 28.12; Appian, *Syr.* 3. On the negotiations at Lysimacheia, see Badian 1964: 119-21.

⁶¹ Polyb. 15.25.1-15.34.6, 16.21.1-16.22.11, 18.53.1-18.55.2.

⁶² For the suppression of the uprising in the delta, see *OGIS* 90 11. 21-28 and Polyb. 22.17.1. See also the bibliography listed above p. 20 n. 57.

unequal balance of power between the two kingdoms in 196, the Seleucid king had to make minimal concessions to the Ptolemaic monarchy. In desperation, the heads of the Ptolemaic government were willing to settle for survival, rather than the restoration of their former possessions. The safeguarding of Egypt, Cyrene, and Cyprus was now the prime concern of the Ptolemaic government.

Antiochus III's announcement at the Lysimacheia conference of his intention to arrange a marital alliance between the Seleucid and Ptolemaic royal houses was made in October 196.⁶³ The wedding itself took place in 194/3.⁶⁴ In the two or three years between the Lysimacheia conference and the marriage of Ptolemy V to Cleopatra I, daughter of Antiochus III, there was no significant change in the balance of power between the Seleucid and Ptolemaic monarchies. During this period, the Seleucid monarch, if anything, rose in prestige, due to the evacuation of Greece by the Romans and because Hannibal became a member of Antiochus III's court.⁶⁵ Thus, the Ptolemaic claims made during the Sixth Syrian War, that Antiochus III had promised Ptolemy V Epiphanes to return Coele-Syria and Phoenicia to him, are suspect.⁶⁶ The strength of the Seleucid kingdom in 196-194/3 and Ptolemaic weakness at that time make it highly unlikely that Antiochus III was forced to make major concessions to the Ptolemaic king, despite claims made by representatives of Ptolemy V's sons twenty-five years later. It appears that the Ptolemaic court had to make do with a promise of Antiochus the Great that Egypt and the remaining possessions of the Ptolemaic monarchy would not be attacked by the Seleucid king.⁶⁷

⁶³ See Holleaux 1938-68: V. 163-64; Walbank 1940: 325, as opposed to Leuze 1923: 203-4.

⁶⁴ Livy 35.13.4. According to Porphyry, *FGH* 260 F 47, the wedding took place in 193/2, but see Leuze 1923: 221-29; Schmitt 1964: 26; Walbank 1936a: 22-23.

⁶⁵ For more information about these events, see Ed. Will 1979-82: II. 176-78, 193-95.

⁶⁶ Polyb. 28.20.9. This promise becomes a fact in Appian, *Syr.* 5; *Jos. Ant.* 12.154; Porphyry, *FGH* 260 F 47; *Chron. Pasch.*, ed. Dindorf I, pp. 434-35; Syncellus, ed. Mosshammer p. 341. Cuq 1927, asserts that Antiochus III gave Ptolemy Epiphanes the income from Coele-Syria; cf. Walbank 1957-79: III. 356; Ed. Will 1979-82: II. 192. This strikes me as illogical. *Jos. Ant.* 12.154, speaks of giving the land as a dowry but in the following sentence discusses the division of the income between the Ptolemaic king and his wife, cf. Holleaux 1938-68: III. 347-54. Thus, *Jos. Ant.* 12.154 and 155 contradict one another.

⁶⁷ A story which is inconsistent with this policy is narrated by Livy 33.41; Appian, *Syr.* 4; Zon. 9.18. These sources tell of Antiochus III's desire to seize

Rome and the Greeks of Asia Minor

The *senatus consultum* of 196 and its subsequent dissemination at Corinth and Lysimacheia indicate that the Republic had now assumed the role of the protector of the right of the Asiatic Greeks to freedom. At the same time, Rome was also the declared champion of the Greeks in Europe and here the Republic was able to match lofty declarations with political action. Flamininus had announced the liberation of Philip's Greek subjects during the Isthmian games, carefully staging his declaration in order to win gratitude and adoration both for himself and for Rome. The goodwill won at Corinth needed to be protected from the incursions of Antiochus III, and since any occupation of European soil by the Seleucid king would draw him closer to Greece and to Rome's interests there, it was only natural for the Republic to try and ward off the king. Rome's objections to Antiochus' territorial ambitions were first disclosed at Corinth, when Flamininus and the ten commissioners warned the king not to cross over to Europe with his army. Harmony, they told him, now reigned in Greece and not one of the Greek states was under attack from another. Later on, at Lysimacheia, the Roman representative L. Cornelius returned to the same topic and wondered what right the Seleucid king had to move his army to Europe. This action, he warned, would be interpreted by all reasonable people as an attempt to attack

Egypt upon hearing a rumor that Ptolemy Epiphanes was dead. Once the rumor proved false, the king nevertheless wanted to capture Cyprus, but in the end returned to Syria. However, the following objections can be raised in response here. (1) The date of the alleged attempt, after the end of the Lysimacheia conference which was held in October, is hardly suitable for a new campaign. Nor did the king have adequate forces. The land army stayed behind in Thrace and only the navy accompanied Antiochus, Livy 33.41.4-5. (2) The season is consistent with the king's return to Antioch-on-the-Orontes or Seleuceia-in-Pieria for the winter, cf. Polyb. 5.57.1, 5.66.5; Livy 33.19.8. (3) The course taken by the Seleucid navy is also compatible with a return to Seleuceia, rather than an attack on Cyprus. According to Livy 33.41.5-7, Antiochus heard at Patara that Ptolemy V was not dead and then turned his sights on Cyprus. If the king wanted to grab the island he would have tried to launch his campaign as soon as possible, before the onset of the winter, and attempted a crossing in the area of the Zephyrium and Sarpedonian promontories. Yet Antiochus continued to sail eastwards until reaching the mouth of the river Sarus, a point significantly further removed from Cyprus. In short, the story of Antiochus' attempt to become master of Egypt and Cyprus in 196 is not credible. The Roman envoy went to Egypt in the hope of dissuading the king and his ministers from forming a marriage alliance with Antiochus.

the Romans. It is clear, then, that in 196 the concentration of Seleucid troops in Europe was seen not only as a disruption of Rome's recent arrangements in Greece, but also as a threat to the Republic's own security. Greece, Thrace, and Chersonesus were all seen as being within Rome's sphere of influence.⁶⁸ While both the Greek cities in Europe and those in Asia deserved support because the principle of Greek freedom was now incorporated within Roman foreign policy, it was only the territorial integrity of the European Greeks which was thought to represent a vital Roman interest. Thus the Greek cities in Europe were deemed doubly worthy of Roman protection. In this sense, Roman support of the Asiatic Greeks must have taken second place to their desire to drive Antiochus out of Europe.

Antiochus' Response to Roman Pressure

The Roman arguments presented at Corinth and then at Lysimacheia failed to convince Antiochus. The king refuted the Roman claims, point by point, arguing that just as he had no right to intervene in the affairs of Italy, the Romans had no excuse for interceding in the affairs of Asia. Antiochus III also justified the landing of his army in Europe. His aim, he said, was to conquer the cities of Chersonesus and Thrace, cities for which his claims were stronger than those of anyone else. These areas, formerly ruled by Lysimachus, had become 'spear-won lands' when that king was defeated by Seleucus I at Corupedium. The Seleucid title to these cities was not suspended afterwards, even when the country first came into the hands of the Ptolemies, and then under the control of the Antigonids, because the cities had not been won in battle, but were acquired through default, through the neglect of Seleucus I's descendants. Antiochus also tried to relieve Roman fears by stating that he had no intention of attacking Rome, but was merely rebuilding Lysimacheia as a residence for his son Seleucus. The Seleucid king was also ready to reassure Rome about the autonomous cities, despite his view that Rome had no right to interfere in the affairs of Asia Minor. Antiochus was prepared to let

⁶⁸ Polyb. 18.47.2, 18.50.8-9; Livy 33.34.3-4, 33.39.7; Diod. 28.12; Appian, *Syr.* 3. A Seleucid envoy to Rome in 193 summarized the demands made of his king, Diod. 28.15.2. For the argument between the Romans and Antiochus III, see Badian 1964: 118-21.

these cities enjoy their freedom, but their liberty was to be granted as an act of kindness on his part.⁶⁹ The Roman envoys responded with a challenge to the king: if Antiochus was so concerned with the freedom of the autonomous cities, they stated, he should hear the grievances and resentment of two such cities, Smyrna and Lampsacus. The ambassadors of these cities were called in to lodge their complaints, but the king refused to hear them out. He was prepared, he declared, to submit his differences with the two cities to the arbitration of the Rhodians. At this point, after Antiochus had demonstrated his refusal to recognize the right of the Romans to involve themselves in the affairs of Asia, the conference dispersed (Polyb. 18.52).

The conference at Lysimacheia ended, as it had begun, in sharp disagreement. Neither the Roman delegation nor Antiochus III had conceded any point to the other party. Thus it is probably wrong to label either one of the participants in the conference a victor, although Antiochus did prove himself capable of countering each of the arguments put forward by the Roman delegates.⁷⁰ The king's assurances that he had no intention of attacking Rome probably failed to put the minds of the Roman ambassadors at rest, insofar as the king's long term plans were concerned, but there was no immediate threat to Rome. The Seleucid king was only beginning to establish his army and administration in his newly acquired European domain, and Greece was still relatively secure from a direct threat. The season, nearly winter, seemed to exclude the possibility of an invasion of Greece, and Antiochus himself went south to Seleuceia-in-Pieria for the cold season. In the following spring Antiochus continued to demonstrate peaceful intentions towards the Republic by sending a delegation to T. Quinctius Flamininus in Greece, with the object of concluding an alliance with Rome.⁷¹ Nothing came of this meeting, probably because, as in Lysimacheia, the king was not willing to offer concessions in order to bring about the proposed alliance.

⁶⁹ Polyb. 18.51; Livy 33.40; Diod. 28.12; Appian, *Syr.* 3. Antiochus' argument concerning the Ptolemaic cities has been discussed above, p. 78. For Antiochus' claim to Thrace as 'spear-won land,' see Bickermann 1932a: 50-53.

⁷⁰ See Badian 1964: 121.

⁷¹ Livy 33.41.5, 34.25.2. For the date, see Holleaux 1938-68: V. 164 n. 4.

Rome Withdraws from Greece

Rome's reservations concerning Antiochus probably increased during his campaigns in Thrace in 195 and 194.⁷² The king sought, no doubt, to consolidate his control over Thrace, and his military activity must have been viewed with alarm in Rome. The Romans were receptive to accusations concerning the king's hostile intentions and his collusion with enemies and potential adversaries of Rome, such as Hannibal, Nabis, and the Aetolians.⁷³ Small wonder, then, that one of the consuls of 194, P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus, spoke of the threat posed by Antiochus III, and recommended assigning Macedonia to one of the consuls. Leaving the question of personal gains aside, Scipio's suggestion shows that he either favored a military solution to the Seleucid presence in Thrace, or at the very least, sought to contain the aspirations of Antiochus III by maintaining the presence of Roman troops in Greece. The *patres* decided, however, to recall the Roman army from Greece (Livy 34.43.3-9). Their decision to adopt a policy contrary to that enunciated by Scipio was undoubtedly influenced by the earlier pronouncements of T. Quinctius Flamininus. Rome's commitment to the freedom of the European Greeks, as expressed in the *senatus consultum* of 196, had been regarded with skepticism, not least because the Republic had fulfilled her promise only in part, keeping troops in the 'fetters of Greece,' Acro-Corinth, Demetrias, and Chalcis. The evacuation of Greece was likely to dispel existing mistrust towards Rome and solidify support for the Republic in Greece, regardless of whether war with Antiochus was imminent. Rome, it could be seen, was liberating the Greeks and leaving them to attend their own affairs. Antiochus, on the other hand, though ostensibly championing the same cause, was applying pressure on his "liberated" cities through the presence of his army and administration near—and at times within—their walls. Rome's departure was a message intended for the Greeks of Asia Minor as well, and these Greeks could compare their treatment by the Seleucid king with the magnanimous approach of Rome. The evacuation of Greece also meant that a subsequent Seleucid invasion would characterize the king as an

⁷² Livy 34.33.12; Appian, *Syr.* 6.

⁷³ The atmosphere in Rome is forcefully described by Gruen 1984: II. 625, though he attaches little importance to it.

aggressor coming to enslave the liberated Greeks. The complete Roman withdrawal from Greece was, it seems, the final stage of the Senate's plan of 196, and it indicates no disinterest in the affairs of Greece. Rome would best achieve her objectives in Greece if Greek public opinion was behind her. In Flamininus' eyes, and in the eyes of most of the senators, the way to attain such support was to paint Rome as the champion and protector of freedom for the Greeks. Pulling the Roman army out of Greece was simply one means of convincing the Greeks that Rome stood by her policies.⁷⁴

Seleucid Negotiators at Rome

Antiochus III seems to have misread the Roman pullout from Greece. He concluded that the Republic would not object now to his possession of Thrace and Chersonesus and thought that the Romans had accepted his view that the Greek cities of Asia Minor should owe their liberated status to him. Consequently, he sent two envoys to Rome. The ambassadors, Menippus and Hegesianax, came to Rome in 193 with instructions to settle the king's differences with the Republic and sign a treaty of alliance. At the same time, other embassies had also arrived in Rome, including delegations from Greece and Asia Minor. The Seleucid mission was first met by T. Quinctius Flamininus and the same ten commissioners who had been sent to Greece in 196. Flamininus and the commissioners were now empowered by the Senate to conduct the negotiations with the Seleucid ambassadors. Menippus opened the meeting by proposing a treaty between Rome and Antiochus III, but made it plain that concrete results would be achieved only if Rome would treat the Seleucid king as an equal and not attempt to impose her own terms upon the king.⁷⁵ In reply, Flamininus offered the Seleucid king one of two options if he wished to become an ally of Rome. If Antiochus would retreat from Europe, the Romans would in turn give him free rein in Asia Minor. If, however, the king refused to withdraw, and continued to hold his Thracian possessions, he would have to accept Rome's right to assist her *amici* in Asia Minor.⁷⁶ Flamininus' two options make it plain that neither Thrace nor Asia Minor was considered

⁷⁴ See Badian 1964: 122-24.

⁷⁵ Livy 34.57.1-11; Diod. 28.15.1-2. Cf. Appian, *Syr.* 6.

⁷⁶ Livy 34.58.1-3; Diod. 28.15.3.

strategically important in itself. What *was* essential for Rome was to achieve some balance of power with the Seleucid kingdom. A balance could be reached either by having the Seleucid kingdom exercise its authority in Asia Minor, with Rome in charge of Europe, or else by allowing the two states to compete with one another in both Asia Minor and Europe.

It should be noted that Flamininus, in each of these two options presented to the Seleucid envoys, was both offering concessions to the king and demanding similar gestures in return. If Antiochus III agreed to his first proposal, Rome would relinquish any aspiration to speak on behalf of the Asiatic Greeks and would accept the king's argument at Lysimacheia that Asia Minor was no concern of Rome. In return, the Seleucid king would have to relinquish his claim on the areas north and west of the Hellespontus. The alternate solution required Rome to forego her demand that Thrace be evacuated. Antiochus, for his part, would have to recognize Rome's right to conclude treaties with the Greek cities of Asia Minor. By offering these two choices, Flamininus made it plain that the principle of the freedom of the Greeks was no longer an issue. In either case, Rome would be abandoning some of the Greeks to their fate. The implication for the Seleucid kingdom was more fundamental. Antiochus, whichever option he chose—either withdrawing from Europe or else recognizing the autonomous status of Greek cities as a result of a treaty with Rome—would be bound to relinquish the principle that any land won by one of his ancestors in battle was part of the Seleucid kingdom. Since Antiochus III had based his wide-ranging conquests in the East, Coele-Syria and Phoenicia, Asia Minor, and Europe on the past victories of Seleucus I, the acceptance of either one of Flamininus' proposals would have deprived the king of a legal right to large areas within the Seleucid kingdom.

When replying to the Roman proposals, the Seleucid envoys categorically refused to make any concessions which might affect Antiochus' claims to Thrace, or for that matter, to any of the territories conquered by his ancestors. The Roman answer was clear. If the Seleucids were not going to relinquish their territorial claims, Rome had no choice but to pursue its previous policy of supporting the Asiatic Greeks. Flamininus then stepped up the pressure by saying that Rome now intended to liberate the Asiatic Greeks (*liberare in animo habet*), just as she had freed Greece from Philip V.

The threat of war was now clearly in the air, but the Seleucid envoys had to reject the Roman ultimatum. They had no authority to agree to a proposal which would diminish either the territories under the king's control or his very standing.⁷⁷

The scene now shifted from diplomatic discussions behind closed doors to a meeting of the Senate, to which the Seleucid envoys were invited, along with representatives of the Greek cities in both Greece and Asia Minor. Flamininus used the occasion to shock the Seleucid envoys and gain the support of the European and Asiatic Greeks. If on the previous day he had hinted at the possibility of war, he now spoke in no uncertain terms. The Roman people would commit themselves to liberating the Greeks of Asia Minor, showing the same spirit they had shown when freeing Greece from Philip.⁷⁸ As soon as the Seleucid ambassadors heard Flamininus' harsh words, they understood the gravity of the situation. Rome was threatening to declare war on Antiochus III if her demands were not met, and the platform used to voice the threat reduced the Republic's ability to retract its belligerent words. Cooler heads were now needed and discussions had to be held away from the public eye. Menippus therefore asked for time to report these developments to his king, and advised the Senate to rethink its policies. The *patres*, who did not wish to be accused of war-mongering, readily granted the Seleucid envoy's request and decided to send their own ambassadors to the king so that discussions could be resumed later on.⁷⁹

Further Roman-Seleucid Negotiations

Talks now shifted to Apamea where Antiochus III conferred with P. Villius, one of the *legati* dispatched by the Senate. Discussions in Rome had been cut short at the request of the Seleucid diplomats, and Antiochus was now expected to respond to Flamininus' proposals. Livy tells us that during the Roman ambassador's encounter

⁷⁷ Livy 34.58.4-34.59.3; Diod. 28.15.4.

⁷⁸ Livy 34.59.4-5; Diod. 28.15.4. I follow Badian 1964: 127 and 137 n. 70, who rightly rejects the statements of Livy and Diodorus, according to which Flamininus' commitment to the Asiatic Greeks hinged upon Antiochus' refusal to evacuate Europe. In public, and in the presence of Greeks from Europe and Asia Minor, Flamininus was bound to present himself—and Rome—as staunch supporters of the Greeks and their liberation.

⁷⁹ Livy 34.59.6-8; Diod. 28.15.4.

with the king, the same sharp differences of opinion which had proven insurmountable in Rome surfaced once again. We are not told what these differences were, but it is obvious that Antiochus III repeatedly insisted on his right to press his claims to all areas of land once occupied by Seleucus I. Villius, too, must have followed what was a predictable line of argument by now, objecting to the king's presence in Europe and arguing for the Republic's right to maintain and develop relations with the Greek cities of Asia Minor. The negotiations had already reached an impasse when Antiochus learned of the death of his eldest son, Antiochus the co-regent. At this point, the king withdrew from the negotiations.⁸⁰ Talks were then resumed in Ephesus, probably after a break of a few weeks. The king no longer took part in the discussions, which were conducted by a member of the court named Minnio. Antiochus' absence could be explained by his recent personal loss, but the king must have realized that the deadlock between the two sides could not be broken. His presence would only accentuate the differences between himself and Rome, making a further attempt at reconciliation less likely to succeed. On the Roman side, Villius was now joined by P. Sulpicius. The Seleucids again argued that earlier conquests of territory by Antiochus' ancestors justified his present claim, while the Romans, as before, rejected this view. The Ephesus conference was doomed to failure, and the parties dispersed, with war all the more likely. The king himself, though absent from the round of talks at Ephesus, was well enough to preside over a secret meeting whose purpose was to decide whether to ignore the Roman demands, or accept them and prevent the outbreak of war (Livy 35.16-19).

The unsuccessful negotiations between the Seleucids and Rome at the conferences of 193 were followed by a renewed attack by Antiochus on Smyrna, Lampsacus, and Alexandria Troas in 192 (Livy 35.42.2). These cities had first been attacked by the king in 197/6, and their freedom had been the subject of repeated discussions between Rome and Antiochus. The fact that the cities

⁸⁰ Livy 35.15.1-3. Appian, *Syr.* 12, presumably alludes to this conference, though he places it at Ephesus. According to Appian, the king was ready to appease Rome by guaranteeing the freedom of all the Asiatic Greeks, including the Rhodians, Byzantines, and the people of Cyzicus, but he was unwilling to liberate the Ionians and Aeolians. Since Antiochus was ready to grant the Asiatic Greeks freedom on his own terms, see above p. 82, it is clear that Appian presents the king's words from a Roman perspective.

were able to hold out for so long cannot be explained solely on the basis of their resistance. The great sieges of that era were almost always concluded in much shorter periods of time.⁸¹ Smyrna and Lampsacus, it seems, were able to retain their freedom, because Antiochus, while claiming to be their rightful sovereign, nonetheless eased his military pressure as long as there was hope that negotiations with Rome would bear fruit. The renewed attack suggests that the king had now despaired of solving his dispute with Rome through peaceful diplomacy.

It is nonetheless fitting that the occasion which triggered the outbreak of war was not the renewed Seleucid offensive against these two cities, but the king's arrival in Greece in 192.⁸² While Rome had repeatedly declared her opposition to Seleucid expansion beyond the Hellespontus, and had presented herself as the defender of the Asiatic Greeks, the real motive behind these policies had been the fear of further Seleucid action in Greece. Consequently it was the Seleucid invasion of Greece, and this invasion alone, that forced the Republic to become involved in a war against Antiochus the Great.

2. *The Treaty of Apamea*

Antiochus' Defeat

The precise details of Rome's armed conflict with Antiochus III need not detain us. The king invaded Greece with an army that was too small to be of any consequence. Antiochus, who was prompted by the Aetolian League to appear in Greece in force, must have calculated that his very appearance would encourage not only the Aetolians, but the rest of the Greeks, to join him. This did not happen. Instead, he was soon forced to face a Roman army which had been recruited and made ready during the long months of diplomatic stalemate which preceded the actual war. By the spring of 191 the Seleucid army had been defeated in

⁸¹ See the list of sieges mentioned by Polyb. 29.12.7-8 with Walbank 1957-79: III. 374-75. Only one siege, at Bactra, lasted as long as two years.

⁸² Polyb. 3.7.3; Diod. 29.1; Livy 35.51.1-10, 36.6.3-4. For political developments from the Ephesus conference until the outbreak of the Antiochene War, see Badian 1964: 128-34; Ed. Will 1979-82: II. 198-204; Green 1990: 419-20.

Thermopylae and was forced to retreat to Asia. Roman victory on land was then matched by similar successes at sea, especially at the battle of Myonnesus, where a combined fleet of Roman and Rhodian ships managed to inflict a severe blow on the Seleucid fleet. Naval superiority was now in the hands of Rome, and the crossing of the Hellespontus by the Roman army was imminent. Antiochus ordered the evacuation of Lysimacheia, and tried to settle his conflict with Rome by proposing to renounce his claims on those cities which had sided with Rome, such as Lampsacus and Smyrna. He also offered to pay for half of the Roman war expenditure. These proposals were heard by the Roman consul L. Cornelius Scipio and his famous brother, P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus, after they had already crossed over to the Asiatic side of the Hellespont. The offers were rejected out of hand. The Romans demanded nothing less than a Seleucid withdrawal from Asia Minor west of the Taurus mountains. Antiochus III could not accept the loss of most of his possessions in Asia Minor without a fight, and he chose to continue the war, which came to a close towards the end of 190, after a decisive Roman victory over the Seleucid army at Magnesia.⁸³

Rome's Terms

Negotiations between the victors and the vanquished began soon after the Seleucid defeat. The first contact took place at Sardis, where the consul and his brother received two emissaries of Antiochus III, Antipater and Zeuxis, who now sought peace and *amicitia* with Rome. At this meeting, P. Scipio presented the Seleucid envoys with Rome's conditions for an agreement. The Seleucids were to forego all claims to Europe and to Asia Minor, up to the Taurus mountains, and were to pay Rome's war expenses, the sum of 15,000 talents. Five hundred talents were to be handed over immediately, an additional 2,500 talents paid after the agreement was ratified in Rome, and the remainder transferred to Rome in 12 yearly installments. Further Roman demands included the return of overdue money and corn to the king of Pergamum, extradition of some of Rome's enemies, the most important of whom was Hannibal, and the dispatch of twenty hostages. Antiochus III's

⁸³ For the course of the war, see Ed. Will 1979-82: II. 204-15; Green 1990: 419-21.

emissaries immediately accepted these terms. It was agreed that the parties to the negotiations would send representatives to Rome so that the Senate and Roman people could ratify the treaty. After a few days, the hostages (including the future king, Antiochus IV, son of Antiochus III) and the first installment of the war reparations, 500 talents, were handed over.⁸⁴ The Seleucid representatives subsequently arrived in Rome, where both the Senate and the people ratified the peace treaty with Antiochus. The two parties to the agreement, the Romans and the Seleucid ambassadors, swore to uphold its terms.⁸⁵ The Senate then sent ten commissioners to work in conjunction with the consul Cn. Manlius Vulso, who had replaced L. Scipio as the Roman commander in Asia Minor. The commissioners and the consul had to reorganize Asia Minor after the withdrawal of Antiochus III.⁸⁶ While Manlius Vulso was awaiting the arrival of these commissioners, he received from an envoy of Antiochus the second payment of reparations, in the sum of 2,500 talents, and a shipment of corn as well. By now Antiochus and his men had supplied Rome with ample proof of their adherence to the new agreement, and their willingness to comply with the wishes of the senior Roman magistrate in Asia.⁸⁷ The time had come for Vulso, now proconsular commander of the Roman army in Asia Minor, to ratify the oaths and agreements made in Rome. This ratification took place in the early summer of 188, after the ten commissioners had joined Manlius Vulso in Apamea. The proconsul then sent two *legati* to Antiochus III in Syria to receive his solemn commitment to abide by the terms of the treaty.⁸⁸

The Weakening of Antiochus

An analysis of the chief clauses in the Treaty of Apamea will clarify what the Roman objectives were at the time the peace treaty was drawn up. Rome set out to punish Antiochus III for his refusal,

⁸⁴ Polyb. 21.16.1-21.17.12; Livy 37.45.4-21; Diod. 29.10; Appian, *Syr.* 38-39. The last two sources include, in addition to Scipio's terms, articles from the final treaty. These will be cited in the proper place.

⁸⁵ Polyb. 21.24.1-3; Livy 37.55.1-3; Appian, *Syr.* 39. According to Appian the final terms of the treaty were modified and elaborated in Rome, cf. Walbank 1957-79: III. 116-17.

⁸⁶ Polyb. 21.24.5-9; Livy 37.55.4-37.56.6; Diod. 29.11.

⁸⁷ Polyb. 21.41.8-12; Livy 38.37.7-9. For compliance with Manlius Vulso, see Livy 38.13.8-10, 38.15.13, 38.37.9-11; Polyb. 21.42.1-5.

⁸⁸ Polyb. 21.42.6-10, 21.44.1-2; Livy 38.37.11-38.38.1, 38.39.1; Appian, *Syr.* 39.

from 196 onwards, to comply with Roman policy and for the war he had waged against the Republic. Retribution, however, was not the sole goal of the treaty. The treaty was carefully designed to weaken the Seleucid kingdom, so that Roman interests would not be jeopardized in the future. Consequently, Antiochus was required to evacuate his troops from all of Asia Minor west of the Taurus mountains, and was forbidden to extend his authority beyond defined geographical boundaries.⁸⁹ Antiochus, who in 193 had rejected Flamininus' offer to recognize the king's authority over Asia Minor, was now forced to cede most of this territory to Rome. Several clauses of the treaty were designed to limit the Seleucid kingdom's military potential. The Seleucid elephant corps was to be handed over to Rome and future use of these war-animals was banned.⁹⁰ The bulk of the Seleucid warships was to be surrendered to Rome; the king was allowed to retain only ten warships, probably *cataphracts*, which he would be permitted to use only if attacked.⁹¹ The king was also prohibited from recruiting

⁸⁹ Polyb. 21.43.5; Livy 38.38.4. The text of Polybius has a lacuna here. Livy does provide geographical detail, but mentions the river Tanais as a boundary. The Tanais is the Don, and that boundary is accepted by Giovannini 1982. However, Antiochus was effectively banned from Asia Minor when forbidden to cross the Taurus mountains. Rome had no need to mention the Don, nor to recognize Antiochus' hereditary rights in Asia, which is Giovannini's explanation. From the Roman point of view, it was Antiochus' insistence on these rights which had led to his war with Rome, and there was no need to make concessions to him in this area. Older solutions have centered on "correcting" the manuscript tradition or assigning the Tanais to rivers whose name is unknown. McDonald 1967, returns to the reading Tanais, but suggests that the river is, in fact, the Calycdanus, whose upper reaches may have held a different name. Gruen 1984: II. 641 n. 145, rightly voices dissent. Had the river here been the Calycdanus, then the position of Pamphylia as lying outside the Seleucid kingdom would have been clear. Yet this was contested, Polyb. 21.46.11; Livy 38.39.17. The problem seems intractable.

⁹⁰ Polyb. 21.43.12; Livy 38.38.8; Diod. 29.10; Appian, *Syr.* 38; Memnon, *FGH* 434 F 18.9.

⁹¹ Polyb. 21.43.13; Livy 38.38.8; Diod. 29.10; Appian, *Syr.* 38-39; Memnon, *FGH* 434 F 18.9. Polybius' *κατάφρακτα* is disputed by McDonald & Walbank 1969, who note that the texts of both Polybius and Livy at this point are unreliable, cf. Walbank 1957-79: III. 159-60. The two scholars assume that Polybius' *cataphracts* are regularly rendered by Livy as *naves tectae*, and since these are not recorded by Livy here they conclude that "the Livian tradition shows no positive sign of any Polybian *κατάφρακτων*" (p. 37). There are, however, three passages in Polybius mentioning *cataphracts*, which are paralleled by Livy. In two cases Livy translates *naves*, in one *naves tectae* (Polyb. 3.95.2, 14.10.9, 18.44.6; Livy 22.19.3, 30.10.3, 33.30.5). We have no cause to rely on Livy's consistency in translating technical terms. Furthermore, the clause is remarkably similar to the one in the Roman treaty with Macedon after

any soldiers from territories to the north and west of the Taurus mountains, either from the Pergamene kingdom, or from the former Seleucid possessions in Asia Minor and Europe, which were now considered to be under Roman control.⁹² The Republic also placed a heavy financial burden on the Seleucid kingdom. For, in addition to the 3,000 talents already paid to L. Scipio and Manlius Vulso, Antiochus was required to hand over 12,000 talents in twelve equal annual payments, and to supply the Republic with 540,000 *modii* of corn. These exorbitant reparation demands were aimed to ensure that Antiochus would suffer from a continued shortage of money, which would, in turn, adversely affect his ability to manage the affairs of the kingdom. The scale of the sums demanded of Antiochus was so high that the possibility of delayed payments was raised, and it was agreed that the king would be required to pay any sums owed on the following year.⁹³ The king was also ordered to hand over twenty hostages to Rome and to replace them every three years. We know that one of these hostages was Antiochus' own son, the future Antiochus Epiphanes; the rest must have been either influential members of the court or their relatives.⁹⁴ The presence of these Seleucid dignitaries at Rome was intended, to be sure, to limit the king's freedom of action. Thus the treaty was designed to weaken the Seleucid kingdom in the military, political, and economic spheres for years to come.

Cynoscephalae. This allowed Philip to maintain five *cataphracts* as well as a bigger battleship, a 'sixteen,' Polyb. 18.44.6; Livy 33.30.5. The similarity between the strength of the two kingdoms and the proximity in time suggests that the Treaty of Apamea provided for ten *cataphracts*. Octavius' mission to burn the Seleucid *cataphracts*, Polyb. 31.2.11, need not imply that all were to be destroyed. The context is not legalistic, and Polybius rendered the tasks that Octavius was to fulfill, and not the fine details. Appian, although inaccurate, writes that Antiochus was allowed twelve *cataphracts*. He seems to have recorded the right type of boats, if not their number.

⁹² From Pergamum: Polyb. 21.43.7; Livy 38.38.6. From territories ἐκ τῆς ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίους ταπτομένης, see Polyb. 21.43.15; Livy 38.38.10; Appian, *Syr.* 39. This refers to the former Seleucid possessions, because they are recorded in the treaty as under Roman control. See Polyb. 21.43.8: εἰ δέ τινες ἐξ ὧν ἀπολαμβάνουσιν οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι πόλεων....

⁹³ Polyb. 21.43.19 and 23; Livy 38.38.13. On the financial clauses, see Le Rider 1992a: 268-75.

⁹⁴ Polyb. 21.43.22; Livy 38.38.15; Appian, *Syr.* 39.

Other Clauses in the Treaty

Antiochus' obligations towards Rome did not end with these clauses. Other articles in the treaty were also aimed at preventing any resurgence of Seleucid aggression. But these clauses referred to the king's relations with the territories ceded to Rome. Seleucid ships were generally forbidden to sail beyond the Calycdanus river and Cape Sarpedonium, but were allowed to do so when their mission was to deliver payments, hostages, or ambassadors.⁹⁵ Antiochus had to pledge not to attack Europe and the islands. He was also compelled to return all those soldiers who had come from the territories now seized by Rome. However, Seleucid military personnel originating from the territories east of the Taurus could stay in Asia Minor if they so chose. Thus, while the clauses prohibiting Antiochus from recruiting soldiers from the Pergamene kingdom and from regions newly held by Rome were designed to have a long term effect on the composition of the Seleucid army, the impact of this article was of short duration. The king had to supervise the evacuation of the cities which were to be handed over to others, and he was banned from ruling these cities, even if they were to approach him in the future. Nor was Antiochus allowed to take advantage of any offensive against his kingdom, either by annexing the territory of the bellicose city or people who had attacked him or by making them his allies. The king could exercise self-defense, but could not profit from it. Disputes concerning such matters would be settled by a tribunal.⁹⁶

Yet other clauses of the Treaty of Apamea were designed to deny the Seleucid kingdom material gains from its military adventure against Rome. Thus Antiochus' troops were ordered to complete their withdrawal while carrying nothing but their weapons, and no booty was to be taken from Asia Minor. Similarly, traitors, slaves, and prisoners of war taken from the Romans and their allies were to be returned.⁹⁷

⁹⁵ Polyb. 21.43.14; Livy 38.38.9; Appian, *Syr.* 39. Cf. Walbank 1957-79: III. 160.

⁹⁶ Polyb. 21.43.4 and 8-9, 21.43.18 and 24-26; Livy 38.38.3 and 6-7, 38.38.12 and 16-17.

⁹⁷ Polyb. 21.43.6 and 10; Livy 38.38.5 and 7; Appian, *Syr.* 38-39.

Benefits for Pergamum and Rhodes

In this treaty, Rome represented the interests of her allies, Eumenes II of Pergamum and the island of Rhodes. The two states did not settle their differences with Antiochus III directly, but had to resort to the good services of the Republic. Rhodes and Pergamum were not considered victors in this war, only Rome was, and the Republic secured the economic interests of her allies. Antiochus III was obligated to honor pre-existing commitments to Pergamum by paying 350 talents, in five equal annual installments, and an additional sum of more than 127 talents in lieu of wheat. Within the Seleucid kingdom, Rhodian private property and money were safeguarded against confiscation, and tax exemptions, granted to the Rhodians in earlier times, were to be retained.⁹⁸

A One-Sided Agreement

This long list of Seleucid obligations towards the Republic and the limitations on Antiochus' freedom of action were not reciprocated in any way by Rome.⁹⁹ There is not even one clause in the treaty which involves a one-sided commitment on the part of the Republic towards Antiochus, and only two clauses are reciprocal. Both Antiochus and Rome pledged not to help an enemy of the other party: they would not allow an enemy to pass through their territory, nor would they provide him with supplies. Both parties also agreed that later amendments to the terms of the treaty could be made, provided both sides supported such changes. It may be noted that these two clauses are not specifically related to the actual state of affairs between Rome and Antiochus. They are, in fact, Greek formulas, adopted by the Romans for their contractual dealings with other states. As such, these articles were automatically introduced into the agreement with the Seleucid kingdom and they do not represent any substantive commitment either on the part of the Republic or of Antiochus.¹⁰⁰ The one-sided character of the agree-

⁹⁸ Pergamum: Polyb. 21.43.20-21; Livy 38.38.14. Rhodes: Polyb. 21.43.16-17; Livy 38.38.11-12.

⁹⁹ See also the requirement to extradite Rome's enemies, Polyb. 21.43.11; Livy 38.38.18.

¹⁰⁰ Polyb. 21.43.2-3 and 27; Livy 38.38.2-3 and 18. A Roman precedent for the first clause can be found in the treaty with Aetolia, Polyb. 21.32.3. For an earlier Greek example, see *IG I³* 83; cf. Thuc. 5.47.5 and 12.

ment was amply demonstrated in the preface to the treaty, which states that Antiochus would be considered a friend of Rome as long as he followed the terms of the treaty.¹⁰¹ Rome herself had no actual obligations to fulfill.

Rome Distributes Territories

In the Treaty of Apamea, the cities ceded by Antiochus are termed "those which the Romans seize" (Polyb. 21.43.8: ὧν ἀπολαμβάνουσιν οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι πόλεων). This wording clearly indicates that Rome's victory over Antiochus entitled her to dispose of the Seleucids' former possessions as she pleased. The various embassies who came to Rome after the victory over Antiochus at Magnesia, including delegations from Eumenes II and Rhodes, must have been aware of the possibility that the Republic would choose not to annex the territorial spoils from the war, and these delegations attempted to influence the Senate's position on a settlement. But the Senate delayed giving its final decision until after it had ratified the treaty with Antiochus. A commission of ten was then sent to Asia Minor to implement the Senate's decisions, together with Manlius Vulso.¹⁰² The procedure adopted by the *patres* was, then, very similar to the one used in 196. After the victory over Philip V in the Second Macedonian War, the king signed a treaty with Rome and handed over to the Romans the territories in Greece which he had pledged to surrender. Flamininus subsequently disposed of these territories, declaring them free. Seven years later, the Senate similarly decided the future of Antiochus' Asiatic possessions after the treaty with the king had been ratified. But if in 196 the Senate announced its commitment to the liberation of the Greeks of Asia Minor, and then set the Greeks of Hellas free at Corinth, the *patres* did not make good on this commitment to all of the Asiatic Greeks, once the battle of Magnesia was won.

The Senate and its ten commissioners decided that those autonomous cities which had been conquered by Antiochus III and were forced to pay him taxes, but had then pledged their allegiance to Rome before the battle of Magnesia, were to be freed from taxation. Other cities, those which had paid tribute to Attalus I, were

¹⁰¹ Polyb. 21.43.1; Livy 38.38.2.

¹⁰² Polyb. 21.18.1-21.24.9; Livy 37.52.1-37.56.6.

supposed to pay the same amount to his son, Eumenes II. A third group of cities included those which had fought alongside Antiochus during the conflict with Rome. These cities were to transfer their allegiance to the king of Pergamum, and pay him the taxes they had formerly given to the Seleucid king. Three cities in this last category were Ephesus, Tralles, and Telmessus. The Romans also determined the future of the vast regions evacuated by Antiochus. In Europe, Eumenes received the area around the Chersonesus and the city of Lysimacheia. In Asia Minor, he now became master of Hellespontine and Greater Phrygia, the part of Mysia which had earlier been conquered by Prusias, as well as Lycaonia, Milyas, Lydia and Ionia. Rhodes, too, was rewarded for her military assistance to Rome, although the island's new acquisitions, Lycia and Caria to the south of the Maeander, were considerably smaller than those granted Eumenes.¹⁰³

The Senate's decision to distribute the land acquired through the war with Antiochus and transfer it to Eumenes II, Rhodes, and the cities of Asia Minor is a clear indication that the *patres* had no desire for territorial aggrandizement. This had also been true of Roman policy in Greece following the Republic's victory over Philip V at Cynoscephalae. This lack of interest in annexing new lands in the east should not be taken as a sign of total indifference to events in the region that the Republic was about to vacate. After all, the war with Antiochus had broken out because Rome had maintained a strong interest in Greece, even after Roman legions were no longer there.

In 189-188, then, Rome parceled out the former territories of Antiochus to Eumenes II, Rhodes, and various Greek cities. These were the Republic's gifts,¹⁰⁴ and the *patres* must have expected Rome's generosity to be appreciated and gratefully acknowledged. In addition, an appeal by one of the states and cities in Asia Minor concerning the terms of the Treaty of Apamea was bound to be addressed, first of all, to the victor. So, for instance, the Rhodians appealed to the Senate to liberate the people of Soli, even though this city lay beyond the Taurus and was to remain under Seleucid control. Similarly, the king of Pergamum petitioned the ten

¹⁰³ Polyb. 21.24.7-8, 21.46.1-10; Livy 37.55.5-6, 37.56.1-6, 38.39.7-16; Diod. 29.11; Appian, *Syr.* 44. For a detailed discussion of the Roman settlement, see Walbank 1957-79: III. 164-174; Magie 1950: II. 758-64 n. 56.

¹⁰⁴ Sherwin-White 1984: 23-26, rightly stresses this point.

commissioners, and later the Senate, that Pamphilia be wrested from the control of Antiochus and handed over to him.¹⁰⁵ These appeals demonstrate how the Treaty of Apamea concluded by Rome and Antiochus III affected the destiny of the people of Asia Minor, whose fate was governed by the terms of the accord, despite the fact that they were not a party to it. Antiochus III was bound by treaty to Rome alone, and only the Republic had the military power to keep Antiochus faithful to his obligations. Hence, the ability of Eumenes II and Rhodes to maintain control over their new territories depended both on their loyalty to Rome and on the Republic's continued involvement in the affairs of Asia Minor. The effect of the Treaty of Apamea and the Romans' subsequent allocation of various lands was to extend the territories of Pergamum and Rhodes and at the same time make these two states more dependent on Rome. The division of control between the two states further insured that neither Pergamum nor Rhodes would be able to become too powerful.

Rome's standing was further enhanced through the actions of the Senate and the ten commissioners, who now had the power to determine the future of the various communities and peoples within Asia Minor. These peoples, in turn, swamped the Senate, the commissioners, and Manlius Vulso with embassies and requests. Each mission courted Roman favor in an attempt to secure benefits and concessions for its city: e.g. freedom from tribute or the removal of garrisons.¹⁰⁶ At times such appeals failed, as in the case of the Lycians who were handed over to Rhodes, despite the efforts of the people of Ilium on their behalf. Even then, it was possible to argue successfully, as ultimately the Lycians did in 178/7, that their treatment by those entrusted by Rome to manage their affairs did not accord with the original instructions given by the ten commissioners.¹⁰⁷ This episode clearly demonstrates that Rome was seen as the supreme arbiter of the affairs of Asia Minor because of the role she played in 189-188, but it also shows that the

¹⁰⁵ Polyb. 21.24.10-15, 21.46.11; Livy 37.56.7-10, 38.39.17.

¹⁰⁶ Polyb. 21.18.1-2, 21.41.1-2, 21.46.1; Livy 37.55.4, 38.37.1-4. There are several individual instances of such appeals, although in some cases the date is contested. Alabanda: Livy 38.13.2; Holleaux 1898: 258-66 no. 3. Apollonia: L. Robert & J. Robert 1954: 303-12 no. 167 ll. 1-4. Araxa: SEG XVIII 570 ll. 62-66. The inscription also records the establishment of a festival to *Dea Roma Epiphanes*, ll. 69-71. Larsen 1956: 155-56, plausibly dates this to 189.

¹⁰⁷ Polyb. 22.5.1-10, 25.4.1-7, 25.5.1-5.

Senate did not shirk from playing its part. It may safely be said that equilibrium, division, and envy were the tools used by the Republic to maintain its influence on the states and cities of Asia Minor.

Antiochus III after Apamea

As for Syria itself, the terms of the treaty of Apamea indicate that the Senate meant to monitor the affairs of Seleucid Syria fairly closely. The treaty called for the payment of reparations in twelve yearly installments which were to be brought to Rome. In this fashion, the Senate expected to test the Seleucid king's allegiance over a lengthy period. The Seleucid embassies coming to Rome every year would give the *patres* an opportunity to assess political developments within the Seleucid kingdom. The replacement of the Seleucid hostages every three years, which served the same purpose, was also meant to ensure that the men held in Rome were indeed important and influential.

In the aftermath of the battle of Magnesia, the Seleucid kingdom faced growing difficulties in the East. Two *strategoi* of Antiochus III, Artaxias and Zariadris, rebelled and each was able to establish his own kingdom. Zariadris crowned himself king of Sophene, while Artaxias became the sovereign of Armenia.¹⁰⁸ The Parthians, who were defeated by Antiochus III in 209, and were then forced to recognize his authority, apparently rebelled after the battle of Magnesia and cast off the Seleucid yoke.¹⁰⁹ It is likely that there was a great deal of unrest in Elymais, the place where we last hear of Antiochus the Great. The king sacked the temple of Bel, and then perished with his troops after clashing with the local population. The attack on the temple is explained by Diodorus Siculus, who depends on the authority of Polybius, by the king's lack of funds. If this is so, Antiochus' compelling need for money after the Treaty of Apamea apparently impelled him to alienate his own subjects. However, Diodorus also refers to the king's accusations against the people of Elymais, namely that they had started a war against him. In other words, Antiochus charged them with

¹⁰⁸ Strabo 11.14.5-6 (C 528-29), 11.14.15 (C 531-32); Plut. *Luc.* 31.3-4; Diod. 31.17a.

¹⁰⁹ Tac. *Hist.* 5.8.2-3. See below p. 220.

rebellion.¹¹⁰ It is therefore possible to account for the king's presence in Elymais and his subsequent attack on the temple by the upheavals that were felt throughout the Seleucid kingdom after Magnesia and the Treaty of Apamea. The king's image as a great conqueror was irrevocably damaged, and opposition to his rule was sure to surface. In addition to these psychological effects, there were more concrete results. According to the agreement, Antiochus could not keep in his army soldiers who originated from Asia Minor, and this meant that the Seleucid army lost an important source of skilled manpower virtually overnight. Mercenaries and soldiers from the Seleucid military colonies in Asia Minor could no longer be used against external enemies or insurgents. In addition, the economic constraints on the monarchy, caused by the loss of provinces and the heavy payments to Rome, must have led to higher taxation, bringing on new waves of discontent.

This was the state of the kingdom which Seleucus IV, son of Antiochus III, received after his father's death in Elam in the summer of 187.¹¹¹ The Seleucid realm was still reeling from the impact of the battle of Magnesia and its aftermath. The kingdom needed a long period of tranquillity in order to recuperate and fulfill its pecuniary pledges to Rome. Antiochus III, the great conqueror, was ill-equipped for this patient work of healing and rebuilding. His son Seleucus, who had gained some experience alongside his father, first during the war with Rome and then, from 189, as co-regent, was more suited to adapt to the new circumstances. The remaining part of the kingdom was still vast, and the king could draw upon fertile Mesopotamia as a source of income, while Phoenicia with her port cities and merchant vessels would continue to trade with other parts of the Mediterranean. Rebuilding the kingdom did not seem impossible.

¹¹⁰ Diod. 29.15. The Elymaeans are accused *πολέμου κατάρχεσθαι*. Cf. Diod. 28.3; Strabo 16.1.18 (C 744); Porphyry, *FGH* 260 F 32.10, F 47; Justin 32.2.1-2. For Antiochus III's eastern domains after Apamea, see Ed. Will 1979-82: II. 348-52.

¹¹¹ For the date of the king's death, see BM 35603 Rev. II. 6-7 (Sachs & Wiseman 1954: 207).

3. *Seleucus IV (187-175)*

Seleucus IV and the Achaean League

Most of the relatively little information we have about the reign of Seleucus IV relates to foreign policy. In 185, representatives of Seleucus IV appeared before the council of the Achaean League. They asked that the Achaeans renew their friendship (*φιλία*) with the Seleucid kingdom and accept ten warships as a present. The Achaean League responded positively to this overture, agreeing to renew their amicable relations with the king, but refused the gift.¹¹² It is possible that the ten warships offered by Seleucus IV were the entire Seleucid fleet, for ten was the number of warships the Seleucid kings were allowed to hold, according to the Treaty of Apamea. Seleucus wanted to hand over these ships in order to replace them with newer and better ones which presumably would be built in his shipyards. By having his men engaged in building warships, an activity not covered by the terms of the treaty with Rome, the king could ensure that they would not forget their trade. In this manner, Seleucus IV could modernize his navy while earning the friendship of the Achaean League.¹¹³ The Achaeans, when declining the present, were being careful to avoid the appearance of cooperating militarily with the Seleucid kingdom, which only a few years earlier had been an enemy of Rome. At the same time, the League's official rationale was that it did not wish to receive presents from kings (Polyb. 22.8.5-7). Seleucus IV's success in Achaea was, then, somewhat limited.

False rumors

In 181/0 Pharnaces, king of Pontus went to war with Eumenes II, king of Pergamum and Ariarathes IV, king of Cappadocia. According to two of our sources, Polybius and Diodorus Siculus, Seleucus IV was ready to be less than cautious when offered 500 talents by Pharnaces in exchange for his military assistance.

¹¹² Polyb. 22.7.4, 22.9.13. Diod. 29.17, from Polybius, wrongly states that the Achaeans accepted Seleucus' present. For the date of the visit, see Walbank 1957-79: III. 9-11.

¹¹³ Mørholm 1966: 33, explains the gift somewhat differently. After 188, he argues, the Seleucid navy numbered more ships than was allowed, and the king was now trying to rid himself of the surplus.

These sources relate that Seleucus IV mustered his army and advanced into the Taurus mountains, but was eventually deterred because he did not want to violate the Treaty of Apamea, which barred the Seleucids from crossing these mountains.¹¹⁴ This story is not convincing: Seleucus could not have been unaware that leading his troops across the chain of the Taurus would be in effect a major violation of his treaty with Rome. This version of events attacks Seleucus IV from two contrary angles, charging that he did not have the courage to go to war, and that he was willing (at least initially) to breach the Treaty of Apamea. Thus the Seleucid king was assigned two contradictory traits: cowardice and aggression. The story clearly reflects animosity towards the king, and it probably echoes a rumor fabricated by the Pergamene court. Seleucus had to contend with such stories, which were meant to blacken his reputation in Rome.

Seleucus IV and Macedon

The hostility between the kingdom of Pergamum and the Seleucid kingdom, revealed in the alleged plan of Seleucus IV to do battle with Eumenes II, was a continuation of the rivalry displayed by the two kingdoms during the war between Antiochus III and the Romans. However, after Apamea, the Attalid kingdom had increased its strength in Asia Minor as a result of the Roman settlement there, and the friendly relationship of its king with Rome made him a potentially dangerous rival. It should also be remembered that the Treaty of Apamea did not preclude an attack on the Seleucid kingdom from Asia Minor.¹¹⁵ Seleucus must have sought to contain Eumenes II, and he found a natural ally in the kingdom of Macedon. After all, Manlius Vulso and the ten commissioners had given Eumenes II a foothold in Europe, by granting him the Chersonesus, and Lysimacheia with its adjacent forts and lands.¹¹⁶ These territories had previously been annexed by Philip V during the Second Macedonian War, and were of considerable strategic importance, for they provided access to the Propontis and to Asia Minor. The Macedonian king, who cooperated with the Romans during their conflict with Antiochus III and the Aetolians, must

¹¹⁴ Polyb. fr. 96; Diod. 29.24.

¹¹⁵ Polyb. 21.43.24-26; Livy 38.38.16-17.

¹¹⁶ Polyb. 21.46.9; Livy 38.39.14.

have been bitterly disappointed when the Romans chose to award these much coveted areas to another of their allies, the king of Pergamum. Furthermore, in the period that followed the retreat of Antiochus III to Asia Minor, Philip had managed to become the master of Aenus and Maronea, cities he was forced to relinquish after his defeat in the Second Macedonian War. But Eumenes II of Pergamum now conducted a prolonged political campaign against the Macedonian king and brought about the Roman decision which forced Philip out of the two Thracian cities. Thus Macedon and Pergamum, enemies during the Second Macedonian War, were unlikely to become friendly neighbors.¹¹⁷ One early hint of the budding friendship between Macedon and the Seleucid kingdom may be found, perhaps, in the name given to the prince royal, Demetrius, born in 186. Seleucus IV deviated from the Seleucid royal custom of naming the eldest son either Antiochus or Seleucus. The name of Seleucus IV's son, Demetrius, is clearly associated with the Antigonid royal house of Macedon and Mørkholm argues that Seleucus' choice of appellation can be viewed as an indication of the king's desire to become closer to Macedon.¹¹⁸

A short while after the death of Philip, the first positive sign of cooperation between Seleucus IV and the kingdom of Macedon appears. In 178, the Seleucid king arranged a match between his daughter, Laodice, and Perseus, the son of Philip V. The royal bride was escorted to Macedon by the Rhodian fleet.¹¹⁹ The fact that the Rhodian navy was asked to accompany Laodice illustrates Seleucus' adherence to the naval clause in the Treaty of Apamea that forbade Seleucid ships from sailing beyond the Sarpedonian promontory. Rhodes, then, served as a link between the Seleucid and Macedonian kingdoms when the marriage of Laodice and Perseus was arranged, and the island was generously rewarded by the Macedonian king for its role. It appears that the royal match symbolized a new political alliance between the Seleucid kingdom, Rhodes, and the Macedonian kingdom. This alliance must have been directed more against Pergamum than Rome, but the

¹¹⁷ For Philip V's role during Rome's conflict with Antiochus and his disappointment, see Hammond 1988: 448-55, and see also pp. 456-57, on Eumenes' involvement in driving him out of Thrace.

¹¹⁸ Mørkholm 1966: 34. Demetrius' date of birth: Polyb. 31.2.5.

¹¹⁹ Polyb. 25.4.8 and 10; Livy 42.12.3-4; Appian, *Mac* 11.2. See also *Syll.*³ 639, an inscription from Delos honoring Laodice, which appears to date from the time of her marriage to Perseus.

move nonetheless aroused resentment in the Senate (Polyb. 25.4.7-10). Seleucus IV went ahead with the match notwithstanding, because the marriage and its political consequences did not contravene the terms of the treaty. At the same time, the Seleucid king, either in anticipation of a negative reaction from Rome, or else because news of the Senate's reaction had reached him, sought to pacify the *patres*. By 178/7, Antiochus (the future Antiochus IV), brother of Seleucus IV, was no longer a hostage in Rome. The Seleucid prince made his residence in Athens. His release occurred only after his brother's son, Demetrius, had replaced him in Rome.¹²⁰ The substitution of his son for his brother as a royal hostage suggests that Seleucus IV felt that his relations with Rome were becoming too strained. It was time to placate the Senate and the king decided to send his son to Rome, as proof of his good intentions. The move was accepted by the Senate, although the eight year old prince was below the minimum age for hostages, as required by the Apamea accord. The *patres* had been given clear proof of Seleucus' friendly intentions, as well as leverage for the future.¹²¹

Ptolemaic-Seleucid Relations

What of the relationship between the Ptolemaic and Seleucid monarchies in these years? The waning power of the Seleucids coupled with the repression of the native uprisings within Egypt somewhat restored the balance of power between the Seleucid and Ptolemaic kingdoms. Ptolemy V Epiphanes had plans to raise money from the members of his court to finance a military campaign to reclaim Coele-Syria and Phoenicia, but nothing substantial came of these designs.¹²² The only military activity we know of belongs to the last year of Ptolemy Epiphanes' reign. Aristoniscus, one of the Ptolemaic commanders, raided and plundered the

¹²⁰ Antiochus in Athens: *SEG* XXXII 131, first published by Tracy 1982: 60-62. Replacement by Demetrius: Appian, *Syr.* 45, 47.

¹²¹ According to Appian, *Syr.* 45, Seleucus IV took the initiative of sending Demetrius to Rome. The prince was delivered by Seleucus as a guarantee of his father's *fides*. See Polyb. 31.2.2: *δοθῆναι γὰρ ὑπὸ Σελεύκου τοῦ πατρὸς τῆς ἐκείνου πίστεως ἕνεκεν*. Gruen 1984: II. 646 n. 172, rightly stresses the role of Seleucus, but ignores the political constraints on the king.

¹²² Diod. 29.29; Porphyry, *FGH* 260 F 48.

island of Aradus.¹²³ With the death of Ptolemy V in 180, real authority was invested in his widow, Cleopatra I, who was now the regent. Cleopatra I was the sister of Seleucus IV, and we have no grounds for assuming that she was hostile to him. Sometime after her death, in about 174-172, the relationship between Egypt and the Seleucid kingdom took a turn for the worse (2 Macc. 4.21), and we can conclude that before this time, during the years that Cleopatra I served as regent, the Seleucid king and his sister had a cordial relationship.¹²⁴

Seleucus IV, Onias III, and the Jews

How did the Jews feel about Seleucus IV? Did they support the Ptolemies or the Seleucids? Presumably there was little point in the Jews supporting the Ptolemaic kingdom in the last years of Seleucus IV's reign (180-175), because the Ptolemaic kingdom did not attempt at that time to repossess the lost province of Syria and Phoenicia. Nonetheless, the stories of the high priest Onias III, which are preserved in 2 Maccabees, are invoked at times to argue that Onias supported the Ptolemaic cause. In one episode we hear that peace reigned in Jerusalem under the righteous high priest Onias III, and the Temple was the focus for benefactions from the Seleucid kings, in particular from Seleucus IV, who supplied the costs needed for sacrifices from his own pocket. All this changed when a high official in the Temple, Simon from the priestly order of Bilgah, quarreled with the high priest and sought to undermine his position. Simon informed the Seleucid *strategos* of Coele-Syria and Phoenicia, Apollonius son of Thraseas, that the coffers of the Temple were full of treasures. This news was then relayed to the king, who sent his chief minister Heliodorus to extract money from the Temple. When Onias would not agree to his demands, Heliodorus decided to enter the Temple and fulfill the orders of his king. He was foiled, however, by supernatural creatures who frightened the chief minister's bodyguards and beat Heliodorus, rendering him unconscious. Heliodorus was then saved from death through Onias' entreaties to God on his behalf. The chief minister

¹²³ Daressy 1911: 2-8; Daressy 1917. Cf. Volkmann 1959c: 1698. There is no question of conquest here, because the island continued to mint its own coins after 180, as the issue of 174/3 shows. See Seyrig 1951: 219.

¹²⁴ Otto 1934: 1, 24.

subsequently returned to his king, recognizing the strength of the Lord. Onias' difficulties did not end there, for his rival Simon approached the Seleucid governor once again (this time, Apollonius son of Menestheus, the successor of Apollonius son of Thraseas) and continued to stir up trouble. He now accused the high priest of conspiring against the crown. Onias saw no alternative but to go to the king and defend himself and his people from the evil machinations of Simon (2 Macc. 3.1-4.6).

These two scenes involving Onias III can be approached in several ways. One possibility is to reject the credibility of the tales. The miraculous deliverance of the Jewish Temple and the recognition of the Lord's power by a pagan potentate are common motifs which do not inspire confidence. Furthermore, the story reverses many of the themes found in the tale of the Temple in the time of Antiochus IV. If here the virtue of the high priest ensures that the Lord saves the people and the Temple, there the sins of the high priests Jason and Menelaus cause God to desert his people momentarily.¹²⁵ Thus it can be argued that the story of Heliodorus' attack on the Temple, not recorded elsewhere, is an edifying invention designed to demonstrate the benefits reaped from loyalty to the Lord's ways. The second scene in our story can also be discredited. According to Josephus, Onias III died at the beginning of the reign of Antiochus IV (*Ant.* 12.237). The writer of our passage extends the life of the high priest, as it were, by removing him to Syria just before Antiochus Epiphanes assumes the throne (2 Macc. 4.1-7). This enables the writer to add further accusations against the two Jewish arch-villains of the book. Jason is accused of supplanting his own brother, while Menelaus, who succeeded Jason as high priest, is blamed for initiating the murder of the noble Onias.¹²⁶ If what we are told of Onias during the reign of Seleucus IV is indeed fictitious, there is no possibility of ascertaining the actual state of relations between the Jews and their king.

Alternatively, it can be argued that Heliodorus' clash with the Jews reflects a real occurrence, despite the supernatural character of the story. The Seleucid king's need for huge amounts of money as a result of the Treaty of Apamea would, according to this theory,

¹²⁵ Onias III: 2 Macc. 3.1-3, 3.31-33. Jason: 2 Macc. 4.10-17. Menelaus: 2 Macc. 5.15-20.

¹²⁶ 2 Macc. 4.7-10, 4.32-34. On the fictitious nature of Onias' assassination, see also below p. 129.

form the background to the tale and explain Seleucus IV's decision to appropriate cash from the Jewish Temple. Further credence to the story is added by the mention of the three Seleucid officials. All three—the chief minister Heliodorus, and the two governors of Coele-Syria and Phoenicia, Apollonius son of Thraseas and Apollonius son of Menestheus—are historical figures.¹²⁷ Thus, many scholars do not reject the tale of an attempt by Heliodorus to despoil the Temple, and explain the miraculous outcome as a fanciful version of a more mundane solution of the crisis reached by the Jews and the Seleucid government.¹²⁸ If we accept a historical basis for the stories relating to Onias III and Heliodorus, some further hypotheses can be put forward. It is argued, for instance, that the high priest Onias III supported the Ptolemies. This thesis is based on the relationship between Onias III and Hyrcanus (2 Macc. 3.10-11) and the assumption that Hyrcanus rebelled against the Seleucid government and supported the Ptolemaic dynasty.¹²⁹ However, this passage in 2 Maccabees illustrates rather the opposite, i.e. that Hyrcanus held an elevated status in Seleucid Coele-Syria (see above p. 45). Furthermore, our discussion in Chapter II shows the need for a critical approach to the story in Josephus which emphasizes the pro-Ptolemaic bent of Joseph and Hyrcanus.

Nor do the stories concerning Onias III reveal a person with pro-Ptolemaic inclinations. The high priest's attempt to keep the treasures in the Temple intact is only natural. Furthermore, if the attempt to despoil the Temple was resolved through a compromise, as is argued by those who essentially accept the story, then there is no basis for the claim that Onias favored the return of Ptolemaic control over Judaea. The second episode tells of Simon, the *strategos* of the Temple, who accuses Onias III of treason in front of the governor, Apollonius son of Menestheus. The high priest does not, however, request Ptolemaic aid, but turns to the king's court in Antioch (2 Macc. 4.4-6). Even if this reflects actual events, Onias' behavior is that of a person who believes that he will ultimately be vindicated by the highest authority in the kingdom, and once again the high priest does not resort to parties outside the Seleucid

¹²⁷ See Habicht 1976a: 210 n. 5a, 210-11 n. 7a, 214 n. 4a. Apollonius son of Thraseas is the brother of the Ptolemy discussed in Ch. I/3.

¹²⁸ See for example Tcherikover 1959: 157-58, 389-90; Mørkholm 1966: 136-37; Gruen 1993: 242.

¹²⁹ Büchler 1899: 50-52; Hengel 1974: I. 272; M. Stern 1960: 5-6.

kingdom. Presumably Seleucus IV faced no danger from a pro-Ptolemaic camp in Palestine during his last five years (180–175), because Cleopatra I tried to have a harmonious relationship with her brother's kingdom.

Seleucus IV: A Summary

Seleucus IV was killed by his chief minister Heliodorus in 175. The reasons for his murder and the changes which took place in its wake are discussed in the following chapter. Seleucus IV apparently did his best to honor the terms of the Treaty of Apamea, as evidenced by the fact that he did not send the Seleucid fleet to Macedon with his daughter. Another indication of Seleucus IV's good faith is that the king wanted to provide the Achaean League with exactly the number of ships he was permitted to hold by the Treaty of Apamea; this perhaps suggests that the king decided to give the Achaeans his warships and replace them with new and better ones. In one respect, he was not able to fulfill his obligation to Rome: Seleucus IV was supposed to have made the final reparations payment in 177, but it was Antiochus IV who wiped the slate clean three years later (Livy 42.6.6-12). At the same time, the king's connection with Macedon and Rhodes was directed against Pergamum, and Rome could not view these political activities in a positive light. We have no irrefutable knowledge that the kingdom was actually threatened by Egypt nor is there any evidence of unrest in Coele-Syria and Phoenicia or other parts of the kingdom. We can presume that the king made an effort to augment the state's income, but again actual proof of this is lacking. The period of Seleucus IV's reign appears to have been calm, and this quiet suited the needs of the Seleucid kingdom in the difficult years after the signing of the Treaty of Apamea.

CHAPTER FOUR

ANTIOCHUS IV AND THE KINGS OF THE SOUTH

1. *The Coronation of Antiochus IV*

Heliodorus and Antiochus son of Seleucus

Seleucus IV died on Elul 10, 137 S.E. (September 3, 175).¹ The Babylonian king-list, which reports this event, does not comment on the circumstances of the king's death, although elsewhere it records the cases of other kings who died in violent circumstances.² This would seem to indicate that Seleucus IV died a natural death,³ but in fact the king was murdered by his chief minister, Heliodorus.⁴ Heliodorus' plans regarding the future of the Seleucid dynasty had to take into consideration the existence of three potential heirs to the Seleucid throne. One of them was Antiochus, brother of the murdered king, who was no longer a hostage in Rome, having been replaced by his nephew Demetrius in 178/7. After his release from Roman custody, Antiochus chose to reside in Athens rather than return to the Seleucid kingdom (see above p. 104). He was now a man in his prime, and though apparently too young to have enjoyed a position of trust before being sent off to Rome, he probably used his enforced stay there to acquaint himself with the fundamentals of Roman politics and power.⁵ The two other possible successors possessed an even stronger claim to the throne,

¹ BM 35603 Rev. ll. 8-9 (Sachs & Wiseman 1954: 208). The Julian date differs from the date given in the original publication. See Parker & Dubberstein 1956 for the conversion of Babylonian dates into Julian ones, and see there p. 23 for this particular date.

² BM 35603 Rev. ll. 2-7, 10-15 (Sachs & Wiseman 1954: 207-8), mentions the violent deaths of Antiochus III and Antiochus, co-regent to Antiochus IV.

³ Cf. 2 Macc. 4.7: μεταλλάξαντος δὲ τὸν βίον Σελεύκου; *OGIS* 248 l. 10: [με]ταλλάξαντος Σελεύκου. See too the remarks of Aymard 1955: 109 n. 3.

⁴ Appian, *Syr.* 45. Bartlett 1973: 241, suggests that 2 Macc. 3.38 hints in an ironical way at the murder of the king by his minister. For Heliodorus' position, see 2 Macc. 3.7; *IG XI/4* 1112-14.

⁵ There are various assessments as to Antiochus' date of birth—212 (Mørholm 1966: 38); 205/4 (Schmitt 1964: 21). According to Zeno of Rhodes, Antiochus participated in the battle of Panium, but this view is rightly rejected by Polyb. 16.18.6, 16.19.9.

for both were the sons of the dead king. These were Demetrius himself, who was now forced to live in Rome, and his (apparently) younger brother, who has received very sparing attention in our Greek sources.⁶ While the two brothers had legitimacy on their side, both were hampered by their young age, and Demetrius was constrained by his captivity in Rome as well.⁷

After murdering his king, Heliodorus took control (Appian, *Syr.* 45). With the concentration of real power in his hands, he seems to have been content to leave the titular leadership to others. A series of Seleucid coins bearing the face of a boy and the inscription ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ ΑΝΤΙΟΧΟΥ is relevant here. Mørkholm maintains that these coins (or certainly some of them) were issued later than the coins of Seleucus IV, but earlier than the earliest issues of Antiochus IV. On two other gold coins we find two likenesses: a boy, identical to the one who appears on the series described above, and a woman, presumably his mother. It is clear, then, that in the interval between the murder of Seleucus IV and the time that his brother took the throne, the Seleucid kingdom was ruled, at least officially, by a child-king whose mother acted as his guardian. The boy must be Seleucus' son, Antiochus, and the woman is his mother, Laodice, widow of Seleucus IV. With the semblance of legitimacy and continuity thus assured, and the death of the king probably presented as due to natural causes, Heliodorus could now manage the affairs of the state with much more power than before.⁸

Was there a group which orchestrated the king's murder and hoped to benefit from Heliodorus' action? Appian, who discusses the murder of Seleucus, does not specify Heliodorus' motives and simply states that the assassin assumed the reins of power. It would appear that simple lust for power motivated the chief minister to

⁶ Diod. 30.7.2; John Antioch. fr. 58 (*FHG* IV. 558).

⁷ Demetrius was born in 186, Polyb. 31.2.5, and was therefore eleven years old when his father was murdered. The literary evidence concerning Demetrius' brother does not refer to his name or age. His coins, to be discussed below, reveal his name as Antiochus. His likeness on the coins has caused scholars to estimate his age as no more than five in 175. This would mean that he was the younger of the two brothers. See E. Bevan 1930; Mørkholm 1966: 36; Le Rider 1986: 411-13.

⁸ Mørkholm 1964a; Mørkholm 1966: 36-37, 45; Le Rider 1965: 61-62; Le Rider 1986. Mørkholm raises the possibility that Laodice was not just a front for Heliodorus' regime, but actually shared control with her husband's murderer.

murder his king.⁹ Yet many scholars have looked for more intricate explanations. One claims that the murderer Heliodorus was an Oriental who, through his deed, gave vent to the inherent animosity of Orientals towards Greeks.¹⁰ Some posit that the Ptolemaic court stood behind Heliodorus, in order to foment instability in the Seleucid kingdom and pave the way for the recapture of Syria and Phoenicia.¹¹ Others argue that Heliodorus unwittingly implemented the joint plan of the Romans and Eumenes II, king of Pergamum, and his brother, for it was in their interest to thwart the political cooperation between Perseus of Macedon and Seleucus IV. Removing Seleucus IV from the scene and crowning his brother in his stead would weaken the ties between Macedon and the Seleucid kingdom, and promote political collaboration between the kingdom of Antiochus IV and its neighbor to the north, Pergamum. According to this theory, Heliodorus was misled into thinking that if he killed Seleucus IV he would be permitted to hold the reins of power in Syria. Thus, even before the murder, the Romans supposedly set the stage for Antiochus, the younger brother of Seleucus, by giving him his freedom and placing him closer to Syria, in Athens. From there, the Seleucid prince, supported by the Pergamene royal house, was meant to approach Syria and gain control over it.¹² This picture of an internationally contrived conspiracy seems without foundation. There is no hint of any cooperation between Rome and between Pergamum and Antiochus in this matter, while the prolonged stay of Antiochus in Athens, lasting two to three years, suggests that there was no direct connection between Antiochus' release and his subsequent bid for power.¹³

⁹ Otto 1912a: 14; Gruen 1984: II. 646.

¹⁰ Swain 1944: 76-77. But see Mørkholm 1966: 36 n. 66.

¹¹ Büchler 1899: 51-52; Holleaux 1938-68: II. 130; Plöger 1955: 79-81; Bunge 1974: 58 n. 4. Porphyry, *FGH* 260 F 49a, is the only possible text which may be used to support this theory. However, Porphyry's words, *ab his qui in Syria Ptolemaeo favebant, non dabatur honor regius*, are an explanation of Dan. 11.21, "In his place shall arise a contemptible person to whom royal majesty has not been given." In short, Porphyry does not seem to display here any specific knowledge of the situation referred to in Daniel. As for the biblical source, it merely recounts that once Antiochus IV ascended the throne, he met with some opposition in Syria from groups whom we cannot identify.

¹² Zambelli 1960: 386-87; Ed. Will 1979-82: II. 304-5.

¹³ Cf. Gruen 1984: II. 646 n. 172.

Eumenes II and Antiochus IV

Heliodorus was ultimately removed by Eumenes II, king of Pergamum, and his brother Attalus, so that Antiochus was greatly helped by the royal house of Pergamum in his attempt to gain the Seleucid throne. If we are to believe Appian, Eumenes II and Attalus supported Antiochus' quest for the Seleucid kingdom because they already had certain reservations vis-à-vis the Romans, as a result of the harm the Romans had done them (*Syr.* 45). However, Appian's version may be anachronistic and based on the tense relationship between Rome and the alliance of the Pergamene kingdom and the Seleucid house in 168–164.¹⁴ Nonetheless, the replacement of the hostage Antiochus by his nephew Demetrius may have been intended to intensify Roman supervision over Seleucus IV (see above p. 104). If the Romans did in fact plan to rid themselves of Seleucus IV and put his brother in his place, they would have anticipated that the new king would not feel strongly towards his nephew, a boy whom he met only when the exchange took place in Rome. The Romans must have also been aware that Demetrius had a brother in Syria. A Roman plot to remove Seleucus IV and to crown his brother meant that supervision over Demetrius' brother, Antiochus, would be placed in the hands of his homonymous uncle. It was easy to predict that Antiochus IV would use Antiochus son of Seleucus—as indeed he did—to grant legitimacy to his reign and thereby mitigate Rome's ability to put pressure on him by holding Demetrius.¹⁵ Thus while the support shown by Pergamum towards Antiochus may not have been directed against Rome, it is not clear that the policy of Eumenes II was in the Republic's best interests.

Why did Eumenes II decide to support Antiochus? When Seleucus IV was alive, his policies of fostering friendship between the Seleucid kingdom, Macedon, Rhodes, and possibly Pontus must have been quite unpopular with the Pergamene royal house.¹⁶ Seleucus IV was probably seen as someone whose aim was to isolate Pergamum from all its important nearby neighbors. But there was no assurance that these policies would change once the king

¹⁴ Cf. Paltiel 1979a: 42.

¹⁵ Paltiel 1979a: 44–45, rightly stresses the weakness of Demetrius' position, but perhaps goes too far in doing so.

¹⁶ For my distrust of the Pontus story, see above p. 101. However there may have been friendly relations between Seleucus IV and the king of Pontus.

was dead. Heliodorus, after all, had been chief minister to Seleucus IV, and a partner to his plans. Furthermore, if any message is to be deduced from the arrangements engineered by Heliodorus—i.e. the crowning of the young Antiochus and the role assigned to his mother—it is that of continuity. For Eumenes II and his brother Attalus, it made sense to try to place a candidate of their own on the Seleucid throne, an individual who also had some claim to power. It should be remembered that after his release by the Romans, Antiochus chose not to return to his brother's court. Instead, he bided his time in Athens for two or more years, thus placing himself at a distance from his elder brother. Antiochus was more likely to revoke the policies of his brother and would be grateful to Pergamum for facilitating his return as king to the land of his fathers. This is probably the background to the cooperation of Eumenes II and other members of his family with Antiochus, cooperation aimed at restoring him to the Seleucid kingdom. The close collaboration of the Seleucid prince and the Pergamene royal house is not only attested to in a general way by Appian, but described in a much more detailed manner by an Athenian decree preserved in a copy made at Pergamum.¹⁷ The Athenian document relates that Eumenes II and his brothers took immediate action after learning of the death of Seleucus IV. They escorted his brother Antiochus to the very border of his kingdom, provided him with money and troops, put the diadem on his head, made a pact with him, and restored him to his ancestral kingdom (*OGIS* 248 ll. 10-22).

A Quest for Legitimacy

Antiochus IV's successful return to the Seleucid kingdom took place, according to the king-list, in the very same month in which his brother died, that is within nineteen days of the death of Seleucus IV.¹⁸ When we remember that Antiochus was in Athens

¹⁷ *OGIS* 248. See the authoritative discussion of Holleaux 1938-68: II. 127-47.

¹⁸ *BM* 35603 Rev. ll. 10-15 (Sachs & Wiseman 1954: 208). The king-list speaks of Antiochus, the son of Seleucus (IV), who reigned for eleven years. Because of the number of regnal years ascribed to this Antiochus, he must be Antiochus IV Epiphanes. See Zambelli 1960: 366; Mørkholm 1964a: 71; Mørkholm 1966: 43. For explanations of his appellation as son, see below. Recently, a new interpretation of the king-list has been offered by Grzybek 1992. He maintains that the Antiochus son of Seleucus in the king-list is the real son

at the time that the Seleucid king was assassinated (Appian, *Syr.* 45), this date seems highly unlikely. For if we accept the combined information of the king-list, Appian, and the Athenian decree, a rapid series of events took place in a nineteen-day period: news of the murder of Seleucus IV reached Pergamum and Athens; Antiochus, the king's brother, made his way from Athens to Asia Minor, met with Eumenes II and his army, and was escorted to the borders of his kingdom; Antiochus entered Seleucid territory and declared himself king. As Mørkholm notes, this scenario—involving speedy events which include traversing considerable distances—is unreasonable in light of the pace of travel in the ancient period.¹⁹ Thus the date supplied by the Babylonian list for the beginning of Antiochus IV's reign must be incorrect. The author of this notice in the king-list attempted to hide the irregular circumstances under which Antiochus IV came to power, and instead presented him as the direct successor of his brother. Mørkholm has argued persuasively that Antiochus IV actually took control of the Seleucid kingdom on the date that the Babylonian list sets for the start of the reign of his co-regent, Antiochus the son. In other words, Antiochus IV actually began to rule the Seleucid kingdom between October 23 and November 20, 175.²⁰

The silence of the Athenian decree and the Babylonian king-list regarding both the manner of Seleucus IV's death and the brief interregnum of Antiochus son of Seleucus probably reflects the unease Antiochus IV felt in relation to his legitimate claim to the Seleucid throne. The king attempted to alleviate the suspicion of others by using similar tactics to the ones previously used by Heliodorus. True, he declared himself king, but he also sought the

of Seleucus IV, and that the author of the list assigned him eleven years of rule in order to erase the memory of Antiochus Epiphanes' reign. However, Grzybek himself accepts that the mention of Antiochus and Antiochus his son in the year 137 S.E. refers to Antiochus IV Epiphanes and to Antiochus son of Seleucus. He also believes (pp. 199-203) that the execution of Antiochus the co-regent by order of Antiochus the king mentioned in the list again refers to Antiochus son of Seleucus and his uncle. In other words, Grzybek concedes that Antiochus IV is mentioned in the king-list. It seems quite pointless to suggest that the authors of the list wished to eradicate the memory of Antiochus IV from the list, and yet to assume that one line later they felt free to mention him.

¹⁹ Mørkholm 1966: 43.

²⁰ Mørkholm 1964a: 71-72; Mørkholm 1966: 43-44.

semblance of legitimacy. Consequently he decided to allow his nephew to retain the royal title. The Babylonian king-list mentions the inauguration of a joint kingship of King Antiochus and Antiochus his son in Month VIII, 137 S.E. This joint rule was to end approximately five years later with the execution of the co-regent Antiochus the son.²¹ Mørkholm has convincingly identified Antiochus the son with Antiochus IV's nephew.²² Since the Babylonian king-list dates the beginning of this joint kingship to two calendar months after Antiochus IV is first mentioned as king, the co-regent is presented as owing his position to an act of generosity on the part of Antiochus IV.

Why, then, was the natural son of Seleucus IV known as the son of his uncle, Antiochus IV? Was it due to a scribal error, as proposed by Zambelli? This seems unlikely in light of other documents attesting to a joint kingship of Antiochus and Antiochus his son in those very years.²³ One possible explanation is that since the two kings were blood relations, the Babylonians referred to the new king as the son of his predecessor, even if he was not the king's natural son. Thus more than one Babylonian scribe may have described Antiochus, son of Seleucus, as the son of Antiochus IV, even if they were not father and son. This practice also explains why the Babylonian list calls Antiochus IV the *son* of Seleucus IV.²⁴ An even more attractive explanation is put forward by Mørkholm, who proposes that after Antiochus IV took power, he adopted his nephew, the previous occupant of the Seleucid throne, and thereby gave his reign a semblance of legitimacy.²⁵

Antiochus IV's willingness to accept his nephew as co-regent, and the postulated adoption of that nephew as well, show that the

²¹ BM 35603 Rev. ll. 10-15 (Sachs & Wiseman 1954: 208). For other documents referring to the joint kingship of Antiochus IV and his son, see MLC 2156, 2138 (Clay 1913: 14, 86 no. 38); Olmstead 1937: 10-11; BM 34806 + 35610 + 35812 + 55569, 31847, 40574, 32143, 34562, 35111, 31476 (Sachs & Hunger 1988-96: II. 428-29, 440-41, 444-45, 454-57, 466-67). See Aymard 1953/4: 59; Aymard 1955: 110.

²² Mørkholm 1966: 45-47.

²³ Zambelli 1960: 371, but see Mørkholm 1966: 46. For the documentation of the joint kingship, see above n. 21.

²⁴ For the Babylonian custom, see Hinz 1972: 134-35. Cf. Bunge 1974: 58 n. 3.

²⁵ Mørkholm 1966: 46-47. This explanation has the disadvantage of distinguishing between two similar phenomena in the king-list and Mørkholm (p. 43), explains the naming of Antiochus IV as son of his brother as "a blunder."

new king sought support for his rule from within the Seleucid kingdom, rather than choosing to rely solely on the assistance of the royal house of Pergamum. This policy may also have found its expression in his choice of a queen, for like his two older brothers, Seleucus IV and the senior Antiochus (co-regent with their father Antiochus III), Antiochus IV was married to a Laodice. Was this one and the same Laodice? While there may have been three different princesses, we do know that Laodice, daughter of Antiochus III, was married to her older brother. She may have then married in succession both her younger brothers, or perhaps just one of them. Thus we can not rule out the suggestion that Antiochus IV married Seleucus IV's widow.²⁶ In light of Antiochus' efforts to gain recognition and support within the Seleucid kingdom, it makes sense that he would marry his brother's queen, accept her son as co-regent, and adopt him as well. The new king would gain support from members of the royal family and members of the Seleucid court, and thus win the loyalty of the populace at large. The partisans of the boy-king, Antiochus son of Seleucus, would be content that the prince be allowed to survive in princely style and retain the prospect of becoming an actual ruler after growing up. The supporters themselves would keep their position and power, and help steer the affairs of the government on the right course.²⁷ Antiochus' rise to power also meant the end—whether physical or political we do not know—of Heliodorus, the assassin of Seleucus IV. This kind of arrangement, where a brother of a dead king assumes the role of monarch while acting as guardian to his young nephew, is not without precedent in the history of Hellenistic kingship.²⁸

One likely source of opposition to these arrangements was Seleucus IV's oldest son, Demetrius, and his partisans. Demetrius, however, was not his own master because of his age and enforced stay at Rome. If the supporters of Demetrius showed their antagonism to

²⁶ Wife and sister of Antiochus, co-regent with Antiochus III: Appian, *Syr.* 4. Wife of Seleucus IV: *SEG* VII 2, 17. Wife of Antiochus IV: *OGIS* 252 (*SEG* VII 15 may also refer to her). For discussion of the inscriptions, see Cumont 1931: 279-85; L. Robert 1936: 137-52; L. Robert 1949: 28. See also Schmitt 1964: 14, 20-24; Bouché-Leclercq 1913: 246; Aymard 1953/4: 52 n. 5. Hollis 1996, suggests that Laodice, the wife and sister of Antiochus the co-regent, was later married to a certain Heliocles, and that Eucratides I of Bactria was the issue of this marriage.

²⁷ Cf. Mørkholm 1966: 47, 49-50.

²⁸ Tarn 1951: 185.

the new king—and there is some indication that they did—their efforts were destined to fail.²⁹ Other, more practical elements would have kept their distance from such an attempt.

2. *The Road to War*

Diplomatic Contacts with Rome

Once on the Seleucid throne, Antiochus IV had to consider his future relationship with Rome. He did not, it seems, owe his new-found position to the Republic, but the decade or so Antiochus spent in Rome as a hostage had left its mark on him.³⁰ During this period of captivity, Antiochus probably enjoyed a comfortable, none too restricted way of life, for his nephew Demetrius, who took his place as hostage, enjoyed that sort of life-style.³¹ If we are to believe the message Antiochus IV sent to the Senate in 173 (and not attribute it solely to diplomatic niceties), the king felt grateful to Rome for the good care that was bestowed upon him during his enforced stay there. He had been treated, so the message said, like a king, rather than a hostage, by all segments of Roman society, and was regarded with exceptional affection by the young Romans (Livy 42.6.9).

The first contact between Antiochus IV and the Romans was initiated by the Republic. We hear of it from Livy, but only incidentally, when he tells his readers that a Seleucid ambassador to Rome in 173 was highly recommended by Roman *legati* who had been in Syria (Livy 42.6.12). This means that the Roman embassy visited the Seleucid court in 174, i.e. in virtually the first year of Antiochus IV's reign.³² Though no report exists of the aims and nature of this legation, it is natural to assume that the Senate wanted first-hand impressions of the new Seleucid king's political agenda and intentions. The envoys would have also reminded Antiochus IV of his immediate obligations to the Republic, namely the completion of the payments which the Seleucid kingdom owed Rome, in accordance with the Treaty of Apamea. One

²⁹ Dan. 11.21; Porphyry, *FGH* 260 F 49a. For these passages see above, p. 111 n. 11.

³⁰ Mørkholm 1966: 39-40.

³¹ Demetrius in Rome: Polyb. 31.11.4-31.15.6; Diod. 31.18.1.

³² Jouguet 1937: 219 n. 1; Mørkholm 1966: 64-65 n. 3.

tangible fact that we do learn from Livy is that while in Syria the emissaries took note of the illustrious status of one of the ministers of the kingdom, Apollonius, and of his friendship towards Rome.³³ Apollonius, it would seem, acted as host to the Roman delegates, and his friendly attitude towards the Republic made him an obvious candidate to head the Seleucid counter mission, which arrived in Rome in 173.³⁴

Antiochus IV ascended the throne with his claim to legitimacy as king somewhat impaired, and it was important for him to win the recognition of a foreign power, such as Rome. It would also be an offense to ignore the Roman visit and not reciprocate in kind. Consequently Antiochus IV dispatched a legation to Rome, with Apollonius as its leader. Apollonius offered excuses for the delay in paying the Seleucid kingdom's debt to the Republic. The king probably blamed Seleucus IV and Heliodorus, for the last payment had been due in 177. The new king sent the entire sum, along with an expensive gift of golden vases, and the time was ripe for a fresh start in the relations between Rome and the Seleucids. Antiochus IV was too young to have played an important role in his father's war against the Republic and his long captivity in Rome left him not bitter, but grateful for the generous and friendly way he had been treated. His chief ambassador was a man of importance in the Seleucid court with a proven record of being friendly to Rome. All that the king wished for was the renewal of *societas et amicitia* between Rome and himself. Antiochus IV's wishes, competently presented by Apollonius, were granted, and the Senate voted among other benefits, a *munera* in the sum of 100,000 *asses* to this capable Seleucid spokesman.³⁵ The Roman historian presents

³³ This Apollonius is identified with Apollonius son of Menestheus. See below pp. 122-23, 263.

³⁴ Gruen 1984: II. 648-50, makes too much of the Seleucid mission in 173. Apollonius' friendship with the Roman envoys explains why he was chosen to head the Seleucid embassy. Note the parallel case of Menochares—Polyb. 31.33.1, 32.2.1. Thus there is no need to connect Apollonius' presence with the failed Ptolemaic designs on Coele-Syria and Phoenicia, perhaps dating from 174. Antiochus IV dealt with these quite effectively; see below.

³⁵ Livy 42.6.6-12. Hammond 1988: 609, claims that Livy's terminology here, when speaking of *societas atque amicitia*, is inaccurate. The king's request was to renew the relationship which had existed between his father and Rome and that relationship is indeed termed *φιλία* or *amicitia* (Polyb. 21.43.1; Livy 38.38.2). However, according to Polyb. 33.18.7 and 12, Antiochus IV enjoyed a relationship of *φιλία καὶ συμμαχία* with Rome, in agreement with the words of Livy.

a picture of slavish obedience by Antiochus IV, generously rewarded by the Romans, but the picture is more complex. In another passage, relating to the events of 171, Livy claims that Antiochus IV professed great friendship with Rome solely in order to have a free hand in his dealings with the Ptolemaic kingdom. He made his position clear to the Senate by means of his own ambassadors, as well as through the delegates sent to him by the Senate (42.29.5-6). Since the only Seleucid deputation to have reached Rome in the years 175-171 is that of Apollonius, it is quite clear that Livy is referring here to his embassy.³⁶ Livy, when stressing Seleucid machinations, is writing with hindsight. The Seleucid embassy of Apollonius was perhaps of even greater consequence to Rome than it was to Antiochus IV. It is quite extraordinary that the Senate voted to present Apollonius with 100,000 *asses*, the highest sum ever accorded to a foreign ambassador of non-princely stock. In those years, 172-169, ambassadors were offered a standard sum of 2,000 *asses*.³⁷ Thirty years earlier the Senate was more lavish in its generosity, but even then foreign envoys did not receive a *munera* of more than 10,000 *asses*.³⁸

The Tension Grows: Rome and Macedon

Why, then, was Apollonius so handsomely rewarded? Surely he was not the first foreign envoy coming to Rome with a record of earlier amicable contacts with Roman legates. The answer seems to be that by the time Apollonius and his fellow ambassadors made their appearance before the Senate, there were already indications of rising tension between the Macedonian king, Perseus and Rome.³⁹ Some of these signs would have been discerned by Apollonius, whose political acumen cannot be doubted (2 Macc.

³⁶ Gruen 1984: II. 651-52, takes this text as evidence for the appearance of Seleucid and Ptolemaic embassies in Rome in 171.

³⁷ 2,000 *asses*: Livy 42.19.6, 43.5.8, 43.6.10 and 14, 43.8.8, 44.14.4, 44.15.8, 45.42.11. Standard sized *munera*: Livy 42.24.10, 45.13.8.

³⁸ 10,000 *asses*: Livy 28.39.19. 5,000 *asses*: Livy 30.17.14, 31.9.5. 4,000 *asses*: Livy 37.3.11.

³⁹ For Perseus' relations with Rome up to the outbreak of the Third Macedonian War, see Hammond 1988: 490-504; Derow 1989: 303-10. Gruen 1984: II. 403-9, champions a different view, according to which up until and throughout 173 "Rome kept herself a cool distance from the affairs of Macedonia," and only in the beginning of the following year was the possibility of war raised.

4.21). Roman envoys to Macedon who returned to Rome in the beginning of 173—approximately the time of Apollonius' arrival—related that Perseus had avoided giving them an interview and that war was now imminent.⁴⁰ While this report seems to have been far from accurate, the trend was clear: the *legati* were promoting the cause of war, rather than that of peace. The response in Rome was equally rash, and tales of prodigies and ominous signs were being publicized, while the need to assuage the gods was stressed (Livy 42.2.3-7). An additional Roman mission to Perseus, which was then to continue on its way to the three other major Hellenistic kings, probably supplied another clue to the Seleucid embassy of the deteriorating relationship between the Republic and Perseus. These Roman ambassadors were instructed first to make a stop in Macedon and learn of developments there, and then to make their way to Pergamum, Antioch, and Alexandria where their recent Macedonian visit would make their report all the more authoritative. By 172, the Roman embassy sent out to Macedon in the previous year had paid calls to the three eastern monarchs, and duly received from them protestations of loyalty. The kings also received Macedonian envoys representing Perseus' point of view.⁴¹ One must also assume that Eumenes II, who felt threatened by Perseus and was personally engaged in a propaganda campaign against the Macedonian king in Rome in 172, kept his ally Antiochus IV well informed of his attitude and policies towards Macedon. Thus the Seleucid king would have been able to collect information from a variety of venues.⁴²

⁴⁰ Livy 42.2.1-2, probably combines here reports on two separate missions: one to Macedon and the other to Aetolia; cf. Gruen 1984: II. 407 n. 57.

⁴¹ Livy 42.6.4-5, 42.26.7-8, 42.29.6; Appian, *Mac.* 11.4. Cf. Ed. Will 1979-82: II. 264, 267. Broughton 1951: 409, 412-15, sees the mission to the eastern kings and Rhodes, Livy 42.26.7-8, as identical with an embassy of Ti. Claudius Nero and M. Decimius to Asia, Crete, and Rhodes dated to 172 (Livy 42.19.7-8), and thinks that Livy 42.6.4-5 reports a different embassy. But the mission of Ti. Claudius Nero and M. Decimius is a fiction, a doublet of the Roman embassy of Ti. Claudius, Sp. Postumius and M. Iunius in 172/1 to Asia and the islands, including Rhodes—see Polyb. 27.3; Livy 42.45. In fact, according to Livy 42.37.2, 42.45.8, a certain L. Decimius was sent as ambassador to Illyria in 172. A corruption in the *praenomen* led Livy to invent a mission for a M. Decimius; cf. Münzer 1901.

⁴² Eumenes in Rome: Livy 42.11.1-42.14.10; Appian, *Mac.* 11.1-2. Mørkholm 1966: 64-65, rightly looks at the relations between Antiochus IV and Rome against the backdrop of the growing tension between the Republic and Perseus.

From these various pieces of information Antiochus and his advisors could now deduce that Rome's prime concern was to isolate Perseus. The Republic could not risk the possibility that a major power such as the Seleucid kingdom would ally itself with Macedon, and the Seleucid king could, if he chose, take advantage of this situation.⁴³ The king's awareness of the growing tension in Greece is demonstrated by the mission he entrusted to one of his friends, Eudemus son of Nicon. Eudemus visited Argos and Boeotia in Greece, Byzantium and Chalcedon in the Propontis, and the island of Rhodes. He also arranged for ships for the Rhodian navy to be built in Seleucid shipyards, probably in an effort to camouflage the building of ships for the Seleucid navy.⁴⁴ Thus, at the very time Antiochus assured the Roman embassy visiting him in 172 that he had no intention of supporting Perseus, he was actually starting to build up the strength of the Seleucid army.

The Ptolemaic Kingdom Looks North

What was the nature of the relationship between Antiochus IV and the Ptolemaic monarchy? During Seleucus IV's last years, the tensions between the Seleucid and Ptolemaic kingdoms subsided. This development can be attributed to the death of Ptolemy V and the assumption of power by his widow, Cleopatra I, sister of Seleucus IV and Antiochus IV. Cleopatra served as regent for her son Ptolemy VI, a minor, and refrained from renewing the Ptolemaic claims of sovereignty over Coele-Syria and Phoenicia (see above p. 105). However, Cleopatra died in the spring of 176, and her eldest son, Ptolemy VI Philometor, was still a young boy aged between eight and ten.⁴⁵ Two members of the court, Eulaeus and Lenaeus, now appear on the scene. Lenaeus was born a slave in Coele-Syria while his more important friend, Eulaeus, was a eunuch who had been the teacher of the boy-king before the death of Cleopatra. Both were now tutors to the young king, enjoying influence and power over the monarch and playing a role similar to the one Cleopatra, the king's mother, had assumed until her death. Once in power,

⁴³ Cf. Winkler 1933: 27-31.

⁴⁴ *Syll.*³ 644/45, and see below pp. 209-10.

⁴⁵ Pestman 1967: 46, dates the death of Cleopatra prior to May 17, 176, probably around April. For Philometor's year of birth, see Otto 1934: 3-7; Ray 1976: 26-27.

these two courtiers began preparations to revive the war against the Seleucid kingdom, in an attempt to recapture the lost province of Syria and Phoenicia.⁴⁶ This effort is consistent with what the Ptolemaic kingdom had demanded since 198: that control over Syria and Phoenicia revert to Ptolemaic hands.⁴⁷

The renewed hostility of Ptolemaic Egypt to the Seleucid monarchy did not remain a secret for long. When celebrations were held in Egypt on the occasion of the festive *πρωτοκλήσια* held in honor of Ptolemy VI Philometor, Antiochus sent Apollonius son of Menestheus, formerly a governor of Coele-Syria and Phoenicia under Seleucus IV, as ambassador (2 Macc. 4.21). We do not know the precise nature of the festival, nor can its exact date be recovered.⁴⁸ What is clear though is that Apollonius could not have reached Egypt earlier than the beginning of 174, for his master, Antiochus IV, probably assumed the throne in October-November 175. Apollonius' mission to Egypt is placed by the author of 2 Maccabees within the chronological framework of the high priesthood of Jason, who received his appointment from Antiochus IV but was dismissed by him three years afterwards, i.e. by 173/2.⁴⁹ Apollonius was in Rome in early 173, but we have no way of knowing whether he visited the court of Ptolemy VI prior to

⁴⁶ Diod. 30.15-17; Polyb. 28.21.1; Livy 42.29.5 and 7; Porphyry, *FGH* 260 F 49a. See Otto 1934: 24-27; Mørkholm 1961.

⁴⁷ Lenaeus' oriental extraction has caused some scholars to regard Eulaeus too as an Oriental—see E. Bevan 1927: 283; Jouguet 1937: 200 n. 2. The anti-Seleucid policy of the two was seen as an expression of hatred to all things Greek; so Swain 1944: 75. However, Eulaeus is a Macedonian name—L. Robert 1963: 71-76—and the tutor of Ptolemy Philometor was probably Macedonian; see Mørkholm 1961: 35-41.

⁴⁸ Some manuscripts name the festival *πρωτοκλήσια*; see Bunge 1974: 70 n. 68. Otto 1934: 15-18, thinks that the festival marks the marriage of Ptolemy VI Philometor to his sister, but Mørkholm 1966: 68 n. 18, uses the chronological data supplied by Shore & Smith 1959: 55, to demonstrate that this is impossible. Bunge 1974: 71, suggests that the *πρωτοκλήσια* marks the first anniversary of the crowning of Ptolemy VI Philometor. This, however, rests on two assumptions: (1) Philometor's coronation took place in March/April 175, and (2) the games at Tyre—which according to 2 Macc. 4.18-21 took place at the same time as Apollonius' mission to Egypt—were celebrated in March/April 174. Bunge 1974: 63-65, dates the games to 174 because he believes that a later visit of Antiochus IV to Tyre, in 170 (cf. 2 Macc. 4.44) coincided with the next quadrennial games, but this remains unsubstantiated; cf. D. Schwartz 1982: 49 n. 5. Furthermore, Antiochus IV was present in Tyre in the autumn of 170, and not in the spring of 170, as Bunge professes. See below pp. 130-31.

⁴⁹ Jason's term of office: 2 Macc. 4.7-10, 4.23.

his Roman mission (in 174) or afterwards (in late 173 or early 172).⁵⁰

Apollonius, it seems, detected the change of attitude in the Ptolemaic court, and noticed that the new regime was taking military steps towards an attack on Coele-Syria and Phoenicia. He duly reported the information to his king, and Antiochus responded to the Ptolemaic threat by a show of force. The Seleucid king visited both Joppa and Jerusalem, presumably in order to raise support among the local population, and then stationed his army in Phoenicia.⁵¹ Since the name Phoenicia may apply to a region extending as far south as Pelusium, it is likely that Antiochus proceeded to the southern maritime plain of Coele-Syria and Phoenicia and thus was ready to face any threat from Egypt.⁵² In sum, Apollonius' visit to Egypt caused Antiochus to keep a watchful eye on the military preparations of the Ptolemaic kingdom and to initiate some moves of his own.

A Semblance of Unity

In the meantime, Eulaeus and Lenaeus were involved with the actual preparations for war. They raised a great deal of money to finance the many war-related expenses. A large portion was earmarked for the bribing of officers in the Seleucid army. The two ministers also convened the people of Alexandria and stated

⁵⁰ Mørkholm 1966: 68. D. Schwartz 1982: 49 n. 5, ignores the visit of Apollonius to Rome, and apparently rejects his identification with Apollonius son of Menestheus, as this would not go hand in hand with his belief that Apollonius son of Menestheus left the Seleucid kingdom once Antiochus IV became king.

⁵¹ This understanding of 2 Macc. 4.21-22, shared by many scholars, is contested by D. Schwartz 1982: 46-48. Schwartz understands this passage to mean that Apollonius was sent to Egypt not by Antiochus IV, but by his nephew Demetrius, then a hostage in Rome. Nonetheless, we must acknowledge that: (1) Schwartz himself admits that "the usual interpretation of the verse is perhaps the natural one." (2) A visit from an envoy of Demetrius at this time might evoke a diplomatic counter-move by his uncle, but does not justify the military measures undertaken by Antiochus. (3) Polyb. 31.2.3, speaks of Demetrius as being utterly powerless while his uncle was alive. This was no doubt true at the time, since Demetrius was only fourteen years old.

⁵² 2 Macc. 4.21-22. For a broad definition of Phoenicia which includes Rhinocolura, see Strabo 16.2.21-33 (C 756-60). Livy 35.13.4, places Raphia in Phoenicia, while Ps.-Scylax 104, in M. Stern 1974-84: III. fr. 558, writes of Ascalon as a Tyrian city. For a more detailed discussion of the role played by Apollonius, see below Ch. VII.

that their objective was to bring the military campaign they were now mounting to a speedy end. By inciting the crowds to dreams of war and glory and promising them that Syria and Phoenicia would be returned to Ptolemaic sovereignty, with perhaps even the annexation of the entire Seleucid kingdom to follow, Eulaeus and Lenaeus received the support of the Alexandrian masses.⁵³

Another move which should be seen in the light of Ptolemaic preparations for war was the change introduced in the status of Ptolemy VI Philometor in relation to other members of his family. By Mesore 19 in Philometor's eleventh year (September 18, 170), Philometor was no longer sole king, for a document of this date attests to "temple rites in honor of the reigning sovereigns."⁵⁴ A few weeks later, on Thoth 1 (October 5, 170), the Egyptian New Year's Day was celebrated. In keeping with Egyptian custom, the beginning of the new year marks the start of a new regnal year. Some of our sources say that this year, Philometor's twelfth regnal year, was the first year of the joint reign of Ptolemy Philometor, his brother and his sister. It seems that the new official reckoning of their combined rule began on the Egyptian New Year's Day, even though the three already had temple rites in their honor in Philometor's eleventh year. This assumption is supported by a vineyard lease contract from the first year of the reign of the trio which is dated to Phaophi 9 (November 12, 170), i.e. shortly after the beginning of the Egyptian new year.⁵⁵ According to Porphyry and Syncellus, who follow an Alexandrian chronographic tradition, Antiochus IV's invasion of Egypt preceded the establishment of this joint rule, and consequently some scholars argue that Antiochus IV's invasion of Egypt predates November 12, 170 (the date of the vineyard lease) or perhaps even September 18, 170 (the date of the temple rites).⁵⁶ But this view seems untenable, and it may be said with some confidence that the establishment of the

⁵³ Diod. 30.15-16. Cf. Fraser 1972: II. 232 n. 303, 233 n. 309.

⁵⁴ *P. BM Eg.* 10591 verso col. II, ll. 5-6, 20 (H. Thompson 1934: 49-52).

⁵⁵ The equation between Philometor's twelfth year and the first year of the trio's rule is given by Porphyry, *FGH* 260 F 2.7; Syncellus, ed. Mosshammer p. 342. Vineyard lease: *P. Ryl.* 583; cf. Turner 1948. For Thoth 1 as the starting point of the reckoning of the triple rule, see Koenen 1957: 1; Samuel 1962: 141.

⁵⁶ For Porphyry and Syncellus, see the preceding note. Those who place the beginning of the Sixth Syrian War earlier than the triple rule are H. Thompson 1934: 51 n. 22; Turner 1948: 150; Scullard 1973: 210 n. 2.

triple kingship *preceded* the outbreak of the Sixth Syrian War. The chronological sequence is, in fact, the reverse of that found in those sources which use the chronographic tradition of Alexandria, and the war itself started almost immediately after the institution of the triple rule.⁵⁷

This joint rule was no doubt presented as an expression of the steadfastness of the united Ptolemaic royal house vis-à-vis the approaching war, but the real motive for this change is more complex. It may very well be that the joint rule was formed after a faction supporting Ptolemy VIII Euergetes, Ptolemy Philometor's younger brother, gained influence in the king's court. Eulaeus and Lenaeus would then be forced to submit to the pressure of this group—presumably headed by two influential members of the court, Comanus and Cineas—and to give Ptolemy VIII Euergetes and Cleopatra II a share in the kingship. While this assumption is certainly attractive, it cannot be proved. If it is true, some of the responsibility for the outbreak of the Sixth Syrian War must be shifted to the party supporting Ptolemy VIII Euergetes.⁵⁸

According to this reconstruction, by the autumn of 170 the Ptolemaic court was deeply divided between two political factions, one headed by Eulaeus and Lenaeus with Philometor as its nominal head, and the second which championed the right of Ptolemy VIII Euergetes and Cleopatra II to share in the throne. The initial advantage obtained by the supporters of Ptolemy VIII Euergetes and Cleopatra—the bestowing of royal honors on Philometor's two siblings—was bound to awaken resistance in the ranks of those who supported Philometor. Indeed Philometor's partisans organized the celebration of Ptolemy VI Philometor's coming of age (*anacleteria*),⁵⁹ in order to draw a line between Ptolemy Philometor and his siblings. The *anacleteria* was probably orchestrated by Eulaeus and Lenaeus, the young king's chief supporters. Our only clue to its date is that news of the *anacleteria* reached the Achaean *synodos* in April or early May 169.⁶⁰ The *anacleteria* itself may have

⁵⁷ Bickerman 1952: 398-402. See also the hieroglyphic inscription published by Fairman 1934: 5-6 no. 8, which speaks of "an attack by many foreign countries against Egypt in the year 12."

⁵⁸ Mørkholm 1961: 41; Mørkholm 1966: 69-70; Walbank 1957-79: III. 322-23.

⁵⁹ Polyb. 28.12.8-9. King Ptolemy here is Ptolemy VI. Cf. Niese 1893-1903: III. 169 n. 4.

⁶⁰ The Achaean *synodos* was informed at the same time of the arrival of

been proclaimed as late as March, but a date in late 170 is also possible. Its political importance seems to be negligible for, as later events will show, Eulaeus and Lenaeus were unable to significantly strengthen their position within the court.

Blaming the Enemy: A Diplomatic Contest in Rome

Antiochus Epiphanes, previously warned by Apollonius son of Menestheus, must have kept a watchful eye on these developments in Egypt. It is no wonder that the Seleucid monarch realized that a Ptolemaic offensive was now impending. On the diplomatic front, Antiochus IV decided to anticipate Ptolemaic aggression by sending a delegation to Rome. The head of the mission was Meleager, who was accompanied by Sosiphanes and Heracleides. It was plain that it was too late for the Seleucid embassy to avert the opening of hostilities, so Antiochus IV must have sent Meleager and his fellow ambassadors with another object in mind. They were to assign the blame for the war to the Ptolemaic kingdom and gain the support of the Senate. In addition to the Seleucid embassy, a Ptolemaic delegation, with Timotheus and Damon as members, also appeared in Rome.

The Seleucid embassy and the rival Ptolemaic mission apparently left for Rome in the autumn of 170, and arrived there in the winter of 170/69. By the time the Senate gave a hearing to both delegations, possibly in January 169, the Sixth Syrian War had, in fact, already started.⁶¹ The war broke out in November or December 170,⁶² but the Seleucid delegation and its Ptolemaic counterpart,

the Roman consul of 169, Q. Marcius Philippus in Thessaly. Next Achaean envoys, Polybius included, came to Marcius Philippus in the summer, Polyb. 28.12.3-4, 29.24.7. Thus Briscoe 1968: 84, is right to place the arrival of the Roman consul in Greece at the end of March 169 at the earliest, but he makes no allowance for the time needed for news of his arrival in Thessaly to reach the Achaeans. This may have occurred at the beginning of April, in which case Marcius Philippus left Rome in March 169 and by April, or perhaps even the beginning of May, he was camped in Thessaly and news of his whereabouts reached the Achaean *synodos*. The news from Egypt of Philometor's *anacleteria* arrived at the same time, so that the message from Alexandria was probably sent at the start of the sailing season.

⁶¹ Walbank 1957-79: III. 24-25, 321.

⁶² Cf. Bickerman 1952: 398. This conclusion is independent of Skeat 1961: 108-9, who dates the beginning of the war to November 170 on other grounds. Briscoe 1968: 84, notes that the Sixth Syrian War may have broken out in February or March 169, because according to Polybius' account (28.12.8-9), when the Achaean assembly was informed of Philometor's *anacleteria*, no

as well as their Roman hosts, were probably unaware of this new development.⁶³ It would therefore seem that Meleager's embassy and its Ptolemaic counterpart left for Rome at about the same time as the establishment of the joint rule in the Ptolemaic kingdom. This raises the question of whether the members of the Ptolemaic embassy to Rome were named by the government of Ptolemy VI Philometor, that is by Eulaeus and Lenaeus, as is generally assumed, or whether Timotheus and Damon represented the royal threesome, and their selection was the outcome of a compromise between the party that stood behind Philometor and the rival group which was in favor of joint rule. The language of Polybius—who speaks here of the king simply as Ptolemy, without adding the adjective "the younger" (νεώτερος)—implies that Polybius is referring to the regime of Ptolemy VI. Polybius however, gives no hint of the joint rule at this early stage,⁶⁴ and the attribution of the ambassadors to Philometor's regime is perhaps a direct result of the historian's silence about the true state of affairs. The Ptolemaic ambassadors may have represented the regime of the three siblings: one of the ambassadors, Timotheus, was firmly attached to Ptolemy VIII Euergetes' side later on, in 163.⁶⁵

In any event, the Ptolemaic ambassadors were instructed to renew their country's friendship with Rome, to offer to mediate between the Republic and Perseus, and lastly to watch the development of the negotiations between Meleager and the Senate. These are the instructions of the Ptolemaic embassy as reported by

mention of the war was made. In other words, in April 169 the Achaeans did not know that war had broken out. If the date for the convening of the Achaean assembly was in fact later (above n. 60), this would mean that the war started even later, i.e. in April or May 169. But Briscoe's argument rests on silence, and with large portions of Polybius' book 28 lost, it would seem unwise to attach too much weight to the silence of Polybius in this one short section. The historian's account of the movements of the Seleucid diplomats and their reception in Rome (Polyb. 27.19, 28.1) points to an earlier date for the beginning of the war.

⁶³ Polyb. 28.1.1 and 6-9. There is no real contradiction between Polybius' opening sentence, where he states that war has begun, and his continuation, which sets out what the parties knew at the time.

⁶⁴ According to Polybius, Ptolemy VIII Euergetes was proclaimed king by the Alexandrians *διὰ τὴν περίστασιν*, and a joint rule of the two brothers was instituted later on, when Philometor came down from Memphis, Polyb. 29.23.4. On Polybius' authority, Ptolemy VIII's term of rule began in the winter of 169/8. Cf. Bikerman 1952: 399.

⁶⁵ See Diod. 31.20, 31.17c. Cf. Niese 1893-1903: III. 209 n. 3; *Pros. Ptol. VI* 14786.

Polybius. Yet it is hard to imagine that the ambassadors from Alexandria were asked merely to report, and not to respond to the diplomatic attacks of the Seleucid envoys. The ambassadors from Egypt must have offered a defense of the Ptolemaic cause, but it is doubtful that they actually claimed, as Diodorus Siculus states, that their kingdom would be justified in trying to reconquer Syria and Phoenicia. It seems that both parties were seeking the approbation of the Republic while relying on the fact that Roman involvement in the Third Macedonian War would prevent the Republic from taking too close an interest in the Seleucid-Ptolemaic conflict. If these were the calculations of the parties, they were well founded. The Senate refrained from taking immediate action and promised Meleager to refer the question to Q. Marcius Philippus, one of the consuls of 169, who, in turn, would write to Ptolemy according to his own judgment.⁶⁶ The Roman response to the ambassadors of Antiochus IV left open the possibility of some action in the future in support of the Seleucid king. However, there was no clear commitment, nor a binding timetable, and further action was left to the discretion of the consul. The Senate did not wish to lend its support to either party. This policy of non-intervention stemmed in part from the Senate's attitude that the affairs of the two Hellenistic kingdoms lay outside the interests of Rome. As long as Rome's influence in Greece remained unchallenged, the Republic had no business involving itself in the far-flung areas of the Mediterranean. In addition, the Senate was reluctant to intervene for fear that a favorable response to one of these two Hellenistic kingdoms would push its rival to a pact with Perseus, who had been seeking the support of both Antiochus IV and the Ptolemaic kingdom for some time. Perhaps the Senators thought that if they refrained from interceding, the Ptolemaic and Seleucid kingdoms would go to war with each other, as indeed they did. The two eastern kingdoms would then fight for control over Coele-Syria and Phoenicia, and would be unable to embroil themselves seriously in Perseus' war with Rome. The same fear that had dictated Rome's relationship with Antiochus IV ever since tensions between Rome and

⁶⁶ Polyb. 27.19, 28.1; Diod. 30.2. See Mørholm 1966: 71-73; Gruen 1984: II. 689. Olshausen 1974b: 798, rightly stresses that the instructions to the Ptolemaic embassy as reported by Polybius should be supplemented from Diodorus Siculus' account. The latter must have had before him a more detailed version of Polybius' original discussion.

Perseus began to rise continued to mold the Republic's actions towards both the Seleucid and the Ptolemaic kingdoms. The Republic did not want to take any action that would encourage the states in the eastern basin of the Mediterranean to sign a pact with Perseus. Consequently it was prudent for Rome to offer the Seleucid emissaries a vague promise that Marcius Philippus would devise a pro-Seleucid policy, while renewing at one and the same time its friendship with the Ptolemaic kingdom.⁶⁷

3. *The Sixth Syrian War—The First Campaign*

The Death of Andronicus and Antiochus IV's Visit to Tyre

The Seleucid embassy to Rome, sent on its mission in the autumn of 170, must have been just one in a series of steps taken by Antiochus IV when preparing his kingdom for the forthcoming war. Alongside these diplomatic efforts, military measures were required. One such action was the king's visit to Tyre, and a closer look at the date of this visit will help establish its relation to the Sixth Syrian War. According to 2 Maccabees (4.36-44) the visit came about after Antiochus had executed his minister Andronicus who was accused of murdering the Jewish high priest, Onias III. Other sources, however, charge this same Andronicus with the assassination of Antiochus son of Seleucus. Apparently the killing of the Seleucid co-regent was initiated by Antiochus IV, who then washed his hands of the deed and had Andronicus put to death.⁶⁸ The two stories, which both tell of the crime and subsequent execution of a Seleucid minister named Andronicus by Antiochus IV, bear a marked resemblance. A plausible explanation for this has been offered: the assassination of the high priest is a doublet of the murder of the Seleucid prince. This would mean that the story about the dismissal and murder of Onias III is fictional.⁶⁹ In any

⁶⁷ Scullard 1973: 209-10; Mørkholm 1966: 73.

⁶⁸ Diod. 30.7.2; John Antioch. fr. 58 (*FHG* IV. 558). For the identification of the Seleucid prince with Antiochus the co-regent, the 'son' of Antiochus IV, see above p. 115.

⁶⁹ Wellhausen 1905: 126-27; Motzo 1924: 185-86 n. 1; Momigliano 1968: 39. Note that the implication of *Jos. Ant.* 12.237, is that Onias III died of natural causes. Furthermore, *Jos. Ant.* 15.41, if accurate, indicates that the dismissal of Onias III by Antiochus IV is equally fictional.

event, the visit of Antiochus IV Epiphanes to Tyre, which is placed after the death of Andronicus, must have also come after the earlier death of Antiochus the co-regent, and we have a date for the latter's demise.⁷⁰ Antiochus the co-regent was put to death in the month of Ab, 142 S.E., i.e. between July 31 and August 28, 170.⁷¹ The earliest of these two dates, July 31, 170, is a *terminus post quem* not only for the execution of Antiochus son of Seleucus, but for the elimination of Andronicus and the king's visit to Tyre. Naturally, the murder, or execution, of the co-regent, son of the late Seleucus IV, was bound to evoke dissatisfaction and unrest. In order to quell this unrest, Antiochus was quick to blame Andronicus for the death of his nephew and to have him killed. Andronicus was executed in Antioch (2 Macc. 4.30-38), but the king must have stayed in the capital for a few weeks at the very least, so that he could monitor the reactions of members of his court and of the population of Antioch at large. Only when Antiochus IV was satisfied that his ploy had succeeded and that he was now secure as monarch, was he likely to leave Antioch.

The Seleucid capital and Tyre are about 450 kilometers apart, and Antiochus Epiphanes would need time to reach the Phoenician city, whether he came overland or by boat. Thus the Seleucid king would have arrived at Tyre in late September or the beginning of October, at the earliest. But what is the latest possible date for the visit of Antiochus in Tyre? Clearly he came there before his "second approach" to Egypt (2 Macc. 5.1: τὴν δευτέραν ἔφοδον), which signals the beginning of the Sixth Syrian War.⁷²

⁷⁰ An alternate, and less skeptical approach, which accepts the murders of both Onias III and Antiochus son of Seleucus as historical, would not rob us of this chronological conclusion. For if one maintains that both killings actually occurred, the execution of Andronicus would still follow the two assassinations. M. Stern 1960: 3-5, believes that the murder of the Seleucid prince preceded the killing of Onias III, while Hengel 1974: II. 185-86 n. 142, seems to favor the reverse order.

⁷¹ BM 35603 Rev. ll. 10-15 (Sachs & Wiseman 1954: 208). For the Julian date, see Parker & Dubberstein 1956: 23. According to the Babylonian king-list, the official version, as it were, Antiochus the co-regent was executed. The Greek sources (above n. 68), on the other hand, say he was murdered and Briscoe 1968: 84, rightly remarks that one would have expected each of these two groups of sources to have presented the opposite version of events. Grzybek 1992: 202-3, sees in the mention of the execution proof of the animosity of the Babylonian scribe towards Antiochus Epiphanes. See above p. 113 n. 18.

⁷² See below pp. 155-56. Even if our argument concerning the date of the "second approach" is rejected, Antiochus' visit to Tyre should still precede the opening of hostilities. While the king was there he was met by emissaries of

Consequently, the king's visit to Tyre took place in the autumn of 170, or slightly later, but before the outbreak of the Sixth Syrian War. The approximate period of time suggested here for the king's stay in the Phoenician city of Tyre more or less coincides with the date when Meleager and his party left for Rome with knowledge of an impending Ptolemaic onslaught on the Seleucid kingdom. Therefore, when Antiochus IV passed through Tyre, he was already aware that war was about to break out and the king was on his way to meet the Ptolemaic challenge.⁷³ His pace however was unhurried, and he had time to deal with complaints leveled against the Jewish high priest Menelaus (2 Macc. 4.44-47). Perhaps the Seleucid army was already stationed in front line positions.

This approximate date for Antiochus IV's visit to Tyre taken together with the hypothesis that the Sixth Syrian War began in November or December 170 would provide the following timetable. In July-August 170 Antiochus IV arranged the death of his nephew, the co-regent. The king was then forced to lay the blame for the death of Seleucus IV's son on Andronicus, who was summarily put to death. When Antiochus IV realized, perhaps after several weeks, that this measure proved successful, and he was secure in his position as monarch, he left Antioch in late August or September, and reached Tyre two to three weeks later. From Tyre the king proceeded southwards and by November he was ready to face the Ptolemaic challenge in Sinai.

The Conquest of Pelusium

The first battle of the campaign was fought on Ptolemaic soil between Mt. Casius and Pelusium, and this location again points to the Seleucid army's readiness for war. The Seleucid army was victorious, and Antiochus IV Epiphanes now sought to win over as much support as possible from the vanquished soldiers, for he

the Jerusalem *gerousia* who came to charge Menelaus with complicity in his brother Lysimachus' crimes. Lysimachus had stolen holy objects from the city when Andronicus was still alive (2 Macc. 4.31-34 and 39-50), and this means that his violations cannot be dated much later than the killing of Antiochus son of Seleucus in the summer of 170. Since the members of the *gerousia* would not have waited for more than a year to lodge their complaints against Menelaus, Antiochus must have been approached by them at Tyre shortly after the summer of 170.

⁷³ So already argued in Bunge 1974: 63, although he dates this visit much too early, to the spring of 170.

chose to keep them alive rather than having them killed.⁷⁴ The Seleucid king did not limit his efforts to gaining popularity with the Ptolemaic soldiery. He also negotiated a truce and this willingness to come to terms after such an auspicious start points to his desire to win over elements within the Ptolemaic government. It would seem that even at this early stage of the war Antiochus IV already directed his efforts to securing an agreement with Ptolemy VI Philometor, promising his friendship to the king on account of their kinship.⁷⁵

For the moment, the Seleucid gesture remained unanswered. Instead, Eulaeus decided to persuade Philometor to flee to Samothrace. Polybius, our primary source for this affair, connects the story with the Ptolemaic military defeat, for he stresses how far removed the king was from danger and from the presence of his enemies. The Achaean historian absolves the Ptolemaic king from charges of cowardice and accuses Eulaeus of being responsible for this ignominious flight.⁷⁶ Why Eulaeus and Lenaeus did not respond to the overtures of the Seleucid king is clear. There was little hope that Antiochus IV would be in need of their services once they had delivered to him the prize he seemed to covet, in the person of his nephew Ptolemy VI Philometor. Furthermore, the two had linked their career with a call for war against the Seleucid kingdom and therefore had little to expect from Antiochus. Nor was their position in the Ptolemaic court strengthened by recent events. Their responsibility for the war, even though others within the Ptolemaic court were also to blame for this initiative, made it clear they were now exposed to charges of incompetence in their handling of the Syrian campaign. Eulaeus and Lenaeus had lost much of their influence since the association of Ptolemy VIII Euergetes and Cleopatra II to the throne, and despite any success they may have achieved in offsetting this move by announcing

⁷⁴ Diod. 30.14; Porphyry, *FGH* 260 F 49a.

⁷⁵ Diod. 30.18. The accusations leveled in Diodorus against Antiochus in connection with the capture of Pelusium point to the Seleucid's attempt to win the cooperation of Philometor at the time; cf. Polyb. 28.18. We do not know how long the armistice agreed upon by the two parties lasted. In 219, Antiochus III and Ptolemy IV concluded a four-month armistice—Polyb. 5.66.2.

⁷⁶ Polyb. 28.21; Diod. 30.17. For the date of this episode, see Mørkholm 1966: 75-76; Walbank 1957-79: III. 27, 356-57. Polybius does not make it clear whether Philometor and Eulaeus actually reached Samothrace. See too Otto 1934: 47-49; Pédech 1964: 149 n. 266.

Philometor's *anacleteria*, their fate must have been sealed by their defeat at the hands of the Seleucid army. Eulaeus (and perhaps Lenaeus as well) now sought to free himself from the dire consequences of his policies by escape, and he convinced the young king, who was under his influence, to flee with him. Eulaeus thought that possession of both the person of the king and the treasures amassed for the conduct of the war would lend him a chance to renew his bid for power later on.⁷⁷ The proposed escape to Samothrace was, it seems, unsuccessful, for we no longer hear of either Eulaeus or Lenaeus and the two apparently were charged with an attempt to run off with the royal treasury and were executed as a result.⁷⁸

Meanwhile, in the war zone, the truce period agreed upon by the Seleucid and Ptolemaic armies came to an end. The Seleucid king, whose attempt to win the support of Ptolemy VI Philometor had so far failed, was now free to resort to force. The Seleucid army took control over Pelusium. We do not know how this was achieved, but it is likely that Ptolemaic soldiers and officers, impressed by Antiochus' considerate treatment after the battle near Mt. Casius, surrendered the city to the Seleucid king.⁷⁹ In addition to the land battle over Pelusium, the navies of the two kingdoms clashed and here too the Seleucid side had the upper hand. Once Pelusium was captured, the road to Egypt was open.⁸⁰

The Campaign in Egypt

The fragmentary state of the relevant chapters in Polybius precludes any attempt to restore the exact details of the Seleucid military operations in Egypt, but some features of this campaign can be ascertained. The resumption of hostilities, signaled by the land and sea battles near Pelusium, probably occurred in the early

⁷⁷ The chronological sequence suggested here: first *anacleteria* and then the Samothracian affair, relies on the fact that nothing more is heard of Eulaeus after the latter incident. Afterwards a new government appears with Comanus and Cineas at its head.

⁷⁸ Polyb. 28.21.1: ὅτι Εὐλαῖος ὁ εὐνοῦχος ἐπεισε Πτολεμαῖον ἀνάλαβόντα τὰ χρήματα. Diod. 30.16: ἀλλ' ἔφερον (Eulaeus and Lenaeus) ἔτοιμα χορηγεία πρὸς τὸν καθ' αὐτῶν ὄλεθρον.

⁷⁹ Diod. 30.18 (from Polybius); Polyb. 28.18; Jos. *Ant.* 12.243. Cf. Walbank 1957-79: III. 352.

⁸⁰ Livy 44.19.9. Cf. Mørkholm 1966: 85 n. 79. For the strategic importance of Pelusium, see Kees 1937.

spring (March). The level of the water in the Nile at this time of the year is low, and a crossing of the river would have been relatively easy. The route taken by the invading force was circuitous: not a direct thrust westwards towards Alexandria, which would bog down the army in the salt marshes and lagoons of the northern delta, nor even a slight southern detour into the central or southern delta, where an invading army would be forced to bridge the seven branches of the Nile, as well as lesser distributaries of the river and numerous irrigation canals. Such a line of attack would have fragmented the Seleucid army, impeding communications and coordinated action. Instead, Antiochus IV chose to advance to the southwest, along the eastern branch of the river. When the southern apex of the Nile delta was reached, somewhere to the north of Memphis, the Seleucid army bridged the river, taking the old Egyptian capital soon after.⁸¹ Some support for this reconstruction of the army's route can be gleaned from a papyrus, probably dated to April 17, 169. The papyrus states that on that day, eight horsemen accompanied by carriages were to leave the Hermopolite nome towards "the army with the king"; the men were given twenty days to complete their assignment. The caravan, obviously carrying supplies to the camp, was not expected to move speedily from its point of departure in the Hermopolite nome. Since the fighting in 169 first broke out in Pelusium, the convoy must have been heading north to reach its destination. By the end of the time allotted, it seems more likely that the convoy would have reached the surroundings of Memphis, some 260 kilometers from Hermopolis (the capital of the nome), than that it would be in the neighborhood of Alexandria, which is 550 kilometers from Hermopolis.⁸² Thus, irrespective of the identity of "the army with the king," we have some indication that military activity was concentrated in the general area of Memphis in April 169, and the Seleucid army should be placed in that region.

From Memphis, the main body of the Seleucid force, with Antiochus at its head, marched towards Alexandria along the Canopic branch of the Nile. The threat to Alexandria was clear,

⁸¹ Livy 44.19.9; Jos. *Ant.* 12.243; Porphyry, *FGH* 260 F 49a. For the geomorphology of the delta, see Butzer 1976: 22-25. These considerations are ignored by Mørkholm 1966: 77, who assumes a direct Seleucid approach to Alexandria.

⁸² *P. Lond.* 2190. For the speed of carts, see Engels 1978: 15.

and the new Ptolemaic administration, formed after the defeat near Mt. Casius and the Samothracian affair, is now mentioned for the first time. The central figures in the new government are Comanus and Cineas. These two were members of the privileged court circle before the opening of the Sixth Syrian War, and may have been among those who moved to elevate Ptolemy VIII Euergetes and Cleopatra II to an equal position with their brother.⁸³

With the imminent approach of the Seleucid army, Polybius tells us, Comanus and Cineas held consultations with the king (i.e. Philometor) and his council. It was decided that a number of delegations from Greece and Asia Minor, present in Alexandria at the time, would be asked to mediate between the Ptolemaic and Seleucid kingdoms and to try to achieve a settlement between the warring sides. The combined embassy, to which Philometor's emissaries were attached as well, set out from Alexandria sailing up-river, and met the Seleucid king at some point beyond Naucratis. Speaking on behalf of Ptolemy VI Philometor and the new regime, these delegates stated that Eulaeus and Lenaeus were completely responsible for the outbreak of the war. The king, they said, was to be absolved of any blame for past events because of his young age. The ambassadors sought to awaken some sympathy in Antiochus toward Philometor by stressing the kinship between the two. These delegates, it would seem, simply echoed Seleucid propaganda. The import of their message was that now that Eulaeus and Lenaeus were no longer there to incite Ptolemy VI Philometor against the Seleucid kingdom, there was no reason to continue fighting. The king was in the capable hands of Comanus and Cineas, and Antiochus need not present himself as a protector of Ptolemy Philometor. According to Polybius, Antiochus Epiphanes accepted all these excuses. This is quite understandable, for these arguments strengthened his own case, namely that Philometor needed an able guardian who would look after the Ptolemaic king's best interests. In substance, however, Antiochus was less than forthcoming. He upheld his claim to Coele-Syria and Phoenicia and implicitly demanded that this right be acknowledged. The Seleucid king then proceeded to Naucratis, with the ambassadors in tow. In Naucratis Antiochus displayed great generosity and

⁸³ Polyb. 28.19.1. For the role of Comanus and Cineas here, see Mørkholm 1961: 39-41. Walbank 1957-79: III. 353-54, gives a résumé of their respective careers.

liberality towards the local Greeks, seeking their support, and probably intending to impress the foreign ambassadors as well. By continuing his march towards Alexandria, the Seleucid king made it clear that he would not slow down his campaign because of the presence of the foreign and Ptolemaic ambassadors. He also stated that he would not give the legation any response until his own ambassadors, whom he had sent to meet Philometor, would return from their mission.⁸⁴ In this fashion Antiochus IV side-stepped the mediation attempt initiated by Comanus and Cineas. He must have suspected that the ambassadors of Ptolemy who accompanied the foreign diplomats were in fact loyal to Comanus and Cineas, and consequently the king concentrated on establishing direct contact with the Ptolemy VI Philometor in Alexandria. This may not have been easy, and we do not know how it was done. One possibility is that by exerting military pressure on Alexandria, Antiochus IV ultimately forced Comanus and his associates to allow him to meet with Ptolemy VI Philometor.

Antiochus IV and Ptolemy VI Philometor

In any event, Antiochus IV's attempt to negotiate directly with Ptolemy Philometor was finally successful. The two reached an agreement and Ptolemy Philometor joined the camp of Antiochus Epiphanes.⁸⁵ The contents of the accord remain unknown, but Ptolemy VI Philometor must have been forced to recognize the Seleucid claim to Coele-Syria and Phoenicia, while Antiochus IV took it upon himself to restore his nephew's authority as sole ruler over all of Egypt, Alexandria included. From this point on, until

⁸⁴ Polyb. 28.19-20. For Polybius, King Ptolemy here is Philometor; see Otto 1934: 49 n. 4; Hampl 1936: 34. Among the foreign diplomats we hear of two Achaeans, Alcithus and Pasiadas. The two were previously selected by the Achaean assembly to go to Egypt when the *synodos* heard of Philometor's *anacleteria*, Polyb. 28.12.8-9. As this occurred in April-May 169, the meeting with Antiochus should be dated to May-June of that year.

⁸⁵ Porphyry, *FGH* 260 F 49a-b; John Antioch. fr. 58 (*FGH* IV. 558). The latter source is wrong in stating that Philometor joined Antiochus IV, having been dethroned by his brother. Cf. Polyb. 28.23.4; Suda s.v. 'Ηρακλείδης Ὁξύρυγίτης. The words of the Suda, ὅς τὰς πρὸς Ἀντίοχον ἔθετο συνθήκας, may either refer to Ptolemy Philometor, as claimed by Niese 1893-1903: III. 172 n. 4, or else to Heracleides. If the second alternative is correct, it was the philosopher and historian Heracleides Lembus who negotiated the agreement on behalf of Ptolemy Philometor. See also Polyb. 29.26.1, for Antiochus IV's obligations towards Philometor.

the spring of the following year, the two monarchs would remain committed to this cause. By negotiating directly with the young king, Antiochus IV demonstrated that in his eyes Ptolemy VI Philometor, and none other, was the rightful monarch of the Ptolemaic kingdom.⁸⁶ Later on in 169, after Ptolemy VI Philometor moved to Memphis, the Seleucid king continued to maintain that his sole purpose was to defend the rights of Philometor, the oldest of his sister's children.⁸⁷ These protestations of Antiochus IV on behalf of Ptolemy Philometor make it clear that the joint rule was not abolished after the first Ptolemaic military defeat, as proposed by Skeat. Ptolemy VI Philometor, even after the proclamation of his coming of age, considered himself the injured party. Antiochus IV was quick to use this situation to his own advantage: through this accord with Ptolemy VI Philometor, the presence of the Seleucid and his army in Egypt was now recognized as legitimate by the rightful ruler of the Ptolemaic kingdom.⁸⁸

Ptolemy VI Philometor, by deciding to ally himself with Antiochus IV, made it plain that there was in fact a connection between the policies attributed to Eulaeus and Lenaeus and his own personal behavior. Just as the proclamation of the *anacleteria* was intended to establish anew the exalted position of Ptolemy VI Philometor in respect to his two siblings, so his departure from Alexandria was a means of breaking away from his younger brother and sister. His

⁸⁶ Antiochus IV and Ptolemy VI Philometor came to an accord in May-June 169, see above n. 84. Consequently it is impossible to accept the view of Skeat 1961: 110-11, that *P. Lond.* 2190, dated to April 17, 169, belongs to the period of cooperation between the two. Cf. Mørkholm 1966: 83. The expression in ll. 11-12 of the papyrus, εἰς τὸ μετὰ τοῦ βασιλέως στρατόπεδον, which Skeat sees as a sign of collaboration, seems to refer to the camp of Antiochus IV without alluding to Philometor in any way. The irregularity of the expression mirrors the special circumstances in Egypt. The foreign king was stationed with his army in Egypt, yet claimed no title and his administration accepted—and perhaps even insisted—that documents be dated according to Philometor's twelfth year. If this is right, it was another means used by Antiochus IV to show that he was defending the rights of Philometor. This may explain the numerical preponderance of documents dated to Philometor's twelfth year, as opposed to only two documents which are dated to the first year of the joint reign.

⁸⁷ Polyb. 28.23.4; Diod. 31.1; Livy 44.19.8, 45.11.1. Thus the statement made by Porphyry, *FGH* 260 F 49a, that Antiochus IV crowned himself in Memphis, probably belongs to the Seleucid's second campaign in Egypt, after the ties with Philometor had been severed.

⁸⁸ Cf. Mørkholm 1966: 84-85. Otto 1934: 52-54, maintains that Antiochus IV became Philometor's guardian, but see Hampl 1936: 34-36 and 40-41, and Aymard 1952.

exit from Alexandria also reminds us of his abortive attempt to escape to Samothrace. Philometor felt himself a prisoner in his own court, robbed of his rights. His desire to assert his predominance must have been overpowering, and Antiochus IV cleverly manipulated that urge.

Philometor now made his quarters in the old Egyptian capital of Memphis, which had earlier been captured by Antiochus IV, and set up a court to rival the one that remained in Alexandria.⁸⁹ The famous gateway of Egypt was thus cut off from its hinterland, not only by the blockade of the Seleucid army but also through the establishment of an alternative administrative center whose head was the rightful king of Upper and Lower Egypt. Thus, through his agreement with Ptolemy Philometor, Antiochus was able to gain the support of many of the inhabitants of Egypt, take charge of much of their country, and block the flow of foodstuff and other commodities to Alexandria.

The Attempt to Conquer Egypt

Ptolemy VI Philometor was now out of the clutches of Comanus and Cineas, but acquired a more threatening ally in their stead. Even before he was joined by his nephew, the Seleucid king, it seems, did not limit his military efforts to an attack on Alexandria. Various units must have been sent to other regions in order to put the local population under effective supervision. The excuse was, no doubt, that the Seleucid army was coming to ensure obedience to the rightful king, and in fact the Seleucid forces were now conquering the whole of Egypt under that pretext.⁹⁰ News of Antiochus' victorious campaign through Meluhha, southern Egypt, became known in Babylon in the month of Ab, 143 S.E. (August 18—September 16, 169) and led to a *pompé* there.⁹¹ The spread of Seleucid control to Upper Egypt is also attested through a hieroglyphic inscription which shows that before October 1, 169, Thebes was garrisoned by foreign soldiers, i.e. by troops from the Seleucid army.⁹²

⁸⁹ Livy 45.11.1; Polyb. 29.23.4.

⁹⁰ Jos. *Ant.* 12.243; Porphyry, *FGH* 260 F 49a-b; Livy 45.11.1; Polyb. 28.19.1, 28.20.1 (though the language is probably that of the excerptor).

⁹¹ BM 41581 (Sachs & Hunger 1988-96: II. 470-71). See Gera & Horowitz 1997: 240-43.

⁹² Fairman 1934: 5-6 no. 8. For the Julian date, see Skeat 1961: 108.

The chief prize for the Seleucid king was yet to be taken. Alexandria had not opened its gates to the army of Antiochus and the city was a haven for Ptolemy VIII Euergetes and Cleopatra II. According to Polybius, the Alexandrian mob, exposed to danger and left without its king, Philometor, proclaimed his younger brother king (29.23.4). The import of this statement is that until this point, i.e. sometime in the summer of 169, Ptolemy VIII Euergetes had never ascended the throne. Yet we know from other sources that Ptolemy VIII, together with his sister, had become co-ruler with Philometor by the autumn of 170 (above p. 124). Furthermore, the alleged aim of Antiochus IV—to defend the rights of Philometor—suggests that the joint rule was then in effect. Philometor sought to regain his original position as monarch by joining the Seleucid king. Ptolemy VIII Euergetes had, in fact, been legitimately associated to the throne and accepted as king by his older brother, and he simply continued as ruler in Alexandria throughout this period. Polybius, however, points to the supposed illegality of the procedure by which the mob proclaimed Ptolemy VIII king. The historian then describes the second period of joint rule by the two brothers as if it were their first association on the throne, and explains that their union was brought about by the existence of a common threat in the shape of Antiochus IV Epiphanes.⁹³ Thus the reader is made to believe that Ptolemy VIII Euergetes' proclamation as king, as reported by Polybius, lacked legitimacy and that his subsequent acceptance by his brother was not binding, because Philometor at the time had no other choice. Polybius' description of the situation is clearly biased, but given his personal friendship with Menyllus of Alabanda, a confidant of Ptolemy VI Philometor, a favorable portrayal of Philometor is not too surprising.⁹⁴

Antiochus, in keeping with his policy of defending the right of Philometor to be sole monarch, attempted to remove the remainder of royal power invested in the hands of Ptolemy VIII Euergetes and Cleopatra II. His army laid a siege on Alexandria, but failed to capture the city. While the protracted blockade caused much suffering to the Alexandrians, they nonetheless prevailed and

⁹³ Polyb. 29.23.4-5. Cf. Livy 45.11.2-7.

⁹⁴ Assessment of Ptolemy VI Philometor: Polyb. 28.21.4-5, 39.7.1-7. Friendship with Menyllus: Polyb. 31.12.8. For the suggestion that Menyllus was the source of Polybius' evaluation of Philometor, see von Scala 1890: 270.

were later able to witness the withdrawal of the Seleucid forces from the city.⁹⁵ Soon after, the Seleucid army evacuated most of Egypt as well. Antiochus IV kept open the possibility of invading Egypt yet again by leaving a strong garrison in Pelusium.⁹⁶

Antiochus IV's Withdrawal from Egypt

Upon his return from Egypt, Antiochus IV Epiphanes marched against Jerusalem in the year 143 S.E. (1 Macc. 1.20), but this date has not proven very useful for fixing the precise time of the Seleucid army's departure from Egypt. Some scholars argue that this date of the Seleucid era should be calculated according to the Macedonian reckoning, thus giving us a *terminus ante quem* of October 169 or thereabouts. Others have opted for a Babylonian reckoning according to which the Seleucid army evacuated Egypt sometime between the spring of 169 and that of 168.⁹⁷ If the second solution is the correct one, the *terminus ante quem* supplied by 1 Maccabees is of no help here, for we know that Antiochus' second attempt on Egypt began in the spring of 168 (Livy 45.11.9). On the whole, scholars agree on the autumn of 169 as an approximate date for the evacuation of Egypt.⁹⁸

⁹⁵ Livy 44.19.6-13, 45.11.1 and 7; Polyb. 28.22.1, 29.2.1 (both references come from the pen of the excerptor); Jos. *Ant.* 12.243-44. Here account should be taken of 4Q248, first read by J. T. Milik and published by Wacholder & Abegg 1995: 33. A recent study of this scroll fragment by Broshi & Eshel, with new readings and reconstructions, demonstrates that Antiochus IV is its subject. In ll. 3-4 mention is made of those who "shall eat [the flesh] of their [so]ns and daughters in siege." Broshi & Eshel 1997, sensibly maintain that this is a reference to the siege of Alexandria by Antiochus in 169. They reject the notion that the residents of Alexandria suffered much during the siege on the grounds that the port of Alexandria was not blockaded by the Seleucid navy (pp. 125-27). That Antiochus failed to enforce a full-scale sea blockade is true, but Alexandria relied on the *chora* to supply its food, and Antiochus IV, from April 169 onwards, managed gradually to cut off this source. Even if food from outside Egypt alleviated the suffering of the Alexandrians, the language of 4Q248, although a biblical formula, would not be used of a minimal blockade.

⁹⁶ Livy 45.11.1-5; 1 Macc. 1.20; Jos. *Ant.* 12.244; 2 Macc. 5.1-11; Porphyry, *FGH* 260 F 2.7, F 49b, F 50; Syncellus, ed. Mosshammer p. 342. See too John Antioch. fr. 58 (*FGH* IV. 558), who makes Antiochus' two campaigns into one.

⁹⁷ Macedonian reckoning: Bickermann 1937a: 161; Bringmann 1983: 39. Babylonian reckoning: Dancy 1954: 50-51; Briscoe 1968: 85. Mørkholm 1966: 86 n. 87, and 161 contradicts himself. On the whole question of the dates employed in 1 Maccabees, see Bickermann 1937a: 155-58; Hanhart 1964; Bringmann 1983: 15-28; Grabbe 1991.

⁹⁸ To the references in the preceding note add Schürer 1973-87: I. 128-29;

One further piece of evidence should be taken into account here—a hieroglyphic document from Egypt. This document speaks of the people of Hermonthis who, because of their fear of the foreign soldiers in Thebes, decided to remove the god Buchis from his Theban abode to Hermonthis and did so on October 1, 169. The foreign soldiers mentioned are clearly Seleucid troops who were still stationed in Thebes at this late date.⁹⁹ Even if we assume that the Seleucid soldiers left Thebes on October 2, the day after Buchis was removed to Hermonthis, they would not have reached Pelusium, located approximately 880 kilometers to the north, before October 12, 169.¹⁰⁰ Mid-October should therefore serve as a rough *terminus post quem* for the evacuation of Egypt. It is to be noted that the Macedonian New Year's Day falls on the first of Dios, and this date in the Seleucid kingdom was equated with 1 Tishre. In the year under discussion, this date fell on October 16, 169.¹⁰¹ One subsidiary result that emerges from these calculations is that Antiochus IV could not have reached Jerusalem, some 315 kilometers from Pelusium, before early November, that is after the beginning of the year 144 S.E. according to the Seleucid-Macedonian reckoning. Therefore, the date for Antiochus' attack on Jerusalem in 1 Macc. 1.20, 143 S.E., can only be correct if it is based on the Seleucid-Babylonian reckoning.¹⁰²

Tcherikover 1959: 186. Swain 1944: 91, without giving any reason, dates the evacuation to December 169.

⁹⁹ Fairman 1934: 5-6 no. 8. For the Julian date, see Skeat 1961: 108. The chronological implications of this document have been noted by Dancy 1954: 67. His discussion, however, is of little value, because he wrongly dates *P. Ryl.* 583 to 169 instead of 170.

¹⁰⁰ *C. Ord. Ptol.* 29 shows that individuals from anywhere in Upper Egypt were expected to reach Alexandria within twenty days. Samuel 1962: 7, calculates that a ship on the Nile could sail about eighty kilometers a day, hence the date suggested here. Naturally an evacuation by land would take more time. For march rates of an army, see Brunt 1976: 488; Engels 1978: 154-56.

¹⁰¹ Equation of Babylonian and Macedonian months in the Seleucid kingdom: Bickerman 1968: 25. Julian date: Parker & Dubberstein 1956: 41.

¹⁰² Bringmann 1983: 15-28, argues that the dates in 1 Maccabees are calculated according to the Seleucid-Macedonian reckoning of October 312. But this date and the one in 1 Macc. 13.41, which is also calculated from Nisan 311, disprove his theory; see Gera 1985: 157-58. However, the date given for the death of Antiochus IV in 1 Macc. 6.16, the year 149 S.E., must have been calculated from October 312; see Bringmann 1983: 17. Bickerman 1937a: 155-58, argues that dates of Jewish events in 1 Maccabees use the Seleucid-Babylonian era of spring 311, while external dates employ the Seleucid-Macedonian era of autumn 312. The evidence for these three dates seems to

A final crux that needs to be elucidated is Antiochus IV's reasons for lifting the siege on Alexandria and withdrawing from Egypt. Alexandria was the last foothold of the partisans of Ptolemy VIII Euergetes and Cleopatra II in Egypt. If the city were to fall into Antiochus' hands, he would have become, through his influence over Ptolemy VI Philometor, the master of Egypt, and perhaps even of the Ptolemaic kingdom as a whole. There must have been overriding reasons for Antiochus Epiphanes to relinquish this aim, the ultimate goal of his campaign. Yet the motives modern scholars attribute to Antiochus for evacuating Egypt—ancient sources do not provide us with a reason—either lack real substance or else are too vague. Otto, for instance, explains that Antiochus IV retreated from Egypt in order to quell the revolt by Jason (2 Macc. 5.1-21). Yet, no matter how much support Jason and his men received from the population of Jerusalem, it is unlikely that the need to occupy this one city would have forced Antiochus to evacuate his entire army, some sixty to seventy thousand strong, from Egypt.¹⁰³ Other scholars similarly suggest that other events within the Seleucid kingdom compelled Antiochus IV to turn his attention to the internal affairs of his kingdom. These events, however, either cannot be linked with the period in question, or else are too unspecified to be of any use.¹⁰⁴ Yet another theory advances the view that Antiochus IV decided to withdraw from Egypt because of his fear of Rome,¹⁰⁵ and the following discussion illustrates that this hypothesis is the most likely.

Immediately after lifting the siege on Alexandria, Antiochus IV sent Meleager, Sosiphanes and Heracleides to Rome. The three, who had already acquired some experience on their previous

justify Bickermann's theory, pending the publication of further material which might throw light on other dates mentioned in 1 Maccabees. One must also take account of the possibility that some of the dates in the book may not be accurate. This is certainly the case with the date mentioned in 1 Macc. 6.20. See Gera & Horowitz 1997: 249-52.

¹⁰³ Otto 1934: 66-67. Swain 1944: 84, supplies good arguments against Otto's view.

¹⁰⁴ Swain 1944: 84, suggests that the Seleucid king wanted to launch an eastern expedition. This is rightly rejected by Gruen 1984: II. 654, who attributes the Seleucid withdrawal to unspecified internal developments. An explanation of a technical nature, i.e. the need for the Seleucid army to retire to winter quarters is supplied by Pédech 1964: 151.

¹⁰⁵ So apparently M. J. Moscovich, *The Role of Hostages in Roman Foreign Policy*, McMaster Dissertation, 161 (*non vidi*), as reported and criticized by Walbank 1957-79: III. 359.

mission to Rome, were now furnished with 150 talents, of which they were to give 50 as a 'crown' (στέφανος) to the Roman people. These ambassadors were expected to give the remaining 100 talents as presents (εἰς δωρεάν) to various cities in Greece. The concise Polybian fragment which informs us of these events associates the end of the siege on Alexandria both with Antiochus IV's decision to pay homage to Rome by sending his ambassadors with a 'crown' and with his attempts to acquire public support in Greece.¹⁰⁶ This passage gives the impression that Antiochus IV was responding to pressure, and it is not unreasonable to assume that this pressure is what caused him to abandon the siege of Alexandria in the first place.¹⁰⁷ Josephus lends support to this interpretation of the Polybius passage. When paraphrasing 1 Macc. 1.20, which tells of Antiochus Epiphanes' departure from Egypt and his subsequent attack on the Jewish Temple in 143 S.E., Josephus notes that Antiochus was ordered by the Romans to keep away from Alexandria and Egypt. The Jewish historian also explains that Antiochus came back from Egypt because of his fear of the Romans (*Ant.* 12.244 and 246). In the past, Josephus has been understood as referring to the effect of the ultimatum delivered by C. Popillius Laenas to Antiochus IV in 168, and the Jewish historian has been accused of confusing the first withdrawal of Antiochus IV from Egypt with the second.¹⁰⁸ However, this interpretation of Polyb. 28.22 points to the possibility that Roman pressure had something to do with the evacuation of Egypt by the Seleucid army ca. October 169, and the words of Josephus seem to bear a direct reference to a Roman diplomatic move and its effect on the Seleucid king.

Numisius' Mission

Who were the Roman diplomats who compelled Antiochus Epiphanes to retire from Egypt? We know of only one Roman embassy which could have met up with Antiochus Epiphanes by the walls of Alexandria in 169, and this is the mission headed by

¹⁰⁶ Polyb. 28.22. Livy 45.11.8, also alludes to Antiochus' diplomatic activity in Greece. For the presentation of 'crowns' as an expression of homage, see Aymard 1938: 337-38 n. 25.

¹⁰⁷ Cf. Morgan 1990: 57-58.

¹⁰⁸ Schürer 1973-87: I. 151 n. 33; Ed. Will 1979-82: II. 323.

T. Numisius Tarquiniensis. Numisius and his colleagues were sent by the Senate at some point in 169,¹⁰⁹ and consequently could have conferred with the Seleucid king in the autumn of that year. We cannot be sure why the Senate dispatched Numisius to the Seleucid and Ptolemaic kings. Earlier, as we have seen, the *patres* had been approached by the Seleucid embassy of Meleager and his associates and by the Ptolemaic mission of Timotheus and Damon (above p. 126). At that time, the Seleucid envoys warned of the aggressive policies of the Ptolemaic kingdom, and the Senate gave the consul Q. Marcius Philippus the authority to deal with the matter: he was to write to Ptolemy, if that seemed to him the right course of action. Polybius makes it clear, however, that this was a temporary decision of the Senate.¹¹⁰ Sending T. Numisius would have been a second stage, after more concrete news concerning the war had reached Rome. By the autumn of 169, Numisius had arrived in Alexandria with the mission of mediating between the rivals in the Sixth Syrian War (Polyb. 29.25.3). As things stood at that time, Numisius found he had to deal with Antiochus IV and Ptolemy VI Philometor, as well as Ptolemy VIII Euergetes and Cleopatra II. One of the primary obstacles to reaching an agreement was the tense relationship among the members of the Ptolemaic royal house. Was Ptolemy VI Philometor to become sole king, or was the joint rule to be resumed? And if the latter solution were to be adopted, would the three siblings enjoy equal authority and dignity?

T. Numisius perhaps succeeded at first in bringing the parties to an initial understanding, but not to a full-scale peace treaty. The terms of the initial agreement were, it seems, that the siege on Alexandria was to be lifted and an armistice imposed. In addition, the unity of the Ptolemaic royal house was probably reaffirmed, while Ptolemy VI Philometor was to be the senior member of the royal family. Details concerning the sharing of power were probably left for further negotiations. With terms such as these, Antiochus Epiphanes could withdraw his forces from the walls of Alexandria. Furthermore, if such an understanding had indeed

¹⁰⁹ Polyb. 29.25.3-4. For the date see Gruen 1984: II. 655; Walbank 1957-79: III. 402. Walbank rightly rejects the view of Otto 1934: 62-63, who claimed that Numisius was sent by the Senate as a result of the request of Ptolemy VIII Euergetes and Cleopatra II.

¹¹⁰ Polyb. 28.1.1-9, and see there 28.1.9: καὶ ταῦτα μὲν οὕτως ἐχειρίσθη κατὰ τὸ παρόν.

been reached, a statement made by Polybius becomes more readily understandable. According to the historian, a Rhodian embassy which had come to Egypt in order to negotiate a peace agreement proceeded from Alexandria to the camp of the Seleucid king. Antiochus told these ambassadors that the Ptolemaic kingdom was the possession of his long time friend, Ptolemy VI Philometor, by right and since the Alexandrians were now ready to lead Philometor back to the city, he would not stand in their way (Polyb. 28.23). Had Antiochus retreated from Alexandria solely on his own initiative, without reaching some sort of an understanding, his words would not only have been an outright lie, but one easily exposed. The Rhodian ambassadors came to him after having been in Alexandria, and thus would have immediately recognized the untruthfulness of his words. But on the assumption that a framework of an agreement had been reached, the Seleucid king was simply stretching the truth a little, implying that Ptolemy VI Philometor was virtually on the point of returning to Alexandria, while in reality the terms for his homecoming were still to be hammered out.¹¹¹ The negotiations between Ptolemy VI Philometor and Cleopatra II and Ptolemy VIII Euergetes (Livy 45.11.1-7) were, it seems, meant to give substance to a pre-existing agreement, which was achieved through the good services of T. Numisius and his fellow ambassadors.

Antiochus IV's reasons for abandoning Egypt may be summarized as follows. During the summer and early autumn of 169, the Seleucid army was besieging Alexandria, blocking the transport of food and other commodities from Egypt to the city. The army failed, however, to breach the walls, thus denying the Seleucid king the opportunity to wipe out the last obstacle before achieving an effective domination of the whole of Egypt. Antiochus' success up to this point owed much to his insistence throughout the campaign that he was fighting partly for reasons of self-defense and partly in order to restore the legal Ptolemaic king, Ptolemy VI Philometor, to the throne. By September or October 169 a Roman embassy headed by T. Numisius Tarquiniensis reached Alexandria. Numisius had been ordered to mediate between the parties to the Sixth Syrian War, and his instructions reflect a growing Roman concern over the Seleucid political and military successes

¹¹¹ For a similar solution, see Swain 1944: 84. Objections to Swain's view have been raised by Briscoe 1964: 71 n. 55; Walbank 1957-79: III. 359-60.

in Egypt. The Senate, by giving these instructions to Numisius, abandoned its initial 'wait and see' attitude. Once in Alexandria, Numisius had no trouble convincing the desperate Ptolemy VIII Euergetes, his sister, and their starving followers that their only hope lay in Roman intervention. The Ptolemaic kings in Alexandria were now ready to acknowledge the seniority of their elder brother, and agreed, in principle, to his restoration to the royal palace in Alexandria. Nonetheless, they must have demanded assurances concerning the preservation of their status as kings, the retention of some of their authority, and the continued well-being of their supporters. Neither Ptolemy VI Philometor nor his champion Antiochus could object to negotiations within this framework, negotiations which accepted in principle their demand that Philometor be recognized as the legal and senior sovereign of the Ptolemaic kingdom. Furthermore, the Seleucid king did not wish to be seen as rejecting Roman involvement, which he himself had originally requested, and he therefore acceded to Numisius' proposals.

This acceptance of an initial agreement did not necessarily mean that Antiochus would relinquish his hold over the Ptolemaic kingdom. In view of the animosity between Ptolemy Philometor and his brother, negotiations could still break down, leaving Antiochus the main victor in such a confrontation.¹¹² The Seleucid king also left a strong garrison at Pelusium. His purpose was not only to leave open the possibility of a renewed invasion of Egypt (Livy 45.11.4-5), but to prevent Philometor from coming to an agreement with the regime in Alexandria without Seleucid consent. Here Antiochus misjudged his young ward, and Ptolemy VI finally understood that his uncle was using him towards his own ends. Philometor had two options. He could threaten his brother and sister with a renewal of the war, and his position in Memphis ensured that the Alexandrians would face another period of hardship and food shortages. On the other hand, Ptolemy VI could offer his siblings partnership and cooperation in the battle against a foreign power which now had no justification in invading Egypt.

¹¹² This was in fact the argument Ptolemy VI Philometor used to coerce his brother and sister to receive him back in Alexandria, see Livy 45.11.5-6: *bello intestino cum fratre eum exitum fore ut victor fessus certamine nequaquam par Antiocho futurus esset. haec prudenter animadversa <a> maiore cum adsensu minor frater quique cum eo erant acceperunt.* Cf. Livy 45.11.1.

Such cooperation would also ensure the Ptolemaic royal house the support of Rome, whose ambassadors had laid the groundwork for concord within the Ptolemaic family. Threats and appeals to a sense of duty, combined with the strategic weakness of the regime of Ptolemy VIII Euergetes, finally reunited the Ptolemaic royal family. Ptolemy VI Philometor and his siblings were now ready to face yet another Seleucid onslaught on Egypt.¹¹³ This attack presumably came because the accord between the brothers did not comply with the instructions which Antiochus Epiphanes must have given his nephew before leaving Egypt. Antiochus, it would seem, had demanded of Ptolemy VI Philometor that he cede to him the sovereignty over Pelusium and its territory. The young king had initially agreed to this demand, but must have gone back on his word after coming to terms with his brother.¹¹⁴ The Seleucid king's willingness to wait out the negotiations between the members of the Ptolemaic royal house at this crucial point of his campaign proved a fatal mistake, for which he was to pay dearly later on.

If the reconstruction proposed here is correct, Numisius' intervention was designed to restore the balance of power between the Ptolemaic and Seleucid kingdoms, rather than bring about a formal peace accord between the two kingdoms. Because of Roman intervention, the Ptolemaic royal house became united in its determination to extend its authority over Pelusium and the Sinai peninsula and to deny Antiochus the opportunity of posing a constant threat to Egypt. The Ptolemaic kings knew that there was no way to reconcile their policies with those of the Seleucid king, and consequently appealed to the Achaean League for military help. Once the Ptolemaic request became known in Achaea (Polyb. 29.23.1-9), it became clear that the armistice which T. Numisius had organized would collapse, as it eventually did. The breakdown of the armistice should not detract from Numisius' achievement in saving Alexandria, reuniting the Ptolemaic royal house, and denying Antiochus IV a very effective propaganda tool. Yet in Polybius' eyes, the embassy of T. Numisius was a complete failure.¹¹⁵ The historian's unfavorable judgment may be due to the

¹¹³ Livy 45.11.2-7; Polyb. 29.23.1-6, 29.25.7.

¹¹⁴ Morgan 1990: 61-64. For a later demand by Antiochus IV to Philometor to be recognized as sovereign of Pelusium, see Livy 45.11.11.

¹¹⁵ Polyb. 29.25.4: οἱ γὰρ περὶ τὸν Τίτον ἀδυνατήσαντες τοῦ διαλύειν

fact that the ephemeral success of Numisius seemed of little value in comparison with the later mission of C. Popillius Laenas. Laenas managed to force Antiochus Epiphanes out of Egypt in a most dramatic encounter on the famous 'day of Eleusis' (Polyb. 29.27.1-8). The renewal of the Sixth Syrian War within a few months of Numisius' visit to Egypt would have been seen as a blow to Roman authority. The meeting of Laenas and Antiochus Epiphanes, on the other hand, was intended by Polybius to be the final act in the original version of his *Histories*, a work which aimed to explain how, and by what system of government, almost the whole of the inhabited world fell to the rule of the Romans in less than fifty three years.¹¹⁶ The 'day of Eleusis' was, it seems, one of the high points of Roman might.

Polybius and Q. Marcius Philippus

There is another reason why Polybius was so dismissive of the results achieved by T. Numisius and it relates to his negative attitude towards another Roman, Q. Marcius Philippus and the latter's intervention in Achaean matters. We must remember that here Polybius, one of the leading Achaeans, does not simply report events, but is an active participant in the affairs he describes. The news of an imminent renewal of the Sixth Syrian War reached Achaëa as a result of the Ptolemaic request for military assistance. The request was discussed, first in the Achaean *synodos* and then in the *synkletos*, and in the debate that followed, two factions emerged. One, led by Polybius, his father Lycortas, and Archon, was in favor of giving military aid to the Ptolemaic kingdom. The other group, headed by Callicrates, Diophanes, and Hyperbatus, was pro-Roman and opposed this initiative. The pro-Roman faction argued that the Achaeans should stand ready to offer immediate support to the Romans with all the military might that they possessed. This group maintained that it was illogical to allocate military forces to Egypt, forces which might later be needed closer to home. The Achaeans would do better if they kept their entire army at home, ready to offer Rome military assistance when the

ἀνακεχωρήκεισαν εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην ἄπρακτοι τελείως.

¹¹⁶ Goal of Polybius' original plan: Polyb. 1.1.5, 1.2.7, 3.1.4 and 9, 3.2.6, 3.3.9, 3.4.2, 3.118.9, 6.2.3, 8.2.3-4, 39.8.7. Place of the 'day of Eleusis' in scheme: Polyb. 3.3.7-9, 29.27.11-13.

occasion demanded. Thus Callicrates proposed that the Achaeans should offer only their good services in trying to convince Antiochus IV and the Ptolemaic kings to come to terms.

According to Polybius, the views of those attending the meetings wavered: at times those in favor of giving military succor to the Ptolemaic kingdom seemed to have won the support of those attending the *synodos* and *syncretos*, while at other times those who advocated restraint and caution seemed to have the majority on their side. In the end, the historian reports, just when a decision to offer military aid to the Ptolemies seemed to be in the air, a letter arrived from Q. Marcius Philippus, the commander of the Roman army in Greece, in which Marcius expressed the same views that had earlier been expounded by Callicrates. In the face of the consul's advice, opposition to Callicrates' stand evaporated and the Achaeans decided to try and mediate between Antiochus IV and the Ptolemaic kings. But the embassy they chose consisted of Archon, Arcesilaus, and Ariston, men who were apparently identified with the faction of Lycortas. This choice supports Polybius' claim that his own faction was on the point of victory in the debate until the intervention by Marcius Philippus caused the Achaeans to vote for a decision which went against their better judgment.¹¹⁷

Polybius, then, is not a disinterested reporter here. Both he and his father, Lycortas, had been personally active in trying to persuade the Achaeans to accept their point of view (Polyb. 29.24). For them, the outcome of the debate within the Achaean League was more than a political defeat, for the Ptolemaic ambassadors had specifically asked for Lycortas to serve as overall commander of the Achaean auxiliary force, while Polybius was to be in charge of the cavalry unit.¹¹⁸ Thanks to Marcius Philippus, this was not to happen. Polybius, who was extremely interested in military affairs and courted danger on the battlefield, must have been bitterly disappointed.¹¹⁹ Had the request of the Ptolemaic ambassadors been

¹¹⁷ Polyb. 29.23-25. For the political division within the Achaean League at this point, see Deininger 1971: 182-84; Lehmann 1967: 300-304; Gruen 1984: II. 510-11.

¹¹⁸ Polyb. 29.23.5. Polybius does not name the officer who was to command the infantry unit, but he may be identified with Archon. Archon, like Lycortas and Polybius, was among the chief speakers on behalf of the Ptolemaic request, Polyb. 29.23.3. In the previous year, 170/69, Archon and Polybius respectively served as *strategos* and *hipparch* of the Achaean League.

¹¹⁹ For this side of Polybius' personality, see Polyb. 28.13.1-2 and 6. Cf. Eckstein 1995: 13-14, 279-80.

approved, both Lycortas and Polybius would have gone to Egypt. This would have been a second visit for the father who had been to that country as ambassador in 187/6.¹²⁰ For Polybius this was a second missed opportunity: in 180 both father and son were to visit Alexandria as representatives of the Achaean League, but did not go on this mission due to the death of Ptolemy V Epiphanes (Polyb. 24.6.3-7). Now, through the intervention of Marcius Philippus, Polybius was not only denied a foreign military command, but again missed a chance to visit Egypt.

Polybius had crossed paths with Marcius Philippus earlier, when the historian was a member of a delegation sent to offer the consul military support from the Achaean League. After the consul declined the offer, Polybius' colleagues returned home, but the Achaean *hipparch*, apparently eager for military action, remained in Marcius' camp in order to participate in the war. When news reached the consul that Ap. Claudius Centho, a Roman legate with a command independent of Marcius, had approached the Achaeans with a request for an auxiliary force of 5,000 soldiers to be sent to Epirus, Marcius Philippus sent Polybius back home with instructions to block Centho's appeal. The instructions were given to Polybius in private (κατ' ἰδίαν), which meant that Polybius could not rely on the consul's authority. He thus faced the danger of appearing to oppose Centho's request. Polybius sought to avoid this difficulty by relying on a *senatus consultum* which forbade obeying such demands from Roman commanders unless these were backed up by a specific *senatus consultum*. He suggested that Centho's request be referred to the consul, and Marcius, in turn, absolved the Achaean League from the need to comply with the demand of Centho. While Polybius was successful in saving the league from the high costs that Centho's demand entailed, he could not avoid the negative consequences of the course of action which Marcius had urged upon him. The historian tells us that detractors used this incident to accuse him in front of Claudius Centho of foiling the latter's plans. In addition, the manipulations of Q. Marcius Philippus led to Polybius' reputation as anti-Roman, a man opposed to extending help to Rome, even when a formal request had been placed. Thus Polybius may have viewed Marcius' manipulations as a deliberate attempt to present him in the worst

¹²⁰ Polyb. 22.3.6, 22.9.1-4.

possible light.¹²¹ He may have even thought that his later banishment from Achaëa was due, in part, to these machinations. Polybius, then, had little love for Marcius Philippus and this message comes across clearly in his writings.¹²²

Let us return, at long last, to Polybius' statement on the utter failure of T. Numisius' efforts at peacemaking. This judgment may be interpreted as the historian's belated response to Marcius Philippus. In his message, Marcius urged the Achaeans to send an embassy to Egypt in an attempt to bring the Ptolemaic royal family and Antiochus Epiphanes to terms. The Roman consul mentioned the embassy of Numisius as a model for the Achaeans to follow, arguing that such efforts were a part of Roman policy. At the time, Marcius' message caused Polybius to leave the theater, where the discussions were held, thus withdrawing his earlier support of the plan to send an auxiliary force to Egypt. The historian explains that he withdrew from the debate "on account of Marcius" (*διὰ τὸν Μάρκιον*). Despite this neutral expression, Polybius' motivation seems clear. He thought it imprudent to stand in the way of the commander of the Roman army in Greece.¹²³ However, by the time Polybius wrote of these events, Q. Marcius Philippus was probably dead, and the historian could now hint at his disapproval of the advice given by Marcius Philippus. The Roman consul, who was kept informed of the debate among the Achaeans by Callistrates and his party (Polyb. 29.25.1-2), must have known of the Ptolemaic appeal for help, and was therefore aware that the armistice initiated by Numisius was close to collapse. This suggestion that the Achaeans mediate between the parties involved in the Sixth Syrian War, was, Polybius seems to say, insincere. If Roman influence could not guarantee peace between the Seleucids and the Ptolemies, prospects that an Achaean embassy might succeed were minimal, and Marcius was well aware of that fact. The Roman consul had resorted to a devious argument which Polybius

¹²¹ Polyb. 28.13. Cf. Briscoe 1964: 70-71; Deininger 1971: 181-82; Gruen 1984: II. 508-9. De Sanctis 1907-23: IV/1. 307 with n. 186, suggests that Polybius took the initiative in rejecting the request of Ap. Claudius Centho and later blamed Q. Marcius Philippus for it.

¹²² Polybius' hostility towards Marcius is also attested in 23.9.8, 28.17.1-9; cf. Pédech 1964: 139, 241-42. See also Livy 42.39.1-42.43.4, 42.47.1-9 and Diod. 30.7.1, from Polybius, on Marcius Philippus' deception of Perseus.

¹²³ Polyb. 29.25.1-5. Cf. Walbank 1957-79: III. 402, though I disagree with his rendering of the Greek in Polyb. 29.25.5, as: "out of consideration for Marcius."

could have easily exposed at the Achaean assembly, had he not been afraid of the powerful consul. At the time, Polybius was forced to withdraw from the debate, but when writing his *Histories*, he underlines Numisius' total lack of success. Numisius' failure points to the weakness of the arguments used by Marcius and Polybius hints here at his own superiority to a man who had embroiled him in much trouble, and brought on him bitter disappointment.

The role played by Marcius Philippus in convincing the Achaeans to send an embassy to the parties involved in the Sixth Syrian War rested on the authority he had been given by the Senate to write to Ptolemy with regard to the Ptolemaic-Seleucid conflict (Polyb. 28.1.9). This may have been the second time that Marcius encouraged a Greek state to offer its services in an attempt to resolve that conflict. Earlier, in May or June 169, the people of Rhodes decided to send delegations to the Senate, to the consul Marcius Philippus who was in Macedonia at the time, and to the commander of the Roman fleet in Greece, C. Marcius Figulus.¹²⁴ The Rhodian embassy was warmly received by Q. Marcius Philippus, and Polybius, in keeping with his overall attitude towards the Roman consul, hints that the Roman was able to dupe the head of the Rhodian delegation, Hagepolis, who was totally enthralled by his reception at the hands of the consul (Polyb. 28.17.1-4: ἐψυχαγωγημένου... ἰσχυρῶς). Marcius Philippus took Hagepolis aside and wondered aloud why the Rhodians had not tried to mediate in a war, which Polybius leaves unnamed. We do not know whether Marcius Philippus suggested Rhodian diplomatic intervention in the Third Macedonian War or in the Sixth Syrian War, and Polybius' own reflections on Marcius Philippus' advice to Hagepolis can be interpreted in either way. However the historian's comments lend some support to the view that Marcius Philippus encouraged the Rhodians to mediate in the war with Perseus so as to compromise their position later on. In any event, when Hagepolis returned to Rhodes, the Rhodians sent an embassy to Alexandria with instructions to intercede in the war between Antiochus and Ptolemy. Thus the Rhodian diplomatic initiative was, it seems, the outcome of a request by Marcius Philippus to the Rhodian embassy, even if that request need not be identified with the

¹²⁴ Polyb. 28.16.1-8. The time of year is indicated by the expression ἀρχομένης θερείας—see Pédech 1964: 461.

remarks made by the consul to Hagepolis in private.¹²⁵ Marcius apparently spoke to the Rhodian ambassadors after T. Numisius departed from Rome, and his advice may be regarded as the consul's counter-move to the policies of the Senate.¹²⁶ Marcius' decision to seek Rhodian mediation in the Sixth Syrian War and the similar request he later made to the Achaeans in the winter of 168 suggest that he thought it advisable to apply diplomatic pressure on Antiochus through Greek public opinion.¹²⁷ The consul thought it best that Rome refrain from direct involvement in the conflict as long as the war with Perseus was going on, because it could not impose its will on the Seleucid king. Roman mediation could lead to unsatisfactory results with diminished Roman prestige, and if things went wrong, such intervention would push Antiochus into an alliance with Perseus. For Marcius Philippus, commander of the Roman forces in Macedonia, this last consideration must have been paramount in his preference of a Greek initiative to a Roman one, when trying to bring about a peaceful solution to the Sixth Syrian War.

4. *Jason's Revolt (169/8) and Antiochus' Attack on Jerusalem*

After the Seleucid withdrawal from Egypt, we find Antiochus IV in Jerusalem, where he is reported to have attacked and looted the Jewish Temple. We have seen that this act of aggression took place in the winter of 169/8 (above p. 141). The attack was initiated, according to one of our sources, without any prior provocation on the part of the Jews (1 Macc. 1.20-24). An alternative source for Jewish history of this period similarly reports of an attack on Jerusalem by Antiochus Epiphanes, followed by a plundering of the Temple (2 Macc. 5.5-21). Here the king is reported to have turned

¹²⁵ Polyb. 28.17.4-9, 28.17.13-15. According to Appian, *Mac.* 17, Marcius Philippus specifically asked the Rhodian ambassadors for Rhodian mediation in the Third Macedonian War. This is, however, Appian's interpretation of Polybius. For different views of the Rhodian efforts at mediation, see Briscoe 1964: 69; Walbank 1957-79: III. 350-52; Schmitt 1957: 145 n. 2; Otto 1934: 63-64; van Ooteghem 1961: 90-93; Gruen 1975: 71-74.

¹²⁶ This chronology relies upon my hypothesis that T. Numisius influenced Antiochus' decision to retreat from Alexandria and Egypt. The Rhodian embassy came to Alexandria after the Seleucid king left, and would therefore have arrived there after Numisius.

¹²⁷ For the importance of this to Antiochus during the war, see Polyb. 28.20, 28.22.

against the holy city because the Jews, led by the former high priest Jason, had rebelled against him. Consequently, it has been argued that Antiochus Epiphanes ransacked Jerusalem twice. The first attack, it is claimed, took place in 143 S.E., and is reported primarily by 1 Maccabees, though other sources attest to it as well, while the second assault on Jerusalem was initiated by the Seleucid king as a response to the challenge of Jason and his followers. Our task is to determine whether Antiochus Epiphanes raided Jerusalem and the Temple twice, or whether 1 Maccabees (as well as the other sources) and 2 Maccabees refer to one single attack against Jerusalem launched personally by the Seleucid king.

Of some significance here is Josephus' discussion of Antiochus IV's attack on the Jewish Temple (*C. Apionem* 2.83-84). Josephus, who claims to make use of the writings of Polybius, Strabo, Nicolaus of Damascus, Timagenes, Castor and Apollodorus, maintains that there was no prior provocation on the part of the Jews, which could have induced the Seleucid king to attack Jerusalem. This statement seems to indicate that the plundering of the Temple discussed by Polybius and other Greek writers corresponds to the account in 1 Macc. 1.20, where it is also claimed that Antiochus had no cause to attack the Jews; 1 Maccabees dates the raid to 169. It has been argued that this assault should be distinguished from the looting of the Temple after the revolt of Jason, because the latter's uprising can certainly be considered a threat to Seleucid rule, a threat which Antiochus was justified in punishing. According to this view, Antiochus' attack after Jason's rebellion was motivated by Jewish actions and is not identical with the king's unprovoked raid in 169; the king's attack on Jason should be dated to 168.¹²⁸ But this theory is not convincing. Elsewhere in his writings, Josephus speaks of internal strife among the Jews which had induced the Seleucid king to make an assault on Jerusalem in 169.¹²⁹ Furthermore, Polybius, who is the earliest of the Greek writers mentioned by Josephus in this connection and the probable source for the entire group, tries to tarnish the character of Antiochus IV.¹³⁰ Just

¹²⁸ For this view, see M. Stern 1974-84: I. 116.

¹²⁹ Jos. *BJ* 1.31-32; *Ant.* 12.239-41, 12.246-47. The date in the *Antiquities* proves that the Jewish historian is referring to 169. This attack is also mentioned in 4Q248 ll. 6-7 (Broshi & Eshel 1997: 125, 128).

¹³⁰ For Polybius as the ultimate source, see M. Stern 1974-84: I. 115. A more exhaustive discussion of the Achaean's attitude towards Antiochus IV will be found below, in Ch. VII.

as Polybius had used the attempt of Antiochus IV Epiphanes to loot the temple of Artemis-Nanaea in Elymais as proof that the king was deranged (31.9), he must have used the plunder of the Temple of Jerusalem as additional ammunition in his campaign to defame the Seleucid king.

In fact, the assumption that 1 and 2 Maccabees tell about two separate expeditions of the king to Judaea raises an intriguing question: is it possible that while the author of 1 Maccabees knew about the attack of 169 and not about that of 168, Jason of Cyrene (or the epitomator) was aware only of Antiochus IV's 168 raid on Jerusalem but not of a previous raid by the same king? The only scholar to address this issue, Bickermann, suggested that 1 Maccabees presents the Jewish version of events and its author said nothing about the 168 revolt of Jason because it could be interpreted as precipitating the king's decrees. 2 Maccabees, in contrast, presents the Seleucid version of events, and consequently the plundering of the Temple is moved to 168, to justify the actions taken by the Seleucid king: the Temple was looted to punish the Jews for the revolt of Jason.¹³¹

Another source often used to promote the theory of two attacks by Antiochus on Jerusalem is the Book of Daniel. Yet Daniel is known for its vague and enigmatic style and language, which has puzzled and beguiled scholars, leading them on occasion to grave errors. And indeed chapter 11 of Daniel, invoked by some in favor of a double assault by Antiochus,¹³² has proven a pitfall when used to determine the number of campaigns conducted by Antiochus IV against Egypt.¹³³

One further argument used to support the claim of two expeditions against Jerusalem is based on a phrase in 2 Maccabees. Jason's revolt was preceded by what 2 Maccabees terms Antiochus' "second attack" or "second approach" to Egypt (τὴν δευτέραν ἔφοδον ὁ Ἀντίοχος εἰς Αἴγυπτον ἐστείλατο).¹³⁴ Some scholars link this

¹³¹ Bickermann 1937a: 17-18, 167-68.

¹³² Two visits by the king: Dancy 1954: 68; Tcherikover 1959: 186, 473-74 n. 20; Mørkholm 1966: 142-43. The discussion in Schürer 1973-87: I. 152-53 n. 37, effectively refutes this interpretation of Daniel, as well as the testimony of Jos. *Ant.* 12.242-50.

¹³³ Three campaigns: Heichelheim 1940: 333. Four campaigns: Ewald 1864: 385-87.

¹³⁴ 2 Macc. 5.1. The reading ἔφοδον is printed by Hanhart, while Abel and Goldstein favor the alternative ἄφοδον.

"second attack" on Egypt with the second campaign of Antiochus IV against Egypt which took place in 168, and therefore date Antiochus' raid on Jerusalem as narrated by 2 Maccabees, to the second part of that year, after the final evacuation of Egypt by the Seleucid king in the summer of 168. This explanation leaves us without any reference in 2 Maccabees to a "first attack" against Egypt.¹³⁵ If, on the other hand, we seek to explain the passage in question within the context of 2 Maccabees, and understand the expression τὴν δευτέραν ἔφοδον as "the second approach" to Egypt, our passage is directly related to the security measures undertaken by Antiochus IV upon hearing that Ptolemaic policy towards him had changed for the worse. At the time, Antiochus IV first sought the support of the local population by visiting Joppa and Jerusalem, and then deployed his forces, presumably in the southern coast of Coele-Syria and Phoenicia.¹³⁶ It appears, then, that the expedition described in the fourth chapter of 2 Maccabees is the Seleucid king's "first approach" to Egypt, and the "second approach" mentioned in the following chapter alludes to the opening of the Sixth Syrian War.¹³⁷

In addition, the transitional formula "at about the same time" (περὶ δὲ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον), in 2 Macc. 5.1, probably links the events narrated in chapter 5 with those of the previous chapter. In chapter 4 we were told of the execution of Andronicus and the king's subsequent visit to Tyre, which occurred in the autumn of 170. Thus if the "second approach" mentioned at the beginning of chapter 5 is indeed the opening stage of the Sixth Syrian War, which began ca. November-December 170, there is a direct chronological continuity between the events described in chapter 4 of 2 Maccabees and those included in the following chapter. Here, as elsewhere, 1 and 2 Maccabees relate the same events in the same order.¹³⁸

At this point it will be instructive to have a closer look at the descriptions in 1 and 2 Maccabees concerning Antiochus' raid on the Jewish Temple.

¹³⁵ This difficulty also applies to the solution of Abel 1949: 348, followed by Schürer 1973-87: I. 129, which places the two "attacks" on Egypt within 170/69, during Antiochus IV's first campaign in Egypt.

¹³⁶ 2 Macc. 4.21-22. See above pp. 122-23.

¹³⁷ Cf. E. Bevan 1902: 297-98; Kolbe 1926: 99-100, 152; Kasher 1988: 22.

¹³⁸ For this phenomenon, see Kolbe 1926: 124-26; Bickermann 1937a: 147-49; Tcherikover 1959: 389.

<u>Event</u>	1 Macc.	2 Macc.
1. Antiochus IV attacks the Temple.	1.21	5.15
2. He plunders the holy vessels.	1.21-22	5.16
3. He raids the other treasures in the Temple.	1.23	5.21
4. The king takes his bounty and returns proudly to his land. ¹³⁹	1.24	5.21

The obvious resemblance in content and structure between 1 and 2 Maccabees points clearly to a literary affinity between the two.¹⁴⁰ This similarity also disproves the claim that one of these two sources depicts a Jewish account of Antiochus' persecutions of the Jews, while the other represents the Seleucid angle. It is clear, then, that both sources describe the same event. 1 Maccabees provides a precise date for this incident, 143 S.E., and the chronological information in 2 Maccabees is better suited to this date. One further argument in favor of one single offensive of Antiochus IV against Jerusalem rests on a scroll fragment which mentions an attack of the Seleucid king on the holy city. As in 1 Maccabees, the attack follows Antiochus' first campaign against the Ptolemaic kingdom. The king's second Egyptian campaign is then mentioned, but the text does not refer to a subsequent assault on the city of Jerusalem.¹⁴¹

We must conclude, then, that Antiochus IV visited Jerusalem and plundered its Temple only once, and that this happened in the winter of 169/8.

¹³⁹ Both 1 and 2 Maccabees seem to rely here on Dan. 11.28.

¹⁴⁰ The similarity here has been noted by Bunge 1971: 541-42; Goldstein 1976: 100-101 n. 34. Dancy 1954: 68, and Habicht 1976a: 224 n. 1a, recognize this resemblance but explain it away by suggesting that in 2 Maccabees two visits of Antiochus to Jerusalem have been amalgamated into one. This approach assumes *a priori* that Antiochus IV did attack Jerusalem twice.

¹⁴¹ 4Q248 ll. 2-8. The new editors of this fragment, Broshi & Eshel (1997: 128-29), claim that the last event in the text dates from 168, and argue that the suffering of the Jews discussed in l. 9, was the result of Antiochus' attack on the Temple in 170/69. However, these tribulations should be linked to the hopes for redemption mentioned in l. 10, and both lines probably refer to the beginning of the persecution of the Jews in 167. If this is accepted, the silence of 4Q248 about a second attack of Antiochus IV on Jerusalem, becomes all the more significant.

A Pro-Ptolemaic Party?

The timing of Jason's insurrection, during the first Seleucid campaign of the Sixth Syrian War, brings us back to the question of the existence of a pro-Ptolemaic party among the Jews of Coele-Syria and Phoenicia. If one were to follow Josephus, the answer would undoubtedly be affirmative. According to his earlier rendition of these events, there were two parties within the Jewish elite at the time of the war between Antiochus IV and Ptolemy VI. The Tobiads, expelled from Jerusalem by one of the high priests, Onias, turned to the Seleucid king for help. Antiochus then attacked Jerusalem and killed many of Ptolemy's supporters (*BJ* 1.31-32). According to this passage, Onias is clearly a supporter of the Ptolemaic cause, because his followers are so defined. In the *Antiquities*, Josephus retains some of the main features of this earlier version. The Jews are divided among themselves and a party headed by a former high priest succeeds in driving the Tobiads away from the city. The Tobiads then turn to Antiochus who captures Jerusalem and kills many of the opposition party. Here, however, the Jewish historian adds the name of Menelaus as an ally of the Tobiads, and supplants the name of Onias with that of Jason.¹⁴² Despite these and a few further changes, the similarity between the two versions is striking and it is clear that Josephus relies on the same source for both. The changes that occur in the *Antiquities* version are most likely a result of a more careful reading by Josephus of his source, which led him to correct the mistakes he had made when writing the *Jewish War*.¹⁴³ In both versions Josephus mentions a party which stood in opposition not only to the Tobiads, but to Antiochus Epiphanes as well, so that we should perhaps conclude that this party and its leader Jason were pro-Ptolemaic.¹⁴⁴ However, it should be remembered that Jason became high priest during the reign of Antiochus IV, and had secured the king's active support for his efforts to introduce the Greek way of life into Jerusalem. It was Antiochus' decision to depose Jason and appoint Menelaus in his stead which turned Jason into an enemy of them both.¹⁴⁵ This

¹⁴² *Jos. Ant.* 12.239-41, 12.246-47.

¹⁴³ Tcherikover 1959: 392-97; Hengel 1974: I. 281; Schürer 1973-87: I. 150-51 n. 32.

¹⁴⁴ Josephus is however notoriously untrustworthy here, as noted by Tcherikover and Schürer in the previous note.

¹⁴⁵ 2 Macc. 4.7-24; *Jos. Ant.* 12.237-39.

change of attitude on the part of Jason expresses itself in his flight to Ammanitis which was, like any other act of *anachoresis*, rebellious by its very nature (2 Macc. 4.23-26). There is no indication however, that Jason received any aid from the Ptolemaic kingdom while in Trans-Jordan, nor at any subsequent stage. During his stay in Ammanitis, rumors reached Jason that Antiochus Epiphanes had died during the Egyptian campaign. Jason quickly marched to Jerusalem with his private army, 1,000 strong and took control of the city. According to 2 Maccabees, our primary source for Jason's revolt, the former high priest forced Menelaus to withdraw into the fortress of Jerusalem. Later, when he failed to retain his hold on Jerusalem, Jason was forced to flee, first to Trans-Jordan, and from there to Egypt. The former high priest did not consider Egypt a proper refuge, for he then attempted to make his way to Sparta (2 Macc. 5.5-10). Jason's initial choice of Egypt as an asylum was due to its geographical proximity and because he was likely to be given a safe haven there by the enemies of Antiochus IV. His subsequent decision to leave Egypt suggests, however, that he found no strong support for his cause in the Ptolemaic court. Jason, the one-time loyal high priest of Antiochus IV had tried to take Jerusalem and the Temple by force because he felt that the high priesthood was his by right. His revolt apparently was not supported by the Ptolemies, whose weakness had become evident during Antiochus' campaign of 170/69. If any sort of help had, in fact, been offered to Jason, it would have stemmed from expediency, rather than any long standing relationship between Jason and the Ptolemaic dynasty.

How then are we to understand Jason's initial success in capturing Jerusalem? The suggestion that Jason took advantage of the concentration of all available Seleucid troops in Egypt to attack the unprotected city is a partial explanation at best. This theory does not explain the severity of Antiochus IV's punitive measures once Jerusalem was back under his control, for we are told of indiscriminate killings of the local population, the desecration of the Temple, the plundering of its holy vessels, and the robbery of large sums of money from the Temple's treasury.¹⁴⁶ Even though these reports are somewhat exaggerated, it is clear that Antiochus treated the people of Jerusalem as rebels (2 Macc. 5.11). If the conquest of

¹⁴⁶ 2 Macc. 5.11-21; 1 Macc. 1.20-24; Jos. BJ 1.32 (confused); Ant. 12.246-47; C. Apionem 2.83-84.

Jerusalem had been due solely to Jason and his thousand soldiers, Antiochus would not have alienated the entire population by behaving as he did. It follows that Jason was able to mobilize the support of many of his countrymen. Jason's past record would have seemed moderate compared to the behavior of Menelaus, and his complicity in the crimes of his brother Lysimachus (2 Macc. 4.32-50). The former high priest may also have retracted his earlier Hellenizing views, adopting a more traditional position after his dismissal, in order to increase his appeal among his fellow Jews. We must also bear in mind that Jason was a member of the family of Joshua son of Jehozadak, whose members had occupied the seat of the high priests for generations, whereas Menelaus, who replaced him, did not belong to that family.¹⁴⁷ Thus many of the more traditional segments of Jewish society would have been ready to support Jason. Furthermore, if (contrary to the story in 2 Maccabees) it is true that Jason did not bring about the dismissal of his brother Onias III, but replaced his brother after the latter's demise (see above pp. 106, 129), there is even less reason to reject the view that Jason could become a focus of popular support.¹⁴⁸ The revolt of Jason should, then, be seen as an attempt by the former high priest to regain the position he had lost. The high priesthood, which had been filled by members of Jason's family for centuries, had now been taken away from the family by Antiochus IV. Jason could rely on the support of those who held his high priestly descent in esteem, and at the same time looked with hatred towards the new, and in their eyes illegitimate, high priest Menelaus and the king who had appointed him. Consequently, when the Sixth Syrian War was raging, Jason thought that the time was ripe to

¹⁴⁷ Menelaus was a member of the priestly order of Bilgah. See M. Stern 1960: 11-12; Hengel 1974: I. 279.

¹⁴⁸ Note that Jason's popular appeal is attested by *Jos. Ant.* 12.240, although this source is not without its problems. Tcherikover 1959: 187-88, argues that Jason's rebellion was foiled, not by Antiochus, but by the enemies of the Hellenizing party, who forced Jason out of Jerusalem, and were then punished by the king, but such a group is nowhere attested. The peculiarities of the story of Jason's revolt are the result of the consistent bias against Jason found in 2 Maccabees. Thus, he is blamed for killing innocent people, even though the dead were probably supporters of Menelaus (2 Macc. 5.6, cf. 1.8). This passage in 2 Maccabees first tells of Jason's revolt, defeat, flight to foreign lands and death (5.5-10), and only then turns to Antiochus' attack on Jerusalem (5.11-21), so as to disconnect the revolt from its suppression. Thus, the reader does not even notice that the hateful Jason actually fought against that enemy of Judaism, Antiochus IV.

muster popular support, and make a bid to regain the high priesthood. Jason's rebellion failed, but the amount of popular support he enjoyed induced the king to punish the Jews severely, thus alienating them even further.

5. *The Sixth Syrian War—The Second Campaign*

The Diplomatic Front

The Seleucid withdrawal from much of Egypt, together with the diplomatic missions Antiochus IV sent to Greece and Rome, signaled a temporary shift from the battlefield to the political arena. However the Seleucid ambassadors were not the first to reach Rome in the winter of 169/8, having been anticipated by diplomats from Alexandria. These ambassadors had been sent by Ptolemy Physcon and Cleopatra II, while the city was still under siege, probably in October, or perhaps even as late as November 169. Reaching Rome, they had no idea of the developments that had taken place in their absence. In Rome, the ambassadors were kept waiting, as was customary, for the new consuls to enter office at the beginning of the new year. As this date, March 15, fell in January 169 (Julian calendar), the Ptolemaic ambassadors had to wait for about a month. The Senate may have been slow to receive them because of its working habits, but two additional factors could have influenced the delay. The war with Perseus had yet to be decided, so there was little chance that the Republic would commit itself unequivocally to the Ptolemaic regime in Alexandria. In addition, the senators were probably hoping to get word from T. Numisius on the outcome of his mission. Soon after the new consuls, L. Aemilius Paullus and C. Licinius Crassus, took office, the envoys from Alexandria were invited to plead their case before the Senate. Looking dirty, unkempt, and pitiful, they petitioned the Senate to work quickly to remove Antiochus IV from Egypt, stating that if the Senate did not take immediate action, the *amici* of the Republic, Ptolemy Physcon and Cleopatra, would be banished from Egypt. The diplomatic emissaries did not return empty-handed: the Senate decided to send a three-member mission, headed by C. Popillius Laenas, to bring the Sixth Syrian War to an end.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁹ Livy 44.19.6-14; Polyb. 29.2.1-3. Livy's narrative here has been

Livy's description of the Alexandrian ambassadors emphasizes their pitiful appearance and the difficult circumstances of Ptolemy VIII Euergetes and his sister. The envoys asserted that the regime in Alexandria was about to collapse. While some exaggeration on their part is not to be ruled out, they would have described the state their city was in before their departure. Additional evidence of the information possessed by the Senate in January 168 is found in Polybius, who writes that the Senate sent Popillius Laenas to the east after learning that Antiochus IV controlled all of Egypt and had only to capture Alexandria (29.2.1-2). It is clear, then, that word of Antiochus IV's partial withdrawal from Egypt had not yet reached Rome, partly because the Seleucid delegation headed by Meleager—which was sent to Greece and Rome after the siege on Alexandria was lifted—had not yet reached its final destination (Polyb. 28.22). The Seleucid representatives were instructed to tarry in Greece, apparently in order to evaluate the impact of the Third Macedonian War on the status of the Seleucid kingdom, but they would not have stayed in Greece unnecessarily. It appears that the Seleucid delegation did not leave the Alexandria area before October 169, and the Seleucid withdrawal from the city should be placed to either the same month, or the following one.

After joint rule by the three Ptolemaic siblings was re-established in Alexandria, the three began to prepare for a second invasion of Egypt by Antiochus IV. They expected such an invasion in

challenged by Otto 1934: 60-63, who suggests that the Senate's reply to the embassy of Ptolemy VIII and Cleopatra II took the form of the delegation of T. Numisius, mentioned by Polyb. 29.25.3-4. Later on, after the Ptolemaic family was able to patch up its differences in the winter of 169/8, the brothers sent an embassy to Achaëa, Polyb. 29.23.1-5, as well as one to Rome. The Romans responded by dispatching C. Popillius Laenas and the other *legati*, as reported in Justin 34.2.8-34.3.1. A different theory is that the embassy sent by Ptolemy Physcon and Cleopatra, which was received in January 168, was not reciprocated, while the embassy of Popillius Laenas was Rome's response to a later representation by the Ptolemaic brothers. For this suggestion, see Briscoe 1964: 72 (who does not accept it), and Mørkholm 1966: 88-91. For good arguments in favor of Livy's account, see Briscoe (above), and Walbank 1957-79: III. 362-63. No less important is the fact that Otto's initial reason for attacking Livy's report was based on the assumption that the ambassadors of Ptolemy VIII and Cleopatra II were left lingering in Rome for months before receiving an audience. Cf. Gruen 1984: II. 657-58, who makes much of the alleged delay. However, the *terminus post quem* for the Seleucid evacuation of Thebes, 1 October 169, pushes the whole timetable forward, shrinking the Ptolemaic ambassadors' wait to a few weeks at most. Thus the timetable proposed by Swain 1944: 91 seems to be more or less accurate.

light of their reunion and in view of the Seleucid king's control of Pelusium, which ensured him easy access to Egypt (Livy 45.11.4-5). The two Ptolemaic brothers decided to solicit outside military aid and sent envoys to the Achaean League to ask for 1,000 infantrymen and 200 cavalrymen. In addition, the emissaries asked Theodoridas of Sicyon to recruit 1,000 mercenaries. The Ptolemaic ambassadors specifically requested that leading Achaean statesmen such as Lycortas and his son Polybius serve as commanders of the expeditionary force. We have seen that the Achaeans, influenced by Q. Marcius Philippus, decided to send to Egypt a diplomatic embassy whose task was to try and bring the enemies to a peace agreement. The Ptolemaic ambassadors, aware that they had failed in their mission, now asked the Achaeans to allow Lycortas and Polybius to come to Egypt on their own and assume some military role there. This request, too, seems to have been denied.¹⁵⁰

When the Ptolemaic brothers petitioned the Achaean League for aid, their action greatly resembled steps taken by the Ptolemaic monarchy during earlier Syrian Wars. For example, during the Fourth Syrian War, the Ptolemies recruited from Greece a large group of commanders, as well as mercenaries including some 8,000 infantrymen and 2,000 cavalry (Polyb. 5.63.8-5.65.10). Later, in the Fifth Syrian War, the commander of the Ptolemaic army in Syria and Phoenicia, Scopas, traveled to Greece and engaged the services of 6,000 infantrymen and 500 cavalrymen (Livy 31.43.5). However the Ptolemaic request from the Achaean League was much more modest in terms of the number of soldiers and military commanders. The 1,000 hoplites and 200 cavalrymen were unlikely to change the course of the war, even when taken together with the mercenaries Theodoridas was asked to recruit. It appears that the Ptolemaic monarchy sought some political gain by involving the Achaean League in the Sixth Syrian War. That political considerations were behind the Ptolemaic request seems even more likely in light of the ambassadors' willingness to settle for the participation of Lycortas and Polybius alone. The Ptolemies did not intend to embroil the Achaean League in a full-scale war with Antiochus Epiphanes, and Achaean aid, even if extended, would not have supplied legal grounds for the introduction of a

¹⁵⁰ Polyb. 29.23-25. For further details, see above pp. 148-49.

state of war between the Seleucids and the Achaeans.¹⁵¹ Furthermore, Achaea was far removed from the battleground and there was little chance that it would engage in an all-out war with the Seleucid kingdom. Thus the Ptolemaic approach to Achaea was probably motivated by the following considerations:

1) Achaean aid to the Ptolemaic kingdom would convince Antiochus IV that Rome was backing the Achaean League. This would either dissuade Antiochus from renewing the war in Egypt, or alternatively, induce the Seleucid king to form an alliance with Rome's enemy, Perseus. This new pact would then force the Republic to stand by the Ptolemies and provide them with substantial aid.

2) Close military cooperation with the Achaean League would perhaps grant the Ptolemaic kingdom better access to Greek politics, and no less important, to Rome. The Achaean League could open doors for the Ptolemaic kingdom, doors which had remained closed for a long time. Rome, it was hoped, would stop her futile direct and indirect mediation efforts and help the Ptolemaic monarchy in a more effective manner than before.¹⁵²

Q. Marcius Philippus obviously understood the real motives behind the Ptolemaic approach to the Achaean League, and as we have seen, defused a situation potentially dangerous to Rome by convincing the Achaeans to adopt a more even-handed policy with regard to the two contestants in the Sixth Syrian War (see above pp. 151-53).

Ptolemy VI's Diplomatic Initiative

Alongside the attempt to achieve a closer relationship with Rome through a third party, the reunited Ptolemaic siblings may have tried to deal directly with Rome, continuing the appeals previously made by the ambassadors of Ptolemy Physcon and his sister.¹⁵³

¹⁵¹ See Bickerman 1943: 292-93.

¹⁵² This interpretation attributes to the Achaeans the role played by Masalia for Lampsacus in 196, for which see *Syll.*³ 591, and by Sparta for Judaea at the time of Jonathan and Simon: 1 Macc. 12.6-18, 14.20-23; *Jos. Ant.* 13.166-70.

¹⁵³ Justin 34.2.8-34.3.1. Justin's account here should not, however, be preferred to Livy 44.19.6-14; see above, p. 161 n. 149. If we assume both reports to be true, the embassy reported by Justin would have no effect on the 'day of Eleusis.' Cf. Gruen 1984: II. 657-58 n. 222.

Ptolemy VI Philometor did send such an embassy at this time. Philometor's short-lived alliance with his uncle Antiochus IV undoubtedly caused some concern in Rome, and it was now in his best interests to patch up relations with Rome. The reunion of the Ptolemaic family was, of course, a step in the right direction, particularly if it was the fruit of Numisius' mediation efforts. It was important, however, for Philometor to establish direct links with Rome, and not simply rely on the ties which had been formed by his siblings' administration. Consequently, it is tempting to view a shipment of corn given by Ptolemy Philometor to the Romans in Greece, as an attempt on the ruler's part to secure Roman goodwill, now that he was out of the clutches of his uncle. Indeed Philometor's contribution of corn has been dated to exactly this period of Ptolemy VI's disengagement from his uncle, i.e. to 168. The grounds for this date once deemed forceful, have become less so,¹⁵⁴ but the date may be kept for different reasons. The presentation of corn by Philometor as sole donor is in accord with the situation in the winter of 169/8 after Antiochus Epiphanes had evacuated Egypt for the first time. The Seleucid king had left the *chora* in the hands of Philometor, and the young king, in flagrant disobedience of Antiochus' instructions, had used his hold on the foodstuffs of Egypt to force his brother and sister to accept him on his own terms as the leading figure in a reconstituted joint rule (Livy 45.11.7). Philometor would have retained control over the *chora* even after the reconciliation with his siblings, as this would ensure his dominant position. He decided to use a fraction of the food supplies to further his own interests and consequently sent a certain Ariston son of Heracleides as his personal envoy to Greece.

Ariston presumably left for Greece at about the same time that the Ptolemaic ambassadors were sent to the Achaean League. Ariston, however, was acting solely on behalf of Philometor and had instructions, no doubt, to curry favor with notable Romans who were in Greece in connection with the Third Macedonian War. It is impossible to tell whether Ariston's brief was more specific, but we know that the Ptolemaic envoy headed for Chalcis,

¹⁵⁴ Philometor's wheat donation: *OGIS* 760. Otto 1934: 70, dated the inscription to 168, but see the cautious remarks of Mørkholm 1966: 91 n. 11, who points out that Philometor's designation in the inscription as Πτολεμαῖον τοῦ πρεσβυτέρου can refer either to the first period of joint rule, 170/69, or the second, 168-164.

where C. Popillius Laenas and his fellow ambassadors had been fitting out a small naval unit.¹⁵⁵ It would seem that Ariston hoped that by supplying grain to the Roman embassy he would win them over to Philometor's side, even though the Senate had entrusted these *legati* with saving the rule of Ptolemy VIII Euergetes. Ariston may have also hoped that by furnishing supplies, he would speed the Roman embassy on its way to Egypt, where a renewed attack of the Seleucid army was clearly expected. This second objective was not achieved, for Popillius and his small fleet did not sail further than Delos until after Cynoscephalae. We do not know the effect Philometor's initiative had on Popillius or, for that matter, Rome, but this episode, along with the earlier embassy of Ptolemy VIII and Cleopatra II, clearly indicates that the Ptolemies regarded Rome as the only force capable of stopping Antiochus Epiphanes.

The Military Campaign

The intensive diplomatic activity in the winter of 169/8 did not prove fruitful in bringing the Sixth Syrian War to an end. With concord now seemingly established in the Ptolemaic family, Antiochus IV Epiphanes was compelled to renew his onslaught on Ptolemaic Egypt.¹⁵⁶ Had he not done so, he would certainly be expected to concede much of what had been achieved in the first campaign. The thrust of T. Numisius' embassy must have made it clear to the Seleucid king that if he continued to wait, he would be robbed of Pelusium, and with it, of influence on the affairs of the Ptolemaic kingdom. In his present campaign, the Seleucid king could hardly claim that he was acting in the best interests of the legitimate sovereign, for the Ptolemaic royal house was reunited. Now military might and swiftness of action were needed, to compensate for precious months in which the Seleucid army had dallied in winter quarters. The first object of the Seleucid onslaught was not Egypt but Ptolemaic Cyprus. Already during the late winter, the Seleucid navy set sail for the island, carrying a land

¹⁵⁵ *OGIS* 760 (Ariston); Livy 44.29.1-5 (Laenas). It is often argued that Philometor's donation of corn was directed at the Roman fleet based at Chalcis, see Otto 1934: 70; Gruen 1984: II. 691 n. 94. However, in 169/8 the Roman navy had been transferred to Oreus and Sciathus, and was no longer in Chalcis. See Livy 44.13.11, 44.30.1.

¹⁵⁶ Polyb. 29.26.1; Livy 45.11.8.

army as well.¹⁵⁷ The Seleucid troops were able to defeat the island garrison, apparently in one decisive land battle. Their victory was facilitated by the defection of Ptolemy Macron, the Ptolemaic governor of Cyprus, to the Seleucid fold.¹⁵⁸ Antiochus' decision to attack Cyprus may have been designed to cover his flank, as the northeastern tip of the island is just 125 kilometers away from Seleuceia-in-Pieria. But it is even more likely that Antiochus wanted to isolate Alexandria more effectively than in the previous campaigning season. Then, the Alexandrians had suffered food shortages and hunger, as the Seleucid army effectively cut off the city from the Egyptian *chora*. The port of Alexandria nonetheless remained open to seafaring ships, as can be seen from the dispatch of ambassadors to Rome by Ptolemy VIII and his sister. The presence of various Greek embassies in the city demonstrates this as well.¹⁵⁹ During the blockade, Alexandria, usually a busy food-exporting harbor, probably relied on supplies from Cyprus to sustain the battle against Antiochus Epiphanes and Ptolemy VI Philometor.¹⁶⁰ This time the Seleucid king decided to cut off the city's lifeline by gaining complete control over Cyprus and its ports.

The bulk of the Seleucid renewed military effort was again directed towards Egypt. As the Seleucid army was approaching Rhinocolura, it was met by ambassadors sent on behalf of the elder Ptolemy, but undoubtedly in conjunction with his brother and sister. The ambassadors tried to convince Antiochus IV Epiphanes of Philometor's loyalty by expressing their king's gratitude for the role Antiochus had played in securing the latter's return to the throne. Their presentation as Philometor's representatives, rather

¹⁵⁷ A winter date is implied by Livy 45.11.9. Cf. Morgan 1990: 62. Otto 1934: 78, was right about the sequence of events, but dated both campaigns to the spring. 4Q248 l. 8 speaks of Antiochus IV who "shall overthrow lands of (foreign) nations and (then) return to Egyp[t]." Since this is narrated after a description of his attack on the Jerusalem Temple in 169, Broshi & Eshel 1997: 125, 128, convincingly identify this phase with the Seleucid invasion of Cyprus, followed by the second campaign against Egypt.

¹⁵⁸ Polyb. 29.27.10, probably implies a land battle. Livy 45.12.7 (Polybian) misunderstood his source, and turned the battle into a naval affair. The Roman annalist probably deduced that since the campaign began at sea, the victory was a naval one. Cf. Jal 1979: 94 n. 14. Walbank 1957-79: III. 405-6, seems to accept both sea and land battles, while Otto 1934: 78 n. 4, claims that Polybius too referred to a sea battle. Macron's defection: 2 Macc. 10.12-13.

¹⁵⁹ Livy 44.19.6; Polyb. 28.19.2-5.

¹⁶⁰ Ptolemy III also imported corn from Cyprus in a time of crisis, see *OGIS* 56 ll. 13-18.

than delegates of the Ptolemaic royal family, was probably done in an effort to convince Antiochus that his mission was complete. His former protégé had been reinstated and was now in full control of the kingdom. The Seleucid king, unaffected by these diplomatic niceties, demanded that Ptolemy renounce his claim to Cyprus and Pelusium, which were already effectively under Seleucid control. He also set a date by which he was to hear that his demands had been met.¹⁶¹

Antiochus' ultimatum clearly indicates that he wished to deny the Ptolemaic kingdom the opportunity of attacking his domain ever again, whether by land or by sea. He also wanted to maintain his influence over the affairs of the Ptolemaic kingdom by stationing his troops at Egypt's gate, as it were, Pelusium. A further benefit would be using Cyprus as a springboard for better communications with Asia Minor, the islands, and Greece.¹⁶² In order to attain all these goals, the king wanted a formal cession of Cyprus and Pelusium so as to avoid the possibility of future Ptolemaic claims, as well as demands on behalf of the Ptolemies by a third party such as Rome.

Antiochus' ultimatum to Philometor remained unanswered, and was, in fact, rejected. Philometor had not entered into partnership with his brother and sister in order to waive his rights over parts of his realm. Once the truce period expired, Antiochus continued his advance. His fleet sailed to Pelusium, while the land army must have marched to this Seleucid stronghold. From Pelusium Antiochus IV's forces advanced to Memphis, and captured the old Egyptian capital.¹⁶³ It is possible that when Memphis was recaptured, in 168, Antiochus IV crowned himself king of Lower and Upper Egypt, in accordance with Egyptian custom.¹⁶⁴ From

¹⁶¹ Livy 45.11.9-11. See too the words of the excerptor in Polyb. 29.27.1, who also refers to Antiochus' claiming of Pelusium, *pace* Walbank 1957-79: III. 404.

¹⁶² In Rome, however, the conquest of Cyprus would probably have been interpreted as an indication that Antiochus was planning to breach, or circumvent, the sailing limitations set forth in the Treaty of Apamea.

¹⁶³ Livy 45.12.1-2; Ray 1976: 14-29 (Text 2 recto ll. 8-10 and verso ll. 7-8, Text 3 verso ll. 11-12), and see there pp. 126-27 for the presence of a Seleucid official in Memphis in 168. Porphyry, *FGH* 260 F 50, alludes to the 168 campaign only in a general way. *SEG* XXVIII 737, also seems to be related to this campaign, but is too fragmentary to be of use.

¹⁶⁴ Porphyry, *FGH* 260 F 2.7, F 49a. Porphyry dates the event to the first campaign of the Sixth Syrian War, and Otto 1934: 53-57, adheres to Porphyry's chronology. However, Antiochus constantly claimed during the first

Memphis, Antiochus IV traveled on side roads to Alexandria, and upon reaching Eleusis, a suburb of Alexandria, was met by the Roman delegation of C. Popillius Laenas (Livy 45.12.1-3). This route was similar to the one Antiochus had taken during the first campaign, and he took it for the same reasons. The king wanted to avoid the swamps and lagoons of the northern delta, as well as its central and southern regions, which are crisscrossed by innumerable water tributaries and canals.¹⁶⁵ The king also intended to cut off the flow of supplies from the *chora* to Alexandria, as he had done in the first campaign.

Popillius Laenas' Mission

The meeting between the Seleucid king and the Roman *legati* needs to be viewed against the background of earlier events, in particular the brief given to Laenas by the Senate, and the subsequent implementation of Roman policy by Popillius Laenas and his two co-ambassadors, C. Decimius and C. Hostilius. Livy's report about the Senate's meeting with the ambassadors of Ptolemy VIII Euergetes and Cleopatra II indicates that the Senate responded swiftly to the appearance of the Ptolemaic envoys in Rome and to their entreaties, made on behalf of *regibusque amicis*. This picture is, however, somewhat misleading.¹⁶⁶ Livy seems to convey the same

campaign that he was in Egypt to defend the right of Philometor to the throne, but in 168 there was no reason for Antiochus to maintain this charade. *P. Tebt.* 698, an undated *prostagma* of "King Antiochus" should be assigned to 168. This document also demonstrates that the name of the Arsinoite nome was changed to the Crocodilopolite, probably attesting to an attempt to eradicate the Ptolemaic claim to Egypt. See van Groningen 1934. For the whole question of Antiochus' legal status in Egypt, see Hampl 1936: 34-41; Swain 1944: 82-84; Mørkholm 1966: 80-83, 92.

¹⁶⁵ Morgan 1990: 38, 53, 72, and especially on pp. 65-67, argues repeatedly that Antiochus IV realized during his 168 campaign against Egypt that he could not win the war. His reasoning is based on the fact that "Antiochus ... declined to advance on his primary target, Alexandria," and he considers the route taken by the Seleucid army as a "leisurely promenade around the *chora*." Such a view does not take into consideration the topographical constraints on a direct march from Pelusium to Alexandria (above p. 134).

¹⁶⁶ Livy 44.19.6-44.20.1: after the new consuls assume office, the Ptolemaic ambassadors are accepted *primum* (but see the MS. tradition); the Senate decides *extemplo* to send Roman ambassadors to end the war; they leave within three days. Even more telling is the fact that Livy 44.19.6-14, 44.22.1-15, places the departure of Popillius Laenas before the speech of Aemilius Paullus. In Polyb. 29.1.1-29.2.3, the events are narrated in the reverse order. Cf. Walbank 1957-79: III. 362.

message—of Rome's unconditional loyalty to its Ptolemaic allies—when relating the content of the Senate's mandate to its *legati*. They were, Livy tells us, to bring the war between Antiochus Epiphanes and Ptolemy VIII Euergetes to an end, and to do so by first approaching the Seleucid king and then the Ptolemaic one. Whichever party would reject the Roman demand for the termination of the war would not be considered a friend or ally of the Roman people (Livy 44.19.13-14). Livy's wording of the ultimatum, which leaves no room for the *legati* to maneuver, and which implies unconditional commitment on the part of Rome, does not tally with what we know of the movements of the embassy that was to save the Ptolemies from the clutches of Antiochus. The 'operational' part of the ultimatum, to approach Antiochus first and Ptolemy second, would seem to be Livy's own invention, based on what actually took place later, on the 'day of Eleusis.'

In fact, the Senate instructed its ambassadors to put an end to the war between Antiochus IV and Ptolemy VIII Euergetes. The motive behind the Senate's decision to intervene is supplied by Polybius. The Seleucid king had become too strong, and by becoming the virtual master of the Ptolemaic kingdom, he was liable to upset the balance of power which had existed in the eastern Mediterranean ever since the conclusion of the Treaty of Apamea.¹⁶⁷ The fact that Rome was involved at the time in a war with Perseus was not a reason for the Republic to be indifferent to the Seleucid attempt to gain control over the Ptolemaic kingdom. However, Rome's military preoccupations did dictate a need for restraint and caution. It would have been foolish under the circumstances to demand that Antiochus withdraw, when Rome could not back up her words with military power. At the very least, the Republic would lose face, while in a more sinister scenario Antiochus might be pushed into forming an alliance with Macedon. If the senators were already aware at the time of the ultimate failure of T. Numisius' mission, the value of deferring action would be clear. There was no point in having the new delegation undergo the same experience. Alternatively, if the members of the Senate had not yet heard of the results of Numisius' undertaking, it would be wiser for the envoys to hear these results, as well as further information on the various parties to the conflict. It made sense,

¹⁶⁷ Polyb. 29.2.1-3, 29.27.7; Livy 44.19.13.

then, to leave the timing of their intervention to the discretion of the members of C. Popillius' embassy so that they could intercede at the best possible moment, and indeed the envoys seem to have been empowered to act in accordance with their own judgment of the international scene.¹⁶⁸

Bearing these considerations in mind, the Roman ambassadors chose to advance towards their destination at an unhurried pace. They apparently left Rome while it was still winter, though probably not as early as January 168, as claimed by Livy.¹⁶⁹ Later, most likely in the spring, we find C. Popillius Laenas and his fellow envoys in Chalcis. The ambassadors fitted three ships there, and then sailed with them to the island of Delos. Using the harbor as their base, the *legati* now acted not as diplomats, but as sea captains, trying in cooperation with some Pergamene ships to keep the lines of supply to the Romans and their allies open, and at the same time to stop the flow of commodities to Macedon (Livy 44.29.1-5). Only after news of the Romans' decisive victory at Pydna reached Delos, did Popillius Laenas and the members of his delegation leave for Egypt, making a short stop in Rhodes on their way (Livy 45.10). Since the victory in Pydna took place on June 22, 168 (Julian), this would mean that about six months elapsed from the time the Senate decided to put an end to the Sixth Syrian War until its ambassadors were ready to face Antiochus IV Epiphanes and present him with an ultimatum. Their prolonged stay in Greece and in Greek waters indicates that the Roman mission to Egypt had deliberately delayed the confrontation with Antiochus IV Epiphanes, in order to approach him when Roman prestige was at its height and the backing of the Roman legions was well in hand.¹⁷⁰

The Day of Eleusis'

The confrontation between Antiochus IV and Rome's chief emissary, C. Popillius Laenas took place outside Alexandria, in Eleusis. The head of the Roman delegation behaved in an uncompromising manner towards the Seleucid king, despite their personal

¹⁶⁸ Polyb. 29.2.3: τὸν τε πόλεμον λύσοντες καὶ καθόλου θεασομένους τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων διάθεσιν ποία τις ἐστίν. Cf. Walbank 1957-79: III. 363; Gruen 1984: II. 690-91.

¹⁶⁹ Livy 44.19.13, 44.20.1.

¹⁷⁰ Badian 1958: 107 n. 3; Scullard 1973: 210-11; Briscoe 1964: 72-73.

acquaintance from the period Antiochus IV was held hostage in Rome. Popillius Laenas read the Senate's decision before the king, demanding an immediate response to the Roman ultimatum, which required Antiochus to terminate his war against the Ptolemaic kingdom. The Seleucid king's request to consult with his friends was summarily denied, and Antiochus Epiphanes acquiesced to the Roman ultimatum. The sides immediately decided on a limited period of time during which the Seleucid forces would withdraw from Egypt and Cyprus.¹⁷¹ On July 30, 168, only about five weeks after the Roman victory at Pydna, the Seleucid army evacuated its last stronghold, Pelusium.¹⁷² The Roman emissaries then turned their attention to Cyprus and saw to the evacuation of the Seleucid expeditionary force from the island.¹⁷³ Thus C. Popillius Laenas and his fellow ambassadors successfully carried out the Senate's policy of bringing the Sixth Syrian War to an end.

Roman Policy

Rome's position in the Ptolemaic-Seleucid conflict had not been consistent throughout. In the beginning, in the winter of 170/69, the Senate chose to do nothing when approached by the ambassadors of Antiochus Epiphanes. The apathy of the *patres* was, in part, in keeping with Rome's policy since the conclusion of the Treaty of Apamea. The treaty did not forbid the Seleucids from waging war to the south and east of the Taurus mountains. The Romans were prepared, however, to encourage the outbreak of war by not intervening, so as to keep both kingdoms busy and consequently uninvolved in the Third Macedonian War. Subsequently the Senate, uneasily aware of Seleucid inroads into Egypt and Ptolemaic royal rule, modified its position. The affairs of the eastern Mediterranean were now the concern of Rome, and the Senate attempted to reconcile the warring kings by sending T.

¹⁷¹ The sources for this meeting are exceedingly numerous. See Polyb. 29.27.1-8; Livy 45.12.3-8; Diod. 31.2.1-2; Justin 34.3.1-4; Appian, *Syr.* 66; Vell. Paterculus 1.10.1-2; V. Max. 6.4.3; Cic. *Phil.* 8.23; Plut. *Mor.* 202f-203a; Porphyry, *FGH* 260 F 50; Pliny, *NH* 34.24; Zon. 9.25. Granius Licinianus, ed. Criniti p. 4, and Dan. 11.30, allude to the Roman intervention without direct reference to Popillius Laenas.

¹⁷² The date of the final evacuation is given in Ray 1976: 14-29 (Text 2 recto ll. 4-7, Text 3 verso ll. 12-14), 127.

¹⁷³ Polyb. 29.27.9-10; Livy 45.12.7.

Numisius to mediate. This policy was also adopted, with some changes, by Q. Marcius Philippus, who encouraged both the Achaeans and the Rhodians to offer their good services to Antiochus Epiphanes and his Ptolemaic adversaries. When the ambassadors of Ptolemy VIII Euergetes and Cleopatra II appeared in Rome, it became clear that Antiochus IV Epiphanes was on the verge of taking Alexandria. If the city were to fall, Antiochus' grip on the Ptolemaic kingdom would be complete. It was at this stage that the Senate decided in principle to put an end to the war, and to deny the Seleucid kingdom its territorial gains. Since there were obvious limitations on Rome's ability to enforce its wishes as long as the Third Macedonian War was undecided, the Senate's resolution to end the war remained in abeyance for a time. But this procrastination should not cloud the fact that Rome's position towards the Ptolemaic and Seleucid kingdoms had gone through a fundamental change in the years 170-168, moving from indifference and apathy to involvement, and then finally to diplomatic intervention backed by a latent threat to use force. It was this change in Roman policy that lost Antiochus the war, which he stood to win when standing on the threshold of Alexandria with his army. Once Pydna was won, the encounter in Eleusis was a foregone conclusion.¹⁷⁴

Antiochus' Defeat

For Antiochus IV the Sixth Syrian War ended with a painful diplomatic defeat. He lost the opportunity to control the Ptolemaic kingdom indirectly after coming very close to that goal. In both the first and second campaigns, his army was clearly superior to that of his opponents. More notable is the fact that in the course of his first campaign Antiochus Epiphanes displayed considerable political and diplomatic skills in winning support from various groups within Ptolemaic Egypt—officers and soldiers as well as the Greek civilian population. The Seleucid king was able to gain this

¹⁷⁴ Gruen 1984: II. 658, sees the 'day of Eleusis' as a series of coincidences, one of which is the Roman victory at Pydna and the other, Antiochus' renewed attack on Egypt. Popillius' presence depended no doubt on Pydna, but his mission was due to a *senatus consultum* designed to put an end to the war between Antiochus IV and Ptolemy VIII. Had Antiochus refrained from a second invasion in 168, he still would have been at war with the reunited Ptolemaic royal house, because of Pelusium.

support because from the very beginning of his campaign he had refrained from appearing as an aggressor, but posed instead as the protector of the rightful king, Ptolemy VI Philometor. Antiochus made brilliant use of his knowledge of Philometor's precarious position in the Alexandrian court in order to lure the young king to the Seleucid camp. This was an intelligence coup equal to his earlier awareness of Ptolemaic aggressive intentions. His big mistake, though, was in lifting the siege from Alexandria in October-November 169, when the city was close to the breaking point. It was this misjudgment which had made it possible for the Ptolemaic family to reunite, thus robbing Antiochus of a pretext for maintaining his presence on Ptolemaic soil. The lull in the fighting further prevented Antiochus from presenting Rome with a *fait accompli*, and his second attempt on Alexandria did not keep up with the pace of events in the Third Macedonian War.

CHAPTER FIVE

FROM ELEUSIS TO TABAE

1. *The Ptolemaic Kingdom*

The Seleucid evacuation of Egypt and Cyprus in the aftermath of the 'day of Eleusis' was no doubt seen in Egypt as a miracle come true.¹ Yet, miracle apart, the Ptolemaic regime and the inhabitants of Egypt had little reason to be content with the outcome of the war. For one thing, the kingdom had decided upon war with the object of reclaiming the former Ptolemaic province of Syria and Phoenicia. Not only had the Ptolemaic army failed miserably in fulfilling that goal, but the arrangement enforced by Popillius Laenas did not touch upon the question of ownership of the former Ptolemaic possession. It is clear, therefore, that *de facto*, if not *de jure*, Rome recognized the Seleucid claim upon the disputed district.²

The Sixth Syrian War also revealed Ptolemaic military inferiority. The army of the Ptolemaic kingdom had failed to withstand the onslaught of the Seleucid army in both the first and the second campaigns of the Sixth Syrian War, and many of its soldiers and officers capitulated to the enemy. For the first time since Alexander the Great, an invading army succeeded in penetrating the Nile valley, thus exposing the inherent weakness of Ptolemaic rule. In addition, the Seleucid navy was able to land troops on Cyprus during the 168 invasion of the island, underlining the relative weakness of the Ptolemaic fleet. Large sums were needed to rebuild the beaten army, but the Ptolemaic kingdom lacked funds at the time. In addition to regular wartime expenses, the kingdom suffered the consequences of the large-scale plundering of Egypt by the greedy Seleucid army.³

¹ A certain Hor of Sebennytes claimed to have divined this withdrawal through a dream. See Ray 1976: 14-20 (Text 2).

² Mørkholm 1966: 97.

³ Dan. 11.24 and 28; Porphyry, *FGH* 260 F 49a; 1 Macc. 1.19; *Orac. Sib.* 3.614-15; Polyb. 30.26.9. Swain 1944: 86-87 and Morgan 1990: 58, date the systematic pillage of Egypt to the campaign of 168. The testimony of Daniel and 1 Maccabees refers however to the first campaign, while the *Oracula Sibyllina* probably points to the second (as can be seen from the reference in the

Roman Influence

Another long term effect of the war was the growing involvement of Rome in the affairs of the Ptolemaic kingdom, whose continued existence owed much to the events of the 'day of Eleusis.' This newly found interest first came to the fore immediately after Antiochus IV received the ultimatum from Popillius Laenas. The Roman emissary and the members of his delegation assured the Ptolemaic kings of Rome's support for the joint rule, and expressed their desire for continued cooperation between Ptolemy VI and his younger brother. By means of these admonitions the Roman ambassadors clearly expressed Rome's view of how the Ptolemaic royal family could repay its debt. It was in Rome's interest, and even more in the interest of the Ptolemaic regime, to prevent a recurrent feud among the three Ptolemies, which might again create the conditions for Seleucid intervention. The Roman behest could not be ignored, and the Ptolemaic kings assured Popillius Laenas of their intention to act in harmony and cooperation. This then was the message that Popillius took back to Rome.⁴

Popillius Laenas took the opportunity to present two additional requests: firstly, the kings were to release from prison a certain Menalcidas, a Lacedaemonian, who had been able to amass a fortune, ostensibly through illicit methods, using the predicament of the Ptolemaic kingdom in the Sixth Syrian War to his own advantage. The kings responded favorably to this request, and freed the prisoner almost at once.⁵ Secondly, the kings were to

Oracula Sibyllina to an evacuation by sea which is corroborated by Ray 1976: 14-20 [Text 2 recto l. 6 and verso l. 12], and see there p. 127). The fear felt by the people of Hermonthis for their god in October 169 (Fairman 1934: 5-6 no. 8) demonstrates that Seleucid troops plundered the temples of Egypt in the course of the first campaign. The destruction of the temple of Amon in the Fayum in the second year of the joint rule (*P. Tebt.* 781) is dated by Otto 1934: 57, to 168. However, this act of devastation, which was carried out by the looting Seleucid soldiery, could equally be dated to the first campaign because the second year of the joint reign began on October 4 169, only three days after the god Buchis was evacuated to Hermonthis.

⁴ Polyb. 29.27.9; Livy 45.12.7, 45.13.1. Winkler 1933: 41, and Otto 1934: 88-89, view this as a long term Roman plan to fan the flames of internal struggles within the Ptolemaic kingdom, so that the Republic could enhance its standing as the arbiter of disputes between the siblings.

⁵ Polyb. 30.16. See Walbank 1957-79: III. 440. Gruen 1984: II. 693 n. 106, regards Popillius' request to free Menalcidas as personal, but since his release is mentioned in conjunction with the embassy of Numenius to Rome, this suggests that Popillius was acting in an official capacity.

extradite Polyaratus, one of the leaders of the pro-Macedonian faction in Rhodes at the time of the Third Macedonian War, to Rome.⁶ The Ptolemies' reaction to this request was somewhat different. Rather than extradite Polyaratus to Rome in accordance with the orders of Popillius Laenas, Ptolemy Philometor chose to send him back to Rhodes. Demetrius, one of the members of the Ptolemaic court, was to see that the Rhodian fugitive would reach his destination (Polyb. 30.9.1-3). In choosing to respond in this manner, Ptolemy Philometor must have wanted to demonstrate his independence, even though he owed his regime to the Republic. Perhaps Philometor saw this step as a way to extricate himself from his responsibilities as a host towards Polyaratus, and to involve Rhodes in the affair.⁷

This rather pathetic attempt to establish their independence notwithstanding, the Ptolemaic kings hastened to send an emissary, Numenius, to Rome with the task of officially thanking the Senate for the part it had played in saving the Ptolemaic kingdom from the grip of Antiochus Epiphanes.⁸ The events of 168, in the wake of the Roman ultimatum to Antiochus IV, highlight the marked weakness of the Ptolemaic kingdom in its relationship with Rome, despite Ptolemy VI's efforts to minimize this dependence.

Revolts in Egypt

Assurances to Popillius Laenas aside, the relationship between Ptolemy VI and his younger brother did not have much chance of improving. The rivalry between the two, nurtured by courtiers and ministers of both princes, was unlikely to diminish now that the two kings had each reached an age when it was expected of them to be able to preside over the affairs of the kingdom. One member of the court, Dionysius Petosarapis, a native Egyptian, counted on

⁶ Polyb. 29.27.9. According to Otto 1934: 89 n. 4, Polyaratus arrived in Alexandria as part of a Rhodian delegation. However, Livy 45.10.14 (based on Polybius) says that some of the pro-Macedonian party fled from Rhodes when the embassy of C. Popillius Laenas appeared on the island. Polyaratus would have been one of these fugitives. For Polyaratus' anti-Roman stance, see Polyb. 27.7.4-12, 27.14.1-3, 28.2.3, 30.6.1-8, 30.7.9-30.8.8. Cf. Lenschau 1952: 1438.

⁷ Pace Otto 1934: 89-90. For Polyaratus' journey to Rhodes and Rome, see Polyb. 30.9.4-19.

⁸ Polyb. 30.16.1; Ray 1976: 20-29 (Text 3 verso ll. 21-22). For Numenius' interview at Rome, see Livy 45.13.4-5, 45.13.7-8. Numenius is identified with Numenius son of Heracleodorus, see Walbank 1957-79: III. 439, with additional bibliography.

this well-publicized enmity when trying to revive the conflict between the brothers. He appeared before the residents of Alexandria, claiming that Ptolemy Philometor had tried to involve him in a conspiracy that would lead to the death of Philometor's younger brother. The inflamed crowd was ready to take vengeance on Ptolemy VI, but he managed to convince Ptolemy VIII Euergetes that Dionysius was lying. In an effort to derail Dionysius Petosarapis' scheme, and in keeping with the promises made to Popillius Laenas, the two brothers appeared before the crowd, emphasizing their solidarity. Outmaneuvered politically, Dionysius now resorted to the use of arms, but the force he raised was defeated at Eleusis. He then fled, finding shelter among his Egyptian brethren, whom he continued to incite to revolt.⁹ It appears that Dionysius Petosarapis, or possibly other rebels who depended upon the support of the Egyptian population, also spread the revolt to the area of Memphis, to the Fayum, and to the Arsinoite nome.¹⁰

During these years, another revolt was under way in the Thebaid nome. This uprising, described by Diodorus Siculus as an "additional revolt" (ἄλλη κίνησις), was unrelated to that of Dionysius Petosarapis. The Ptolemaic king (presumably Philometor) easily defeated most of the rebels. The remaining rebels fortified themselves in Panopolis, but here too the king was able to overcome the opposition and capture the city.¹¹

The conflict between Ptolemy Philometor and Ptolemy VIII Euergetes continued during this period even while the central government was occupied with suppressing the various revolts in Egypt. The joint rule apparently lasted at least until October 23, 164,¹² but shortly thereafter, in circumstances that elude us, matters came to a head and Ptolemy Philometor was banished from the kingdom by his brother.¹³

⁹ Diod. 31.15a. The MS has the name of the rebel as Dionysius Πετοσαράτης. For the emendation to Πετοσάραπις, see Müller's note in *FHG* II p. ix. Dionysius' revolt took place between 168 and 164, see Fraser 1972: I. 119-20, II. 212 n. 218.

¹⁰ For the papyrological evidence, see Préaux 1936: 538-41; Fraser 1972: II. 212 n. 219.

¹¹ Diod. 31.17b. This fragment is dated to 168-164. For a revolt in the Thebaid nome at this period, see Uebel 1962: 160-61; Skeat & Turner 1968: 202-7; Collart & Jouguet 1934; Wilcken 1935: 292-93.

¹² *UPZ* 110 11. 1-4, 19, 213. See also Otto 1934: 92; Skeat 1954: 33; Samuel 1962: 142.

¹³ Diod. 31.18.1-2; Livy, *Per.* 46; Trogus, *Procl.* 34; V. Max. 5.1.1f; Porphyry,

Ptolemy Philometor in Exile

The exiled king then traveled to Rome. His decision to go there is not surprising, for only four years earlier C. Popillius Laenas and his fellow ambassadors had impressed upon Ptolemy VI Philometor and his brother the need for them to cooperate. Thus Ptolemy came to Rome with the object of persuading the Senate to enforce an agreement which had previously been endorsed by its *legati*. Once Ptolemy VI Philometor arrived in Italy and made his way to Rome, he decided to leave most of his friends behind and then approached the city dressed in rags. Outside the city Ptolemy Philometor was met by his cousin, the Seleucid prince Demetrius, who was still a hostage in Rome. Demetrius brought with him a diadem and all the paraphernalia of royalty and implored Philometor to put them on. Ptolemy VI refused the offer and found humble lodgings with an artist, also named Demetrius, who had often been entertained by the king in Alexandria. His living conditions were extremely difficult. Once the Senate learned of Philometor's presence in Rome, the exiled king was invited to make an appearance before the *patres*, and from that day until he left Rome, Ptolemy VI was to enjoy the same honors which Rome bestowed upon other visiting royalty.¹⁴

According to one interpretation, Ptolemy VI Philometor brilliantly manipulated the Roman senators by keeping his visit a secret at first. Once it became known that Philometor was living in Rome in uncomfortable conditions, the senators were bound to offer their apologies to the king, and to be more inclined to offer aid to him.¹⁵ However, the rags worn by Philometor evoke the memory of the shabby appearance of his siblings' emissaries to Rome in 169/8 (Livy 44.19.6-7), and suggest that Ptolemy VI Philometor came to Rome as a suppliant, putting his trust in the Senate's support for his cause. True, Philometor does seem to have shown some subtlety in his approach, subtlety that is absent from the conduct of the Ptolemaic ambassadors of 169/8, but this should not disguise the fact that Philometor came to Rome to seek the Republic's assistance in his quest to return to Egypt and share the kingdom

FGH 260 F 2.7. Zon. 9.25 tells only of the squabbling between the brothers, but makes no mention of Philometor's expulsion.

¹⁴ Diod. 31.18.1-3; V. Max. 5.1.1f. See Fraser 1972: II. 213 n. 221.

¹⁵ See Gruen 1984: II. 694-95.

with his brother as before. As for the Senate, it did not take kindly to Philometor's attempt to manipulate its members. The king was granted his due, lodging and living expenses, but the Senate refused to accept any responsibility for the king's sorry living conditions in Rome or apologize for them. Rather, the Senate seems to have blamed Philometor himself for his predicament.¹⁶ The Senate, adding insult to injury, made it plain that it would not support the reinstatement of Philometor to the Ptolemaic throne.

Philometor's Return to the Throne: Roman Influence?

In light of this reception, it is not surprising that Ptolemy Philometor did not wish to extend his stay in Rome. The deposed king left for Cyprus, which was still under his control. In the meantime, officials of Ptolemy VIII Euergetes busied themselves with acts of atrocity in Alexandria, and the king himself was held responsible for the crimes. The fickle masses of Alexandria became disenchanted, overthrew the government of Ptolemy VIII, and recalled his elder brother from Cyprus.¹⁷ The reception given to Ptolemy VI Philometor in Rome and the manner in which the king was reinstated in Alexandria suggest that Rome did not facilitate Philometor's return to Alexandria. Yet, various sources assign Rome a role both in restoring the king to the throne and in bringing about the subsequent division of the kingdom, with Egypt and Cyprus allotted to Philometor, and Cyrene to his younger brother. In examining Roman influence on the return of Ptolemy Philometor to the throne in Egypt,¹⁸ we must consider the part played by the embassy of Cn. Octavius. The members of this mission had been sent to the east after word had reached Rome of the death of Antiochus IV Epiphanes and the ascension of his son to the throne. Initially the ambassadors were instructed to look into the affairs of Macedonia, Galatia, Cappadocia and most importantly, Syria (Polyb. 31.2.1-13). At this stage Egypt was not on Cn. Octavius'

¹⁶ V. Max. 5.1.1f: *eaque non sua neglegentia, sed ipsius subito et clandestino adventu facta dixit*. This snub is more significant than either the decision to grant Philometor customary hospitality or what Valerius Maximus terms Roman *humanitas* towards the exiled king.

¹⁷ Diod. 31.20, 31.17c (in that order). Ptolemy VIII Euergetes' tyrannical rule in Alexandria is noted, Polyb. 31.18.14, as is the resultant hatred of him by the Alexandrians, Polyb. 31.10.4. Cf. Fraser 1972: I. 120.

¹⁸ For Rome's involvement in Philometor's reinstatement, see Livy, *Per.* 46; Porphyry, *FGH* 260 F 2.7; Trogus, *Prol.* 34. Cf. Zon. 9.25.

agenda. Babylon learned of the death of Antiochus IV Epiphanes between November 20 and December 18, 164.¹⁹ Accordingly, it is unlikely that word to that effect would have reached Rome before February 163. It would seem, then, that until the first months of 163 the Senate was either unaware of the *coup d'état* in Alexandria or else did not consider the expulsion of Ptolemy VI Philometor an issue, and consequently did not give instructions to its ambassadors to the east on the matter.²⁰ However, after Cn. Octavius and his colleagues left Rome, the Senate sent further instructions. The ambassadors were to try and mediate between the Ptolemaic kings as far as they were able (Polyb. 31.2.14: *κατὰ δύναμιν*). This flexible mandate suggests that the ambassadors were to intervene only if they could, or to put it differently, only if Roman interests so demanded. It is unclear what made the Senate suddenly remember that Ptolemy VI Philometor and his brother were at odds with one another. Perhaps news reached the Senate of the upheavals in Egypt only after Octavius' embassy left Rome. In any event, Ptolemy Philometor was back in power by late May 163, so that Cn. Octavius had no time to intervene in Egyptian affairs.²¹

Once Ptolemy VI Philometor returned to Egypt, an agreement was reached according to which Ptolemy VIII Euergetes received Cyrene as his domain while Egypt and Cyprus became the possession of his elder brother.²² Was this arrangement reached through the offices of Rome? If Rome was responsible, this raises the possibility that Philometor's return was the result of Roman involvement in the struggle between the two brothers. Scholars differ with regard to both these issues. Some maintain that Ptolemy VI initiated the partition agreement, forcing it upon his brother; others prefer to see the sinister hand of Rome behind the arrangement.²³

¹⁹ BM 35603 Rev. l. 14 (Sachs & Wiseman 1954: 208-9). For the correct Julian date, see Parker & Dubberstein 1956: 23.

²⁰ By February 163 Philometor must have arrived in Rome, since he was back in Egypt by the end of May of that year. See Reekmans & Van't Dak 1952: 159-60, 162-66; Skeat 1954: 33-34; Samuel 1962: 142-43. The exiled king would have left Rome no later than the beginning of April 163.

²¹ If Obsequens 15, is to be believed, the embassy of Cn. Octavius got no further than Syria by 162, cf. Walbank 1957-79: III. 468. The murder of the *legatus* in Syria probably forced his colleagues to cancel their visit to Egypt altogether.

²² Trogus, *Prol.* 34; Zon. 9.25; Porphyry, *FGH* 260 F 2.7; Syncellus, ed. Mosshammer p. 342; Livy, *Per.* 47.

²³ Gruen 1984: II. 696 n. 117, refers to the pertinent bibliography.

A look at Ptolemy VIII Euergetes' subsequent attempt to renegotiate the agreement of 163 will help resolve this controversy. In 163/2, the younger brother, now king of Cyrene, approached the Senate and requested that Cyprus be removed from his brother's dominion and added to his own. Ptolemy VIII maintained that the earlier agreement had been forced upon him. He acted as he did, not willingly, but under duress and the force of circumstances.²⁴ To some, this remark of Ptolemy VIII Euergetes, as reported by Polybius, indicates that the Romans masterminded the agreement of 163.²⁵ However the statement can also be taken as evidence that it was Ptolemy Philometor, and not the Romans, who compelled the younger brother to give up his claim to the Ptolemaic kingdom as a whole, and settle for Cyrene. In support of this second view it may be said that had the Romans been responsible for the division of the kingdom, it would have been highly impolitic of Ptolemy VIII to come forward to the Senate and declare that he had earlier agreed to the partition because he was forced to accept such a settlement.²⁶ Even more compelling evidence for this interpretation is found elsewhere in Polybius. The historian, when summing up the personality of Ptolemy VI Philometor, praises the king for his attitude towards his younger brother. Even though Ptolemy VIII had deposed Philometor, when Philometor had the opportunity to act against his younger brother in Alexandria, he nevertheless agreed to pardon him for his sin.²⁷ Polybius clearly refers here to the events of 164-163, and paints a picture in which the younger brother came to be completely at the mercy of the older. No wonder, then, that Philometor was in a position to dictate the terms of a settlement and Ptolemy VIII Euergetes had to comply with them.

Once the younger Ptolemy had made his plea to the Senate to revoke the partition settlement of 163, two Roman senators, referred to by Polybius as Canuleius (L. Canuleius Dives) and Quintus (Q. Marcius Philippus?) joined the discussion.²⁸ These senators

²⁴ Polyb. 31.10.2: φάσκων οὐχ ἑκόν, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἀνάγκην τῷ καιρῷ περιληφθεὶς πεποιθέναι τὸ προσταττόμενον.

²⁵ See Otto 1934: 93; Walbank 1957-79: III. 475.

²⁶ So Gruen 1984: II. 697.

²⁷ Polyb. 39.7.5: ἔπειτα δόξας ἐκπεσεῖν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς ὑπὸ τὰδελφοῦ, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐν Ἀλεξανδρείᾳ λαβὼν κατ' αὐτοῦ καιρὸν ὁμολογούμενον ἀμνησικακῆτον ἐποίησατο τὴν ἁμαρτίαν.

²⁸ Polyb. 31.10.4. For the identity of Canuleius, see Münzer 1899a; Münzer 1899b; Münzer 1903. Bouché-Leclercq 1904: 32 n. 4, suggested taking Quintus as the son of the consul of 169. The grounds for this are much weaker.

testified on behalf of Philometor's chief representative in Rome, Menyllus of Alabanda, and his colleagues. They said that Ptolemy VIII Euergetes owed both the dominion of Cyrene and his very life to the intervention of Menyllus and the other Ptolemaic ambassadors, for he was much hated by the mob.²⁹ It would seem, then, that after the angry Alexandrian mob toppled Ptolemy VIII Euergetes and called on his elder brother to repossess the kingdom, Euergetes had little choice but to accept the terms that were dictated to him by Philometor and his advisers.³⁰

Ptolemy VI Philometor's ability to dictate his own terms to his brother and foe, without any effective Roman involvement, raises questions as to the king's motive in awarding Cyrene to his brother.³¹ Ptolemy VIII had been his brother's bitter enemy since 170, if not earlier, and it is strange to see Ptolemy VI Philometor giving a sizable portion of his realm to his foe, even though he was in full command of the situation. The explanation for this lies

²⁹ Polyb. 31.10.4: τῶν δὲ περὶ τὸν Κανολήτιον καὶ Κόιντον ἀπομαρτυρούντων τοῖς περὶ τὸν Μένυλλον, τοῖς παρὰ τοῦ πρεσβυτέρου παραγεγονόσι πρεσβευταῖς, διότι καὶ τὴν Κυρήνην ὁ νεώτερος καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα δι' αὐτοὺς ἔχει. τοιαύτην γενέσθαι τὴν τῶν ὄχλων πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀλλοτριότητα καὶ προσκοπήν. Debate has focused on whether the words δι' αὐτοὺς refer to Menyllus and his associates or to the Roman *legati*. For the latter view see Badian 1958: 109 n. 3. Polybius' words here seem to convey the message that those responsible for saving the life of Ptolemy VIII were able to exert their influence on the Alexandrian mob. Surely, Philometor's men were more likely to achieve that. What is more, the passage under discussion again echoes Polyb. 39.7.5. There, Ptolemy VIII Euergetes owed his life to Philometor. Here it is Menyllus who saves the younger brother. Cf. Winkler 1933: 43. Polybius obviously wanted to portray his friend in a favorable light.

³⁰ Polyb. 31.10.6: ἡ σύγκλητος, ἅμα μὲν ὁρῶσα τὸν μερισμὸν... γεγονότα τελέως, ἅμα δὲ βουλομένη διελεῖν τὴν βασιλείαν πραγματικῶς, αὐτῶν αἰτίων γενομένων τῆς διαίρεσεως, is another source of debate. It is impossible to know if the διαίρεσις refers to the partition of 163 or to the new division that the Senate is about to initiate. Equally perplexing is the identity of those who divided, or are about to divide, the Ptolemaic kingdom. Are the αὐτῶν αἰτίων the Senate, even though it appears early in the passage in the singular, or is Polybius referring here to the Ptolemaic ambassadors? Walbank 1957-79: III. 475-76, seems to opt for the first view while Gruen 1984: II. 697 n. 120, prefers the second. Although it strikes me as impossible to reach a decision on the basis of this passage, Polybius' other pronouncements do not allow any effective Roman involvement in the 163 division.

³¹ The sources that assign the partition to Roman influence do so on the basis of the presence of the two *legati* in Egypt and because of Rome's position from the first century B.C.E. onwards. See Trogus, *Prolog.* 34; Zon. 9.25; Livy, *Per.* 46-47; Porphyry, *FGH* 260 F 2.7. Syncellus, ed. Mosshammer p. 342, attests to the existence of two traditions, of which only one assigned Rome a role in the division of the Ptolemaic kingdom.

firstly with Philometor's recent experience in Rome. The Senate, once it had learned of his presence, had treated him coolly, awarding him the customary marks of hospitality but rebuking him at the same time. Clearly a majority of the *patres* were content to see Ptolemy VIII Euergetes on the throne, and were not willing to help Philometor regain his share in the Ptolemaic kingdom. Once Philometor returned to his ancestral throne it was obvious that his restoration would offend Rome. Philometor was also cognizant of the fact that his previous demand to be reinstated in Egypt on the basis of Popillius Laenas' endorsement of joint rule could now be turned against him. He therefore sought to avert the senators' displeasure. Since he found the previous agreement unworkable, he would not share power with his brother as before. Instead, he decided to divide the kingdom between the two of them. In this manner, he would be able to convince the Romans that he was trying to live up to the spirit of the agreement which Popillius Laenas had endorsed. According to this self-imposed settlement, the main part of the kingdom—Egypt—would remain in Philometor's hands, as would Cyprus. The continued control of this island would ensure Ptolemaic economic and political ties with Asia Minor and the Aegean. Ptolemy VIII Euergetes, in contrast, would dominate a far less significant portion of the Ptolemaic kingdom—Cyrene.

Ptolemy VI Philometor now attempted to use the presence of two Roman senators in Egypt to his own advantage. The two *legati* were invited to witness the official signing of the agreement between the two brothers. On the face of it, they were to play a similar role to the one played by the embassy of Popillius Laenas in 168. In addition, Philometor could impress these two senators with his magnanimous treatment of his vanquished brother, and they would spread word of his noble behavior. There was, however, one fundamental difference between Laenas and his colleagues, and these two Roman envoys. Popillius Laenas had been sent to Egypt by the Senate with a detailed brief. In 163 the Senate did issue some instructions and had them forwarded to Cn. Octavius, but Octavius' embassy only managed to get as far as Syria, and even this was well after Philometor had regained his throne. L. Canuleius Dives and Q. Marcius Philippus(?) could not have been members of Octavius' embassy, and they possessed neither authority nor stature. Consequently, the Senate ignored their testimony on behalf of

Ptolemy VI Philometor and his diplomats, and supported Ptolemy VIII Euergetes in his request to overturn the terms of the agreement of 163 (Polyb. 31.10). The efforts of Ptolemy VI Philometor to soothe the *patres* failed and the king was to suffer the effects of Roman displeasure for some years to come.

The State of the Ptolemaic Kingdom

The five years following the summer of 168, when Antiochus IV withdrew from Egypt, demonstrate the disastrous effects of the Sixth Syrian War on the Ptolemaic kingdom. The economic crisis brought on by the war limited the kingdom's military capability. In light of the revolts that spread to all parts of Egypt during this period, it is doubtful whether the kings were able to rebuild the army. The internal conflicts between the brothers also contributed to this unsettled state of affairs. The rivalry between the two brothers also led them, each in his own turn, to seek the support of Rome. It is true that the Senate's response to both requests proved ineffective. In the first instance Ptolemy VI Philometor was able to regain his kingdom despite Rome's unwillingness to offer assistance. Later, he withstood the pressures from the Senate, which supported Ptolemy VIII Euergetes in his bid to add Cyprus to his domain. In both these situations Ptolemy VI Philometor exhibited independence of spirit, making it clear that Rome was not in a position to control the affairs of the Ptolemaic kingdom. The Republic did, however, have the ability to exert influence on the Ptolemaic kings, and even Philometor could not ignore Rome's position and influence altogether, as can be seen from his decision to part with Cyrene. In sum, internal conflict between the kings in the years 168-163, native revolts, and Roman influence on Egyptian affairs must have caused the outside world to view the Ptolemaic kingdom as a paralyzed body. The kingdom was not in a position to press its claim for Syria and Phoenicia, nor was it able to play an active role there.

2. A Friend in the North: Antiochus IV's Relations with Pergamum

The successful efforts of the Attalid royal house to install Antiochus IV as king in 175 formed the basis for the political pact

between the Seleucid king and Eumenes II.³² That the alliance was still very much alive during the last year of the Seleucid's reign is clear from accusations made at that time against the two kings. They were charged of working in tandem against Rome.³³ While the accusations themselves need not necessarily be believed, the link between the two monarchs and their continued cooperation would have furnished the basis for such allegations against them.

What purpose did the alliance between Antiochus IV and Eumenes II serve? Was it, in fact, directed against Rome, and if so, what was its aim? After Antiochus IV was crowned king, there is no further evidence of concrete steps taken by one of the monarchs to help the other, nor of a mutual effort that would have benefited both the Pergamene and the Seleucid kingdoms. This makes it all the more difficult to uncover the reasons for the cooperation between the two kings. Consequently, the following investigation will focus on the relationship between the Seleucid kingdom and two cities in Asia Minor with close ties to Pergamum, Miletus and Cyzicus. The friendly relations of each of these two cities with both the Seleucid and Pergamene kingdoms may serve as an indication of the friendship between the Seleucids and Attalids themselves. Thus, a set of indirect connections between Pergamum and the Seleucid kingdom will be used to demonstrate what must have been the reality—a policy of continued cooperation between the two kingdoms, which was to last from Antiochus IV's rise to power until after his death.

Cyzicus

The city of Cyzicus, situated on the shores of the Propontis, had been closely affiliated with Pergamum since the early third century. Philetaerus, the founder of the Attalid royal house, took it upon himself to defend the territory of Cyzicus against the attacks of the Galatians and to meet the costs for this defense. In addition he supplied the city with corn to alleviate the suffering caused by the war (*OGIS* 748). Cyzicus, apparently in gratitude for Philetaerus' support and generosity, had instituted a festival named after him, the Philetaeria.³⁴ The ties between Cyzicus and the royal house of

³² See above Ch. IV/1.

³³ Polyb. 30.30.4-8, 31.1.3-8; Livy, *Per.* 46. Cf. Diod. 31.7.2, from Polybius.

³⁴ *CIG* 3660 1.15, cf. L. Robert 1937: 199-200. For the early ties between

Pergamum grew even closer with the marriage of Attalus I and Apollonis, a woman from Cyzicus. During the reign of their son Eumenes II, Apollonis came to her native city with two of her sons (Polyb. 22.20), reaffirming the attachment of the Attalid dynasty to Cyzicus. An even stronger link was established through the building of a temple in Cyzicus for Apollonis. The temple was adorned with mythological scenes extolling the theme of the love and devotion of children to their mother.³⁵ It would seem, then, that while the cult was for Apollonis, divine honors were also accorded her pious children.

Cyzicus also features as one of a series of Greek states which conferred honors upon a friend of Antiochus IV, Eudemus son of Nicon from Seleuceia-on-the-Calycdanus.³⁶ Another place visited by Eudemus was Rhodes, where the Seleucid courtier was present ca. 172/1.³⁷ The inscription honoring Eudemus does not specify why was he honored by the people of Cyzicus, but they conferred upon him *proxenia* and granted him the right to import and export goods from the city without paying duties (*Syll.*³ 644/45 11. 81-93).

Livy is another source of information on the contacts between Cyzicus and the Seleucid kingdom. By his account, Antiochus IV donated gold vessels to the city's *prytaneum*. This act of generosity is dated by Livy to 176/5 and the historian's discussion is based on a section from Polybius which also belongs to that year.³⁸ Since Polybius collected in this section a series of stories about Antiochus IV as a means of depicting the character of the Seleucid king, and artificially assigned the tales to 176/5, Antiochus' first regnal year, we cannot be sure that these tales—and consequently Livy's report concerning Antiochus IV's generosity towards Cyzicus—can be

Pergamum and Cyzicus, see Hansen 1971: 18, 29-30, 207-8, 210-11; Allen 1983: 14-16, 137-39, 146.

³⁵ *Anth. Pal.* 3. See Hansen 1971: 289.

³⁶ *Syll.*³ 644/45. The inscription has been assigned to the reign of Antiochus IV on the basis of the honors awarded by Cyzicus and Rhodes to a friend of a king Antiochus. This tallies with the benefactions conferred upon the two states by Antiochus IV, Livy 41.20.7. See Wilhelm 1896: 108-17. Börker 1978: 208 n. 50, suggests dating the inscription to the reign of Antiochus III, but this has been rightly rejected by J. Robert & L. Robert, *Bull. épigr.* 1979: no. 310.

³⁷ See below p. 209.

³⁸ Livy 41.20.7. Walbank 1957-79: III. 286-88, demonstrates the similarity between Polyb. 26.1, and Livy 41.20.

securely dated to that year. In fact, our only other testimonial to connections between Cyzicus and the Seleucid king, the visit of Eudemus son of Nikon to the city, may have occurred in 172-170, if the Seleucid ambassador came to Cyzicus shortly before or after his visit to Rhodes. It is possible that Antiochus IV's gift to Cyzicus was delivered through the agency of Eudemus, and that it was then, and not in 175, that Antiochus formed his first contact with Cyzicus.

The motivation behind the Seleucid king's munificence seems quite clear. Antiochus IV wanted to show his respect to a city held dear by the Attalid family, as a token of appreciation for the part that family played in securing him the Seleucid throne. Cyzicus, on the other hand, would have shown its respect to the Seleucid ambassador, hoping to maintain its friendly relations with the munificent Seleucid king through him. Here we must conclude that the people of Cyzicus were willing to receive a present from Antiochus IV, as well as court the favors of one of his friends, because they knew that ties with the Seleucid king would not be seen as an affront to Eumenes II, on whom they were politically dependent.

Eirenias of Miletus

Like Cyzicus, Miletus, too, seems to have been closely attached to the Attalid kingdom of Eumenes II. Evidence for this comes through a series of inscriptions in which the figures of the Attalid king and a certain Eirenias son of Eirenias from Miletus feature prominently. One of these inscriptions indicates that Eirenias had approached the king on behalf of his city and secured from him a substantial fund which enabled the Milesians to build a gymnasium in their city. The Milesians were quick to respond to the monarch's generosity by setting up an inscription honoring the king and voting divine honors to him, including the building of a *temenos*. Eumenes II was then informed of the gratitude of Milesians by Eirenias, who came to the king for the second time. As a result, Eumenes II decided to display even greater munificence towards the city, increasing his donations to the gymnasium and taking it upon himself to defray the costs of the honors which he had been awarded. This second audience of the Milesian ambassador with the Pergamene king is perhaps identical with an inter-

view given by Eumenes II in the winter of 167/6 to Eirenias and another envoy who had come to the king on behalf of the Ionian League. This would mean that Eirenias had a double agenda on this occasion, representing his own city and handling the affairs of the league. In any event, Eirenias and his colleague presented the king with a list of honors which the league had conferred upon him, including the erection of a golden statue of the king in a place of his choosing. Eumenes chose to have his statue in Miletus, alluding among other things to the city's alleged kinship with him and to the *temenos* awarded him by Miletus.³⁹ Other documents of this dossier, which seem to belong to a later stage, specify some of the divine honors which Eumenes II received from the Milesians: they celebrated a *panegyris* on his birthday, the city had a priesthood for the cult of Eumenes, and the king is referred to as Eumenes the God ($\theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$).⁴⁰

Side by side with this very close relationship with the Attalid kingdom, Miletus seems to have maintained good relations with Antiochus IV. Here too Eirenias son of Eirenias played a part. This emerges from an inscription, already mentioned, in which the Milesian diplomat was praised for his role in persuading Eumenes II to contribute to the welfare of Miletus. A different section of the same inscription records how Eirenias persuaded Antiochus IV's "sister" (whose identity is not completely clear) to prevail upon her brother to exempt the Milesians from paying customs for agricultural products exported to the Seleucid kingdom.⁴¹ Eirenias, then, established ties with a "sister" of Antiochus IV in order to obtain economic benefit for the residents of Miletus. In his eyes, there was no contradiction between the city's close cooperation

³⁹ Eumenes' double contribution towards building the gymnasium of Miletus is mentioned in a Milesian decree honoring Eirenias: *SEG XXXVI 1046 Block I. Decree honoring Eumenes: Milet I/9 307. Eirenias' meeting with Eumenes II on behalf of the Ionian League: Milet I/9 306 = OGIS 763. The date for this has been established by Holleaux 1938-68: II. 153-78. This reconstruction of relations between the Attalid kingdom and Miletus is based on Herrmann 1965b: 103-17. For some reservations as to Herrmann's conclusions, which do not affect our discussion, see Kleine 1986.*

⁴⁰ *Panegyris: Didyma II 488. Priesthood and divinity of Eumenes: SEG XXXVI 1048. According to Herrmann 1965b: 112-17, and Allen 1983: 118-19, Eumenes was recognized as god in his lifetime. Habicht (as quoted by Herrmann) thinks that apotheosis followed the king's death.*

⁴¹ *SEG XXXVI 1046 Blocks II+III. Herrmann 1965b: 83, suggests identifying the "sister" with Laodice, the wife of Antiochus IV, who may have actually been his sister, see above, p. 116; cf. Mørholm 1966: 56.*

with Pergamum and an appeal to the Seleucid kingdom for aid. Equally important is the fact that the city of Miletus did not sense any conflict between its contacts with Eumenes II and Antiochus IV. Indeed, Eirenias' ties to the two royal courts are commemorated on the same monument and this situation can best be understood if we assume that Eirenias' appeal to the Seleucid princess relied on the good relationship between Pergamum and Antioch.⁴²

The contact between Miletus and the Seleucid kingdom was also nurtured by other Milesians who were members of the Seleucid court. Two such ministers of Antiochus IV, the brothers Timarchus and Heracleides, built a *bouleuterion* in their native city on behalf of Antiochus IV.⁴³ The people of Miletus accepted the generous donation not only because it had been made by two of their citizens, but also because they knew that the display of the Seleucid king's name on a public building in Miletus would not meet with the disapproval of his friend and ally, Eumenes II of Pergamum.

The picture presented here of friendly relations between the Seleucid and the Attalid kingdoms in the time of Antiochus IV and Eumenes II is inferred, at least in part, from the ties which both monarchies enjoyed with the cities of Miletus and Cyzicus. Yet since both these cities were considered autonomous, they were, it could be argued, entitled to forge their own foreign policies.⁴⁴ According to this argument, the amicable ties of Miletus and Cyzicus with both the Seleucid and Attalid kingdoms do not indicate that these two monarchies were closely associated with one another. However, such an approach does not take into consideration the fact that in both Miletus and Cyzicus the Attalid royal house was the object of divine worship and this, in turn, expresses the dependence of both these cities on Pergamene support.⁴⁵ Hence

⁴² Herrmann 1965b: 85-86.

⁴³ *Milet I/2* 1-2, and the preceding discussion on pp. 95-99. For Timarchus and Heracleides, as well as another Milesian family in the service of Antiochus IV, that of Apollonius son of Menestheus, see below, Ch. VII.

⁴⁴ *Autonomy of Cyzicus*: Polyb. 25.2.13. *Of Miletus*: Allen 1983: 98.

⁴⁵ For the view that Miletus' ties with Antiochus IV were divorced from its association with Pergamum, see Allen 1983: 113 n. 146, who criticizes Mørkholm, whose views are here endorsed. Allen admits, however, that Miletus relied heavily upon the support of Eumenes II, and rightly states that the legal status of an autonomous city bears little relation to its ability to pursue independent policies (pp. 114-21). Polyb. 21.46.2-3, indicates that often this was the case. See Walbank 1957-79: III. 166.

it may be reiterated that both Cyzicus and Miletus were grateful recipients of the liberality of Antiochus IV and his friends, not only because of the material gains to their respective cities, but also because it was clear to the civic authorities that Eumenes II would not disapprove.

Cappadocia

A different case of three-way cooperation in which both the kingdoms of Eumenes II and Antiochus IV play a part revolves around Cappadocia, a trusted ally of Pergamum since the period after the battle of Magnesia. The friendship between the two kingdoms was based, *inter alia*, on the marriage of Eumenes II to Stratonice, the daughter of the Cappadocian king, Ariarathes IV, and lasted throughout the lifetime of Eumenes II.⁴⁶ When Cappadocia was attacked by the Galatians, the bitter enemies of Eumenes II, it is reasonable to assume that Ariarathes IV sought the cooperation of his son-in-law in the war against the Galatians.⁴⁷

During this period, Cappadocia also had amicable relations with the Seleucid kingdom, as can be seen from the fact that Cappadocia's first silver coins were struck at the Seleucid mint of Soli in Cilicia. The minting of these coins should be dated to the years of Antiochus IV's rule,⁴⁸ and during this period the three kingdoms—Pergamum, Cappadocia and the Seleucid kingdom—cooperated closely on political matters.

Eumenes, Perseus, and Rome

The close connections between Pergamum and the Seleucid kingdom apparently contributed to difficulties in the relationship the Attalids had with Rome. To a large extent, the Roman attitude towards Eumenes II is colored by the Pergamene's alleged attempt to deal covertly with Perseus in the course of the Third Macedonian War. According to the sources at our disposal, Eumenes was supposedly willing to withdraw the troops he had fighting alongside the

⁴⁶ Hansen 1971: 95, 101-4; Hopp 1977: 38-39.

⁴⁷ For the Galatian attack, see Polyb. 31.2.13, 31.8.1-5. Cf. Hansen 1971: 123; Hopp 1977: 39; McShane 1964: 184; and below p. 199.

⁴⁸ Mørkholm 1962: 409-10 and Mørkholm 1964b: 61-62. Recapitulated in Mørkholm 1966: 54-55.

Romans, if Perseus was prepared to award him 500 talents. If the Macedonian king were to treble the bounty, Eumenes was ready to promise a negotiated settlement of the war. The Attalid king allegedly entered into secret negotiations with Perseus towards that end, but his demand that he receive the money in advance—and Perseus' refusal to part with the sum—are said to have led to a breakdown of the negotiations.⁴⁹ Polybius' discussion of the affair is riddled with the historian's doubts concerning the affair. How, Polybius asks, was it possible for anyone to describe in precise detail matters which allegedly were conducted in secrecy? Why would Eumenes help Perseus when it is clear that he did not want the Macedonian to win the war? How did Eumenes hope to keep the negotiations secret, and why did Perseus refuse to pay the money? Polybius answers these questions by arguing that it was the avarice of the two kings which both led to the negotiations and brought about their subsequent failure, but it is difficult to accept the historian's conclusions.⁵⁰ The date of the alleged crucial round of negotiations, the last year of the Third Macedonian War, was a most inauspicious time if Eumenes really intended to reach a settlement with Perseus. The previous year's campaign had ended with Roman legions already poised to enter the heartland of Macedon. The navy was also moved to more forward positions, and its winter quarters for 169/8 were in the ports of Oreus and Sciathus, and not in Chalcis as before.⁵¹ Eumenes II had everything to lose if he were to abandon his allies on the eve of their victory, and it seems highly unlikely that he considered such an option.⁵²

Perseus, then, was in a most difficult position. The war was not going his way, and an appeal to the kings of Pergamum and Seleucid Syria would have been an obvious step for him to take. It is likely that the king warned the two other monarchs that their kingdoms would be next to fall prey to the insatiable Roman lust

⁴⁹ Polyb. 29.5.1-29.9.13; Livy 44.24.8-44.26.1; Appian, *Mac.* 18.1; Dio 20, fr. 66.1; Zon. 9.22.

⁵⁰ For Polybius' doubts, see 29.5.1, 29.7.1-2, 29.9.1-13. Cf. Livy 44.24.11, 44.25.1-2.

⁵¹ For the Roman campaign in 169, see Hammond 1988: 527-30. Chalcis: Livy 43.7.5-11, 44.1.4, 44.2.1. Oreus and Sciathus: Livy 44.13.11, 44.30.1.

⁵² See too Gruen 1984: II. 558-63; Walbank 1957-79: III. 366; De Sanctis 1907-23: IV/1. 359; Hansen 1971: 116-18. For qualified belief in the negotiations, see Badian 1958: 102-3; Scullard 1973: 286-87; Schlessner 1973.

for power.⁵³ This may have been the basis for the report of negotiations between Perseus and Eumenes, but their dealings were to be made into something quite different. Who embroidered the tale and why?

The fabricators of the story clearly intended to harm Eumenes, casting doubt on his loyalty to Rome, and associating him with an enemy of the Roman people.⁵⁴ Rome would not be bound to honor her friendship with such a person, and the story would serve both as a cause of—and justification for—a worsening in the Republic's relations with the king of Pergamum. Polybius speaks of Perseus' friends, who had learned of the negotiations between the two kings and relayed their knowledge to the historian (29.8.10). These friends of Perseus, so it has been suggested, had every reason to invent the story. After all, the king of Pergamum had been a long standing opponent of Macedon, and was responsible, to some extent, for their predicament. The rumors, it is argued, would serve as their revenge on the hated Attalid king. But this theory fails to explain how these allegations of collusion between the two kings led to a reversal in Roman policy towards Pergamum, a reversal which becomes apparent soon after Pydna. Are we to believe that such a story would have gained ground in Rome, turning a long time friend of Rome into a *persona non grata* almost overnight? Allowing such influence to the former members of Perseus' court seems incredible. These men were no longer ministers or men of affairs, but mere prisoners of war. Roman senators would have been involved in the dissemination of the story as well, because it suited their own purposes. It must also be remembered that all the members of Perseus' court became Aemilius Paullus' prisoners of war. It was he who had conquered their country, and it was his decision to transfer them all to Rome.⁵⁵ Perhaps the story of the secret negotiations between the kings was in fact circulated by Perseus' friends, who would lend the story credibility in view of their earlier attachment to the Macedonian king. They now had an opportunity to embarrass their erstwhile foe and at the same time perform a service for their present master.

While this hypothesis cannot be proven, it would explain why

⁵³ Polyb. 29.4.8-10; Livy 44.24.1-7; Appian, *Mac.* 18.1.

⁵⁴ More accusations against Eumenes are reported by Livy 44.13.12-13, from Valerius Antias.

⁵⁵ Livy 45.32.3-6; Plut. *Aem.* 33.6-34.2.

Polybius, who was obviously aware just how flimsy the accusations against Eumenes were, nonetheless devoted a lengthy discussion to these charges. Furthermore, Polybius tells of a scheme by the Romans to divide the Attalid kingdom in two in the period immediately following Pydna.⁵⁶ The story, which will be discussed below, is not altogether reliable. Yet it is interesting that the historian, who was not yet in Rome at the time of the affair, suggests that the plan was concocted by senators he identifies as "some of the most distinguished men" and "some of the most notable men."⁵⁷ Polybius thought that he could point to the elevated status of the men involved in a plot against Eumenes, because from 167 onwards he had come to know the composition of a group which worked tirelessly against the Attalid king.

What were the reasons, then, for this reversal in attitude towards the kingdom of Pergamum? The elimination of an independent Macedon upset the balance of power in the eastern basin of the Mediterranean and created a political vacuum in Greece. This vacuum would now be filled by Rome, which had no more use for Pergamum in its traditional role as a balancing force to counter that of Macedon. In addition, the liquidation of Macedon had left Pergamum and its powerful military machine in an uneasy proximity to Roman power. On top of that, Pergamum enjoyed very friendly relations with its southern neighbor, the Seleucid kingdom, and the combined resources of the two kingdoms would have created an imposing power. The Senate, or some of its members, could not ignore the danger latent in such a situation. The Republic was bound to contest any obstacle, real or imaginary, to its ability to pursue its own policies, and would do its best either to drive a wedge between the two allies, or else to weaken the two kingdoms so as to make their combined efforts less threatening. In addition, Pergamum was a Greek state. True, the Attalid kingdom had helped Rome in her war against Perseus, and consequently was unlikely to become an immediate focus for those elements in Greece opposed to Rome. But Pergamum had a long tradition of involvement in the affairs of Greece and might, with time, become the object of Greek yearnings to achieve political freedom once again.

⁵⁶ Polyb. 30.1.1-30.3.9; Livy 45.19.7-45.20.3.

⁵⁷ Polyb. 30.1.7 and 10: ἔντιοι τῶν ἐπιφανῶν ἀνδρῶν and ἔντιοι τῶν ἀξιολόγων ἀνδρῶν.

Polybius on Eumenes II and Attalus

These considerations were bound to affect Roman policy towards Pergamum. If Polybius is to be believed, the change was sudden and dramatic, with senatorial animosity towards Eumenes II revealing itself on the very morrow of the Roman victory at Pydna.⁵⁸ The occasion for this sudden turnabout in Roman policy towards the Pergamene king was the Galatians' revolt against the Attalid yoke.⁵⁹ Polybius says that Eumenes II decided to send his brother Attalus to Rome to seek her support, and to extend the felicitations of the Attalid royal house to the Republic upon the successful conclusion of the war against Perseus. In Rome, well-known members of the Senate approached Attalus privately, saying that the Senate was ready to award him with a kingdom of his own. Attalus was elated by this prospect of personal aggrandizement, and promised to make his position clear before a plenary session of the Senate. Eumenes, however, divined this development and sent his personal physician, Stratius, to Rome. Stratius managed to convince the prince not to act against his own best interests. The king's doctor reminded Attalus that he enjoyed powers equal to those of Eumenes, lacking only the diadem and the title of king. Stratius added that Attalus was his brother's heir, and in view of Eumenes' failing health, would soon become king. The physician also pointed out that if Attalus were to follow the plan proposed by these senators, discord with his brother—and the destruction of the kingdom—would be sure to follow. As a result, Attalus would forfeit his present position as well as the hope of playing a more prominent role in the future. The prince was won over by these arguments and consequently refrained from bringing any accusations against his brother when addressing the Senate. He also did not ask the Senate to support a division of the Attalid kingdom, despite his promises to his Roman allies. Instead, Attalus requested that the Senate grant him the cities of Aenus and Maronea, and

⁵⁸ The portrayal of Roman reversal at this point is well suited to Polybius' decision to expand his original plan and encompass in his *Histories* events after 168/7, so that contemporary readers of his work would be able to determine whether Roman rule is to be shunned or embraced, while future readers would be able to decide whether it is worthy of praise and emulation or warrants censure. See Polyb. 3.4.7 and cf. Walbank 1972: 27-28.

⁵⁹ Polyb. 29.22; Diod. 31.12 (from Polybius). On the war, see Hansen 1971: 120-26; Allen 1983: 142-43.

dwelled upon the Galatian danger. The Senate, we are told, assumed that Attalus would soon ask for a second audience to claim his share of his brother's kingdom and granted him the two cities. The senators also decided to send P. Licinius Crassus to address the Galatian question. But, when Attalus left Rome without responding to the Senate's expectations, the *patres* quickly chose to award Aenus and Maronea their freedom.⁶⁰

This, then, is Polybius' account. Some elements of his story have met, quite justifiably, with disbelief. It is difficult to accept Polybius' statement that Eumenes possessed the ability to divine events in Rome. It is equally difficult to comprehend how Stratius managed to reach Rome before any irrevocable step had been taken by Attalus. So too the physician's persuasive powers have been called into question, as his arguments would have added nothing to what Attalus himself knew. In short, Polybius' discussion of Attalus' visit to Rome in 168 lacks credibility.⁶¹ The story, or at least that segment of it which revolves around Stratius the physician, must be late in date, because it alludes to Attalus III as king. Thus the year 138 seems to be the earliest possible date for the Stratius section to have been incorporated in Polybius' *Histories*.⁶² The passage depicts Attalus II as a man tempted by the prospect of acquiring his own principality, to the extent that he is ready to betray his elder brother and bring strife and dissolution to the kingdom of his ancestors. The hostile attitude displayed by Polybius towards Attalus II here lends support to the view that the Stratius passage was composed after 138, for elsewhere the historian heaps praise on the prince for his devotion to his elder brother.⁶³ The section probably reflects a source in the court of Attalus III, who had to wait twenty one long years for the death of his uncle. Polybius, then, introduced at least part of the story concerning Attalus' visit to Rome at a late date, because it tallied with his own characterization of Roman behavior in the wake of

⁶⁰ Polyb. 30.1.1-30.3.9; Livy 45.19.7-45.20.3. Cf. Polyb. 29.6.3-4. Nissen 1863: 31, notes that Livy minimizes the import of Attalus' Roman allies, shifting some of the blame to the prince.

⁶¹ Hansen 1971: 121-22; Walbank 1957-79: III. 416. More comprehensively, Gruen 1984: II. 574-75.

⁶² Polyb. 30.2.6, cf. Livy 45.19.11. For the date, see Lehmann 1974: 193 n. 1. Walbank 1957-79: III. 417, regards only Polyb. 30.2.6, as a later insertion.

⁶³ Polyb. 23.11.6-7, 27.18.1-3. See also Polyb. 32.8.6, for concord between Eumenes and his three brothers.

Pydna and the 'day of Eleusis.' In fact, Roman reassessment of its attitude towards Pergamum would have taken longer than Polybius would have us believe, and it was only in 167 that clear signs of a change in Roman policies appeared.

Prusias II of Bithynia

In the year 167, two neighboring monarchs, Prusias II of Bithynia and Eumenes II of Pergamum, went to Rome. Polybius treats the two royal visits to Italy in sequence, not only because they followed one another, but in order to contrast senatorial attitudes towards the two kings (30.18-19). First came Prusias with the object of congratulating the Senate and the triumphant Roman generals on their recent victories over Perseus and the Illyrian king Genthius.⁶⁴ During his stay, Prusias spared no effort to court the favors of the *patres*, and this shameless behavior is sharply criticized by Polybius. Prusias' motives for this particular conduct have been questioned, but it is very likely that the king, in addition to paying homage to the Senate, was hoping to acquire, through Roman favor, specific benefits for himself.⁶⁵ Livy, who had the advantage of having two variant accounts of the royal visit at his disposal—one from an annalistic source and the other from Polybius—allows us, through the Roman material, a glimpse at the king's requests from the Republic and the favors he received in return. Prusias requested (1) to be allowed to offer sacrifices in Rome and Praeneste to celebrate the victory of Rome, (2) to leave his son Nicomedes (whom he had brought with him) under the protection of the Senate, and (3) to be allocated territories which previously had been part of the Seleucid kingdom and were now held by the Galatians. Prusias claimed that the Romans had not assigned these lands to anyone in the aftermath of the Roman victory at Magnesia. The Senate was happy to receive Nicomedes in its care, and

⁶⁴ Polyb. 30.18.1-7; Diod. 31.15.1-3; Appian, *Mithr.* 2; Dio 20, fr. 69; Zon. 9.24; Livy 45.44.4-21; V. Max. 5.1.1e; Eutrop. 4.8.4. Cf. Plut. *Mor.* 336d-e. Prusias' aim in coming to Rome is reported by Polyb. 30.18.1; Diod. 31.15.1; Livy 45.44.5 and 8, as well as by Valerius Maximus and Eutropius. Eckstein 1988: 437, is wrong to assert that Polyb. 30.18 "contains no information on Prusias' motivation" for coming to Rome.

⁶⁵ Eckstein 1988: 414, 438-39. Eckstein (pp. 435-42) convincingly rejects the view of Scafuro 1987: 28-33, that Prusias' abject performance was meant to prevent the Senate from punishing him for his offer to mediate between the Romans and Perseus in 169, Livy 44.14.5-7.

allowed Prusias to offer the sacrifices, while insisting that the costs would come from Roman public funds, but denied Prusias' third and most important request. A polite gloss was put on the rejection, for the *patres* promised to look into the matter and send a legation to investigate the situation. The king was also awarded several unsolicited favors, most notably the donation of a fleet of twenty ships. In addition, the Senate voted *munera* for Prusias and his son, and extended other marks of goodwill towards the visiting monarch.⁶⁶ The polite refusal to grant Prusias the land occupied by the Galatians should not be seen as a Roman rebuff, for the Republic compensated the king handsomely for his disappointment with the gift of a fleet and other honors.⁶⁷ Nor was Rome unwilling to interfere in the affairs of Asia Minor. At the time, Rome was busy encouraging the Galatians at the expense of Pergamum and consequently was unwilling to betray Galatian trust by handing over some of their land to Prusias.⁶⁸ Prusias' short term ambitions would, it seems, best be served by cooperating with the Galatians against Pergamum, rather than by fighting them.

Rome's Campaign against Eumenes

Shortly thereafter, in the winter of 167/6, the Senate learned that Eumenes II intended to come to Rome and appear before the *patres*. As Eumenes was now viewed with disfavor by Rome, the Senate decided to prevent his arrival and voted to prohibit any king from visiting Italy. The *senatus consultum* was couched in general terms, but was obviously directed at the Pergamene king. At Brundisium, Eumenes was met by a *quaestor* who read the Senate's decision to him. If the king had any message for the *patres* he was advised to

⁶⁶ Livy 45.44.4-18. The rest of Livy's exposition, 45.44.19-21, condenses Polybius. Nissen 1863: 91, observes that the two sources complement one another. The veracity of the annalistic passage is rightly defended by Habicht 1957a: 1112-13; Eckstein 1988: 438-39, *pace* Scafuro 1987: 33-35.

⁶⁷ Polyb. 30.18.6-7, deliberately refrains from giving an account of what took place during Prusias' appearance before the Senate. He concedes, however, that Prusias' abject behavior was well worth his while, for the Senate responded warmly: φανείς δὲ τελείως εὐκαταφρόνητος ἀπόκρισιν ἔλαβε δι' αὐτὸ τοῦτο φιλόανθρωπον. Gruen 1984: II. 576 n. 19, rightly notes that Diod. 31.15.3, misrepresents Polybius.

⁶⁸ Habicht 1957a: 1112-13. Hence, the view that the Roman gift of a fleet to Prusias was not directed against Pergamum, Eckstein 1988: 440, is unconvincing.

relay it through the *quaestor*. If Eumenes had no such message, he was to leave Italy. Eumenes, who did not want to be subjected to the indignity of dealing with the Senate through a messenger, announced that he had no issue to raise with the Senate and left Italy forthwith.⁶⁹

The humiliation inflicted on Eumenes, a staunch supporter of Rome during the war with Perseus, stood in stark contrast to the Senate's recent treatment of Prusias II. The Bithynian king had stood on the sidelines during most of the Third Macedonian War, joining the Romans only when victory seemed a foregone conclusion.⁷⁰ For Polybius there was only one explanation of the shabby treatment accorded Eumenes by the Senate: the *patres* were sending a clear message to the Galatians to persist in their resistance to Pergamene domination (30.19.12-13). This appraisal of the Roman attitude towards Eumenes in 167, to which no cogent alternative has been offered, seems correct. Livy's annalistic sources lend support to Polybius' interpretation, for they reveal the extent to which members of the Senate protected the Galatians at the time. Rome was doing its best to weaken the kingdom of Pergamum, signaling to all interested parties, and especially to the Galatians, that the Republic would not disapprove of any actions taken against Eumenes II.

It will be remembered that Attalus, in the course of his visit to Rome, had asked the Romans to help the kingdom of Pergamum resolve its conflict with the Galatians. On the face of it, the Senate agreed to the king's request and dispatched a delegation to Asia Minor, headed by P. Licinius Crassus. Polybius relates that although he does not know the exact instructions given this delegation, subsequent events indicate that the Senate's orders were designed to persuade the Galatians to continue fighting Pergamum.⁷¹ The Roman delegation met Solovettius, the Galatian leader, near Synnada. Attalus was supposed to have attended the meeting as well, but at the last moment it was decided that he should not attend, in order to prevent the discussion from becoming too heated. When the Roman *legatus* left the meeting he declared that the Galatian

⁶⁹ Polyb. 29.6.4, 30.19.1-14; Livy, *Per.* 46; Justin 38.6.3-4.

⁷⁰ Neutrality: Livy 42.29.3, 44.14.5-7; Appian, *Mithr.* 2; Eutrop. 4.6.2. Help to Rome: Livy 44.10.12, 44.14.6, 45.44.8.

⁷¹ Polyb. 30.3.2, 30.3.7-8. See Walbank 1957-79: III. 419; Hopp 1977: 52; McShane 1964: 183.

chief Solovettius had departed in a combative mood. To Livy, and his source Polybius, this was a telling sign (Livy 45.34.10-14). With the failure of Roman mediation, a failure which may be intended in the first place, Eumenes was free to muster his army in battle and the Galatians were utterly routed.⁷²

Eumenes Defeats the Galatians

In spite of Eumenes' victory over the Galatians, the Senate decided to grant them autonomy. The Galatians were to stay within their own borders and were forbidden to carry out armed campaigns against their neighbors (Polyb. 30.28). Rome's policy remained unchanged even if the tone had mellowed somewhat. Eumenes, at the moment of a great victory, was told to give up his control over the Galatians and grant them independence. The Senate, on its part, would try to influence the leaders of the Galatians and advise them to practice restraint. Senatorial policy was thus clearly designed to weaken Pergamene control in Asia Minor, and the support given to the Galatians was likely to encourage others to follow suit. Eumenes II, who to a certain extent had brought such Roman interference upon himself, was not intimidated by this blatant example of Roman intervention and maintained his authority over the Galatians. The king also nurtured his own partisans among the Galatians, men who would help him both in pacifying the Galatian population as a whole, and in withstanding Roman pressure over the treatment of the Galatians. One such Galatian supporter of Eumenes was Attis, the priest of Pessinus.⁷³

Pergamene success on the battlefield and Eumenes II's refusal to comply with Rome's wishes were bound to bring a new round of

⁷² Diod. 31.14. The following inscriptions may commemorate Eumenes' victory: *I. Pergamon* 165, with an additional fragment published by von Prott & Kolbe 1902: 90 no. 74; *OGIS* 305, a decision of the people of Sardis, quoted in an inscription from Delphi, to celebrate a *Eumeneia*. The inscription, ll. 10-11, mentions a κίνδυνος from which Sardis escaped through the help of Eumenes. This would refer to Eumenes' war against the Galatians; *Milet* 1/9 306 ll. 9-14, from 167 refers to the war while it was still being waged; *OGIS* 751 = *RC* 54, seems to reflect some of the war's results. According to this inscription, the city of Amalda had to pay indemnities to Pergamum on account of the Galatian war. No doubt this Pisidian city sided with the Galatians. The writer of this letter, Attalus, is probably the future Attalus II, and if that is the case, the Galatian war is the one fought by Eumenes. See Hopp 1977: 70-74.

⁷³ Eumenes' Galatian partisans: Polyb. 30.30.2-3. Attis: *RC* 55-61 = *OGIS* 315. See Hansen 1971: 123-24; Allen 1983: 143.

invective against Pergamum. The campaign was led by Prusias II, whose ambassadors came to Rome in 165/4 and accused Pergamum of flagrant disregard of the Senate's express wishes that the autonomy of the Galatians be respected. Prusias' envoys also charged Eumenes with aggression against the Bithynian kingdom. Obviously, Roman support for both Prusias and the Galatians had prompted them to cooperate against Pergamum, but the Bithynian leader found he had joined forces with the losing side. The Senate also heard similar charges against Eumenes II from other embassies, including one from the Pisidian city of Selge. The delegates, prompted by Prusias II, spoke ill of Eumenes II and of his close cooperation with Antiochus IV. For the moment, however, no new measures were adopted in Rome, especially since a senatorial commission headed by Ti. Sempronius Gracchus had recently returned from the courts of both kings with a favorable report.⁷⁴

In the following year, Eumenes sent an embassy to Rome, led by his brothers Attalus and Athenaeus. The mission was probably intended to defend Pergamum and counteract the campaign led by Prusias and his accomplices. Ti. Gracchus' report from the previous year no longer affected the Senate's decision, and a fresh delegation was dispatched, headed by C. Sulpicius Galus and M'. Sergius. The envoys were to determine if there was any truth to the rumors that Antiochus IV and Eumenes II were working together against Rome.⁷⁵ When he reached Sardis in 163, Sulpicius Galus invited delegations from all of Asia Minor to confer with him there and air their grievances against the Pergamene king (Polyb. 31.6.1-5).

This attempt by Sulpicius Galus to incite the population of Asia Minor is, then, part of a long catalogue of senatorial activities against Eumenes II and the Attalid kingdom. The catalogue of anti-Attalid initiatives stems, for the most part, from Polybius, and it has been suggested that the historian's misconceptions have colored his presentation, making his account unreliable.⁷⁶ However,

⁷⁴ Polyb. 30.30.1-8, 31.1.3; Livy, *Per.* 46. These passages refer to the same event, the appearance of Bithynian and Bithynian-inspired embassies in Rome in 165/4, despite Habicht 1957a: 1113-14.

⁷⁵ Polyb. 31.1.2-8; Diod. 31.7.2. The Senate did not know that at the time of the discussions the Seleucid king was already dead, cf. Walbank 1957-79: III. 465.

⁷⁶ Gruen 1984: II. 569-84.

one recurrent theme in Polybius, that of Roman support of the Galatians, is corroborated by the annalistic sources of Livy. The complementary Polybian theme, the depiction of Roman enmity towards Eumenes II, again appears in a source unrelated to the Achaean historian, namely a letter sent by Attalus II to Attis, the priest of Pessinus. In this letter, later to be carved on stone, the king expresses his concerns about pursuing a certain course of action. He writes that if his action were to succeed, it would engender envy and suspicion among the Romans. The king would then suffer the same treatment at the hands of the Romans that his brother had.⁷⁷

Rome and Eumenes II: Conclusions

What were the effects of the Roman campaign against Eumenes II? Clearly, the political support given by Rome to the Galatians was a factor in their sustained war against the kingdom of Pergamum and in the decision of Prusias II to join the war on their side. Some of the Pisidian towns also joined the ranks of Pergamum's enemies. Selge is reported to have been encouraged by Prusias, but Roman propaganda may well have contributed to its decision to oppose Pergamum.⁷⁸ Rome was ready to bolster the hopes of these opponents of Pergamum, and even to supply Prusias II with a sizable fleet for this purpose, but was not willing to be directly involved in the conflict. The contest was to be decided on the battlefield, where Pergamene power proved superior. In the aftermath of his victories, Eumenes II held on tenaciously to his conquests and was not intimidated by Roman support for Galatian autonomy. In addition, the Attalid king won over some Galatians to his side, most notably the priest of Pessinus.

If Eumenes II was only partially successful in rallying support for his cause among the Galatians, his achievements with the Greek cities of Asia Minor were more noteworthy. Polybius states that as the Roman attitude towards Eumenes II turned harsher, the

⁷⁷ RC 61 II. 13-15: καὶ γὰρ ἐπιτυχούσιν φθόνον καὶ ἀφαίρεσιν καὶ ὑφωσίαν μοχθηράν, ἣν καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ ἐσχόσαν. Gruen 1984: II. 591, claims that Attalus II did not want to commit himself to Attis, and therefore invoked Rome's influence as an excuse for his inaction. But even if this explanation is correct, there is no need for an additional declaration from Attalus II on Roman enmity towards his elder brother.

⁷⁸ Selge: Polyb. 31.1.3; Trogus, *Prol.* 34. Amalda: RC 54, see p. 200 n. 72.

Greeks became increasingly well-disposed towards the king (31.6.6). This Greek support first became apparent after Eumenes II was forced to depart from Italy. The Ionian League responded to the Senate's decision by honoring Eumenes II.⁷⁹ Another no less important factor behind their support of the king was his determination to fight the Galatians, whose habitual raids on city-dwellers proved a constant menace. The Greek cities of Asia Minor were grateful to Eumenes for his efforts to combat these barbarians and appreciated his success in vanquishing them.⁸⁰

A brief respite from the persistent Roman pressure on Pergamum came through the offices of Ti. Sempronius Gracchus. When he returned from his mission in 165/4, Gracchus was able to convince the Senate that there was no need to take steps against Eumenes. His success indicates that on occasion a majority of senators did not necessarily support the campaign against Eumenes. Polybius portrays Gracchus, father of the famous Gracchi brothers, as a man whose attitude towards Antiochus IV and Eumenes II, as well as towards the Cappadocian king Ariarathes V and to Rhodes, was favorable. This positive approach towards the kings of Pergamum and Syria was the result of the efforts of both kings to dupe the Roman envoy, or so Polybius would have us believe.⁸¹ Yet Polybius acknowledges that the senator held the same views before going on his diplomatic mission.⁸² In other words, Ti. Gracchus' approach to the affairs of Pergamum and the Seleucid kingdom was not due solely to the influence exerted on him by the two monarchs, but stemmed from earlier convictions he had held while still in Rome. These beliefs may have been reinforced later, when he went as ambassador to the east. Ti. Sempronius Gracchus stood in opposition to other Roman statesmen who were ready and eager to weaken the kingdom of Pergamum, and he cannot be one of the senators described by Polybius as the most prominent and

⁷⁹ This decision is quoted in the response of Eumenes II, *Milet* 1/9 306. The occasion has been established by Holleaux 1938-68: II. 153-78.

⁸⁰ For the gratitude of the Ionian League and Sardis, see *Milet* 1/9 306; *OGIS* 305.

⁸¹ Polyb. 30.30.8: οὕτως αὐτοὺς οἱ βασιλεῖς (Eumenes and Antiochus) ἐξετέμοντο τῇ κατὰ τὴν ἀπάντησιν φιλοanthρωπία. Cf. Polyb. 30.27.1-4, 30.31.19-20, 31.3.3-5; Diod. 31.17.

⁸² Polyb. 30.30.7: οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Τεβέριον ἦκοντες ἀπὸ τῆς πρεσβείας οὐδὲν περιττότερον ἠδυνήθησαν οὐτ' αὐτοὶ διαλαβεῖν οὐτε τῇ συγκλήτῳ διασαφῆσαι περὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸν Εὐμένη καὶ τὸν Ἀντίοχον, ἤπερ ἂ καὶ πρότερον ὄντες ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ διελάμβανον.

remarkable men in Rome.⁸³ Ti. Gracchus is clearly rebuked by Polybius for being under the influence of Antiochus IV and Eumenes II, and holding views which the historian regards as naive, while those who hold the opposite view receive words of praise. Perhaps the senators who were actively opposed to Eumenes were members of the senatorial group with whom Polybius himself was allied while in Rome, the circle of Aemilius Paullus.⁸⁴ In any case, Ti. Sempronius Gracchus, and possibly other like-minded Roman senators as well, would have encouraged Eumenes II in the belief that Roman policies could still be reversed, so that submission to Rome's wishes would be premature: matters might well change for the better in the future.

Antiochus and Eumenes

A more important factor in Eumenes' determination to overcome the military threats of his neighbors, and to prevail in the face of Rome's propaganda campaign, was the knowledge that no threat to his position would come from the south. His alliance with Antiochus IV left the Attalid king with as much freedom as could be desired. For Antiochus, the primary reason for his cooperation with Pergamum was the gratitude the king felt towards the Pergamene royal family for its help in establishing him on the Seleucid throne. But Antiochus had profited from the alliance in other ways. The backing of Pergamum had left him free to ensure his hold over the Seleucid kingdom and had afterwards enabled him to deal effectively with the Ptolemaic threat on his southern flank. Now, after the 'day of Eleusis,' Pergamum could become a buffer state between the Seleucid kingdom and Rome, deflecting most of Rome's attention. Antiochus had every reason to help Eumenes II in maintaining his strength and in ensuring the viability of the alliance. Thus throughout his reign, the king sought to help Eumenes secure his influence on the Greek cities of Asia Minor. The Seleucid was even ready to alleviate, in a small way, the

⁸³ We have seen above (p. 196) that the picture presented in Polyb. 30.1-3, is suspect. What matters here is that Polybius was ready to believe his source, and he ascribes positive, respectable qualities to those conspiring against Eumenes.

⁸⁴ Consequently, the view of Briscoe 1969, that the Scipionic circle was against a policy of 'divide and rule' and that Ti. Sempronius Gracchus was a member of that group should be rejected. Cf. Scullard 1973: 295-96.

financial burdens to which Eumenes was subjected. Antiochus gave the city of Cyzicus gold utensils for its *prytaneum* and exempted the Milesians from paying customs for products exported to the Seleucid kingdom. The king also helped these two cities through his courtiers. Two such courtiers, the brothers Timarchus and Heracleides, erected a *bouleuterion* in Miletus, their mother city, on Antiochus' behalf, while another friend, Eudemus son of Nicon, was honored by Cyzicus for unspecified services. There may have been other donations by Antiochus IV and members of his court, but these would have amounted to a subsidiary effort. The chief burden of maintaining the allegiance of the Greek cities and the loyalty of Pergamum's subjects fell upon Eumenes. It was up to him to administer the kingdom, to set aside funds for the use of cities such as Miletus, and to defend the kingdom against its opponents, both political and military.

Having surveyed Roman involvement in Asia Minor, it is time to return to the Seleucid kingdom and investigate the extent of Roman intervention in Seleucid affairs.

3. *The Seleucid Kingdom: 168-164*

Antiochus IV's policies during the Sixth Syrian War were designed to gain control of Egypt before the outcome of the Third Macedonian War was decided. The king initially tried to take over Egypt by using Ptolemy VI Philometor as a vassal king. When this strategy failed, Antiochus IV was left with only one option: to wage a war to conquer the land, without even the pretense of legitimacy. Had Antiochus IV succeeded in this endeavor, he would, no doubt, have posed a significant challenge to the victor of the Third Macedonian War. With the capture of Egypt, cooperation between the Seleucid king and Eumenes II, king of Pergamum, would have created a political bloc with territorial continuity from Asia Minor to Egypt. Such a bloc would act to check Roman power, and Antiochus IV's war against the Ptolemaic kingdom was intended to ensure that the two kingdoms could not be outflanked from the south. But events unfolded too quickly for Antiochus IV: the Romans defeated the Macedonians in Pydna before the king could capture Alexandria. Thanks to this victory, Popillius Laenas was able to force Antiochus IV to retreat from Egypt.

A multitude of authors tell of the meeting between Popillius Laenas and Antiochus IV.⁸⁵ To these writers, from Polybius onwards, the scene at Eleusis exemplified the unlimited power of Rome. The king who was forced to succumb to Roman *hauteur* became, according to the view of one scholar, a neurotic and broken man, who no longer had the power to save his kingdom.⁸⁶ That such a picture is exaggerated and distorted cannot be doubted.⁸⁷ True, Antiochus IV failed in his ambition to become the prime force in the affairs of the Ptolemaic kingdom, and he may have suffered a severe blow to his ego. Yet he emerged from his Egyptian campaigns with a series of successes and still possessed considerable power.

Antiochus and the Treaty of Apamea

Antiochus' independence, both before and after his meeting with Popillius Laenas, is evident from his repeated infringements of the provisions of the Treaty of Apamea. According to the treaty, the Seleucid kingdom was barred from the ownership, use, and deployment of elephants,⁸⁸ yet Antiochus IV made use of these animals during his first invasion of Egypt in 170 (1 Macc. 1.17), and was said to have equipped Perseus with war-elephants. While this latter report is in all likelihood a fabrication, designed to link Antiochus with Rome's enemy Perseus, the story probably reflects the use of elephants in the Seleucid army during Antiochus Epiphanes' reign.⁸⁹ More important still is the continued presence of elephants in the Seleucid army after the 'day of Eleusis.' Thus elephants formed part of the procession at Daphne in 166, and a year later, when Antiochus left for his eastern campaign, he is reported to have taken with him some of these beasts, while leaving others for the use of his chief minister, Lysias.⁹⁰ These

⁸⁵ See above p. 172 n. 171.

⁸⁶ Otto 1934: 82-88.

⁸⁷ See the balanced approach of Mørkholm 1966: 181-91.

⁸⁸ Polyb. 21.43.11-12; Livy 38.38.8; Memnon, *FGH* 434 F 18.9.

⁸⁹ Polyæn. 4.21. For the rejection of the story, see Winkler 1933: 30 n. 54; Mørkholm 1966: 66 n. 7. For the elephants of Antiochus IV, see Scullard 1974: 185-88.

⁹⁰ Daphne: Polyb. 30.25.11. Elephants divided between Antiochus and Lysias: 1 Macc. 3.34; Jos. *Ant.* 12.295. According to 2 Macc. 11.4, Lysias employed elephants against the Jews in 165, but the parallel sources for this campaign, 1 Macc. 4.28, and Jos. *Ant.* 12.313, do not confirm this.

elephants were then employed by Lysias in his second campaign against the Jews, during the reign of Antiochus Epiphanes' successor, Antiochus V Eupator, but soon afterwards the Romans decided to enforce the Treaty of Apamea. The Senate then dispatched Cn. Octavius to maim the Seleucid elephants.⁹¹ Antiochus IV Epiphanes seems, then, to have paid scant respect to the clause in Treaty of Apamea which forbade him the use of elephants.

Antiochus IV disobeyed another clause in the treaty, the clause restricting the recruitment of military manpower. According to the terms of the Treaty of Apamea, Antiochus III and his successors were not permitted to recruit mercenaries from the areas subject to Roman rule (τῆς ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίους ταπτομένης), i.e. from those areas which Antiochus III had been forced to give up in accordance with the agreement.⁹² Yet, there were Thracians, Galatians, and Mysians among the soldiers serving under Antiochus IV, and all of these men, judging by their ethnic identity, originated from these forbidden territories.⁹³

Seleucid Shipbuilding and Rhodes

Yet another provision in the 188 settlement banned the Seleucid navy from sailing beyond the Sarpedonian promontory, and limited the number of its warships to no more than ten *cataphracts*.⁹⁴ In the years following the signing of the treaty, Seleucus IV faithfully complied with these restraints on his naval capability.⁹⁵ His younger brother, on the other hand, entertained more ambitious plans. Antiochus IV's involvement in maritime affairs is apparent

⁹¹ Elephants in Lysias' second campaign: 1 Macc. 6.30, 6.34-37, 6.43-46; 2 Macc. 13.2 and 15; Jos. *Ant.* 12.366, 12.371-74; *BJ* 1.41-44. The numerical strength assigned by the Jewish sources to the Seleucid elephant corps, as well as to other Seleucid units, is much exaggerated. Cf. Bickerman 1938: 67 n. 9; Bar-Kochva 1989: 40-47, 307. Octavius' embassy: Polyb. 31.2.9-11; Appian, *Syr.* 46; Zon. 9.25; Cic. *Phil.* 9.4.

⁹² Polyb. 21.43.15; Livy 38.38.10; Appian, *Syr.* 39.

⁹³ Polyb. 30.25.4-5. The title Μυσάρχης in 2 Macc. 5.24, also suggests Mysians. 1 Macc. 6.29, regards Lysias' troops in 165 as coming ἀπὸ βασιλειῶν ἐτέρων καὶ ἀπὸ νήσων θαλασσῶν. For attempts to deny the possibility that Antiochus IV recruited soldiers from the forbidden territories, see Griffith 1935: 146-47, and Launey 1949: 99, 384, 442-44, 523, justifiably rejected by Paltiel 1979b: 32-33.

⁹⁴ Polyb. 21.43.13-14; Livy 38.38.8-9; Memnon, *FGH* 434 F 18.9; Appian, *Syr.* 39 (inaccurate).

⁹⁵ See above pp. 101, 103.

from his promise to the Rhodians, relayed by his ambassador Eudemus son of Nikon, to make a contribution to the Rhodian fleet. We learn from an inscription that when the promised donation was late in coming, the anxious Rhodians sent emissaries to Antiochus and to Eudemus. These representatives were instructed to approach Eudemus and request that he arrange for the gift to be sent as quickly as possible. The Rhodian ambassadors were also told to express their gratitude to Eudemus for his willingness to intercede on their behalf.⁹⁶ The exact nature of the benefactions pledged by the Seleucid king is not detailed in our inscription, but Antiochus either promised them wood for the building of boats or else undertook to supply the finished product, battleships. No less interesting is the fact that the Rhodians were exceptionally eager to receive the promised supply at the earliest possible date.

Rhodian anxiety over the delayed consignment can be explained in light of a visit to the island made in 172/1 by the Roman ambassadors Ti. Claudius Nero, Sp. Postumius Albinus Paullulus, and M. Iunius Brutus. During their stay the *legati* were received by Hagesilochus, a Rhodian politician who was the head of the Rhodian *prytaneis* at this time. Previously Hagesilochus, no doubt in his capacity as chief *prytanis*, had encouraged his compatriots to take a pro-Roman stance, and had advocated the fitting out of a forty-ship fleet which would help the Romans in times of need. Now, on the occasion of the Romans' visit, Hagesilochus was able to exhibit his efforts on behalf of the Republic, displaying the ships as they were being equipped, and earning his island goodwill from the ambassadors. Later in the year, after Stratocles replaced Hagesilochus as chairman of the Rhodian *prytaneis*, C. Lucretius Gallus, the commander of the Roman navy in Greece, asked Rhodes to meet its commitment and send him naval reinforcements. Lucretius' approach initially generated strong differences of opinion in the island, but in the end Stratocles managed to rally the Rhodians behind him, and support the Roman cause. Rhodes had, however, managed to fit out only six ships. Five of

⁹⁶ *Syll.*³ 644/45 ll. 23-27: ... ἀφικόμενοι καὶ ποτὶ Εὐδάμον παρακαλεῦντον αὐτὸ[v] συνεπιμεληθῆμ(ε)ιν ὅ[π]ω[ς] ταὶ δωρ[ε]αὶ ταὶ δεδομένα τῶι δάμωι εἰς τὰν ναυτικὰν δύνανμιν τὰν ταχ[ί]σταν εἰς τὰν πόλιν ἀποσταλῶντι, δηλοῦντες αὐτῶι ὅτι ταῦτα πράξας χαριεῖται τῶι δάμωι. The Rhodian envoys were obviously instructed to approach Antiochus IV as well. For the dating of the inscription to ca. 170, see Wilhelm 1896: 116-17; J. Robert & L. Robert, *Bull. épigr.* 1979: no. 310, despite Börker 1978: 208 n. 50.

these were dispatched to Chalcis, where C. Lucretius was stationed, and one ship was sent to Tenedos. Rhodes' failure to fulfill its promise is not surprising, for the Rhodians' efforts to revitalize their sea power had started less than a year before. Nevertheless, the Roman commander of the fleet, piqued no doubt by what seemed to him a meager show of support, relieved the Rhodian naval unit and sent it back to port.⁹⁷

Hagesilochus' decision in 172/1 to build a forty-ship fleet and Rhodes' inability to fit out more than six galleys in the summer of 171 suggest that the Rhodian navy found itself unprepared when the Third Macedonian War was already in the offing. In addition, once it was decided to expand the Rhodian navy, the process took longer than expected.⁹⁸ It seems, then, that 172 was the earliest possible date for the Seleucid offer to help Rhodes rebuild its maritime power. The occasion arose when the Seleucid envoy, Eudemus, passed through the island on a mission to assess political developments in Greece and Propontis. War between Perseus and Rome was about to break out, or had just begun.⁹⁹ The Rhodian authorities must have revealed to the Seleucid dignitary their need to expand their navy swiftly. Eudemus secured a promise from his king to help Rhodes, and was rewarded for his efforts by the Rhodians. They granted him *proxenia* in the Rhodian year in which Astymedes served as head of the *prytaneis* during the summer semester and Iatrocles followed him in the winter semester.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁷ Polyb. 27.3.1-5, 27.7.1-16; Livy 42.45.1-7, 42.56.6-7. According to Livy 42.45.3-7, the fitting of the forty war-ships was successfully completed by Hagesilochus. This is a mistake, as his source, Polyb. 27.3, makes clear. The identity of the Roman ambassadors: Walbank 1957-79: III. 295. Lucretius' resentment: Meloni 1953: 244.

⁹⁸ Berthold 1984: 182, suggests that the small reinforcements were due to a compromise between the rival factions in the island. However, Thiel 1946: 270 n. 331, estimates that during the first half of the second century Rhodes could launch no more than approximately forty ships. If this is so, the island's navy was virtually non-existent in 172. Six years earlier the Rhodian navy was comprised of unfenced ships, ἀφρακτα (Polyb. 25.4.10).

⁹⁹ *Syll.*³ 644/45 also records Eudemus' visits to Cyzicus, Calchedon, Byzantium, Boeotia and Argos. If all these places were visited by Eudemus on the same voyage, his tour is fixed to 172/1, because the decree of the Boeotian *koinon* in his honor cannot be later than 171. See Wilhelm 1896:113-14, who bases his argument on the dissolution of the Boeotian confederacy in that year. For 171 as the date of the dissolution of the Boeotian federation, see Étienne & Knoepfler 1976: 342-47.

¹⁰⁰ *Syll.*³ 644/45 l. 12ff. Pugliese Carratelli 1939-40: 160 n. 1, dates the year in which first Astymedes and then Iatrocles served as heads of the *prytaneis* to 176/5 or 175/4, before Hagesilochus became head of the *prytaneis* (winter

This offer of aid to Rhodes must have provided Antiochus with an excuse to build warships in his docks, an activity which the provisions of the Treaty of Apamea did not prohibit. Furthermore, since Rhodes was publicly committed to use its fleet in support of the Roman war effort, any intent to strengthen the Rhodian navy could be presented as indirect support of Rome. Antiochus could well have ordered his shipyards to build long boats in excess of the number he had promised to Rhodes, intending to use the surplus to arm himself in anticipation of Ptolemaic aggression, of which he had been forewarned. The war with Egypt broke out towards the end of 170, and it is possible that the Seleucid king conscripted the boats originally earmarked for Rhodes into his own navy. The Rhodians, waiting in vain for reinforcements to their fleet, decided to approach both the king and Eudemus, imploring them to deliver what they had previously promised. We do not know if their appeal had any effect.

Further shipbuilding, the construction of *triremes* in Tyre, is attested to a date within the period in which Jason was the Jewish high priest. Since Jason's term of office extended to the years 175-173/2 it is possible, but only just possible, that the *triremes* were part of the consignment intended for Rhodes. In any case, the building of these warships at Tyre and their later inclusion in the Seleucid navy would not have contradicted the naval provisions of the Treaty of Apamea, which banned the use of more than ten *cataphracts*, but not the lighter *triremes*.¹⁰¹

The expanding Seleucid fleet was put into service during the Sixth Syrian War. Seleucid boats were employed during the first campaign of the war, and they inflicted a defeat on the Ptolemaic navy off the coast of Pelusium. The ships may have been used to support the Seleucid army during the crossing of the Nile.¹⁰² Their main use, however, would have been in combined land and sea operations. Such operations are frequently attested in the wars of

semester, 172/1). This sequence is arbitrary, and Livy 41.20, cannot be used to date Antiochus' benefactions to Rhodes; see above p. 187. The reconstruction proposed above indicates that Astymedes' term of office could not have begun before the summer of 170. The Rhodian year began at this time in the summer, see Hiller von Gaertringen 1931: 743-45; Samuel 1972: 107-10.

¹⁰¹ 2 Macc. 4.18-20. Distinction between *cataphracts* and *triremes*: Casson 1971: 123.

¹⁰² Livy 44.19.9; 1 Macc. 1.17.

the *Diadochi*, as well as the Fourth Syrian War.¹⁰³ During the second campaign of the Sixth Syrian War, the Seleucid navy must have transported and escorted the troops which were to occupy Cyprus, and this fleet, or at least part of it, remained stationed at the island until after the 'day of Eleusis.'¹⁰⁴ In addition, other naval units must have accompanied the main body of the Seleucid army as it made its way towards Alexandria. These units were ready and available when Antiochus IV was ordered out of Egypt by Popillius Laenas.¹⁰⁵ Further evidence for the existence of the Seleucid fleet is attested for 163, when the Senate, hearing of the death of Antiochus Epiphanes, sent Cn. Octavius to destroy the Seleucid *cataphracts* and elephants (Polyb. 31.2.11 etc.).

While the evidence relating to Seleucid naval forces in the Sixth Syrian War does not include details of the number or types of vessels employed by Antiochus IV, it would be wrong to assume that the Seleucid king did not infringe the naval clause of the Treaty of Apamea. Antiochus IV, who foresaw the Ptolemaic attack, and was well prepared for the war in other areas, would not have neglected to ready a strong fleet capable of withstanding the Ptolemaic navy in both quality and numerical strength. The king's shipbuilding activity before the beginning of the Sixth Syrian War, attested in our sources, was a deliberate act of preparation for the imminent war. The fact that the Seleucid navy was able to operate on two separate fronts in 168 clearly suggests that by that year the navy was quite sizable. The campaign of 168 also demonstrated the overall superiority of the Seleucid navy over the Ptolemaic fleet, and warships were obviously required to guarantee this superiority. After the war, Antiochus IV, far from dismantling his fleet, continued to maintain it until his death. Clearly, the Senate took advantage of the death of Antiochus Epiphanes in order to do away with his front line warships, but the destruction indicates that the Seleucid king had exceeded the number of *cataphracts* he was entitled to possess.

¹⁰³ Diod. 18.37.3 (321); Diod. 18.43 with Appian, *Syr.* 52 (319); Diod. 20.73-76 (306); Polyb. 5.62, 5.68-69 (219-218).

¹⁰⁴ Livy 45.11.9, 45.12.7. Livy is wrong, however, in attributing a Seleucid naval victory over the Ptolemaic navy off Cyprus. See above p. 167 n. 158.

¹⁰⁵ Ray 1976: 14-20 (Text 2 recto l. 6 and verso l. 12); *Orac. Sib.* 3.614-15.

Roman Intervention in Seleucid Affairs

How then should we account for Seleucid breaches of the Treaty of Apamea? One explanation is provided by Gruen, who claims that Rome's involvement in eastern affairs was sporadic and her desire to intervene in local disputes questionable. More often than not, he argues, Roman missions to the east were instructed to bring warring sides together, rather than pit them one against the other. Rome's lack of response to the continuous infringement of the Treaty of Apamea up to the death of Antiochus IV seems in accord with such an attitude, and Gruen duly presents it as an instance of Roman apathy. However, two instances of Roman intervention in Seleucid affairs at this time, when Roman *legati* first ordered Antiochus Epiphanes out of Egypt, and then destroyed the military and naval forces that the king had left to his son, do not blend well with this view. Gruen sees the 'day of Eleusis' as an expression of Roman desire to bring about peace between the Ptolemaic and Seleucid kingdoms, yet admits that Rome's behavior in the second incident can only be described as an "aberration."¹⁰⁶ There is no need then to dwell on the second of these events. As for the earlier episode, here the *patres* showed little inclination at first to offer their good services to the rivals in the Sixth Syrian War. Only when it became clear that Antiochus IV was about to achieve effective control of Egypt through his military victories and manipulation of Ptolemy VI Philometor, did the Roman attitude change. From that moment onwards, Rome was determined to maintain an independent Ptolemaic kingdom. Ti. Numisius' failure to achieve a peace settlement demonstrated that the Republic could not enforce its will as long as the Third Macedonian War was being fought. Consequently Rome applied indirect pressure on Antiochus, encouraging third parties to act as mediators. Direct confrontation was withheld until victory over Macedon was achieved, and Rome's ability to impose its will made apparent. At that stage, Popillius Laenas did not try to mediate between Antiochus Epiphanes and the Ptolemaic royal house. Instead, he demanded—and received—a unilateral Seleucid withdrawal from the Ptolemaic kingdom. This behavior, taken together with Roman efforts to undermine the rule of Eumenes II of Pergamum, do not support the view that Rome ignored the Seleucid breaches of the

¹⁰⁶ Gruen 1976: 76, 81-82, 95; Gruen 1984: II. 659-660, 664.

Treaty of Apamea because they were of no interest to the Republic. Nor can a legalistic approach resolve the problem of why Rome chose to turn a blind eye to the Seleucid king's violation of the treaty.¹⁰⁷

Roman Compromise

Perhaps, then, there is another explanation for Rome's behavior towards the Seleucid kingdom from 173 onwards. Rome's relations with Macedon became extremely tense in 173, and the Republic's policy from that time onwards was designed to isolate Perseus. The implications of this policy for Rome's relations with the other major Hellenistic states, the Seleucid kingdom included, were obvious. As long as these states did not openly side with Perseus, Rome could not afford to alienate them. This constraint on Rome's behavior towards the Seleucid kingdom probably became clear to Antiochus, when his ambassador, Apollonius son of Menestheus, visited Rome in 173. In the following year the signs of growing tension between Rome and Macedon multiplied, and Antiochus was well aware of the possibilities for increasing his own standing and that of his kingdom. Yet, it was not merely the lust for power and aggrandizement that made Antiochus defy various clauses in the Treaty of Apamea. From the year 172, or perhaps even earlier, the king realized that the Ptolemaic kingdom was bent on attacking his kingdom and prising Coele-Syria and Phoenicia from his grasp. An appreciation of both the aggressive intentions of the Ptolemaic kingdom and of Rome's preoccupation with the kingdom of Macedon is surely the background to Antiochus' decision to abrogate the Treaty of Apamea.

Why did Rome tacitly accept Seleucid defiance on the 'day of Eleusis' and afterwards? This implicit acquiescence is well

¹⁰⁷ So Paltiel 1979b, who argues that the clauses limiting Seleucid sea-power and forbidding Antiochus III to possess war elephants or recruit mercenaries from beyond the Taurus were valid only during the king's lifetime. He argues that other clauses, such as the payment of reparations, were honored by Antiochus' sons because they were considered private contracts. This suggests that there were two sets of clauses, with one set more binding than the other. The preamble to the treaty shows, however, that all its provisions are equally binding. Cf. Polyb. 21.43.1: φιλίαν ὑπάρχειν Ἀντιόχῳ καὶ Ῥωμαίοις εἰς ἅπαντα τὸν χρόνον ποιοῦντι τὰ κατὰ τὰς συνθήκας. Paltiel's explanation is also vitiated by Seleucus IV's apparent regard for the naval clause forbidding his ships to sail beyond Cape Sarpedonium, Polyb. 25.4.10.

demonstrated by the embassy of Ti. Sempronius Gracchus, which visited Antioch shortly after the *pompé* at Daphne, where Seleucid military might was paraded in view of an international audience. The Roman envoy seems to have ignored this very public demonstration of Seleucid military might and independence.¹⁰⁸ The explanation for this lies in the circumstances prevailing in Rome in January 168, when the Senate decided to demand an end to the Sixth Syrian War. By that time, the Roman army in Greece had experienced two campaigning seasons, but victory still seemed uncertain and far ahead. Moreover, even if the *patres* were optimistic about the final outcome of the armed conflict with Macedon, they could not ignore the strain on their resources. Nor was it easy to recruit manpower for the Macedonian war (Livy 43.14.2-10). Declaring war on Antiochus Epiphanes as soon as the war with Macedon was won was not an appealing prospect, and the move was not likely to win popular support. Even after Pydna, these considerations would have still held true.

There were other difficulties, political as well as logistic, of enormous proportions. The launching of a campaign against the Seleucid kingdom meant that the Roman army in Greece had to cross over to Asia Minor and be prepared to march as far as Cilicia in order to confront the Seleucid army. Naval assistance for such an operation would also be required. But Eumenes II, a close political ally of the Seleucid king, would not necessarily support such a campaign through Asia Minor. Moreover, if the Roman army were to march through Pergamene territory, or pass through areas of Greek cities attached to Eumenes, his own interests were bound to suffer. A Roman campaign might have united the two Hellenistic kingdoms in a common effort to repel the Romans from Asia. Since this war would have followed immediately upon the defeat of Macedon, Greeks everywhere would come to the inevitable conclusion that the Republic was their common enemy. Danger might also come to a Roman expeditionary force from a variety of warlike tribes, even before they reached the Seleucid kingdom. Alexander the Great had covered a similar route, from Macedon to Issus, in about eighteen months, and a Roman expedition was not likely to fare much better.

¹⁰⁸ Polyb. 30.25-27; Diod. 31.16-17.

Antiochus' Gains at Eleusis

The Senate had, it seems, to draw a fine line between what was imperative to the Republic, and what seemed non-negotiable on the part of the Seleucid king. Thus the demands which the Senate and its envoy Popillius Laenas failed to make of Antiochus Epiphanes are no less important than the actual terms laid down before the Seleucid king. Antiochus understood that if he held his ground at Eleusis, a war with Rome might follow, in spite of the enormous difficulties the Romans would have to face. But if he were to lose face and give up his ambitions vis-à-vis the Ptolemaic kingdom, he would nonetheless be able to reap some of the gains he had secured before and during his war with Egypt. The Seleucid army would emerge victorious from the war and its strength would remain undiminished, with the tacit assent of Rome. By giving in to Rome, Antiochus would in effect nullify those provisions in the Treaty of Apamea which theoretically, at least, could still be imposed. There were other benefits to be had from this course of action. Coele-Syria and Phoenicia would remain in the Seleucid domain, again with the silent blessing of Rome, and the loot taken in the war was to stay in Seleucid coffers. As for the Ptolemaic kingdom, it was allowed to maintain its separate identity, but it emerged from the war militarily powerless, financially destitute, and with the prospect of continuous division within.

The Procession at Daphne

Two years after the 'day of Eleusis,' in the summer of 166, Antiochus Epiphanes made a point of demonstrating his gains from the war against the Ptolemaic kingdom. Daphne was to become the focus of interest for visitors from afar. A procession was to be performed in this suburb of Antioch, and games and gladiatorial contests were to be held.¹⁰⁹ The king had broadcast his intentions to the Hellenic world well in advance, and the publicity apparently aroused much interest in the games at Daphne. The festivities opened with a parade by troops of the Seleucid army. The

¹⁰⁹ For the date: e.g. Mørkholm 1966: 98 n. 37. Bunge 1976, suggests that the games were celebrated in September 166 on the ninth anniversary of Antiochus' accession. For two attempts to shift the date of the celebrations to 169 and 165, see Geller 1991: 1-2 and Bar-Kochva 1989: 466-73. See however Gera & Horowitz 1997: 240-43, 248.

participants included approximately 40 elephants, 140 chariots, 9,500 horse, and more than 41,000 infantry. Spectators of the martial parade would have been impressed not only by the military might on display but also by its symbolic expression, the splendid trappings of many of the soldiers. The riches amassed by Antiochus Epiphanes during his Egyptian campaign were also presented in the non-military part of the procession, in which objects made of gold and silver were lavishly displayed. Even after the thirty-day period for the games came to an end Antiochus Epiphanes continued to entertain his guests in the most extravagant manner.¹¹⁰

Polybius ascribes to the Seleucid king a motive for organizing the spectacle at Daphne: Antiochus IV wanted to surpass Aemilius Paullus in the splendor of his liberality (Polyb. 30.25.1). In the year preceding the games at Daphne, the victor of Pydna had organized games in Amphipolis, where he unveiled the booty taken during the Third Macedonian War. Paullus had also demonstrated great generosity towards his guests (Livy 45.32.8-45.33.7). The historian, not surprisingly, portrays Antiochus as simply imitating the shining example of one of Polybius' heroes. Nevertheless, this explanation may well be the right one,¹¹¹ and not merely on the personal level. Just as the games in Amphipolis demonstrated not only the personal achievements of Aemilius Paullus, but also the greatness of Rome, so the display at Daphne was intended to proclaim the king's accomplishments in the Sixth Syrian War and to confirm that the Seleucid kingdom was a major power once again, unhampered by the results of the battle of Magnesia. Antiochus could permit himself to display the great bounty amassed in Egypt, parade the victorious troops, and demonstrate, in full view of an international audience, that the Treaty of Apamea was no longer a limiting factor. The commemoration of the victory over Ptolemaic Egypt,¹¹² sometimes cited as the reason for these celebrations, was in fact part of a more ambitious plan. Antiochus Epiphanes presented his kingdom as a power equal to that of Rome, thus obfuscating both the blow to his prestige at Eleusis and the restrictions

¹¹⁰ Polyb. 30.25-26 = Athen. 5.194c-95f; Athen. 10.439b-d; Diod. 31.16.

¹¹¹ Polybius' explanation is accepted by Otto 1934: 83; Walbank 1996: 126.

¹¹² So Mørkholm 1966: 97-98, who on pp. 172-75, rightly rejects the view of Tarn 1951: 193-98. Tarn maintains that the procession at Daphne was designed to commemorate the victory of Eucratides over Demetrius of Bactria.

on his ability to wield an independent foreign policy in the Mediterranean basin. The king retained his freedom of action in the eastern parts of his kingdom, and he may have also intended the celebrations at Daphne to mark his resolve to leave for an *anabasis* in the East, similar to the military campaign launched by his father, Antiochus III.¹¹³ One further consideration which may have contributed to Antiochus' decision to arrange the games at Daphne may have been the recent success of athletes from various Seleucid cities in international competitions.¹¹⁴ The king expected these contestants to win on their home turf and bring greater glory to his kingdom.

Soon after the games in Daphne were over, Antiochus Epiphanes was visited by a delegation headed by Ti. Sempronius Gracchus. The Roman ambassador refrained from any mention of what must have been by now public knowledge, the fact that the Seleucid king no longer felt himself bound by the Treaty of Apamea. In fact, Gracchus' audience with the king was conducted in a most friendly atmosphere (Polyb. 30.27; Diod. 31.17). Antiochus could now be sure that the Senate was maintaining the quiet understanding reached in Eleusis, and was willing to let the agreement signed between Rome and his father fall into neglect. The king was ready to turn his attention to the East, where Rome had no interest, and try to regain the Seleucid holdings there which had been lost since 188.

Antiochus' Eastern Campaign

Antiochus' eastern campaign began in the spring of 165.¹¹⁵ The army marching to the East was undoubtedly composed of the troops who had paraded in Daphne, but other units, which were stationed in the East and consequently not summoned for the *pompé*, were bound to join the main army as it made its way

¹¹³ Bunge 1976: 55-57.

¹¹⁴ SEG XLI 115 cols. I-II, first published by Tracy & Habicht 1991, lists the victors of the Panathenaic games for 170 and 166. The latter group apparently did not attend the games at Daphne, but their success in Athens reflects the level of excellence achieved at the time by competitors from the Seleucid kingdom.

¹¹⁵ 1 Macc. 3.37; Jos. Ant. 12.297. Antiochus' *anabasis* will be discussed here only briefly; for a more detailed exposition, see Mørkholm 1966: 166-80, and Gera & Horowitz 1997, who discuss additional cuneiform evidence.

eastward. Antiochus Epiphanes, it would seem, was able to marshal an army as big as the Seleucid armies in the days of Raphia and Magnesia.¹¹⁶ In the early summer, probably around June, the Seleucid army reached "the fortresses of the city of Habigalbat which they call the land of Armil." This was the territory to the east or northeast of Lake Van, territory within the kingdom of Artaxias I, ruler of Armenia.¹¹⁷ Artaxias is known to have made a show of resisting the Seleucid army of Antiochus Epiphanes, but when opposition proved ineffective, he surrendered and recognized Antiochus' authority over him. The Seleucid king then allowed Artaxias to remain as a client king.¹¹⁸ After Armenia, Antiochus surfaces again at the mouth of the Persian Gulf where he re-established Alexandria, the city Alexander the Great had built there. The Seleucid king renamed it Antioch, after himself (Pliny, *NH* 6.138-39). While in the area, Antiochus Epiphanes also organized, but did not participate in, an expedition to explore the coast of the Persian Gulf. The king's presence in the area can now be fixed to a date before October 30, 165.¹¹⁹

The next, and last, appearance of Antiochus Epiphanes is recorded for the year 164. The king demanded that the treasures of a temple of Artemis in Elymais be handed over to him. The local inhabitants would not permit such a violation, and Antiochus, not wishing to impose his wishes by force, retired upcountry (*ἀναχωρῶν*) to a place named Tabae, where he died.¹²⁰ Antiochus' movements from the head of the Persian Gulf to Elymais, probably to Susa,¹²¹ and then to the upper regions suggest that he was heading towards Parthia. In the depiction of Alexander's pursuit of Darius from Persepolis to the region of Ecbatana and beyond,

¹¹⁶ See Bar-Kochva 1989: 30-40.

¹¹⁷ BM 35015 + 35332 + 55531 (Sachs & Hunger 1988-96: II. 496-97). See Gera & Horowitz 1997: 243-49.

¹¹⁸ See Diod. 31.17a; Appian, *Syr.* 45-46 and 66; Porphyry, *FGH* 260 F 38, F 56.

¹¹⁹ Pliny, *NH* 6.147; BM 45848 + 45907 (Sachs & Hunger 1988-96: II. 496-97). See Gera & Horowitz 1997: 243-49.

¹²⁰ Polyb. 31.9, which does not indicate the use of force. The other sources, of which only some are dependent on Polybius, speak of combat. So 1 Macc. 6.1-4; 2 Macc. 1.13-16, 9.1-3; Jos. *Ant.* 12.354-55; Appian, *Syr.* 66; Porphyry, *FGH* 260 F 53, F 56. See Holleaux 1938-68: III. 255-79.

¹²¹ Tarn 1951: 463-66, identified the temple of Artemis in Elymais with the temple of Nanacia which was located in Susa. Guépin 1965-66, prefers a location close to the pass of Tang-i Sarvak.

Tabae is also mentioned as lying in *Paraetacene ultima* (Curt. 5.13.2). This means that Tabae should be located in Paraetacene, as far as possible from Persepolis, on the border of Paraetacene and Media, and in the general direction of Ecbatana.¹²²

Rebellions against Seleucid Rule

The route taken by Antiochus IV Epiphanes in 165-164 indicates that the king was seeking an armed confrontation with Parthia. In fact, the general pattern of his movements, first to Armenia in the northeast, then down to Mesopotamia and the mouth of the Persian Gulf, and then north towards Media is not dissimilar to the itinerary chosen by his father when *he* was on his way to fight the Parthians.¹²³ Tacitus speaks of Antiochus IV as actually engaged in war against the Parthians (*Parthorum bello*) because the Parthian king, Arsaces, had rebelled.¹²⁴ While Tacitus must have been mistaken to conclude from Antiochus' geographical proximity to the Parthians and his bellicose intentions that the king in fact met them on the battlefield, his words indicate that Antiochus' campaign was occasioned by a recent rebellion which the Seleucid king rushed to quell. Interestingly, Antiochus' campaign against the Armenian king Artaxias is explained by a Greek historian in an identical manner. Antiochus, we are told, the strongest king of his time, went to war against Artaxias. This took place after Artaxias had rebelled against "King Antiochus," assembling a powerful army and establishing a city to be named after himself (Diod. 31.17a). It is clear that Diodorus has conflated two kings, Antiochus III and Antiochus IV, and it is the son who tries to undo the effects of a rebellion which occurred in his father's time. Artaxias' revolt against Seleucid domination and the foundation of Artaxata are securely dated within the reign of Antiochus the Great, after his defeat at Magnesia,¹²⁵ but it is Antiochus Epiphanes

¹²² For additional discussion, see Gera & Horowitz 1997: 250 n. 71.

¹²³ For the route of Antiochus III see Polyb. 8.23 (Armosata), 9.43 (down the Euphrates), 10.27-31 (Ecbatana in Media and Parthia).

¹²⁴ *Hist.* 5.8.2-3. The *rex Antiochus demere superstitionem et mores Graecorum dare adnitus* of the passage is undoubtedly Antiochus IV. See M. Stern 1974-84: II. 48. For attempts to identify him with Antiochus VII see Meyer 1921: 153 n. 2. For the view that Tacitus conflated the two kings, Antiochus IV and VII, see Otto 1934: 85 n. 3; Bickerman 1937a: 24 n. 4.

¹²⁵ Strabo 11.14.5-6 (C 528-29), 11.14.15 (C 531-32); Plut. *Luc.* 31.3-4. Polyb.

who went to war against Artaxias in order to bring the principality of Armenia, lost after Magnesia, back to the Seleucid fold. Tacitus' testimony should be interpreted in similar fashion. Antiochus Epiphanes marched with his army in the general direction of Parthia, with the object of annexing it yet again, after the Parthians had rebelled against Seleucid yoke in the final years of Antiochus III's reign. Tacitus' Parthian king who rebelled against the Seleucids is probably Arsaces IV Priapatius (ca. 191-76), while the king against whom Antiochus IV set out in his campaign is Arsaces VI Mithridates I (ca. 171-138/7). The dynastic names of both Arsaces and Antiochus have misled Tacitus, just as the two Antiochi were merged into one by Diodorus Siculus.¹²⁶ The picture which emerges so far of an initiative by Antiochus Epiphanes to restore Seleucid control over Parthia is further supported by the absence of any evidence pointing to a serious Parthian attempt to expand westward. Media seems to have been safe in Seleucid hands until well after the death of Antiochus IV.¹²⁷ Artaxias of Armenia was not the only dynast to rebel in those years. A certain Zariadris took advantage of the troubled times faced by the Seleucids in order to establish his own kingdom in Sophene, and the presence of Antiochus the Great in Elymais in 187 may be attributed to an attempt by the local population to free themselves from Seleucid domination.¹²⁸

25.2.12, records the inclusion of Artaxias in a peace agreement of 180/79 between Pharnaces and Eumenes II, making it clear that Artaxias remained independent throughout the reign of Seleucus IV. Cf. Otto 1934: 86.

¹²⁶ Mørkholm 1966: 176, is undecided whether Tacitus' Parthian revolt should be assigned to Arsaces I or to Arsaces IV, but the first possibility should be rejected in light of Antiochus III's victory over the Parthians, Polyb. 10.28-31. Altheim 1948: 36, and Le Rider 1965: 312-23, favor a rebellion by Mithridates I. The historical background, however, points to an earlier revolt, and Le Rider's contention that Arsacid money begins with Mithridates I who issued coins after his successful rebellion against Antiochus IV, has proven wrong. The Parthians began issuing money already in the third century; cf. Abgarians & Sellwood 1971; Sellwood 1983: 279-81. Both Justin 41.5.9 and Isidore of Charax, *FGH* 781 F 2.7, portray Arsaces IV's son, Phraates, as an independent ruler, and this reinforces the conclusion that the father is Tacitus' rebel.

¹²⁷ Mørkholm 1966: 178-79. Our only sign of Parthian activity is the settlement of the Mardians in Charax at the western tip of the Caspian Gates, Isidore of Charax, *FGH* 781 F 2.7.

¹²⁸ See above p. 99.

The Achievements of Antiochus IV

In the *anabasis* of 165-64, Antiochus IV Epiphanes cowed Artaxias of Armenia, founded the city of Antioch on the shores of the Persian Gulf, initiated the exploration of the seaboard there, and then attempted to wage a campaign against the Parthians, a campaign which was aborted only because of the king's death. All these deeds attest to a conscious effort on Antiochus' part to extend Seleucid authority in the eastern parts of his kingdom, and to restore the realm to the heights of power and expansion which his father Antiochus III had managed to achieve in his *anabasis*. Yet, despite Antiochus' high ambitions, this eastern campaign reveals that horizons were diminishing for the Seleucid king. The 'day of Eleusis' had put a stop to the king's aspirations to expand his power, influence, and authority over the Ptolemaic kingdom. Furthermore, if the king had entertained any thoughts (and it is unlikely that he did) of repossessing the territories lost by his father in Asia Minor, the lesson of the ultimatum delivered by Popillius Laenas would not have been lost. The East was the only front left for a Seleucid king, because Rome, as yet, had no real interest in it. Thus, while some of Antiochus' successes should not be minimized, the evacuation of Egypt and Cyprus imposed by Rome was to have lasting consequences. The Republic would not allow the Seleucid kingdom of Antiochus Epiphanes to become a major power in the Mediterranean basin. At the same time, Rome's ability to enforce her wishes on Antiochus was not without its limits and the king reaped considerable advantages from the confrontation at Eleusis. Seleucid control of Coele-Syria and Phoenicia was maintained, the military threat from the south was eliminated, the coffers of the kingdom were plentiful, and the limitations on Seleucid military might, as agreed upon in Apamea, were in effect ignored. In terms of size, sources of manpower, and variety of equipment, the Seleucid army had become as impressive as the armed forces employed by Antiochus the Great.

Antiochus Epiphanes consistently maintained his alliance with Eumenes II of Pergamum and thus was able to ensure the security of the northwestern parts of the kingdom. The continuing Seleucid-Pergamene alliance meant that Rome could do little to incite one of these two powers against the other. Roman attempts to destabilize the alliance were generally directed against the kingdom

of Eumenes, because of Pergamum's geographical proximity to Greece, an area of great importance to Rome. The achievements of Antiochus Epiphanes were considerable, but his attempt to transform his kingdom into a major power failed. In 169, the Seleucid squandered the opportunity to make the Ptolemaic kingdom a client state, and in the following year he succumbed to the Roman demand that he withdraw. In that respect, the festivities at Daphne, while designed to impress both a local and an international audience with evidence of a Seleucid resurgence, were a hollow spectacle. Recognition of Seleucid power would only come after the kingdom had acquired inner stability and further territory. Both were to elude Antiochus Epiphanes, who was to die while on a campaign to achieve the second of these two goals.

CHAPTER SIX

EVENTS IN JUDAEA: 168-163

1. *Apollonius the Mysarch and the Decrees of Antiochus IV*

The final four years of Antiochus Epiphanes' reign (168-164) were characterized by the relative strength of the Seleucid kingdom, despite the diplomatic defeat at Eleusis. Thus it is clear that the Hasmonaean revolt, which broke out in 167, could not have been the result of a rational assessment by the Jews that the Seleucid kingdom was weakening and that the Jews should take advantage of an opportune time to win their independence. It seems, rather, that the rebellion began in response to the persecutions instigated by Antiochus IV Epiphanes, although the issue is much debated among scholars. Loyalty to the Law, despair in the face of religious oppression, and the hope that independent action would bring about redemption—these apparently were the motivations of those who chose the path of armed resistance. Political considerations, as our summary of events in Judaea will show, came only later.

Apollonius the Mysarch in Jerusalem

The dispatch of a Seleucid officer, Apollonius the Mysarch, to Jerusalem is a convenient starting point for the discussion of events in Judaea in the wake of the Sixth Syrian War.¹ Apollonius' mission to Judaea is dated by 1 Maccabees to "two years after" Antiochus IV sacked the temple. We have seen that the king's attack on the Temple took place in 143 S.E., according to the Babylonian reckoning, so that Apollonius' mission to Jerusalem is to be dated to 145

¹ 2 Macc. 5.24. The title *Μυσάρχης* denotes Apollonius as the commanding officer of a Mysian unit. This Apollonius is identical with the *ἄρχων φορολογίας* of 1 Macc. 1.29, where his title is the result of a mistake by the Greek translator of 1 Maccabees. The translator was unaware that the word Mysian, transliterated in Hebrew characters, was an ethnic name. He understood it to mean "official in charge of tax-gathering," from the Hebrew word for taxes, *מִסֵּד*. See Wellhausen 1905: 161; Abel 1949: 15. Mittwoch 1955: 356, offers an unlikely solution to the problem.

S.E. by the same reckoning, i.e. April 167 at the earliest.² Since the author of Daniel, a contemporary of Antiochus Epiphanes, associates the Roman ultimatum of July 168 with Apollonius' mission (11.30), the two events could not have been that far apart. It seems likely then that the *Mysarch* left for Jerusalem in the spring of 167, and arrived there in the early summer.³

When Apollonius and his Mysian soldiers arrived in Jerusalem, they were given a peaceful reception. But within a few days the apparent harmony was dispelled, and the Seleucid soldiers attacked and massacred many of the inhabitants of Jerusalem.⁴ Other measures soon followed: the walls of Jerusalem were torn down, and a new citadel, the *Acra*, was built. The new citadel was intended for Apollonius' soldiers, who are described in the Book of Daniel as "people of an alien god," whom Antiochus put in charge of his strongest fortresses. Another activity which is attributed to the Seleucid king in this connection is the distribution of "land at a price." In other words, Apollonius' soldiers came to Jerusalem as military settlers. 1 Macc. 1.38 expresses the horror aroused by this addition of a permanent foreign element to the population of Jerusalem, calling Jerusalem the "seat of gentiles" (κατοικία ἀλλοτρίων). The Seleucid soldiers and the Hellenists who joined them, now made up the citizen-body of the 'Antiochenes in Jerusalem.' These new citizens of Jerusalem must have received their lands at the expense of Jewish landowners, while further losses to the Jews were incurred by the rampages and plundering of the soldiers. The killings, enslavement of women and children, and forcible appropriation of possessions caused many to flee Jerusalem and seek refuge in the mountains and desert nearby.⁵

² For the date of the king's attack, see above Ch. IV/4. Schürer 1973-87: I. 152-53 n. 37, also dates the Apollonius affair to 167. Others wrongly date it to 168, see Bickermann 1937a: 161; Bringmann 1983: 15-16 n. 1.

³ Fischer 1980: 143-44, reaches a similar conclusion on the basis of Dan. 12.11-12.

⁴ 1 Macc. 1.29-30; 2 Macc. 5.24-26. 1 Maccabees stresses that Apollonius' unit was numerically strong, while 2 Maccabees demonstrates this by supplying inflated figures. The latter source also claims that the massacre occurred on a Sabbath. Since 1 Maccabees omits any reference to the seventh day, and an attack on the Jews on that day is a recurrent theme—see 1 Macc. 2.32; Jos. C. *Apionem* 1.209-10; *Ant.* 12.5-6; Frontinus, *Strat.* 2.1.17; Plut. *Mor.* 169c; Dio 37.16.2-4 and cf. M. Stern 1974-84: fr. 30, 229, 256, 406—this detail was probably added by the epitomator. Apollonius had no need to wait for the Sabbath, because the Jews were not wary of him.

⁵ 1 Macc. 1.29-40; 2 Macc. 5.27; Dan. 11.39; Jos. *Ant.* 12.252. Cf. 1 Macc. 3.45.

Antiochus IV Reacts to Jason's Revolt

The deeds done by Apollonius and his Mysian soldiers point to the reason for their dispatch, as well as to the nature of their mission. It seems obvious that Antiochus Epiphanes had lost his trust in the people of Jerusalem. After all, many of them had supported Jason in his rebellion against the king, while the latter was busy fighting the Sixth Syrian War. At the time, only a minority of the citizens of Antioch in Jerusalem gathered round Menelaus and held the citadel until the king was able to come to their aid. Now the king could strengthen his hold on the rebellious Jews by sending a unit of his own soldiers to join the loyal Menelaus and his men. These two groups would dominate the population in Jerusalem from a new citadel, the *Acra*, which would be large enough to serve as the center of the *polis*, yet small enough for its walls to be manned by Menelaus' party and the military settlers. While those loyal to Antiochus were to live in security, the remaining population of Jerusalem was to be denied such quiet. The king ordered the walls of Jerusalem demolished so that the Jews could never again shield themselves behind them. To further intimidate the Jews, Apollonius had his soldiers kill many of them. The economic measures instituted by the king were intended to supply the new settlers with cheap labor and the means of their livelihood, while at the same time punishing those who were suspected of collaborating with Jason.⁶ In sum, Apollonius' mission in 167 was intended to penalize the Jews for their previous disloyalty towards Antiochus, to cow them into submission, and to strengthen the king's hold on Judaea and Jerusalem.⁷

One possible objection to this interpretation of Apollonius' expedition is the time gap between Jason's revolt in the winter of 169/8

See Tcherikover 1959: 188-89; Schürer 1973-87: I. 152-54. Bar-Kochva 1989: 438-44, denies that the foreign soldiers were military settlers. 1 Macc. 1.34, refers to the settlement of the *Acra* by ἔθνος ἀμαρτωλόν, ἄνδρες παράνομοι and these too are sometimes thought to be non-Jews, cf. Hengel 1974: I. 281. But παράνομοι refers to Jews, as can be seen from 1 Macc. 1.11, 10.61, 11.21, and see Bickermann 1937a: 72. Josephus had it right. For the *Acra*, see Sievers 1994.

⁶ According to 2 Macc. 5.24, Antiochus ordered Apollonius τοὺς ἐν ἡλικίᾳ πάντας κατασφάζει, τὰς δὲ γυναῖκας καὶ τοὺς νεωτέρους πωλεῖν. It seems that a comprehensive order of this nature was never issued; the writer assigns this command to Antiochus on the basis of the incidents of killing and enslavement that did occur, cf. 1 Macc. 1.30 and 32.

⁷ Bickermann 1937a: 71-73; Tcherikover 1959: 188-90; Hengel 1974: I. 281.

and the response to it, which came about a year and a half later. Furthermore, it might be argued that there was no need for Antiochus to punish the Jews, because he had already done so by ransacking their Temple. In fact, in the short period that separated the first campaign of the Sixth Syrian War from the second, Antiochus was forced to quell the rebellion, but could not devote his time to the reorganization of affairs in Jerusalem. He could deal with the symptoms, not offer a cure for the disease. The king's main concern was the Ptolemaic kingdom and the relations between Ptolemy VI Philometor, whom he had left in Memphis, and Ptolemy Euergetes II and Cleopatra II in Alexandria. Already in that same winter, Antiochus was engaged in preparations for the naval expedition to Cyprus, and in the early spring he led his troops to Alexandria. The king could not divert his attention to Jewish affairs before he withdrew from Egypt at the end of July 168, and even then it is hardly likely that the Jews stood very high on his agenda. After all, the king had to deal with a series of issues: the effects of his withdrawal on future relations with Rome and the Ptolemaic kingdom, the impact of his evacuation of Egypt on internal affairs, the relative neglect of the kingdom after approximately two years of fighting, the management of the spoils amassed during the war, and the need to give his army a rest after the prolonged campaigns. Thus, the fact that the king sent Apollonius to Jerusalem in the spring of 167 does not invalidate the contention that his goal was to address the problem of Jewish betrayal, as it had revealed itself during Jason's rebellion of 169/8.

The Temple Defiled

The Seleucid government probably expected to encounter some resistance from Jason's former supporters. It failed to foresee, however, the effect of the permanent settlement of pagan soldiers in Jerusalem. The importance of this innovation has been stressed by Tcherikover who argues, correctly, that these soldiers must have brought their own cults with them. There can be little doubt that the worship of foreign gods was now a daily affair in Jerusalem. However, Tcherikover goes too far in claiming that the Temple was desecrated by the new citizens, who worshipped Syrian deities in the shrine itself as well as on other sites on the Temple mount. He also asserts that the Jewish response to all the changes intro-

duced by Apollonius and his men was not merely a retreat to the mountains and desert, a fact which is attested by our sources, but a rebellion. Apollonius had threatened the very existence of Judaism, and the Jews had no recourse but to fight.⁸ Some of the innovations which Tcherikover attributes to Apollonius and his men—the oriental nature of the foreign cults and the practice of these cults on the Temple mount—are based on speculation, and are not substantiated by the sources. Yet they serve to explain how the Temple became defiled and why the offering of the daily sacrifice was discontinued.⁹

Other solutions, equally hypothetical, are also possible. Just three decades before the arrival of Apollonius and his unit in Jerusalem, Antiochus III made a public proclamation, excluding gentiles from entering the Temple precincts and banning the introduction of impure animals, their skin, and their meat into Jerusalem.¹⁰ The king realized that the presence of non-Jews in Jerusalem might inadvertently hurt Jewish religious feelings and he took steps to minimize the danger. Thus it can be argued that the defilement of Jerusalem in 167 occurred as a result of the arrival of a relatively large number of foreigners. These men had come to Jerusalem equipped with orders to instill fear in the local population and to make the city their home. In a climate such as this, it is difficult to conceive them showing much respect for Jewish customs, and it is unlikely that they refrained from visiting the Jerusalem Temple, which was now the shrine of their city. It is therefore possible that a mixture of violence, ignorance, and overbearing behavior on the part of Antiochus' settlers led to the profanation of Jerusalem and the Temple, rather than the appropriation of the Temple by soldiers for the worship of one of the Syrian deities. Whatever the reason for the city's desecration, the pious Jews now left for the hills and desert, joining those who had left Jerusalem because of their affiliation with Jason (1 Macc. 1.38).

The Decrees of Antiochus

Relations between the Seleucid government and the Jews had not yet reached their lowest point. Next came the king's decision to

⁸ Tcherikover 1959: 194-96.

⁹ 1 Macc. 1.37 and 39; Dan. 11.31.

¹⁰ Jos. Ant. 12.145-46. See above p. 34 n. 109.

persecute the Jews by the placing the 'abomination of desolation' in the Temple on December 167.¹¹ This new policy on the part of the king seems to have been his response to an ever deteriorating relationship between the Seleucid authorities and the Jews.¹² It is in this sense that Tcherikover's view that "it was not the revolt which came as a response to the persecution, but the persecution which came as a response to the revolt" is correct.¹³ What we cannot determine is whether the actual fighting between Jews and Seleucid soldiers broke out in the wake of the arrival of the military settlers in Jerusalem, or if the number of Jews who fled from the city was so great that the king became worried that he would soon have a rebellion on his hands unless he reacted decisively.¹⁴

Antiochus' reaction to the situation in Jerusalem and the countryside was made known through an emissary, Geron the Athenian, who brought word of the decrees imposed on the Jews.¹⁵ The decrees included the prohibition of Jewish worship in the Temple in Jerusalem and elsewhere. Jews could no longer keep the Sabbath or celebrate their festivals. Circumcision was banned and the possession of Torah scrolls forbidden. Any attempt to follow the precepts of the Torah was punished with a death sentence, and the same fate befell those who refused to transgress the Law. Jews were ordered to take part in Greek festivals, to sacrifice pigs and other unclean animals, and to eat pork. The Jerusalem Temple was defiled by a sacrifice of a sow, and the Temple's precincts became the site for orgies. Altars to the Greek gods were erected throughout Judaea, but the force of these decrees extended beyond Judaea and applied to all of the Jews in Coele-Syria and Phoenicia.¹⁶ The Jerusalem Temple became the sanctuary of Zeus Olympius, but

¹¹ 2 Macc. 6.1; 1 Macc. 1.54 and 59; *Jos. Ant.* 12.253.

¹² 1 Macc. 1.41-42, which tells us of an edict by Antiochus IV designed to unite the various people of his kingdom into one, may be used to contradict this interpretation. However, the historicity of this edict is widely denied, see Bickermann 1937a: 127-28; Mørkholm 1966: 132 n. 53; Gruen 1993: 250-51.

¹³ Tcherikover 1959: 191.

¹⁴ Cf. Hengel 1974: I. 282.

¹⁵ 2 Macc. 6.1. For this reading of the emissary's name, see Habicht 1976a: 229 n. 1a.

¹⁶ 1 Macc. 1.41-64; 2 Macc. 6.1-11; *Jos. Ant.* 12.251-54, 13.243; *BJ* 1.34; *Diod.* 34-35.1.3-4. That the persecutions were applied throughout the province is apparent from 2 Macc. 6.8, which states that the decrees were in effect in the Greek cities by the order of Ptolemy. This Ptolemy is the son of Dorymenes, governor of Coele-Syria and Phoenicia, cf. Habicht 1976a: 230 n. 8a.

Jews were also compelled to make monthly sacrifices on the king's birthday and to take part in the procession for Dionysus. Antiochus Epiphanes' decrees also affected the Samaritans whose temple on Mount Gerizim was now dedicated to Zeus Xenius, or according to a different version, to Zeus Hellenius.¹⁷ Antiochus Epiphanes intended to eradicate the Jewish religion from Coele-Syria and Phoenicia and to implant in the Jews living there belief in the gods of the Greeks and the rituals which such a belief entails.¹⁸

The manner in which Antiochus IV responded to Jewish restiveness seems quite clear, but the same cannot be said about his motives. This is partly due to our ignorance of what really happened in Jerusalem and Judaea between the arrival of Apollonius the *Mysarch* in the city and the moment when the king decided to launch his campaign of persecution and religious coercion. But our ignorance also extends to the king and his personality, despite the fact that ample attention has been paid to his character in our sources, especially Polybius. If the gaps in our understanding of these two questions will be filled by new findings, perhaps it will be possible to understand why Antiochus Epiphanes reacted in such extraordinary fashion to the events in Judaea. At present it seems best to acknowledge our inability to resolve this knotty problem.¹⁹

¹⁷ Jerusalem: 2 Macc. 6.2 and 7. If the second century inscription published by Applebaum 1980, does in fact originate in Jerusalem (and some doubts remain), then one must also consider the cult of Ἄρης Αἰγλήτης, and not Ἄρης Ἀθλητής as in the *editio princeps*. In the *lemmata* to SEG XXX 1695, Habicht understands Ares as a name of a person with the occupation of a flute-player, ἀθλητής. This too is to be rejected. Mt. Gerizim: 2 Macc. 6.2; Jos. Ant. 12.261 and 263. On the authenticity of the letters quoted in Jos. Ant. 12.258-64, see Bickerman 1937b; Momigliano 1975a: 108.

¹⁸ See 2 Macc. 6.9, 11.24; Jos. Ant. 12.263 (the last two references come from official documents); Tac. Hist. 5.8.2. See Millar 1978: 18-20; M. Stern 1968: 96-97, as opposed to Bickermann 1937a: 90-116; Tcherikover 1959: 194-95; Hengel 1974: I. 292-303.

¹⁹ See Millar 1978: 16-17, and note also his remarks on p. 12 on the centrality of Antiochus himself to the solution of this crux. For a recent attempt at explanation see Gruen 1993: 262-64, who argues that Antiochus' treatment of the Jews in 167 was a show of force intended to impress his subjects with his own power and to demonstrate to them that the shame of the 'day of Eleusis' was not to be repeated. However, the mission of Apollonius to Judaea in early 167 started out as nothing more than a typical policing operation intended to strengthen the Seleucid hold on an unruly city. As for the persecution itself, it began in December 167, some seventeen months after the ultimatum of Popilius Laenas, and can hardly be seen as the king's response to that

Mattathias

Jewish reactions to the persecutions ordered by the king were varied. Many did not dare to transgress the royal decrees and risk being punished by death at the hands of the king's troops. These people were now ready to worship foreign gods, to sacrifice to them, and to desecrate the Sabbath.²⁰ To others, loyalty to the laws of the Torah was of the highest priority. In the very face of death, these Jews held fast to the Holy Books, circumcised their sons, and refused to violate the sanctity of the seventh day. In some cases, the faithful took to the desert, where they hoped to practice their beliefs freely, but the king's forces followed them there, and had them killed.²¹ The passive resistance of these Jews could do little to halt the organized persecution, and opposition to the Seleucid government soon took a more active form. When an attempt to enforce the king's decrees was made at the village of Modein, a certain Mattathias, a priest from the family of the Hasmonaeans, not only refused to comply with the king's edicts, but killed a fellow Jew who was willing to make a sacrifice on the altar and the Seleucid officer in charge as well. Mattathias then collected his five sons and his followers and sought refuge in the desert.²² He then resolved to pursue a policy of armed opposition. Mattathias gathered around him as many supporters as he could and propagated the view that Seleucid attacks on the Sabbath, as well as assaults during the week should be met with force. He also began to enforce Jewish Law in the countryside. Altars to the foreign gods were destroyed, young boys were forcibly circumcised, and apostate Jews killed.²³ Mattathias had formed the nucleus of an underground movement, but he died shortly afterwards, leaving to his son Judas Maccabaeus the task of heading an armed struggle against the Seleucid government and the Hellenizing party.

situation, cf. Morgan 1993: 269, and the views expressed in Green 1993: 269-74. Gruen's discussion (pp. 250-61) offers a useful conspectus of earlier undertakings with pertinent criticism and full bibliography. Cf. Tcherikover 1959: 175-203.

²⁰ 1 Macc. 1.43 and 52, 2.15-16, 2.23-24; *Jos. Ant.* 12.255, 12.270.

²¹ 1 Macc. 1.53, 1.57-63, 2.29-38; 2 Macc. 6.10-11, 6.18-7.42, 14.37-38; *Jos. Ant.* 12.255-56, 12.272-75; *BJ* 1.35. Dan. 11.32b-35, seems to refer to the same group.

²² 1 Macc. 2.15-28; *Jos. Ant.* 12.268-71; *BJ* 1.36.

²³ 1 Macc. 2.29-48; *Jos. Ant.* 12.272-78; *BJ* 1.36-37.

2. *The Hasmonaean Revolt and the Central Seleucid Authority*

The first military clash between the Jewish rebels and Seleucid forces occurred when a Seleucid official named Apollonius, apparently the *meridarch* of Samaria, collected forces from the city of Samaria in an attempt to hunt down Judas and his men. In the ensuing battle, the Seleucid commander and many of his soldiers were killed, while the survivors fled the battlefield.²⁴ The picture one gets of this armed confrontation is that of a local governor who tries to rid the area under his jurisdiction of insurgents, but fails to do so.²⁵ After the defeat of Apollonius' forces, an officer named Seron left to attack the rebels, but he and his troops were defeated in the battle of Beth-Horon.²⁶

Seron

If one is to believe the language of 1 Maccabees, Seron's place within the Seleucid hierarchy was rather high. He is referred to as the "commander of the Syrian army" (1 Macc. 3.13: ὁ ἄρχων τῆς δυνάμεως Συρίας), yet he cannot have enjoyed such an exalted position within the Seleucid government. The author of 1 Maccabees indicates that Judas' successes were conveyed to Antioch only at a later stage (1 Macc. 3.27), and this would explain why a low ranking officer was the commander of this unit. Seron was, it seems, a Seleucid official within the province of Coele-Syria and Phoenicia, but was less important than the governor at that time, Ptolemy son of Dorymenes.²⁷ Seron must have been of lower rank.²⁸ It should be noted that 1 Maccabees, when telling of the

²⁴ 1 Macc. 3.10-12; Jos. *Ant.* 12.287. Cf. Bar-Kochva 1989: 199-206. For the identification with the *meridarch*, mentioned in Jos. *Ant.* 12.261 and 264, see Mørkholm 1966: 108-10; Goldstein 1976: 245. Bévenot 1931: 65-66 and Schunck 1980: 308 n. 10a, identify him with Apollonius the *Mysarch*. Abel 1949: 55-56, combines the two views, suggesting that Apollonius first conducted operations against the people of Jerusalem, and then became governor of Samaria.

²⁵ J. Schwartz & J. Spanier 1991, argue that Samaria was the focus for the activities of Judas' father, Mattathias. For Judas' activity there, see Bar-Kochva 1989: 203.

²⁶ 1 Macc. 3.13-24; Jos. *Ant.* 12.288-92. For a reconstruction of the battle, see Bar-Kochva 1989: 207-18.

²⁷ Ptolemy son of Dorymenes: 2 Macc. 4.45-46, 6.8, 8.8-9; 1 Macc. 3.38; Jos. *Ant.* 12.298; cf. Habicht 1976a: 223 n. 45a.

²⁸ Josephus apparently recognized that Seron's title in 1 Maccabees is inaccurate, and introduced a 'correction': he was the *strategos* of Coele-Syria,

later battle at Emmaus, refers to one of the units within the Seleucid forces as the "Syrian army" (3.41: δύναμις Συρίας). The context of the Emmaus passage makes it clear that the "Syrian army" is not identical with the royal troops, who had been mentioned earlier. How did the unit referred to as the "Syrian army" come to acquire this name? It has been plausibly suggested that this unit was originally referred to in the Hebrew text of 1 Maccabees as the army of Idumaea/Edom (אדום) which in Hebrew can be easily misread as Aram (ארם), i.e. Syria (see below p. 238). The same mistake may have occurred in the Seron passage. If this explanation is correct, then Seron may have been the *strategos* of Idumaea. But by 165 he was replaced by Gorgias, who was then the governor of Idumaea.²⁹ Some support for this hypothesis may be adduced from Seron's line of attack: his troops approached from the west, passed through the ascent of Beth-Horon, and after being defeated, retreated to the land of the Philistines, which at this time was part of Idumaea.³⁰

Another theory may also be proposed. The management of the affairs of the Seleucid provinces and their sub-divisions was apparently divided between two branches of the administration: one, under the command of the provincial *strategos*, concerned itself chiefly with military matters, while the other, headed by a *dioiketes*, was in charge of the financial management of the province. We find the same division of powers between military commanders and financial officials at a more local level.³¹ Despite the apparent separation of responsibilities between these two branches of the administration, too rigid a distinction might be misleading. Thus, at the battle of Emmaus in 165, the overall commander of the

Ant. 12.288. As 1 Maccabees was his only source for the affair, the title Josephus bestows on Seron is meaningless; cf. Bar-Kochva 1989: 132.

²⁹ 1 Macc. 3.10 and 5.6, both refer to Seleucid officials commanding an army (δύναμις) which is identified by its biblical name. On Gorgias' position, see below p. 238.

³⁰ 1 Macc. 3.16-24. For the inclusion of Philistia within Idumaea, see Abel 1949: 76. Bar-Kochva 1989: 132-33 and 209-10, similarly deduced from the direction of Seron's approach that he and his men came from either Jamnia or Gezer.

³¹ Birkman 1938: 129-30; Musti 1984: 186. In Coele-Syria and Phoenicia the division of powers between the *strategos* and the *dioiketai* (there were two) is apparent from SEG XLI 1574, and the discussion of this inscription by Taylor 1979: 152. The same distribution of authority may be inferred from ll. 16 and 38-39 of the inscription. See also *Jos. Ant.* 12.258-64, discussed below, p. 237.

Seleucid forces was Nicanor, who in the previous year had been in charge of the financial administration of Samaria.³² Thus it is possible that Seron was not the *strategos* of Idumaea, but the official responsible for financial affairs there. The name Seron (Σήρων) is not otherwise attested, so that the official known to us as Seron may have borne a Greek name which was either corrupted in the Hebrew original of 1 Maccabees or was misread by its translator. It can be suggested, then, with some caution, that Seron is identical with the financial official of Idumaea in 163, whose name was probably Nesseus.³³

At any rate, as with Apollonius' campaign against Judas Maccabaeus, Seron's offensive seems to have been conducted by a local Seleucid official of mid-rank. Ptolemy son of Dorymenes, the *strategos* of the whole province, is as yet uninvolved in the effort to eradicate the Jewish rebels, while the king in Antioch is apparently unaware of the military defeats suffered by his troops. The lack of interest by the authorities at this stage is reflected in 2 Maccabees, a source which often exhibits first hand knowledge of Seleucid affairs. No explicit reference is made there to the Jewish triumphs over Apollonius and Seron, but the allusion to Judas' invincibility at this time probably indicates knowledge of these victories, even if the author has no desire to describe them in detail.³⁴ Each of these battles may have been relatively unimportant in itself, but together the two victories must have extended Judas' control over the countryside and increased his popularity among the Jews. However, the failure of the Seleucid troops to subdue Judas

³² On Nicanor, see below pp. 236-37. Whether Nicanor and other Seleucid financial officials of his period bore the title of *oikonomos* is a moot point. See the opposing views of Bengtson 1944: 128-29 and 148, and Taylor 1979: 154. Nicanor, at any rate, is referred to as ὁ τὰ βασιλικά πράττων, *Jos. Ant.* 12.261.

³³ For this official, see *SEG* XLI 1556, an inscription from Jamnia-on-Sea. The official's name, in the dative case, is read by the first editor, Isaac 1991, as Νέσσωι, while Gauthier, *Bull. épigr.* 1992: no. 552, suggests Νέσ[τορ]ι. The first three letters ΝΕΣ are easily read. What remains of the fourth, a diagonal stroke descending from the middle of the line to the left end of a low horizontal bar, supports Isaac's readings of a *sigma*. A fifth letter also betrays traces of a low horizontal bar. I therefore suggest Νεσσε[ι]. Νεσσεύς would be a variation of the name Νεσεύς/Νησεύς (cf. *IG* I³ 476 ll. 260-61, 328). There are two indications that Neseus was a financial official: (1) The king's letter to him deals with the Jamnians' request for ἀτέλεια (2) The letter is dated to the summer of 163. At this time, the *strategos* of Idumaea was Gorgias, 2 Macc. 10.14-15, 12.32.

³⁴ 2 Macc. 8.5-6; see Goldstein 1983: 325.

and his men only marginally heightened Seleucid awareness that events in Judaea required closer attention.

Antiochus in the East

Chronologically, the campaigns of Apollonius and Seron were followed by the departure of Antiochus IV for the East. 1 Maccabees attempts to link the king's *anabasis* with developments in Judaea by stating that the military successes of Judas Maccabaeus caused Antiochus to rally his entire army against the Jews. Upon realizing that the effort would exhaust the royal treasury, the king decided to raise additional funds by marching to Persia, leaving the affairs of the western part of his kingdom, and half of his army, in the hands of his chief minister, Lysias. Lysias was then ordered to mount a campaign of his own against the Jews. This outline of events is clearly wrong. It is inconceivable that Antiochus would find himself without funds just a few months after Daphne. Nor is there any logic in the claim that lack of money caused Antiochus to abort his planned campaign against Judaea and to launch an expedition against the much more distant Persia at one and the same time. In addition, while lack of funds supposedly stops Antiochus from attacking the Jews, the king nevertheless orders Lysias to mount a campaign against them. The author of 1 Maccabees, desiring to make the events in Judaea the focal point of his story, asserted that the Seleucid king's departure for his *anabasis* was precipitated by developments in Judaea, and assigns an exaggerated amount of military forces to the handling of the Judaeian crisis.³⁵ In fact, from the time of his visit to Jerusalem in 169/8 until his death, Antiochus IV did not visit Judaea even once.³⁶

³⁵ 1 Macc. 3.10-37; Jos. *Ant.* 12.287-97. See Niese 1900: 455-56; Kolbe 1926: 156-57; Bar-Kochva 1989: 227-28, 231-32.

³⁶ It is true that Jos. *Ant.* 12.248-56, assigns Antiochus IV a visit to Jerusalem at a later date, when telling of the religious persecutions. But our principal sources, 1 & 2 Maccabees and the Book of Daniel, do not mention any such visit. Josephus attributes the actions of Apollonius the Mysarch to the king, see Schürer 1973-87: 152-53 n. 37. In this section, Josephus mentions that Antiochus IV sacrificed a pig on the altar, cf. *Ant.* 13.243 and Diod. 34-35.1.3-4. Both Josephus and Diodorus Siculus apparently used a common source, see M. Stern 1974-84: I. 184. In his attempt to have this common source conform to 1 Maccabees, Josephus removed Apollonius from the narrative and replaced him with the king. The account in the original pagan source was apparently intended to present the clash between the Jews and Antiochus IV as a direct conflict and its purpose was dramatic.

Like all Hellenistic kings, Antiochus IV was the commander-in-chief of the army.³⁷ The king took an active role in the important military campaigns of his day, namely the *anabasis* to the East and the Sixth Syrian War, and his army's successful conquest of Pelusium in the course of this expedition is attributed to his cunning.³⁸ The king's absence from Judaea after 169/8 is evidence that he did not think the events in Judaea were particularly important.³⁹ This neglect of Judaeian affairs is a continuation of earlier Seleucid behavior where the handling of the rebels was left in the hands of middle-ranking commanders, without any apparent effort by the *strategos* of Coele-Syria and Phoenicia or the central government in Antioch to manage the crisis.

The Battle of Emmaus

The next military confrontation between the Jewish rebels and Seleucid troops occurred at Emmaus.⁴⁰ How did the Seleucid authorities respond to the revolt? According to 1 Maccabees, it was Lysias, the chief minister of the kingdom, who sent Ptolemy son of Dorymenes, Nicanor, and Gorgias to fight Judas Maccabaeus. This would seem to indicate that the last three officers were of equal rank, but 2 Maccabees presents a different scenario. Nicanor and Gorgias, we are told, were dispatched to fight the Jews by the order of Ptolemy son of Dorymenes, the governor of Coele-Syria and Phoenicia, not by Lysias.⁴¹ The introduction of Lysias in the first version reflects the tendency of the author of 1 Maccabees to stress the importance of the Jewish revolt, as he did when associating the *anabasis* of Antiochus IV to the East with events in Judaea. 2 Maccabees, on the other hand, provides a wealth of circumstantial details which seem credible, even if they are not corroborated by independent sources. Thus, we are told that Philip, the *epistates* of Jerusalem, sent a letter to his superior, Ptolemy son of Dorymenes, informing him of the spread of the revolt, and as a result, the governor sent two subordinate commanders to fight the rebels. In general, the abridgment of Jason of Cyrene underlying 2

³⁷ Préaux 1978: I. 195-99; Bar-Kochva 1976: 85-86.

³⁸ Polyb. 28.18; Diod. 30.18.

³⁹ Cf. Kolbe 1926: 155; Mørkholm 1966: 150.

⁴⁰ 1 Macc. 3.38-4.25; Jos. *Ant.* 12.298-312; 2 Macc. 8.8-29, 8.34-36. For the military side of the campaign, see Bar-Kochva 1989: 219-74.

⁴¹ 1 Macc. 3.32-38; Jos. *Ant.* 12.295-98; 2 Macc. 8.8-9.

Maccabees is reliable on administrative matters and this confirms the veracity of our report.⁴² In addition, in the 2 Maccabees version the conduct of the battle is entrusted to a joint command of two, Nicanor and Gorgias, and this is a feature often found in the Seleucid army.⁴³ One may accept, then, that the Seleucid preparations for the campaign at Emmaus involved the Seleucid *strategos* of the province in the offensive against Judas Maccabaeus for the first time, even if his role was still rather limited. Ptolemy son of Dorymenes coordinated the campaign from a distance, and left the direction of the fighting to his two commanders, Nicanor and Gorgias.

Nicanor, the son of Patrocles, ranked among the king's First Friends.⁴⁴ In the battle of Emmaus, according to the 2 Maccabees version, he apparently acted as the commander-in-chief of the Seleucid forces, for his name occurs many times in the description of the battle, while that of his co-officer, Gorgias, is mentioned only once (2 Macc. 8.9). The situation is reversed in 1 Maccabees where it is Nicanor's name which appears only once (3.38), whereas Gorgias' attempt to destroy Judas Maccabaeus' troops receives considerable attention. While 1 Maccabees gives the impression that Gorgias was the overall commander of the Seleucid troops at Emmaus, we must bear in mind that this same source assigns to Gorgias only a small portion of the Seleucid force.⁴⁵ The majority of the Syrian troops stayed in Emmaus when Gorgias set out against the Jewish rebels. There is, then, no contradiction between the two sources. Nicanor acted as commander-in-chief during the Emmaus campaign, while Gorgias played an important, but secondary, role.⁴⁶

Nicanor

Nicanor, the Seleucid commander in the battle of Emmaus (which took place in 147 S.E.), is to be identified with the homonymous Seleucid official who, in the previous year, had been in charge of

⁴² See Niese 1900: 466. For 2 Maccabees on administrative matters, see Habicht 1976a: 178, with bibliography. In some cases, however, 2 Maccabees is deficient, probably because the epitomator reworked the original material. See Ch. VII/1 on Philip, a minister of Antiochus IV.

⁴³ Bar-Kochva 1989: 238. For examples, see Gera 1987: 69-70.

⁴⁴ 2 Macc. 8.9; cf. Bikerman 1938: 41 with n. 10.

⁴⁵ Compare 1 Macc. 3.39 and 4.1.

⁴⁶ See also Schürer 1973-87: I. 160 n. 58.

the "Sidonians in Shechem" together with Apollonius the *meridarch* of Samaria (Jos. *Ant.* 12.258-64). The correspondence exchanged between the "Sidonians in Shechem" and Antiochus IV, which mentions these two officials, records Nicanor's title as ὁ τὰ βασιλικά πράττων (Jos. *Ant.* 12.261). This means that Nicanor was responsible for collecting the royal revenues in Samaria, i.e. he was the financial official in charge of Samaria.⁴⁷ This conclusion is supported by the division of authority between Apollonius and Nicanor. The "Sidonians in Shechem" asked the king to instruct both men not to cause them harm, and the king, in response to this request, sent letters to both Nicanor and Apollonius.⁴⁸ Thus it is clear that both Apollonius and Nicanor exercised authority over the people of Shechem, and neither was in charge of the other. Nicanor and Apollonius belonged to different branches of the administration. Apollonius the *meridarch* was the military and civil governor of Samaria, while Nicanor was responsible primarily for economic matters: collecting taxes and duties, and administering the king's property. This division in the administration of Samaria reflects the situation for the whole of Coele-Syria and Phoenicia, as outlined in the inscription from Hefzibah.⁴⁹ Nicanor's fiscal and economic duties in Samaria confirm his identification with the commander in the battle of Emmaus. The commander is said to wish to sell the Jews into slavery so as to provide his king with sufficient funds to repay his debt to Rome (2 Macc. 8.10-11, 8.34-36). While this information is clearly incorrect—Antiochus IV had already repaid Rome in full in 173 (Livy 42.6.6-7)—Nicanor is nonetheless portrayed as being particularly concerned with financial matters, and this would indicate that he is none other than the homonymous financial administrator of Samaria.⁵⁰ It would seem, then, that after Apollonius the *meridarch* of Samaria was killed, Nicanor, the remaining senior Seleucid official in Samaria, had to step in as military commander. Whether he relinquished his position as financial administrator, handing it over to someone else, or simply held both positions, is impossible to say.⁵¹

⁴⁷ Beloch 1912-27: IV/1. 389 n. 2; Bengtson 1944: 173 n. 2.

⁴⁸ See Bickerman 1937b: 192-96.

⁴⁹ See above p. 232 n. 31.

⁵⁰ See Mørholm 1966: 109; Habicht 1976a: 239 n. 9a, as opposed to Bar-Kochva 1989: 239.

⁵¹ Nicanor's fiscal background would not disqualify him from fulfilling military duties, as the Friends, regardless of their background, were expected

Gorgias

The deputy commander at the battle of Emmaus was Gorgias. Two years later, in 163, he is named governor of Idumaea, with Jamnia in the coastal plain under his jurisdiction. Jamnia is in the area of biblical Philistia, which at this time was considered to be a part of Idumaea.⁵² At the battle of Emmaus the main body of the Seleucid army was joined by slave-traders, and by the "Syrian army and troops from the Land of the Philistines" (1 Macc. 3.40-41: δύναμις Συρίας καὶ γῆς ἀλλοφύλων). It has been demonstrated that the "Syrian army" noted here does not refer to the Seleucid army already mentioned, but to troops from Idumaea. The translator of 1 Maccabees, or perhaps earlier copyists of the Hebrew original, wrongly read Idumaea as Aram, i.e. Syria. Similarly, the expression "troops from the Land of the Philistines" refers to a local militia comprised of residents of cities along the coastal plain, cities in the region of biblical Philistia.⁵³ In other words, the main Syrian army was aided by militias from two areas which were under the authority of the *strategos* of Idumaea, and one of the army's commanders was a man later known to be the governor of Idumaea. Thus, it seems reasonable to conclude that Gorgias held the position of *strategos* of Idumaea already at the battle of Emmaus.

The Seleucid Defeat at Emmaus

At the battle of Emmaus, the Seleucid troops were under the command of the acting governor of Samaria and his colleague from Idumaea. This reinforces the statement in 2 Maccabees that the campaign was supervised and coordinated by the governor of the whole province, Ptolemy son of Dorymenes. There is a perceptible change in the governor's attitude towards the revolt, for in 165 Ptolemy son of Dorymenes became involved in the effort to crush the revolt, ending his earlier inactivity. It is nonetheless important to note that Ptolemy son of Dorymenes placed two of his commanders in charge of this mission, and did not lead the campaign personally, although, as governor, he was the senior military

to perform military tasks. See Walbank 1984: 69-70.

⁵² Governorship: 2 Macc. 10.14-15, 12.32. Control of Jamnia: 1 Macc. 5.58-59; Jos. *Ant.* 12.351. For the extent of Idumaea, see above p. 232 n. 30.

⁵³ See Abel 1949: 67; Bar-Kochva 1989: 247.

figure in the province.⁵⁴ Ptolemy son of Dorymenes thus attributed greater importance to the Jewish rebels in 165, but only appreciated the full gravity of the situation after the results of the military confrontation at Emmaus became known. For the Seleucid forces were roundly defeated in this battle. At this juncture, only a relatively small Seleucid force could be deployed against the rebels. When Antiochus IV left for his *anabasis*, there was no danger to the kingdom from the north or southwest. Pergamum was a loyal ally of Antiochus IV and Ptolemaic Egypt was too divided and weak to threaten the Seleucid kingdom.⁵⁵ The king could afford to take the bulk of his army with him, and these forces were already marching in the direction of Armenia and Mesopotamia. In the western part of the kingdom, the troops stationed at Coele-Syria and Phoenicia sustained a painful defeat, while those found in Syria, under the command of the chief minister Lysias, could not have been numerous. The Seleucid defeat at Emmaus called for one of two actions. Either the king could send some of the troops he had taken with him on his *anabasis* back to Syria, and have them join Lysias in an attempt to subdue the Jews. Such a step would reduce Antiochus' chances for success in his own campaign, and time would be wasted until these troops actually reached Judaea. Alternatively, the king could alter his policy of religious persecution and try to appease the rebellious Jews.

3. *Diplomacy and History*

Four Letters in 2 Maccabees

An analysis of the events which transpired after the battle of Emmaus depends, to a large extent, upon the acceptance of the authenticity of a group of four documents found in 2 Maccabees (11.16-38). If the genuineness of these documents is agreed upon—and this seems to be the current trend in scholarship—the question of their chronological order still remains.⁵⁶ The letters are presented

⁵⁴ For the overall military authority of the governor in his province, see Bengtson 1944: 167-68.

⁵⁵ See above Ch. V/1 and V/2.

⁵⁶ See Kolbe 1926: 74-107; Laqueur 1927; Tcherikover 1959: 213-20, 225-26; Tcherikover 1961b; Zambelli 1965: 213-27; Mørkholm 1966: 162-65; Bunge 1971: 386-400; Habicht 1976b: 7-18; Fischer 1980: 64-80; Goldstein 1983: 408-28;

within the context of the reign of Antiochus V Eupator, and it is clear from the short introduction prefixed to each of them that three of the letters allegedly relate to the dealings of the young king and his chief minister Lysias with the Jews, while a fourth is concerned with Roman involvement in these negotiations. The documents are introduced as Seleucid concessions which come after the failure of Lysias' first campaign against the Jews (2 Macc. 11.1-15), but since this campaign is placed within the reign of Antiochus IV Epiphanes in 1 Macc. 4.28-35, it is possible that at least some of the documents refer to the time of Antiochus IV, rather than his son.⁵⁷ Furthermore, Lysias was chief minister and guardian to Antiochus' son under Antiochus IV, and he continued to hold the same positions after Epiphanes' death. This may have led to some confusion, with Lysias' earlier activities under Antiochus IV ascribed in 2 Maccabees to the reign of Antiochus Eupator.⁵⁸ Thus the context in which the letters are set need not determine their actual date.

The Content of the Four Documents

The first document by order of appearance in 2 Maccabees, Document 1, is a letter from Lysias, the chief minister of the Seleucid kingdom, addressed to the Jewish masses (*πλήθει τῶν Ἰουδαίων*). Lysias writes that two Jewish emissaries, John and Absalom, appeared before him and presented him with a memorandum containing the requests of the Jews. The minister tells the Jews that he has informed their representatives which requests were to be passed on to the king, while he himself has granted others. After expressing his goodwill, Lysias states that he has ordered both the Jewish emissaries and his own to discuss these matters with the Jewish masses. This letter is dated to 148 S.E.⁵⁹ The name of the

Bringmann 1983: 40-51; Bar-Kochva 1989: 516-33.

⁵⁷ Cf. Habicht 1976b: 7.

⁵⁸ For Lysias' role under Antiochus IV and his son, see 1 Macc. 3.32-33, 6.14-17, 6.55-60, 7.2-4; *Jos. Ant.* 12.295-96, 12.360-61, 12.379-81. In 2 Maccabees, Lysias makes his first appearance as an appointee of Antiochus V (10.11). Some support for this theory may be found by comparing 2 Macc. 11.1 with 1 Macc. 3.32-33. Both passages mention Lysias as chief minister and *epitropos*, and the description of Lysias as ἀπὸ γένους τῆς βασιλείας is a literal translation of the title συγγενής. The two passages seem to originate from the same source, even if one is dated to the reign of Antiochus IV and the other to the reign of his son.

⁵⁹ 2 Macc. 11.16-21. Lysias' partial response to the requests of the Jews is based on the reading *συνεχώρησα*, not *συνεχώρησεν* at 11.18; cf. Habicht 1976a:

month appears in the various manuscripts in different forms: Dioscorynthios, Dioscori, etc. Since not one of these variations corresponds to the Macedonian calendar employed in the Seleucid kingdom, some corruption must have taken place.⁶⁰

Document 2 is a letter from a King Antiochus to Lysias. The king declares that now, after the death of his father, he would like the inhabitants of his kingdom to be able to live without interference. He has heard that the Jews do not agree with the policy of conversion to Greek customs initiated by his father, and that they would prefer to live in accordance with their own laws. The king grants the Jews their request and returns the Temple to them. Antiochus then instructs Lysias to make the Jews aware of his goodwill so that they will respond in kind (2 Macc. 11.23-26).

In Document 3, King Antiochus addresses the *gerousia* and the rest of the Jews. The king notes that Menelaus had appeared before him personally and told him of the Jews' desire to attend to their private affairs. Antiochus then proclaims his decision to pardon those Jews who will return to their homes by the end of the month of Xanthicus. The king also declares that the Jews will be free to live in accordance with their customs and laws, and no one will be permitted to harm them in any form. Antiochus then adds that he has sent Menelaus to the Jews with an invitation to accept his offer. The letter is dated Xanthicus 15, 148 S.E.⁶¹

Document 4 is a letter sent to the Jewish people (δῆμος τῶν Ἰουδαίων) by two Roman *legati*, whose names appear in most manuscripts as Q. Memmius and Titus Manius. The Roman delegates declare their approval of the concessions granted by Lysias to the Jews, and ask them to send word quickly of their position regarding those matters which Lysias has referred to the

257 n. 18a.

⁶⁰ Bévenot 1931: 224; Tcherikover 1959: 215. It is sometimes claimed that Antiochus IV gave new names to the months, cf. Niese 1900: 482-83; Bar-Kochva 1989: 522-23. Epigraphic findings do not support this claim, see *OGIS* 253 (167/6); *SEG* XLI 1556 (163).

⁶¹ 2 Macc. 11.27-33. This rendering of the letter depends upon the introduction of punctuation after ἀδείας at 11.30, and retaining δὲ after χρῆσθαι at 11.31, cf. Habicht 1976b: 8 n. 15. διατήμασι (11.31), replaces the original reading δαπανήμασι "expenses" which makes little sense. See Wilhelm 1937: 22-25, cf. Habicht 1976a: 193, 259 n. 31a. διατήμασι should be understood here as "customs," parallel to the following νόμοις, and not as "food," as suggested by Bar-Kochva 1989: 518 n. 3. The latter meaning is, in any case, covered by the "laws." παρακαλέσονται ὑμᾶς (11.32) means "to invite you (to accept our proposals)," see P. Gauthier 1989: 60.

king. The *legati* state that they are on the way to Antioch, where they will be ready to present the Jewish point of view. This epistle, like the previous letter, is dated to Xanthicus 15, 148 S.E.⁶²

Dating the Documents

Document 2 has been preserved without a date, but its date is easily ascertained from its contents. The fact that the king mentions the death of a father who had imposed Greek customs upon the Jews indicates that the sovereign here is Antiochus V Eupator, the son of Antiochus Epiphanes. Furthermore, the king refers to the death of his father in connection with his own concern for the welfare of all his subjects. Such a pronouncement befits a new king, who is anxious to win the support of his people and offer them a fresh start, free from the tensions which have marred their relations with his predecessor.⁶³ Consequently, Document 2 was written either in December 164 or at the beginning of 163.

The date in Document 1 on the other hand, 148 S.E., indicates that the "king" mentioned there is Antiochus IV Epiphanes, not his son. The contents of the letter support this conclusion, for Lysias is not the all-powerful minister that he was to become under Antiochus V Eupator. While he can decide upon some issues by himself, he must refer others to his sovereign. The matters left to the discretion of the king remain unanswered for the time being, and the Jewish envoys who have negotiated with Lysias return home before receiving the king's reply. This suggests that the king is not found at the same place as his chief minister. The situation as a whole corresponds to the time after Antiochus IV left for the East, so that the year found in Document 1, 148 S.E. (October 165–October 164), makes sense. The month mentioned in the date formula is another matter. We have seen that the variant readings do not yield the name of any recognizable Seleucid-Macedonian month, and it is best to leave the problem open.⁶⁴

Document 4 is thematically linked to Document 1. In Document 4, the Roman ambassadors approve of Lysias' concessions to the Jews and implore them to convey their views on the matters

⁶² 2 Macc. 11.34-38. The Latin manuscript from Bologna, 2571/628, has the date 149 S.E., see De Bruyne 1932: 193.

⁶³ Schürer 1973-87: I. 164; Habicht 1976b: 16-17. Habicht notes similar steps adopted by Perseus in 179, and by many of the Ptolemies.

⁶⁴ M. Stern 1972: 68; Habicht 1976a: 257 n. 21a.

which Lysias has referred to his king. Both Lysias' decisions and his deferrals cover the same ground as Document 1. In addition, Document 4 closely resembles Document 1 in style.⁶⁵ Obviously, the Roman letter to the Jews was written only a short time after Lysias' own epistle to them. Unfortunately, the date attached to the Roman letter cannot be used to provide an approximate date for Lysias' negotiations with the Jews in 148 S.E. It is inconceivable that Roman officials would have employed a Macedonian month and an official era of the Seleucid kingdom and dated their letter to Xanthicus 15, 148 S.E.⁶⁶ The date attached to the Roman letter is obviously a mistake by a copyist who affixed the date at the end of Document 3 to the missive of the Roman ambassadors.⁶⁷ Document 4, at any rate, belongs to the same year as Document 1, that is to 148 S.E., or to the early months of 149 S.E. A later date seems impossible because no mention is made of the death of Antiochus Epiphanes. Had the Romans known of his demise, which was bound to influence negotiations with the Seleucid court, they would certainly have referred to it. Since news of Antiochus IV's death reached Babylon no later than December 164 (above p. 181), the information would have reached Syria, where the Roman ambassadors were found, no later than the end of January 163.

Turning to Document 3, we see that it tells of the amnesty offered to those Jews who would return to their homes by Xanthicus 30, a date which coincides, more or less, with the beginning of the campaigning season. This final date for the amnesty should be accepted, and its credibility is supported by identical or similar dates for other known amnesties.⁶⁸ The date at the end of the letter, Xanthicus 15, 148 S.E., on the other hand, is problematic. Antiochus Epiphanes was in the East on this date, and a letter from him could not have reached the rebels in Judaea with sufficient time to allow them to return to their homes while the amnesty was

⁶⁵ Compare 11.18: ὅσα μὲν οὖν ἔδει καὶ τῷ βασιλεῖ προσανεχθῆναι, διεσάφησα. ἃ δὲ ἦν ἐνδεχόμενα, συνεχώρησα with 11.35-36: ὑπὲρ ὧν Λυσίας... συνεχώρησεν ὑμῖν, καὶ ἡμεῖς συνευδοκοῦμεν. ἃ δὲ ἔκρινε προσανεχθῆναι τῷ βασιλεῖ...

⁶⁶ See also Goldstein 1983: 425; Bar-Kochva 1989: 531. Cf. Sherk 1969, *passim*.

⁶⁷ See Abel 1949: 430-31; Tcherikover 1959: 215. A glance at Hanhart's edition of 2 Maccabees shows that variants of this date follow some of the readings for the date recorded in Document 1, and not Document 3.

⁶⁸ The amnesty recorded in Diod. 18.56, marks Xanthicus 30 as the final day for the return of exiles. A similar closing date for a pardon is found in Cic. *Phil.* 8.33. Cf. Wilhelm 1937: 22; Habicht 1976b: 13.

still in force.⁶⁹ But if this date is condemned, and the date in Document 4 is similarly rejected (as it should be), there is no explanation for the presence of the Xanthicus 15, 148 S.E. date in our text. Perhaps this date denotes the time that the king's letter arrived at Jerusalem, and this latter date was appended to the end of the document by the archivist in Jerusalem.⁷⁰ This would mean that a period of fifteen days was granted for the return of the rebels to their homes, before the offer of the amnesty was to be withdrawn. A fifteen-day period from the time the king's letter was publicized throughout Judaea and Samaria, where the rebels were active, until the end of the amnesty period does not seem too short. In Ptolemaic Egypt, once the king's orders were publicized, a man required by the crown to reach Alexandria would be allotted no more than twenty days for the journey, no matter how far south in Upper Egypt he lived. Twenty days was also the time period allotted to the inhabitants of Ptolemaic Coele-Syria who were required to notify their *oikonomoi* of their possession of enslaved free persons.⁷¹

Gerousia and Plethos

According to Document 3, Antiochus IV Epiphanes hears from the high priest Menelaus of his people's desire to tend to their own affairs, and as a result, writes a letter to the *gerousia*. In other words, Document 3 shows Antiochus Epiphanes formulating a revised policy towards the Jews with the help of the leader of the Hellenizing party, and this policy is then revealed to the collective leadership of that group, the *gerousia*. Lysias' letter, it will be remembered, was addressed to the Jewish *plethos*. This must mean that Lysias wrote to a body without a formal status, the rebels of Judas Maccabaeus, because circumstances compelled him to hold talks with them. This conclusion is bolstered by the Hebrew names of the Jewish emissaries who conducted the negotiations with Lysias. Their names, John and Absalom, seem to indicate that they represented Judas Maccabaeus and his men, and not the Hellenizing

⁶⁹ So Laqueur 1904: 39-40; Habicht 1976b: 13.

⁷⁰ A similar case appears in *RC* 49 l. 11. The inscription records the bearer's name. If this is what happened with our letter, the name of Menelaus may have been dropped by the editor of 2 Maccabees.

⁷¹ *C. Ord. Ptol.* 29 and 22.

party. Lysias' demeanor towards the two men also lends some support to the view that they represented the party of Judas Maccabaeus, for the chief minister takes pains to stress their non-official status. John and Absalom are not termed by him ambassadors (πρεσβευταί), but are called non-official messengers (2 Macc. 11.17: οἱ πεμφθέντες παρ' ὑμῶν).⁷² Furthermore, in his letter the chief minister makes a point of demonstrating his authority over the Jewish messengers by giving them orders (2 Macc. 11.20). Had the emissaries been the representatives of the Hellenizing party, his tone would have been more polite, as can be seen from Antiochus IV's letter to the *gerousia*.

The Chronological Order of the Documents

The four letters discussed here were not all written in the reign of Antiochus V Eupator, as is claimed in 2 Maccabees. Only one of the letters, Document 2, can be ascribed to that king, while the other three were composed when Antiochus IV Epiphanes was still alive, or at least was thought to be so.⁷³ Consequently, the question is whether Document 3 was written earlier than the two related letters, Documents 1 and 4, or whether these two letters precede the amnesty decree which Antiochus IV presented to the Jews in the spring of 164. The majority of scholars who have tackled this problem opt for the latter solution. In Document 1 Lysias refers some of the more difficult issues to the king, and awaits his decision, while in Document 3, King Antiochus pardons the Jews. Hence, these scholars argue, Document 3 should be read as the king's response to Lysias, and therefore his decree must have been written later than the Roman letter, which was written shortly after Document 1.

⁷² Despite the view of Tcherikover 1959: 218, and the reservations of Gruen 1984: II. 747. See Meyer 1921: 213; Habicht 1976b: 10; Bar-Kochva 1989: 521.

⁷³ This was first argued by Laqueur 1927: 232-41, cf. Tcherikover 1959: 213-14; Habicht 1976b: 9-12; Bringmann 1983: 42. Fischer 1980: 66-72, tries to assign all the letters to Antiochus V, in keeping with the text of 2 Maccabees. He claims that Document 3 was written by Eupator as co-regent in the spring of 164, while the other three were written after Antiochus IV's death. But Eupator did not serve as co-regent, at least not in the spring of 164 (see below p. 247 n. 76), and news of his father's death in the East reached Babylon on November 20, 164 at the earliest, cf. Parker & Dubberstein 1956: 23. The king's death would have become known in Antioch only afterwards. In other words, Antiochus IV died in 149 S.E. and documents from the previous year must be attributed to him.

Habicht, however, makes a persuasive case for rejecting this scenario. He posits that Document 3 is not addressed to Lysias, as one would expect from an answer to a letter written by the chief minister, but to the Jewish *gerousia*. The concessions granted by Lysias during the negotiations are not mentioned at all. It is not the Seleucid minister who asks the king to change his policies towards the Jews, but Menelaus, who appears before the king and informs him of the Jews' desire to return to their private affairs. It is particularly significant that the king addresses his concessions to the Hellenizing party of Menelaus and the *gerousia*, and not to the rebels with whom Lysias negotiates. Habicht thus concludes that Document 3 was written before Documents 1 and 4. Antiochus IV's letter to the *gerousia* was sent in the winter or early spring, 148 S.E., and Lysias' letter to the Jewish rebels was sent before the end of 148 S.E., i.e. before the end of September 164.⁷⁴

Scholars have subsequently attempted to overturn Habicht's theory and re-establish, in ingenious fashion, the older view, namely that Document 1 preceded Document 3. These scholars argue that Document 3 does not refer back to the situation in Document 1, because Menelaus became afraid of losing his influence once Lysias started talks with Judas' men. Menelaus therefore traveled to the king, who for reasons of his own wanted to clip Lysias' wings.⁷⁵ This explanation is unconvincing and compresses too many events into the period from the battle of Emmaus, in the summer of 165, until Antiochus' amnesty during the following spring. It is assumed that the defeat at Emmaus was followed by Lysias' campaign against the Jews. This campaign, dated to 148 S.E. (1 Macc. 4.28), is then computed according to the Seleucid-Macedonian era and placed in October 165. According to this view, Lysias' lack of success on the battlefield pushed him to start negotiations with the rebels. When Menelaus heard of these negotiations, he then made a round trip of approximately 3,000 kilometers to the Persian Gulf or Susa, to Antiochus' winter quarters, and was able to return by the spring. But the dating of Lysias' expedition according to the Seleucid-Macedonian era does not conform to the practice of 1 Maccabees, where events relating to the Jews are reported according to the Seleucid-Babylonian era. Lysias' first

⁷⁴ See Habicht 1976b: 14-15.

⁷⁵ Bringmann 1983: 42-45; Goldstein 1983: 426-28.

campaign could not, then, have taken place earlier than the spring of 164.⁷⁶

We must therefore conclude with Habicht that the purpose of Document 3 was to persuade some of the rebels to lay down their arms. Antiochus Epiphanes decided to annul the decrees he had imposed on the Jews and to allow them to live according to their own laws. In addition, the king offered to pardon those who had opposed the crown during the disturbances, if they would return to their homes by the end of the spring. The king did not, however, provide for the return of their private property to those dispossessed by Apollonius the *Mysarch*, nor did he promise to hand over the Temple to the pious Jews. The king's attempt to appease the rebels failed, and as a result Lysias was forced to do battle with the rebels, a campaign which ended with the defeat of the Seleucid army at Beth-Zur.⁷⁷ After Lysias' failure and retreat to Antioch, negotiations with the Jews were reopened, but this time contact was made with the rebels under the stewardship of Judas Maccabaeus.

This analysis of the documents indicates that Antiochus IV did not respond to Document 1. Habicht explains that this letter reached Persia too late, after the death of the Seleucid king. It was left to the king's heir, Antiochus V Eupator, to reply to Lysias' letter, and although Document 2 was officially written by the young king, it was Lysias who dictated its contents. In this epistle, Antiochus V announces the categorical repeal of the decrees and the return of the Temple to the Jews. The king also expresses his hope that the Jews will now live in peace and will administer their affairs without disturbances.⁷⁸

Political Power and Diplomatic Recognition in Judaea

The diplomatic moves undertaken by the Seleucid government, the Hellenizing party of Menelaus, the Jewish rebels under Judas, and the Roman *legati* allow us to see how the various parties

⁷⁶ For Antiochus' stay in this region, see Gera & Horowitz 1997: 243-49. Goldstein 1983: 418 and 427, assumes that Menelaus went to Antioch, and that Document 3 was written by Eupator as co-regent. But Eupator did not serve in that capacity, at least not until the very end of his father's reign, see Habicht 1976b: 3-7; Houghton & Le Rider 1985. For the use of the Seleucid-Babylonian era in 1 Maccabees with regard to Jewish events, see above p. 141 n. 102.

⁷⁷ 1 Macc. 4.26-35; Jos. *Ant.* 12.313-15; 2 Macc. 11.1-15.

⁷⁸ Habicht 1976b: 17-18.

handled the Seleucid-Jewish crisis. The defeat of Nicanor and Gorgias at Emmaus demonstrated the failure of the religious persecutions. Not only were the Seleucid authorities unsuccessful in their efforts to compel the Jews to conform to Greek customs, but resistance to the royal decrees grew at a time that the government could not muster adequate military forces in the west of the kingdom to face this threat. The gravity of the situation was appreciated by Menelaus, who feared that his power base in Jerusalem would be swept away from him by the victorious Judas Maccabaeus. The high priest sought to apprise the king of the situation, either with or without the authorization of high officials such as Ptolemy son of Dorymenes and Lysias. Menelaus was ready to travel enormous distances to his king, who in 165/4 wintered in the area of the Persian Gulf.⁷⁹ The high priest seems to have impressed Antiochus with the gravity of the situation, for the king was ready to withdraw unconditionally from his policy of religious persecution. Nonetheless, the king was still not ready to accept the extent of popular support for Judas Maccabaeus, and this may have been the result of Menelaus' presentation of the events. Antiochus' letter to the *gerousia* indicates that the king insisted upon working through the official leadership, i.e. the Hellenized council of elders and Menelaus the high priest. Antiochus Epiphanes trusted the Jewish leadership he had worked with thus far, and did not acknowledge the possibility that Jewish support for the official leadership had eroded to such an extent that it was no longer viable. The premise of Document 3 is that once the Jews would be free to exercise their religious beliefs without interference from the authorities, support for the rebels would wane. The Jews who would remain under arms would be too weak to withstand the Seleucid forces in Coele-Syria and Phoenicia or those stationed in Syria under the command of Lysias. It took another military reversal, sustained by the chief minister himself, to bring about a more realistic approach towards Judas and his men. Lysias was now ready to conduct talks with the rebels.⁸⁰ His aim must have been to conclude an agreement with Judas and his men in order to pacify Judaea. Failing that, he may have hoped to gain enough time to recall reinforce

⁷⁹ See above p. 218 with n. 119.

⁸⁰ 2 Macc. 11.13-21. As noted above, these negotiations, as well as the preceding campaign, are wrongly placed in the reign of Antiochus V Eupator.

ments from the East or raise mercenary troops from outside the realm, and thus be able to deal by force with the insurgents.⁸¹ Judas was ready to negotiate with Lysias because he had other objectives in mind. His prime motive was to gain recognition from the Seleucid authorities. Lysias, we have seen, refrained from awarding any such status to the rebels and their spokesmen, but by the very act of talking with Judas' envoys and addressing the rebels' body, which he termed a *plethos*, Lysias granted the insurgents a semi-official status. These talks sent a clear message to those Jews who did not side with Judas: he was a force to be reckoned with and the continued support of the Seleucid government for the Hellenizing party was not to be taken for granted. In other words, through these talks Judas sought to augment the power of his movement, as well as to further his own position among the Jewish population of Coele-Syria and Phoenicia. In addition, once this quasi-recognition of the Jewish rebels was achieved, the way towards fuller recognition in the future would be much easier.

Roman Intervention

Fortune was soon to lend a hand and justify the decision to negotiate with Lysias. As we know from Document 4, John and Absalom met, apparently by chance, two Roman *legati* who were on their way to Antioch. The Jewish spokesmen were apparently returning from that city, and the two parties met either in coastal Syria or one of the Phoenician cities. We do not know why these particular Roman ambassadors were visiting Syria at the time. Perhaps they were sent to obtain information about the Seleucid kingdom in general, or specific information about Antiochus IV's campaign to the East.⁸² A more precise purpose could perhaps be assigned to this tour if these *legati* could be identified with Roman senators of the period. However, one ambassador, Quintus Memmius, is not otherwise known, while the name of his colleague, Titus Manius, was obviously corrupted in the manuscript tradition, for it consists of two *praenomina* but no *nomen*.⁸³ The Venetus manuscript records a variation, giving the second emissary's name as

⁸¹ The last possibility is referred to in I Macc. 4.35; Jos. *Ant.* 12.315.

⁸² Cf. Laqueur 1927: 236.

⁸³ 2 Macc. 11.34. Some of the lesser manuscripts have Μάνλιος instead of Μάνιος, see Niese 1900: 478 n. 6; Bringmann 1983: 47 n. 25.

τιτος μανιος ερνιος. Niese suggests that this last component is a corruption of Σέργιος, and he identifies the Roman emissary with M'. Sergius, a colleague of C. Sulpicius Galus in an embassy to Greece and Asia Minor.⁸⁴ It must be remembered, however, that Polybius tells of the dispatch to the east of the latter two Roman officials within the context of the first year of the 154th Olympiad, which extended from the autumn of 164 to that of 163.⁸⁵ Even if it is assumed that the two left Rome at the beginning of the year, M'. Sergius could not have reached Syria before word arrived there of the death of Antiochus Epiphanes in December 164/January 163. Since Documents 1 and 4 reflect a situation in which Antiochus IV was either alive or thought to be so, M'. Sergius cannot be identified as one of the Roman ambassadors mentioned in Document 4.⁸⁶ We can only conclude, then, that two Roman senators, thus far unidentified (perhaps because their names were altered in the manuscript tradition), reached the Seleucid kingdom at this time and met with two Jewish envoys, John and Absalom, on their way to Antioch.⁸⁷

At this meeting, the Jewish emissaries disclosed details of their encounter with Lysias and allowed the Romans to read Lysias' letter which they were then able to quote.⁸⁸ We can also assume that the Jews provided additional background information to the Romans on the armed struggle against the Seleucid army and on Lysias' recent defeat at Beth-Zur. In this fashion, the Romans became acquainted with the difficulties facing Antiochus IV Epiphanes. The king was in the East with the lion's share of his army, while in the western part of the kingdom, Lysias and an insufficient number of troops faced Jewish rebels who had already enjoyed a significant victory over Lysias' army. Lysias' concessions to the Jews provided further proof of the weakness of kingdom in the west. The behavior of the Roman *legati* at this point is telling. They expressed their support for the Jews' achievements and asked the Jews to present their positions on those matters which Lysias

⁸⁴ Niese 1900: 478, 485-87. For a list of scholars who endorse Niese's position, see Bringmann 1983: 48 n. 28, to which add Liebmann-Frankfort 1969: 103; Sherwin-White 1984: 74. For the embassy of Sulpicius Galus and M'. Sergius, see Polyb. 31.1.6-8, 31.6.1-6.

⁸⁵ Polyb. 31.1.6-8, cf. Walbank 1957-79: III. 34-35, 464-65.

⁸⁶ Bringmann 1983: 47-49; Gruen 1984: II. 746 n. 7; Bar-Kochva 1989: 532.

⁸⁷ Cf. M. Stern 1972: 69.

⁸⁸ See above p. 243 n. 65.

had referred to the king. Once the Jewish stance was clarified, the Romans would be able to represent the Jews officially (ἐκτιθέναι) to Lysias at Antioch, and the chief minister would then convey their position to the king, who was far away in the East (2 Macc. 11.36-37). This Roman offer of diplomatic support was aimed at strengthening the position of the Jews. After all, if official Roman representatives were willing to support demands raised by the rebels, and offered their good services as spokesmen for the insurgents' cause, why should the Jews themselves settle for anything less than the acceptance of their demands by the king? Furthermore, by conversing with the Jewish emissaries, writing to the body which had dispatched the emissaries, and offering to speak on the Jews' behalf at Antioch, the Roman ambassadors were placing themselves between the Seleucid crown and its subjects. It should also be noted that whereas Lysias made a point of stressing the unofficial status of his partners to the negotiation, addressing the Jews as a *plethos*, the Romans turned to them as a *demos*. The rebels of Judas Maccabaeus received official recognition of sorts from the *legati*, thus denying this status to the *gerousia*, who up to that moment had represented the Jewish people.⁸⁹ The initiative of the two Roman ambassadors, undertaken at an inopportune moment for the Seleucid government, was aimed at encouraging the separatist aspirations of Judas and his men and weakening the Seleucid kingdom.⁹⁰

This intervention by the Roman *legati* stands in stark contrast to Roman apathy towards Antiochus' disregard of the terms of the Treaty of Apamea. This attitude, as we have seen, originated from an unspoken agreement between the king and C. Popillius Laenas on that fateful day in Eleusis. In 164, however, the Roman ambassadors, perceiving the weakness of the Seleucid government in the west of the kingdom, could not afford to miss the chance to encourage Judas Maccabaeus and his men to persist in their armed struggle. The method used by these Roman *legati* is reminiscent of

⁸⁹ The form of the Roman address in 2 Macc. 11.34, is appreciated by Meyer 1921: 213; Ginsburg 1928: 27. The Venetus, however, reads τῷ Ἰουδαίων πλῆθει and two Latin manuscripts have *multitudini Iudaeorum*. Niese 1900: 478, argues for the reading of the Venetus, but his view should not be adopted. The formula appears also in vs. 16, and a copyist, either casting an eye on what he had already copied, or else trying to harmonize the two related letters, would have made the change.

⁹⁰ Pace Gruen 1976: 78; Gruen 1984: II. 746-47.

Roman policy towards the Galatians at precisely the same period. The Galatians, it will be remembered, rebelled against Antiochus IV's ally, Eumenes II of Pergamum. When negotiations between the Galatians and the Attalid king were about to begin, the presence of a Roman intermediary served to make the Galatians more obdurate, rather than bring the insurgent nation and their king closer. Later on, the Romans unilaterally declared the Galatians autonomous (above pp. 199-200). Thus, the attempt of the two Roman ambassadors in 164 to bolster the Jews and strengthen their position vis-à-vis the Seleucid government supports Polybius' view of Roman policy of the period: when the conditions were favorable, the Romans aimed at reducing the power of the Hellenistic kingdoms of the day.

Lysias' Concessions

This more vigorous Roman policy towards the government of Antiochus Epiphanes foreshadows the Republic's attitude towards the Seleucid kingdom during the reign of the next king, Antiochus V Eupator, and anticipates Roman treatment of Demetrius I in the very first years of his rule. It is not possible to determine the effects of the intervention by the Roman delegates. We are not told if the Jews responded to the letter or if the two Romans did, in fact, represent the rebels' point of view at Antioch. However, after the death of Antiochus Epiphanes, Lysias announced, by means of his ward's letter (Document 2), his decision to renounce completely the dead king's religious policies and to recognize officially the right of the Jews to serve their god in their temple. To be sure, all this cannot be due solely to the Roman ambassadors. For Lysias, the need to ensure control of the kingdom was paramount, and he was prepared to pay a high price to guarantee his authority. Furthermore, the military achievements of Judas at this particular time forced Lysias to appease the rebel leader and recognize what was now a fact: Jewish control over the Temple.⁹¹ Yet it is possible

⁹¹ This order of events—Lysias' first campaign and defeat at Beth-Zur, the liberation of the Temple, the death of Antiochus IV, and the assumption of the throne by his son—is narrated in 1 Macc. 4.28-61, 6.1-17; *Jos. Ant.* 12.313-26, 12.354-61. 2 Macc. 9.1-10.11, 11.1-15, first tells of Antiochus IV's death, passes on to the purification of the Temple and the crowning of Eupator, and only then tells of Lysias' first campaign. Although the Babylonian king-list (BM 35603) justifies placing Antiochus IV's death before the purification of

that Roman pressure was indeed exerted upon Lysias in the last days of the reign of Antiochus IV Epiphanes, and that he took the Roman position into account when deciding to reverse Seleucid policy towards the Jews. Be this as it may, the Jewish insurgents, successful on the battlefield as well as on the diplomatic front, were not to be satisfied by what they had already achieved. From that moment on, Judas and his men would strive to be recognized as the leading force within the Jewish people, and at the same time gain their independence from the Seleucid kingdom.

4. Conclusions

There is an inexplicable incongruity between Antiochus IV's initial lack of interest in the military aspect of the Hasmonaean revolt and his role in imposing harsh decrees. During the first two years of the uprising, Antiochus Epiphanes, Lysias, and Ptolemy son of Dorymenes did little to initiate concerted military action against Judas Maccabaeus and his fellow rebels. Steps to quell the revolt were introduced by middle-ranking Seleucid officials such as Apollonius the *meridarch* of Samaria, Philip the *epistates* of Jerusalem, and Seron (who may have been the top Seleucid financial administrator in Idumaea), but these steps were uncoordinated and ineffective. The king, for his part, decided to leave for the East. It is clear that at this stage the Hasmonaean revolt was not uppermost in the minds of the Seleucid king and his senior advisors.

This approach changed somewhat in the summer of 165, when Ptolemy son of Dorymenes sent Nicanor and Gorgias, the governors of Samaria and Idumaea, to do battle with the insurgents. Here, for the first time, the governor of the province became aware of the growing danger of the Jewish rebellion, but even then, he did not see the necessity of leading the military operation personally. Among the Jews, in the meantime, the string of successes

the Temple, the version in 2 Maccabees reveals signs of tampering: 2 Macc. 10.9, is a continuation of 9.1-29, and consequently the description of the rededication of the Temple, 10.1-8, is out of place. For the mistake in placing Lysias' first campaign in the time of Eupator, see above p. 240. The historicity of Lysias' first campaign has been denied on the grounds that it is a doublet of the second, so Kolbe 1926: 79-81; Mørkholm 1966: 152-54. These arguments are to be rejected with Tcherikover 1961b: 195-96; Schürer 1973-87: I. 160 n. 59.

enjoyed by Judas Maccabaeus must have increased his prestige, added to his ability to recruit supporters to his cause, and undercut the position of the Hellenizing party and its leader, Menelaus.

The Seleucid defeat at Emmaus, and the presence of nearly the entire Seleucid army in the East, brought further changes in the attitude of the Seleucid government towards the revolt. For the first time, Antiochus Epiphanes understood that he could not go on trying to defeat Judas Maccabaeus while maintaining a major military campaign in the East. Since this military initiative remained the king's prime objective, Antiochus decided to appease the Jews. He revoked his decrees, gave the Jews personal freedom to worship their god, and offered amnesty to those Jews who were willing to return to their homes within a limited period of time. The credit for this new policy was attributed to Menelaus, and the decree itself was addressed to the *gerousia*. Antiochus chose this course of action in order to shift Jewish support from Judas Maccabaeus to Menelaus and the *gerousia*, who had succeeded in abolishing the persecution of the Jewish faith by diplomatic means. However, the change had come too late. The persecution period could not be forgotten overnight, many Jews still remained dispossessed, and the Temple was in the hands of both the Hellenizing party and the Greek element now living in Jerusalem.

The liberation of the Temple was now the goal of Judas and his men, and they would not be deflected from their target. Lysias had no choice but to mount a fresh campaign against the Jews. His failure was to lead to negotiations with representatives of Judas Maccabaeus, and to a *de facto* recognition of the influence of Judas and his camp on the Jews in Coele-Syria and Phoenicia. Details of the negotiations elude us, but their importance lies only partly with the status which Lysias conferred on the rebels, despite himself, by conducting talks with them. The talks also afforded an opportunity to two Roman *legati* to enter the scene and offer support to the Jews. Roman attempts to undermine the Seleucid kingdom converged here for the first time with the Hasmonaean need for foreign support and legitimacy. This meeting would serve to expand the horizons of the Hasmonaean dynasty, who would gain recognition from the Roman Republic and other states, and would also provide the Romans with one more tool among many to foment division within the Seleucid kingdom.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE KING'S MEN

1. *Lysias' Enemies at Court*

Once Antiochus IV was dead, there were two possible candidates for the Seleucid throne: Seleucus IV's son Demetrius, who was held hostage in Rome, and Antiochus, son of Antiochus IV. According to the law of primogeniture, Demetrius was entitled to succeed Antiochus IV.¹ But Demetrius was far away, and his release depended upon the goodwill of the Senate. Lysias, who was chief minister of the Seleucid kingdom and guardian to Antiochus IV's son, lost no time in taking advantage of the situation and crowned the nine year old boy king.² In view of the king's tender age, it was obvious that he would not run the affairs of the kingdom. Lysias continued as chief minister of the kingdom and guardian to young Antiochus, but his position had now become much stronger.³

Philip the syntrophos

From the early days of Antiochus V's rule, other men set their sights on Lysias' high-ranking post. 1 Maccabees relates that shortly before his death, Antiochus IV appointed his friend Philip chief minister of the kingdom and guardian to his son Antiochus.⁴ Later, in 163, during Lysias' second campaign against the Jews,⁵ the Seleucid army lifted the siege on Jerusalem because Lysias heard that Philip had returned from the East to take control of

¹ See Bickerman 1938: 17-20.

² For Antiochus V's coronation, see 1 Macc. 6.17; Jos. *Ant.* 12.361; Appian, *Syr.* 46. His age is given by Appian, *Syr.* 46, 66. Porphyry, *FGH* 260 F 32.13, has him become king at the age of twelve, but this entails Antiochus IV having married either in Rome or in Athens.

³ 2 Macc. 10.11, 11.1, 13.2; Appian, *Syr.* 46; Livy, *Per.* 46; Zon. 9.25; Porphyry, *FGH* 260 F 32.14. According to Justin 34.3.6 and 9, Antiochus V had several guardians, but this information is of questionable value.

⁴ 1 Macc. 6.14-15. Cf. Jos. *Ant.* 12.360.

⁵ For this date, see Gera & Horowitz 1997: 250-52.

the kingdom. According to 1 Maccabees, when the young king returned to Antioch, he discovered that Philip had already taken the city. The king and his army then stormed the capital and took it by force.⁶

A very different picture is painted in 2 Maccabees, where, as in 1 Maccabees, a man named Philip is introduced in relation to the death of Antiochus IV. In 2 Maccabees, Philip is the king's *syntrophos*, who escorted the corpse of the king (probably to Antioch). But in this version, Philip is afraid of Antiochus V and consequently flees to Egypt, to Ptolemy Philometor (9.29). Later in 2 Maccabees, we hear of a man named Philip in the context of Lysias' second campaign in Judaea. As in 1 Maccabees, the Seleucid withdrawal is associated with Philip. After he was defeated in battle by the Jews, Antiochus V was informed that Philip had staged a revolt against him in Antioch. The king then tried to conciliate the Jews, offered a sacrifice to God, contributed to the Temple, and returned to Antioch.⁷

If we take 2 Maccabees by itself, the picture which emerges is quite different from that drawn in 1 Maccabees. The Philip who escorted the corpse of Antiochus IV fled to Egypt, and this suggests that he cannot be identical with the Philip who appears later in the book, in conjunction with Antiochus Eupator. Furthermore, the verb used to describe Philip accompanying the body of the dead king is in the imperfect tense (2 Macc. 9.29: παρεκομίζετο). This indicates that Philip did not carry out his intention of bringing the king's body home and that his mission was aborted somehow.⁸ Thus those scholars who claim that Philip did indeed find refuge in Egypt, but only after escorting the king's corpse home, ignore the language of 2 Maccabees.⁹ The natural explanation for the mention of Philip in the context of the death of Antiochus IV is that he started to accompany the corpse of his king, probably to Antioch, but for some reason became afraid of the new king and fled to Egypt. In addition, the Philip who is introduced in connection with the rebellion in Antioch in the days of Antiochus

⁶ 1 Macc. 6.55-63. Cf. Jos. *Ant.* 12.379-83 and 386, who adds one detail here: after the troops occupied Antioch, Philip was killed by the king.

⁷ 2 Macc. 13.23-26. For ἀπονενοῆσθαι here as a rebellious act, see Habicht 1976a: 269 n. 23a.

⁸ Goldstein 1983: 372-73, 467.

⁹ For this solution, see Niese 1893-1903: III. 242-43; Zambelli 1965: 232; Bunge 1976: 58.

V is termed "the Philip left as governor in Antioch" and this wording suggests that he is not the same Philip who had been mentioned earlier.¹⁰

To recapitulate, in 1 Maccabees (and Josephus), a Seleucid official named Philip is mentioned in conjunction both with the death of Antiochus Epiphanes and Lysias' second campaign against the Jews. 2 Maccabees' discussion of the same historical circumstances refers to *two* men named Philip. The first was a *syntrophos* of Antiochus IV who started to carry the body of his king home, but decided to find asylum in Egypt because he was afraid of the new king; the second was an official of Antiochus Eupator who rebelled against the young king while the Seleucid ruler was fighting the Jews. Should we believe 1 Maccabees or 2 Maccabees? Was there just one Seleucid official named Philip who was, or claimed to have been, appointed chief minister by the dying Antiochus IV, and who, after the king's death, escorted the royal cadaver to Antioch, thus setting the stage for Lysias' and Antiochus V's willingness to come to terms with the Jews? Or is the chief minister who tried (and failed) to bring the body of his dead king home one person, and the rebel in Antioch another?

Despite their differences, the two Jewish sources share marked points of similarity. Both introduce a man named Philip in connection with the death of Antiochus IV and again, in relation to Lysias' second campaign against the Jews. Both refer to Philip as a Friend of Antiochus IV and assign him the function or title of chief minister.¹¹ These points of agreement seem to indicate that the first two books of Maccabees share a common source, yet the different ways in which Philip is treated point to a different conclusion. I shall argue that in this instance, 1 Maccabees is more accurate than 2 Maccabees and that the latter version is the result of the epitomator's reworking of the original account by Jason of Cyrene.

According to 2 Maccabees, Philip abandoned Antiochus IV's body and sought refuge with Ptolemy VI Philometor in Egypt. Philip's flight bears a marked resemblance to Onias IV's escape to Egypt, to find a haven with the same king. In other words, the

¹⁰ 2 Macc. 13.23: μετέλαβεν ἀπονεοῖσθαι τὸν Φίλιππον ἐν Ἀντιοχείᾳ τὸν ἀπολελειμμένον ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων, συνεχύθη.... Cf. Goldstein 1983: 372.

¹¹ 1 Macc. 6.14-15 and 56; 2 Macc. 9.29, 13.23. Cf. Jos. *Ant.* 12.360 and 379.

story of Philip seeking asylum in Egypt is a doublet of the story of Onias IV, and is in all likelihood fictitious.¹² We have some information concerning Antiochus IV's corpse. A Babylonian astronomical diary dated to the month of Tebet, 148 S.E. (December 19, 164–January 16, 163) attests that during the course of that month the body of Antiochus IV was brought to the city of Babylon. The diary speaks of "[... the men who] came [wi]th the king's corpse." Although Philip is not mentioned by name, it is reasonable to assume that he was in charge of those who accompanied the body.¹³ Later, the royal cadaver was brought to Antioch, as can be seen from a bizarre story found in Granius Licinianus.¹⁴ These two pieces of information indicate that Philip did indeed complete his mission and escort the king's corpse to Antioch, and his presence in Antioch is in accordance with the accounts found in 1 Maccabees and Josephus. By conveying the body of the late king from Persia to Antioch, Philip displayed his loyalty to Antiochus Epiphanes. His act was a means to impress upon the army and the Greek population that Antiochus, before dying, had recognized Philip's devotion and entrusted him with the well-being of the child king and the day-to-day management of the Seleucid kingdom.

Why, then, did 2 Maccabees transform Philip into two separate people? In all likelihood, the explanation is to be found in the attitude displayed by the writer, probably the epitomator of 2 Maccabees, towards the arch-enemies of the Jewish people. Two such enemies, the Hellenized high priests Jason and Menelaus, are punished in this work by dying outside of their homeland and then being denied burial in their ancestral tombs.¹⁵ The assertion that Philip did not complete the task of conveying the corpse of Antiochus Epiphanes but fled instead to Egypt, enabled the epitomator to indicate to the reader that Antiochus Epiphanes, too, was punished posthumously and denied burial with his ancestors. Like Jason and Menelaus, Antiochus IV met his just deserts. In his subsequent description of the events of 163, the epitomator had no choice but to make Philip in Antioch a different person.

¹² *Jos. Ant.* 12.387-88. See Habicht 1976a: 248-49 n. 29b.

¹³ BM 41670 + 41840 + 41915 + 42239 (Sachs & Hunger 1988-96: III. 18-19). Cf. Gera & Horowitz 1997: 249-50.

¹⁴ Granius Licinianus, ed. Criniti p. 5.

¹⁵ 2 Macc. 5.9-10, 13.4-8; cf. *Ps.-Arist.* 249.

It appears, then, that there was only one man named Philip, who claimed—justifiably or otherwise—that immediately before his death, Antiochus IV had appointed him chief minister of the kingdom.¹⁶ Philip wanted to remove Lysias from center stage, but he did not deny the legality of Antiochus V's rule. We have no more information about Philip.¹⁷

Antiochis

Lysias had another rival as well: Antiochis, a daughter of Antiochus III, and aunt to both Antiochus V and Demetrius.¹⁸ Antiochis had been married to Ariarathes IV, king of Cappadocia. At the time in question, her son Ariarathes V, the reigning king of Cappadocia asked Lysias' permission to rebury his mother's and sister's bodies in the family plot of the Cappadocian royal house. When Ariarathes V received the bodies, he buried them with pomp and circumstance. Polybius carefully notes that the Cappadocian king did not want to blame Lysias for their demise, but it is clear that the historian himself held Lysias responsible for the deaths of the king's mother and sister. Why were the women killed, and when? We are told that Ariarathes V submitted his request to Lysias as soon as his emissaries returned from Rome (Polyb. 31.7). These delegates had left for Rome immediately after Ariarathes V assumed the throne and were received by the Senate in the winter of 164/3.¹⁹ Their return to Cappadocia must have occurred in the spring or summer of 163, and at this time the deaths of Antiochis and her daughter were common knowledge. The killing of the two Seleucid princesses should therefore be placed in the beginning of 163, quite soon after the death of Antiochus Epiphanes. Lysias must have had Antiochis and her daughter killed because he considered them a threat to his authority. It is possible that Antiochis, like Philip, sought to replace Lysias and

¹⁶ Philip's claim to have been nominated by the dying king to replace Lysias is accepted by Laqueur 1927: 237-38; Mørkholm 1966: 105. Others doubt it; see Bouché-Leclercq 1913: 307-8; Zambelli 1965: 234.

¹⁷ Some historians have identified the Philip of 1 & 2 Maccabees with an homonymous Seleucid official mentioned in *OGIS* 253, from Mesopotamia. The name is much too common to make the identification certain; cf. Mørkholm 1966: 106 n. 21.

¹⁸ Diod. 31.19.7. Welles 1962: 49-52 suggests identifying her (or her daughter) with the Antiochis, Antiochus IV's mistress, who is mentioned in 2 Macc. 4.30.

¹⁹ Polyb. 31.3. For the date, see Walbank 1957-79: III. 35, 468.

rule the Seleucid kingdom through Antiochus V. An alternative explanation is that Lysias executed Antiochis because she sided with Demetrius.²⁰

Ptolemy Macron (a)

Another member of Antiochus Epiphanes' court who met his death soon after the rise of Antiochus V to the throne, was Ptolemy Macron, the governor of Coele-Syria and Phoenicia. Macron was accused of treason by the Friends of the new king, and was forced to kill himself (2 Macc. 10.13). There can be little doubt that this campaign against Macron was orchestrated by Lysias, who was, after all, the central figure behind the new king. Macron appears as governor sometime after the battle of Emmaus, replacing Ptolemy son of Dorymenes. It would seem, then, that Ptolemy son of Dorymenes was relieved of his duties because of the results of that battle. The king apparently dismissed him both for military and political reasons. He was held to be responsible for the continued success of the rebels and blamed for not personally leading his troops into battle, leaving this task to his lower-ranking officers (above pp. 235-39). Ptolemy did not appreciate the capabilities of Judas Maccabaeus and his men, and this evaluation influenced the higher echelons of the Seleucid government. But Ptolemy son of Dorymenes also had to go because he had been governor from the very start of the religious persecutions, and he was identified with the anti-Jewish policy, not least because he applied these decrees against the Jews living in the Hellenistic cities of the province as well.²¹ Ptolemy son of Dorymenes' removal and the appointment in his stead of a governor sympathetic to the Jews—for this is the way Ptolemy Macron is described (2 Macc. 10.12)—signaled a new phase in Antiochus Epiphanes' behavior towards the Jews. This phase began, as we have seen, with the decree which the king sent to the Jewish *gerousia* towards the spring of 165, abolishing the prohibitions on the Jewish religion, and offering amnesty

²⁰ For Antiochis' alleged support of Demetrius, see Niese 1893-1903: III. 220, who errs in giving her the name Laodice. See also Schmitt 1964: 25.

²¹ For the wider application of the decrees, see 2 Macc. 6.8. This understanding of the passage is based on the reading Πτολεμαίου ὑποθεμένου, cf. Habicht 1976a: 230 n. 8a and n. 8b. The governor Ptolemy son of Dorymenes also appears in 2 Macc. 4.45-46, 8.8-9; 1 Macc. 3.38; Jos. *Ant.* 12.298. For this Ptolemy, see Mørkholm 1966: 152.

to those returning to their homes.²² Antiochus Epiphanes' new policy towards the Jews was dictated by the failure at Emmaus, for which Ptolemy son of Dorymenes was held responsible. Yet Lysias, who held overall responsibility for the western part of the kingdom at the time, was not himself without fault. It would seem, then, that the appointment of Ptolemy Macron was intended to clip Lysias' wings. Macron may well have been chosen by the king for the post of *strategos* of Coele-Syria and Phoenicia because Antiochus could trust him to present a position independent of that of his chief minister. Differences of opinion between Lysias and Macron in the years 165-164, as well as pre-existing rivalry, would go a long way towards explaining the death of Macron.

These victims of Lysias—the Seleucid princesses, Philip, and Macron—were all considered by him dangerous rivals, but it is unlikely that they all were committed to one single course of action. Philip as we have seen, sought to rule the Seleucid kingdom through Antiochus V. Antiochus' objectives remain unclear, while Macron, so it will be argued, had links with a group of Demetrius' supporters, and in consequence probably had little in common with Philip.²³

2. Polybius and Demetrius' Inner Circle

In the first year following Antiochus IV's death, Lysias encountered a number of difficulties within the Seleucid kingdom. What was the situation in Rome, where Demetrius, son of Seleucus IV, was held hostage? Demetrius had a great many friends in Rome and Polybius tells us of several who planned and executed his escape from Rome to Syria. This section will focus on these individuals.

Apollonius son of Menestheus and his Family

Three brothers, Apollonius, Meleager, and Menestheus, the sons of Apollonius, belonged to the small group which helped Demetrius contrive his escape.²⁴ A special role is assigned to the younger

²² 2 Macc. 11.27-33; see above pp. 243-48.

²³ See below pp. 267-72.

²⁴ Polyb. 31.13.2-3. A fourth brother, Lachares, is now known. See *SEG*

Apollonius, who was privy to the plot from the start and who was Demetrius' *syntrophos*. Apollonius' title and his position of trust with Demetrius make it clear that he was in Rome with the Seleucid prince for a number of years, perhaps even from 178/7, when Demetrius was first dispatched to Rome by his father. Apollonius' close relationship with Demetrius is also apparent from an occasion in the early part of 163, when news first reached the prince of his uncle's death. Demetrius, as soon as he heard of Antiochus IV's demise, appealed to the Senate to set him free and help him become king. The *patres* rejected Demetrius' request, and decided to continue holding him as a hostage, while helping Antiochus V retain the throne (Polyb. 31.2.1-6). Later on, in 162, when Demetrius heard of the murder of Cn. Octavius in Syria, the prince wondered if he should not seize this opportunity and again approach the Senate and ask for his release. He first took counsel with Polybius, who advised against a renewed appeal to the Senate, but then turned to Apollonius who recommended the opposite course. Demetrius chose to follow the advice of his friend Apollonius, rather than that of the more experienced Polybius, only to see his petition rejected once more. The Achaean, so it would seem, did not resent Apollonius' counsel, or his influence over the exiled prince, for the rejection of Demetrius' second appeal had proven Polybius right. In fact, he makes allowances for the mistake of the naive and young Apollonius.²⁵ Polybius, it would seem, was quite fond of Apollonius, his junior, fellow conspirator.

We know virtually nothing of the position enjoyed by Apollonius' brother, Menestheus, within the Seleucid court.²⁶ What of the father of these brothers, who also bore the name of Apollonius? Polybius notes that the elder Apollonius enjoyed a high standing in the Seleucid kingdom during the reign of Seleucus IV, but decided to move to Miletus after Antiochus IV ascended the throne (31.13.3). The implication is that Apollonius did not see eye-to-eye with the new king, and therefore chose to remove himself from the Seleucid kingdom. However, Apollonius the elder, whose sons included a Menestheus, is clearly identical with a governor of

XXXVII 991 A l. 2, first published by Herrmann 1987: 177-79.

²⁵ Polyb. 31.11, and especially 31.11.7: ὁ δὲ προειρημένος (Apollonius) ἄκακος ὢν καὶ κομιδῆ νέος.

²⁶ Later on, ca. 150, he was awarded Athenian citizenship. See *IG II²* 982 (and *addenda*).

Coele-Syria and Phoenicia during Seleucus IV's reign named Apollonius son of Menestheus. This governor was sent to Ptolemy VI Philometor's *protoclesia* during the reign of Antiochus IV (2 Macc. 4.4 and 21). Apollonius' diplomatic mission to the Ptolemaic court also favors his identification with Antiochus' homonymous ambassador to Rome in 173 (Livy 42.6.6-12). This latter identification is lent support by the presence of Apollonius the younger in Rome, alongside the Seleucid Demetrius. Since the father held an important position under Seleucus IV (according to Polybius and 2 Maccabees) and under Antiochus IV (according to 2 Maccabees and Livy), his son would be a suitable candidate to serve as a companion to Prince Demetrius. Apollonius son of Apollonius' stay in Rome provided him with an opportunity to introduce himself to senatorial families and to cultivate the close relationships in Rome which his father had initiated. We must also bear in mind that Apollonius the younger was probably a hostage, as was Demetrius. Thus, Apollonius son of Apollonius seems to have been in Rome for two related reasons: he was one of the Seleucid hostages in Rome and, at the same time, he served as Demetrius' confidant and friend. Apparently, his father's elevated status required that Apollonius be detained in Rome. The presence of Apollonius son of Apollonius and that of other hostages linked to the king's court provided Rome with the leverage needed to guarantee that the Seleucid king would not unduly strain his relationship with the Republic.²⁷ We can conclude that Apollonius the elder served under Antiochus IV on important and delicate missions, and Polybius' statement that he left Syria for Miletus in 175, once Antiochus IV had become king, is factually incorrect. The historian's implied argument that the king and the Seleucid minister were enemies from that date is equally suspect.

By 170, Apollonius son of Menestheus was no longer Antiochus' envoy to Rome. In that year, and again in 169, the king dispatched three ambassadors to Rome. The head of the Seleucid mission was Meleager, who was accompanied by Heracleides and Sosiphanes.²⁸ In the Hellenistic kingdoms of the period, the king's

²⁷ See Mørkholm 1966: 47-48, 107-8; Habicht 1976a: 214-15 n. 4a; Bunge 1974: 61-62 n. 20; Nachtergaele 1975: 260-61. Olshausen 1974a: 209 no. 145, rejects the identification of Apollonius son of Menestheus with Apollonius the father of Menestheus.

²⁸ Polyb. 27.19, 28.1, 28.22.

Friends often held the same positions which had previously been occupied by their fathers,²⁹ and it seems that Meleager, Antiochus' chief ambassador to Rome in 170 and 169, is none other than the son of Apollonius son of Menestheus.³⁰ Apollonius' service as ambassador to Rome, and the esteem with which he was regarded there, must have played a part in Antiochus Epiphanes' decision to choose his son Meleager as his envoy to Rome in 170 and 169. When family connections played a large part in the appointment of the king's Friends, age and experience do not seem to have been an overriding factor, and Meleager was appointed an ambassador to Rome at a relatively young age.³¹

A few years after Meleager's two embassies to Rome in 170 and 169,³² Antiochus IV conferred with Ti. Sempronius Gracchus at Antioch, shortly after the close of the festivities at Daphne. The Seleucid king, so we are told, behaved quite amicably to the Roman representative, although his true feelings towards the Romans were quite the opposite (Polyb. 30.27). Polybius could only have known of the king's true feelings, if he made use of a source

²⁹ Habicht 1958a: 14-16. For the case of Aetus, a Ptolemaic governor of Cilicia whose son and grandsons served as *strategoi*, first of the Ptolemaic kingdom, and then of the Seleucids, see Habicht in Jones & Habicht 1989: 341-46.

³⁰ For the identification, see Geyer 1931; Nachtergaele 1975: 260; Paltiel 1979a: 46. Olshausen 1974a: 213-15 no. 149, accepts the identification of the ambassador with the governor's son, but denies any connection with the Meleager the son of Apollonius mentioned at Polyb. 31.13.2-3.

³¹ For Meleager's approximate age, and the consequent objections to his identification with Meleager the ambassador, see D. Schwartz 1982: 50 n. 17. But the following are examples of senior posts acquired by men at a young age; some of these appointments are due to family connections. Aratus of Sicyon: *strategos* of the Achaeans at the age of twenty six, Polyb. 2.43.1-4 with Walbank 1936b: 65-66 n. 9. Polybius: elected as envoy to Alexandria when about twenty, Polyb. 24.6.3-7, with Walbank 1972: 6-7. The head of the mission was supposed to be the historian's father, and another member was Aratus, a grandson of the *strategos* mentioned above. Both Polybius and the young Aratus were elected because of family connections. Dorimachus son of Nicostratus: Aetolian ambassador, Polyb. 4.3.5, 4.5.1. Tlepolemus: *strategos* of Pelusium, Polyb. 15.25.25 and 31.

³² Mørkholm 1964a: 75-76 (cf. Mørkholm 1966: 47-49), suggests that Polybius' statement concerning Apollonius' hostility towards Antiochus IV is essentially accurate, but that his negative attitude dates from 173 to 170, not 175. According to Mørkholm, Apollonius looked after the interests of Antiochus son of Seleucus, the co-regent. As long as the status of Seleucus IV's son was maintained, Apollonius was ready to recognize Antiochus IV as king and act on his behalf. But after Antiochus IV established himself at the expense of the co-regent, Apollonius left for Miletus. Meleager's role as ambassador to Rome in late 169 disproves this theory.

close to the Seleucid king. Gelzer has suggested that Polybius' source was Menochares, who served as Demetrius I's emissary to Cappadocia, where he met Ti. Sempronius Gracchus. Gelzer posits that Menochares met Polybius when he was sent by his king to Rome, and that he provided the historian with information about the meeting between Ti. Gracchus and Antiochus IV.³³ There is, however, no evidence that Menochares was personally acquainted with Polybius or that he held a position in Antiochus IV's court which would have given him access to secret information about the meeting. Meleager, on the other hand, was Antiochus' expert on Roman affairs, and therefore privy to inside information regarding the king's policy towards the Republic. Furthermore, Polybius, in his account of Demetrius' flight from Rome, tells us that he was personally acquainted with Meleager and his brothers.³⁴ We can assume that in 169 Meleager returned to Antioch from his mission to Rome, and some three years later he either sat in on the meeting between his king and the Roman envoy, or else was told about it by Antiochus. Meleager subsequently provided Polybius with an eye-witness account of the festival at Daphne and the meeting between Antiochus Epiphanes and Ti. Gracchus.³⁵

In 166, Meleager was still in Antioch, while in 162/1 he was already a prominent member of Demetrius' circle in Rome. When did Meleager leave Antiochus' court in Antioch to support the claims of Demetrius? Since Meleager enjoyed a harmonious relationship with Antiochus IV, the key to his open support for Demetrius in 162/1 lies in a series of events which took place in the Seleucid kingdom: the death of Antiochus IV in late 164, the coronation of his son Antiochus V, and Lysias' assumption of *de facto* control over the Seleucid kingdom.

Polybius Rewrites History

This, it appears, is the background to Polybius' allusion to the supposed hostility between Apollonius—the father of Meleager, Apollonius, and Menestheus—and Antiochus IV. The close friendship between the exiled historian from Megalopolis and

³³ Gelzer 1964: 166-67. Cf. Pédech 1964: 371 with n. 111.

³⁴ Polyb. 31.11.6-8, 31.13.2-3.

³⁵ Walbank 1996: 126 n. 44, suggests that a written source may underlie Polybius' description of the Daphne festival.

Apollonius' sons indicates that Polybius knew full well when Apollonius the father really left the Seleucid kingdom for Miletus.³⁶ Our analysis has demonstrated that, contrary to Polybius' statement, there was no rift between the king and Apollonius and his family.³⁷ Antiochus IV sent Apollonius son of Menestheus on diplomatic missions to Egypt and Rome, and when Apollonius later retired from the Seleucid court, his son Meleager continued to serve the king. Meleager headed two delegations to Rome, and may have been present at the meeting between Antiochus IV and Ti. Sempronius Gracchus in 166. The younger Apollonius was Demetrius' *syntrophos* at Rome and was probably one of the hostages whom the Seleucid kingdom was required to deliver to Rome according to the Treaty of Apamea. He, too, was attached to the administration of Antiochus IV, and the same should be assumed for the third brother, Menestheus.

Why, then, did Polybius tell his readers that Apollonius left the kingdom as soon as Antiochus IV became king? The historian misleads his readers: he does not state explicitly that Apollonius was an opponent of Antiochus IV, but simply says that Apollonius left the Seleucid kingdom for Miletus as soon as Antiochus came to power. The reader naturally concludes that Apollonius and Antiochus IV had an acrimonious relationship, and Polybius was deliberately inaccurate in his chronology in order to create the impression that Apollonius and his sons were hostile towards the Seleucid ruler. The need to establish such hostility arose when Demetrius I and Antiochus V challenged one another for the throne. At that time, Demetrius and his supporters found it difficult to admit that they had earlier reconciled themselves to the rule of Demetrius' uncle. This might imply that the prince had relinquished his rights to the throne, and the title should therefore pass to the son of the king whom Demetrius had recognized. Polybius, in an attempt to help his friends, disguises the fact that both the Seleucid minister and his sons had served Antiochus IV. The historian's explanation of Demetrius' passivity during Antiochus IV's reign had the same objective. Polybius claimed that Demetrius was a child throughout the reign of Antiochus Epiphanes, and that he reached his prime only after he learned of his uncle's death, at the age of twenty three. The message here is clear. The

³⁶ Cf. D. Schwartz 1982: 46.

³⁷ Cf. Paltiel 1979a: 45-46.

prince was too young to take any action while his uncle was alive, and should not be blamed for his inactivity at the time. Nor should this lack of initiative on Demetrius' part be interpreted as a sign that he had waived his right to the throne. Here, too, Polybius sought to hide the fact that Demetrius had come to terms with Antiochus IV's rule.³⁸

In short, after the death of Antiochus IV, Demetrius and his advisers sought to deny their friendly relationship with Antiochus IV, in order to highlight Demetrius' preeminent right to the throne. Their friend Polybius joined forces with them, and implied in his *Histories* both that Demetrius was too young to take action before Antiochus Epiphanes' death, and that his advisers were the sons of a member of the court who had left the Seleucid kingdom because of his antipathy towards Antiochus IV.

In fact, Apollonius son of Menestheus' departure from Antiochus Epiphanes' court and move to Miletus can be explained in completely different fashion. In 173 or shortly thereafter, Apollonius son of Menestheus secured the transfer of his position in the king's court to his son Meleager. The Seleucid minister could then leave public life, and retire to his *patris*, Miletus.³⁹

Ptolemy Macron (b)

Polybius' description of Apollonius son of Menestheus dovetails with his portrayal of Ptolemy Macron. The Achaean historian tells us, in the context of the year 172/1, of a man named Ptolemy who was appointed governor of Cyprus while Ptolemy Philometor was still a child. The governor, described as a sensible and practical man, diligently collected income from the island, but did not hand the money over to any of the kingdom's financial officials,

³⁸ Polyb. 31.2.3-4. It is reasonable to conclude that this passage and Polyb. 31.13.3, were written at the same time. Put differently, Polybius composed the passage dedicated to Demetrius' first appeal to the Senate (31.2.1-7) at the same time that he wrote the story of Demetrius' flight from Rome (31.11.1-31.15.13). Both passages reflect the political conditions of 162. This conclusion is in accord with the view, shared by many, that Polyb. 31.11-15, was written soon after Demetrius escaped from Rome. Cf. De Sanctis 1907-23: III/1. 202-3; Gelzer 1964: 161-62; Volkmann 1925: 382.

³⁹ For the Milesian origin of Apollonius and his family, see *IG II²* 982 (and *addenda*) and the inscriptions published by Herrmann 1987: 175-90. Cf. *SEG XXXVII* 990-992, and compare below p. 284 n. 85. For retirement to one's native *polis*, see the case of Philonides son of Philonides, *P. Herc.* 1044 fr. 57.

even though he was criticized for keeping the funds. When the king reached maturity, Ptolemy the governor gave the money to his ruler, and thus won the esteem of both the king and the members of his court (Polyb. 27.13). Since the passage refers to the king's coming of age, the reference here is to Philometor's *anacleteria* in 170/69, and Ptolemy, the governor of Cyprus, would have held his post into the period of the Sixth Syrian War. The Jewish source of 2 Maccabees, also speaks of a governor of Cyprus during the reign of Ptolemy VI Philometor. His name was Ptolemy Macron, and we are told that, although he had been entrusted by Philometor with the administration of Cyprus, he deserted and went to serve Antiochus IV (10.12-13). Ptolemy Macron's betrayal, then, seems related to the Seleucid king's successful occupation of Cyprus during the Sixth Syrian War.

Since both Polybius and 2 Maccabees tell of a Ptolemy who was *strategos* of Cyprus during the early years of Philometor's reign, they are obviously referring to the same person. Furthermore, both sources seem to date his term of office to the time of the Sixth Syrian War. In the first year of the war, when Philometor came of age, the governor was still loyal to him, sending him the revenues which he had amassed. His defection to Antiochus IV must have occurred during next year's campaign, in 168, when Seleucid forces successfully occupied the island of Cyprus.⁴⁰ The two reports complement one another on points of chronology. Polybius is our source for Macron's earlier career, while 2 Maccabees contains information on his activity during the Seleucid occupation of Cyprus in 168. However, Polybius speaks of Ptolemy Macron's loyalty to Ptolemy Philometor, while the Jewish source notes his betrayal.⁴¹

Two considerations support the claim that Ptolemy Macron defected. In his later role as the Seleucid governor of Coele-Syria and Phoenicia, Macron proved to be friendly towards the Jews, and the report in 2 Maccabees is quite favorable to him.⁴² The Jewish

⁴⁰ See Lévy 1950: 690-92; Mitford 1957: 176-77; Mørholm 1966: 70, 91-92; Habicht 1976a: 251-52 n. 13c.

⁴¹ Otto 1934: 78 n. 4, who wishes to uphold Polybius' trustworthiness here, argues that Macron did not defect to Antiochus IV as reported in 2 Maccabees, but surrendered to the king in battle.

⁴² 2 Macc. 10.12: Πτολεμαῖος γὰρ ὁ καλούμενος Μάκρων τὸ δίκαιον συντηρεῖν προηγούμενος πρὸς τοὺς Ἰουδαίους διὰ τὴν γενομένην εἰς αὐτοὺς ἀδικίαν ἐπειράτο τὰ πρὸς αὐτοὺς εἰρηνικῶς διεξάγειν.

author would have had no reason to portray Ptolemy Macron in negative fashion or to fabricate information on his defection to the Seleucid camp. More important still is an inscription from Paphos, a dedication from a governor of Cyprus to Ptolemy Philometor. The name of the *strategos* has been effaced, but according to one reading of the inscription, supported to some extent by an accompanying photograph, it can be restored to [[(Πτολ)ε(μ)αῖος Πτολε(μ)αίου]]. If this reading is correct, the Ptolemaic governor of Cyprus, Ptolemy son of Ptolemy, is identical with Ptolemy Macron of 2 Maccabees, and the obliteration of the governor's name would be an outcome of his betrayal of the Ptolemaic cause, as narrated in 2 Maccabees.⁴³

Polybius' discussion of Ptolemy Macron is surprisingly similar to his treatment of Polycrates, in the context of the events of 197. Both sections deal with a governor of Cyprus who holds office at a time when the king was a child. The governor is involved in collecting money and hands the money over to the king, only after he is declared of age. When the money arrives at court, the king and his friends sing the governor's praises. Polybius states explicitly that Polycrates was loyal to his king, and his discussion of Ptolemy Macron indicates the same.⁴⁴ The numerous parallels illustrate that one of the two passages is a doublet of the other. Was this doublet the work of one of Polybius' sources or that of the historian himself? If Polybius was responsible, was the original passage that describing Polycrates or that dealing with Macron?

The section on Polycrates forms part of a longer and quite detailed passage concerning events in Egypt in 197. Polybius was an infant at the time, and must have used both oral and written sources as the basis for his narrative. Ptolemy of Megalopolis, an older compatriot of Polybius, who himself had been a governor of Cyprus, may have been Polybius' source here.⁴⁵ Since Macron and

⁴³ *OGIS* 105. See Mitford 1957: 182-84 no. 3; Mitford 1961: 20 no. 51. For other inscriptions relating to Ptolemy Macron, his father Ptolemy, and other members of his family, see *Inscriptiones Creticae* IV 208a; *Syll.*³ 585 11. 138-39; *OGIS* 117. See the discussions of Lévy 1950: 691-92; Peremans & Van't Dack 1954/5: 339-41 and cf. Walbank 1957-79: III. 311-12.

⁴⁴ Compare Polyb. 18.55.3-7 with 27.13.1-4.

⁴⁵ Polyb. 18.53-55. For Ptolemy of Megalopolis as a possible source, see von Scala 1890: 267 and the objection of Pédech 1964: 271. Pédech argues that Polybius would not have relied on Ptolemy, since he paints an unfavorable picture of him, but the lack of alternative sources may have forced Polybius to rely on his compatriot's work. For Polybius' sources in general, see Walbank 1972:

Polybius were contemporaries, the historian probably did not use the writings of Ptolemy of Megalopolis, or any other author, when describing Ptolemy Macron, for he need not have depended on written sources. It seems more likely, then, that the story of the governor and the young king was originally told of Polycrates, and Polybius' description of Ptolemy Macron is an adaptation of his section on Polycrates, which was based on an earlier source.

In his account of Polycrates, Polybius praises the governor's fidelity to the young king when telling of Ptolemy V Epiphanes' coming of age. Yet in his parallel tale of Ptolemy Macron, Polybius does not insert the story of the faithful governor in the twenty eighth book of his *Histories*, where we are told of Philometor's *anacleteria* (28.12.8), but includes it in the twenty seventh book. This can be explained as a conscious effort on the part of the historian to separate his description of Ptolemy the governor, from his report on the Sixth Syrian War, which is found in Polybius' books twenty eight and twenty nine. Had Polybius inserted his complimentary description of Ptolemy in its proper place, the historian's readers may have been reminded of the part actually played by Ptolemy Macron during the war, i.e. his defection.⁴⁶

Polybius portrays Ptolemy Macron, the governor of Cyprus, as a loyal officer of Ptolemy Philometor, even though the historian knew the contrary to be true. It must be remembered that Polybius, in keeping with his favorable portrait of Ptolemy, does not even mention the governor when discussing Antiochus IV's capture of Cyprus in 168. This event is recounted in the context of Polybius' description of Popillius Laenas' ultimatum to Antiochus IV in 168. After Antiochus IV gave in to the demands of the Roman *legatus*, Popillius and the members of his delegation departed for Cyprus. Upon arrival, they discovered that the Ptolemaic forces had been defeated in battle (Polyb. 29.27.9-10). This would have been the proper place for Polybius to introduce the story concerning Macron's defection, yet the existing fragmentary text makes no mention of the renegade governor. Livy's report on the capture of

77-82.

⁴⁶ It is possible that the events of the Olympic year 171/0 were narrated in book twenty eight, see Walbank 1957-79: III. 22-23. In that case, Polybius could not have inserted his passage on Ptolemy in the section relating to that year, without bringing it uncomfortably close to the events of the Sixth Syrian War.

Cyprus is based on the same section of Polybius. The Roman historian must have consulted Polybius' complete version of these events, yet he, too, does not allude to Ptolemy Macron.⁴⁷ Livy's more elaborate description indicates that an existing fragmentary section of Polybius (29.27), and not another section which was subsequently lost, is where Macron's defection should have been recorded. We can conclude that Polybius deliberately chose not to discuss the desertion of Ptolemy Macron to the Seleucid fold.

Polybius' praise of Ptolemy Macron is especially surprising in view of the Achaean historian's harsh words on the subject of traitors elsewhere in his work. Thus he strongly criticizes a later governor of Ptolemaic Cyprus, Archias, who attempted to deliver the island to Demetrius I (Polyb. 33.5.2-4). How, then, can we explain Polybius' sympathetic treatment of Macron? While it is possible that Polybius was personally acquainted with Ptolemy Macron and that is why he chose to clear his name, this assumption has no real basis in fact. The connection between Ptolemy Macron and the historian is most likely an indirect one, with the two linked by a third party. The passage concerning Ptolemy Macron is a doublet of Polybius' description of Polycrates and reveals no special knowledge of Ptolemaic affairs. But Polybius does include in this section one item of information on the governor of Cyprus which is not found in his account of Polycrates. Ptolemy is described as a practical and intelligent man whose character did not betray his Egyptian origin. In other words, Polybius knows that Macron was born in Egypt.⁴⁸ Polybius is privy to a personal detail concerning the governor of Cyprus, and we need not assume that the historian relied here on an oral source in the Ptolemaic court. Such a Ptolemaic source would hardly sing the praises of a man who had betrayed the island to Antiochus Epiphanes.⁴⁹

The key to Polybius' report on Macron may lie in the latter's subsequent career as the Seleucid governor of Coele-Syria and Phoenicia. His governorship came to an end when Macron was

⁴⁷ Note the parallels between Polyb. 29.27.1-11 and Livy 45.12.1-8.

⁴⁸ Polyb. 27.13.1: Πτολεμαῖος... οὐδαμῶς Αἰγυπτιακὸς γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ νονεχῆς καὶ πρακτικὸς. For similar preconceptions relating to Egyptians, see Polyb. 39.7.7. For slurs against other nationalities, see Polyb. 4.3.5, 5.81.1, 27.12.2-3, 32.11.10; cf. above p. 30.

⁴⁹ *Pace* von Scala 1890: 270, who assumes that Menyllus of Alabanda is Polybius' source.

attacked by the friends of Antiochus V Eupator. Macron was accused of being a traitor (προδότης) by nature, and his earlier defection to Antiochus IV was cited as proof of this trait. As a result, the *strategos* chose to take his own life (2 Macc. 10.13). Thus, many of the Friends of Antiochus V doubted Macron's allegiance to the new king and, in all likelihood, he was suspected of being a partisan of Demetrius, in league with other supporters of that prince, such as the sons of Apollonius son of Menestheus. At least one of Apollonius' sons, Meleager, probably knew Ptolemy Macron personally, for we have seen that he was an active member of Antiochus IV's administration well after Macron joined the court in 168. Meleager was also a friend of the historian, and supplied him with information on Seleucid affairs. It is possible, then, that Meleager influenced Polybius to clear Ptolemy Macron's name, but it may have been another one of Demetrius' supporters in Rome. Polybius, who was friendly with the Seleucid prince's backers and was personally involved in planning Demetrius' flight from Rome, would have been open to such a suggestion. While Macron's enemies had charged him with treachery, the historian made a point of praising his fidelity, describing the loyalty of Ptolemy Macron to Philometor in a context far removed from the Sixth Syrian War. Polybius was careful not to mention the governor in connection with the Seleucid campaign against Cyprus and he tried to mislead his readers into thinking that Ptolemy Macron was a loyal supporter of Ptolemy VI Philometor, just as he tried to create the wrong impression that Apollonius son of Menestheus was an enemy of Antiochus Epiphanes.

Other Members of Demetrius' Circle

We have seen that Ptolemy Macron was accused of disloyalty towards Antiochus V Eupator. This accusation can best be explained by the presence of a group within the Seleucid court which supported the right of Demetrius to succeed his uncle, already during the reign of Antiochus Epiphanes. Since Demetrius did not press his own claims during Epiphanes' lifetime, there was no *immediate* reason for Antiochus to object to such a faction. He was, after all, at the height of his powers, and his son Antiochus was too young to take part in the management of the kingdom's affairs. Demetrius himself was not a free man, but in the custody of Rome,

and he posed only a remote threat to the stability of the Seleucid throne. It was best for Antiochus to make use of the men who supported his nephew for his own benefit, and for the good of his kingdom. The careers of Meleager and Apollonius, and of their father Apollonius son of Menestheus before that, demonstrate how it was possible for some members of the court to be loyal to the king and to his nephew at the same time. Were there others?

In 167/6 Nicanor served as the financial official in charge of Samaria, and in 165, as *meridarch* of Samaria, he was one of the commanders of the Seleucid army in Emmaus (above pp. 236-37). In the context of the battle of Emmaus, 2 Maccabees speaks of Nicanor as "thrice-sinful" (8.34: τρισσαλιτήριος). The same disparaging term is directed against an officer of Demetrius I named Nicanor (2 Macc. 15.3), and obviously, the Nicanor who served under Antiochus IV is identical with the minister of Demetrius. In addition, Polybius speaks of a Nicanor, a member of Demetrius' entourage in Rome, who was told of Demetrius' plan to escape from Rome the day before it was executed. This Nicanor made his way to Syria together with the Seleucid prince (Polyb. 31.14.4-13). Josephus identifies Demetrius' confidant in Rome with the commander appointed by Demetrius to fight the Jews, basing his identification solely on the shared name and the link to Demetrius I. This identification is convincing, even if Josephus had no additional information about Nicanor.⁵⁰ Thus Nicanor served, at least until 165, in different capacities under Antiochus IV, while in 162 he was allied with Demetrius in Rome. In all probability, Nicanor, like Meleager son of Menestheus, traveled to Rome after Antiochus IV had died and Lysias had assumed *de facto* control over the kingdom.

Among the men surrounding Demetrius in Rome, a person of considerable importance was Diodorus, who had been the prince's *tropheus*. After the death of Antiochus Epiphanes, Diodorus seems to have acted as Demetrius' eyes and ears in Syria, and he played a major role in convincing the young prince to take matters in his

⁵⁰ Jos. Ant. 12.402-10 and 420. For the other allusions to Nicanor's ties with Demetrius, see 1 Macc. 7.26-47, 9.1; 2 Macc. 14.12-39, 15.1-37. For the identification, see E. Bevan 1902: 200 n. 5; Habicht 1976a: 239 n. 9a; Paltiel 1979a: 46. Bar-Kochva 1989: 352-53, thinks that the Nicanor mentioned in 1 & 2 Maccabees is different from the one mentioned by Polybius.

own hands, escape from Rome, and seize the Seleucid kingdom.⁵¹ We do not know when Diodorus began to play the role of 'foster-father' to Demetrius or for how long he fulfilled this function. We also cannot determine if Diodorus was attached to Seleucus IV, Antiochus Epiphanes, or both kings.

Two other figures who were linked both to Antiochus IV and Demetrius, were the Epicurean philosopher Philonides and his brother Dicaearchus. Philonides is the subject of the treatise known as *Vita Philonidi* (*P. Herc.* 1044).⁵² The information gleaned from this work, and from three inscriptions relating to Philonides and members of his family, helps us establish his position and family relations. Philonides was the eldest son of a prominent citizen of the *polis* of Laodiceia-on-Sea in Syria, who enjoyed good connections with the Seleucid royal house. The philosopher and his father shared the same name and there was another son named Dicaearchus.⁵³ All three—the father and his two sons—are honored in an Athenian decree from Eleusis, because of the help offered by Philonides the elder to Athenian envoys who were sent to the "kings" (*IG II²* 1236). The Athenian decree, as well as the mention in the *Vita Philonidi* of a man named Heliodorus, who seems to be none other than Seleucus IV's chief minister, point to the possibility that the younger Philonides became associated with the Seleucid court under Seleucus IV.⁵⁴

In any event, when Antiochus IV Epiphanes was in power, Philonides had some contact with him, although it remains unclear whether the philosopher was able to convert the king to the Epicurean school. Perhaps, having failed at that, Philonides turned his attention to Demetrius and instructed him in philosophy.⁵⁵ Another piece of information relates to Philonides' brother Dicaearchus, who was honored by the Delphians for the help he had extended to *theoroi* from Delphi who sought an audience with a "King Antiochus." The Delphian decree probably belongs to

⁵¹ Polyb. 31.12.3-7, 31.13.1.

⁵² First published by Crönert 1900. See now Gallo 1980, which contains many new readings and a commentary.

⁵³ See Köhler 1900; Philipsson 1941: 64.

⁵⁴ Heliodorus is mentioned in fr. 21 and 28 of the papyrus. For dating the beginning of the Epicurean's career to the time of Seleucus IV, see Otto 1912a: 13; Philipsson 1941: 66. Crönert 1907: 146-49, and Gallo 1980: 153-54, argue that this occurred during the reign of Antiochus IV.

⁵⁵ *P. Herc.* 1044 fr. 30. For the different views on the meaning of this section, see Gallo 1980: 154-56.

168/7,⁵⁶ and in that case, "King Antiochus" must be Antiochus IV Epiphanes.⁵⁷

The name of Dicaearchus, together with that of his brother Philonides, appears in a list of Delphian *theorodokoi*. Different parts of the list apparently were inscribed at different dates, but the names of the two brothers would not have been added to the list before 168/7.⁵⁸ Dicaearchus had been awarded the title of *theorodokos* in acknowledgment of his assistance to a delegation from Delphi visiting Antiochus IV, and he, like his father before him, ranked among the king's Friends. The similar status which the Delphians conferred upon his brother Philonides, suggests that he, too, belonged to this select group.⁵⁹

Philonides retained his position at the Seleucid court and perhaps played an even more prominent part during the reign of Demetrius. The *Vita Philonidi* refers specifically to the ties between the king and the philosopher, and to Demetrius' esteem and gratitude towards his former teacher.⁶⁰

Bacchides, the Seleucid officer who was involved in Demetrius' attempt to curb the Jewish rebellion, followed a similar pattern of service, first in the court of Antiochus IV Epiphanes and then under Demetrius I.⁶¹ At first glance, this Seleucid official seems to be a different person from the Bacchides who was a member of Antiochus Epiphanes' court. Josephus relates that Bacchides was sent by Antiochus IV to Judaea to enforce the king's edicts, and was killed by Mattathias the Hasmonaeon, when attempting to force the residents of Modein to violate their ancestral laws (*BJ* 1.35-36). This would mean that this Bacchides, who died in 167, cannot

⁵⁶ *OGIS* 241. The name of the archon was copied by Cyriac of Ancona as ΕΑΕΩΝ. This is thought to refer to the archon <Κ>λέων(ος) of 168/7 rather than (Ξ)έ(ν)ων(ος) of 189/8. Some doubts as to the true date must remain; cf. Fraser 1972: II. 601-2 n. 320.

⁵⁷ Köhler 1900: 1000; Mørkholm 1966: 61.

⁵⁸ Plassart 1921: 24 col. IV ll. 78-80. For the nature of the list, see Plassart's discussion on pp. 39-41; Daux 1949: 21-27; J. Robert & L. Robert, *Bull. épigr.* 1950: no. 127.

⁵⁹ For Dicaearchus' place beside the king, see *OGIS* 241 l. 11, and Mørkholm 1966: 105, on the two brothers. Daux 1936: 513, raises the possibility that the people of Delphi dedicated an inscription to Philonides, similar to the one which honored his brother.

⁶⁰ *P. Herc.* 1044 fr. 10, 27.

⁶¹ On Bacchides under Demetrius, see 1 Macc. 7.8-20, 9.1-72; *Jos. Ant.* 12.393-97, 12.420-32, 13.4-33. This man is mentioned at the time of Antiochus IV in 2 Macc. 8.30, but this is an interpolation; Habicht 1976a: 242 n. 30a (with bibliography). See too Bengtson 1944: 181-85.

be identical with the homonymous officer of Demetrius. However, in the *Antiquities*, we hear a different version of the same story. In this account, the name of the slain Seleucid officer is given as Apelles (*Ant.* 12.270). In the *Antiquities*, Josephus stresses his desire to describe what happened during the reign of Antiochus IV Epiphanes "precisely" (*Ant.* 12.245: ἐπ' ἀκριβέως). The Jewish historian seems to admit here that his earlier treatment of the period was riddled with errors, which now need to be corrected. Hence, the different name for the Seleucid officer should be seen as one of the many amendments which Josephus introduced into the *Antiquities* in order to correct mistakes he had made in the *Bellum*.⁶²

In the *Antiquities*, when telling of Demetrius I's reign, Josephus states that Demetrius' minister Bacchides was one of the Friends of Antiochus IV (*Ant.* 12.393). This statement cannot be based on his discussion of Bacchides in the *Bellum*, a discussion which Josephus himself corrects. Perhaps Josephus' earlier mistake stemmed from his knowledge that Bacchides had been in the service of Antiochus IV. The historian, relying on his memory rather than referring back to his source, recorded the name of one officer of Antiochus Epiphanes (Bacchides) instead of another (Apelles). We do not know which source Josephus used for his statement that Bacchides was one of Antiochus IV's ministers, but since he makes the claim after he corrected his earlier error concerning Bacchides, this pronouncement should be accepted. Bacchides would then fit the pattern we have established for other Seleucid courtiers, who first served Antiochus IV Epiphanes and then supported Demetrius.

A somewhat different case is that of Menochares, who in 161/0 was Demetrius' ambassador to Cappadocia, where he met Ti. Sempronius Gracchus and established ties with him. A year later, Menochares was sent to Rome to bring the Senate a 'crown' and to extradite the men responsible for the murder of Cn. Octavius.⁶³ An inscription from Delos reveals that Menochares was ranked among the First Friends of Demetrius I, that he was the king's *epistolographos*, and that his father's name was Dionysius.⁶⁴ We

⁶² Cf. Tcherikover 1961a: 145. For a list of these corrections in the *Antiquities*, see Goldstein 1976: 60-61.

⁶³ Polyb. 31.33.1-5, 32.2.1-3, 32.3.13. Habicht 1988: 214, has shown that Menochares is mentioned in *P. Herc.* 1044 fr. 10.

⁶⁴ *I. Délos* 1543. This identification was first proposed by P. Roussel in his annotations of the Delos inscription. Cf. Walbank 1957-79: III. 517.

have already encountered, on more than one occasion, members of the Seleucid court, whose function is later taken up by their sons. Menochares son of Dionysius, the *epistolagrophos* of Demetrius I Soter, should probably be seen as another such instance, for he fills the same position which Dionysius had held under Antiochus IV (Polyb. 30.25.16).

In sum, we have seen that several of the Friends of Antiochus IV were later found among the supporters of Demetrius I. In the case of Apollonius son of Menestheus and his children, their attachment to the Seleucid court can be traced back to the time of Seleucus IV, and the same can be said of the Epicurean philosopher Philonides and his brother Dicaearchus. These two families, along with Menochares son of Dionysius, exemplify a well known trend in Hellenistic kingdoms, whereby fathers pass on their positions in court to their sons.

Two of the Friends led particularly interesting careers at court. Meleager son of Apollonius was already a high ranking official when Antiochus son of Seleucus was eliminated. The killing of the young prince apparently did not cause Meleager, whose father had been a minister of Seleucus IV, to part ways with Antiochus IV. Nor do we know of any other member of the court who responded in this manner to the murder. Meleager was associated with Antiochus Epiphanes in late 169, and it seems likely that in the summer of 166 he was still the king's adviser on Roman affairs. We find Nicanor son of Patrocles in the service of Antiochus IV in 165. Here, too, there is no hint of any conflict between Nicanor and the king, and after Antiochus IV's death, both Nicanor and Meleager surface in Rome as supporters of Demetrius. It seems, then, that both men left the Seleucid kingdom after the death of Antiochus IV. Perhaps Meleager and Nicanor supported Demetrius' cause, but found no conflict between this position and their service under Antiochus IV, while Antiochus Epiphanes was still alive. This hypothesis accords with the fact that Demetrius refrained from pressing his claim to the Seleucid throne while his uncle was alive (Polyb. 31.2.3). The connection between Meleager and his brothers, and Seleucus IV, in whose court their father Apollonius had enjoyed an important position, is also apparent from Apollonius the younger's position as Demetrius' *syntrophos*. The family supported Demetrius out of loyalty, and this must also have been true of Diodorus, Demetrius' *tropheus*. Other members of

the court may have had different motives for backing Demetrius, including hostility towards Lysias, Antiochus Epiphanes' chief minister and the *epitropos* of Antiochus' son. While Antiochus IV was alive, it was in Lysias' interest to support the cause of his ward, and this may have induced some of his opponents to declare themselves in favor of Demetrius.

We do not know enough about some of the figures discussed here to say what their stand was in the crucial years 163-162. Did men such as Philonides, Dicaearchus, Bacchides and Menochares, join Demetrius in Rome or did they support him from within the Seleucid kingdom? Did they remain undecided? Did some, perhaps, support Antiochus V at first, only to change their allegiance later on?⁶⁵ A decisive answer to these questions is impossible, but many of Antiochus Epiphanes' ministers were later to become members of Demetrius I's court, and some of them seem to have declared their support for Demetrius as soon as Antiochus Epiphanes died.

Antiochus IV: A Question of Image

We have seen from Polybius' treatment of Apollonius son of Menestheus and of Ptolemy Macron that the historian was not a disinterested witness, at least in relation to Seleucid history from the time of Antiochus Epiphanes to that of Demetrius I. This is not surprising in view of the historian's personal involvement in Demetrius' flight from Rome, and his friendship with the prince and his confidants. What was Polybius' attitude towards Antiochus IV Epiphanes? The Seleucid king is portrayed by Polybius as a bizarre character. Antiochus' unusual habits included dressing as a commoner, mingling with the masses, conducting conversations with tradesmen, entering his name as a candidate for civic magistracies, and pouring oil on the bathhouse floor so that his fellow bathers would slip. This behavior earned Antiochus IV the nickname Epimanes, a play on his epithet Epiphanes.⁶⁶ The king's behavior was no less unconventional at the festivities in Daphne

⁶⁵ As did, for example, the Jewish high priest Alcimus; see 2 Macc. 14.3; Jos. Ant. 12.385-87, 12.391-92. However, 1 Macc. 7.5, states that Alcimus did not reach his high position until after Demetrius became king.

⁶⁶ Polyb. 26.1a, 26.1. Cf. Diod. 29.32.

where again his conduct allegedly lacked royal dignity.⁶⁷ Who was Polybius' source here? Mørkholm proposes the sons of Apollonius son of Menestheus, whom he sees as enemies of Antiochus IV Epiphanes. The unsympathetic characterization of the king, he suggests, was the result of this hostility.⁶⁸ Mørkholm is probably correct, but the timing and motive behind this unflattering representation of Antiochus IV need to be defined more carefully. We have seen that Polybius' hint of a rupture between the king and Apollonius son of Menestheus is misleading. The evidence shows that in 169 Antiochus Epiphanes was still employing a son of Apollonius, and it is likely that this son, Meleager, continued to serve at court until the king's death.

After Antiochus IV died, Meleager and his brothers were affiliated with Demetrius and were committed to his cause. Demetrius' success could only be achieved at the expense of the reigning king, Antiochus V, the son of Antiochus Epiphanes. The new king soon received the epithet Eupator. This epithet, given to him by Lysias, was designed to allow the young king to bask in Antiochus Epiphanes' reflected glory.⁶⁹ Demetrius' supporters sought to undermine the figure of Antiochus IV posthumously, as a means of eroding the support of the masses for Antiochus V. Thus, the undignified portrait of Antiochus IV Epiphanes is probably the product of rumors passed on to the receptive ears of Polybius by friends of Demetrius in Rome. These friends (and Meleager is probably the key figure amongst them) knew Antiochus IV quite well, but after his death, they decided, for political purposes, to present a rather slanted view of the king. These tales, with their obvious propaganda value, were not only recorded for posterity by Polybius, but were disseminated to the general public, possibly even to an audience in Syria, by the group that surrounded Demetrius in Rome. Ptolemy Euergetes II records another example of such stories in his memoirs (*FGH* 234 F 3). During the relevant years, the Ptolemaic king and his emissaries visited Rome, and it

⁶⁷ Polyb. 30.26.4-8 (from Athenaeus). Cf. Athen. 10.439b-d (another version), and Diod. 31.16.1-3.

⁶⁸ Mørkholm 1966: 184.

⁶⁹ 1 Macc. 6.17; Jos. *Ant.* 12.361. Appian, *Syr.* 46, characteristically claims that the new king received his epithet from his subjects, in this case the Syrians. Muccioli 1996: 21-26, rightly rejects this. Antiochus V, Alexander Balas, and Antiochus VI all made use of the figure of Antiochus Epiphanes for propaganda purposes; see Mørkholm 1966: 184-85.

was there that he could have heard the tale, either directly or indirectly.⁷⁰

3. *Antiochus Eupator's Partisans*

Timarchus and Heracleides

Let us turn now to those ministers of Antiochus IV who later served his son, Antiochus V. Two of them, Timarchus and Heracleides, were brothers, and came from Miletus.⁷¹ There are conflicting reports on Timarchus' position under Antiochus Epiphanes and his son. According to one account he was satrap of Babylon, while another states that he was the satrap of Media. It seems that Timarchus served in the latter capacity, for Media was Timarchus' power base later on, ca. 162, when he sought to establish himself as an independent ruler. But he may have held some form of authority over the city of Babylon as well, for it is possible that in addition to being satrap of Media, Timarchus had overall responsibility for Seleucid affairs in the East. In that case, his authority would have extended to Babylon.⁷²

Timarchus is said to have participated in several diplomatic missions to Rome. During his visits there, the Seleucid minister showered many senators with presents, thus causing weaker-minded *patres* to become indebted to him. His brother Heracleides was a ready accomplice in this matter. We are told that, later on, during the period when Demetrius I ruled Syria, Timarchus the satrap of Media made an additional trip to Rome. He asked the Romans to recognize him as king and they agreed to do so. Timarchus, Diodorus notes, capitalized on his connections with the many senators whom he had bribed in the past, and succeeded in winning the support of the Senate as a whole (Diod. 31.27a). This passage from Diodorus is manifestly hostile towards the two

⁷⁰ Polyb. 31.10.1-6, 31.20.1-3. Mørkholm 1966: 183 n. 6, and Walbank 1957-79: III. 288, emphasize that Ptolemy does not depend on Polybius.

⁷¹ Diod. 31.27a. For the *bouleuterion* erected by the brothers in Miletus, on behalf of Antiochus Epiphanes, see *Milet* 1/2 1-2. Cf. Herrmann 1987: 171-73.

⁷² Babylon: Appian, *Syr.* 45 and 47. Media: Diod. 31.27a. For Timarchus' position, see E. Bevan 1902: 132; Bengtson 1944: 86-88; Mørkholm 1966: 107. Gruen 1976: 85 n. 84, suggests that Timarchus was first appointed satrap of Babylon, and that he subsequently moved on to Media.

brothers, and clearly is wrong in assigning Timarchus a visit to Rome in person, ca. 162. If Timarchus was indeed Demetrius' satrap in Media, as Diodorus contends, he could hardly have left his post for an extended period, without word of his departure reaching Demetrius. The king would then have replaced Timarchus with a more loyal officer. Equally improbable is the supposition that Timarchus, having declared his animosity towards Demetrius, left Media, traveled to Rome, attained the Senate's support, and only afterwards returned to his power base. Under such circumstances, Timarchus could not rely on Demetrius to mark time and avoid taking control of Media in his absence. Therefore, it seems that the man who traveled to Rome and secured Rome's recognition of Timarchus' independent position as king must have been his brother Heracleides, who took advantage of the relationships he himself had established during previous visits to Rome.⁷³

It is important to note that not only was Timarchus a member of Antiochus' court in charge of a satrapy in the eastern part of the Seleucid kingdom, but he also retained that command until Demetrius I seized the throne.⁷⁴ The implication of this is clear. Timarchus continued in his post as satrap of Media after the death of Antiochus IV and his position remained unaltered throughout the short reign of Antiochus V Eupator. He was in place as satrap when Demetrius had both Lysias and the young king killed. Since the sources telling of Timarchus' conflict with Demetrius place the confrontation immediately after these killings, it is obvious that Timarchus had opposed Demetrius from the very start. Timarchus was a member of Eupator's court, who saw no way of maintaining his position under Demetrius, and therefore chose to establish a kingdom of his own. The nucleus of this kingdom was Media and the other territories in the East that had been under his control as governor.⁷⁵ Timarchus lay claim to independence by minting his

⁷³ See Ed. Will 1979-82: II. 368, as opposed to Ziegler 1936: 1237, and Lenschau 1940. On Heracleides' previous embassies to Rome, see Polyb. 28.1.1, 28.22.1-2.

⁷⁴ Diod. 31.27a; Appian, *Syr.* 45, 47.

⁷⁵ Similarly, Ed. Will 1979-82: II. 368. The portrayal of Timarchus as a rebel reflects Demetrius' outlook. In his eyes, both the reign of Antiochus V and Timarchus' attempt to create his own kingdom must have seemed illegal. Diod. 31.27a, and Appian, *Syr.* 45, 47, present Demetrius' viewpoint, because their source is Demetrius' associate, Polybius. The anti-Timarchean strain is again apparent in the allegation made by Appian, that both Timarchus and

own coins in Media and Mesopotamia, and his rule seems to have been accepted by the local population. He sought successfully, as we have seen, to obtain recognition from Rome, and he also secured the co-operation of a closer ally in his conflict with Demetrius, Artaxias of Armenia. Timarchus did not rely solely on help from the outside and raised his own army to face Demetrius. He moved the army to Zeugma in northwest Mesopotamia, making it clear that the whole of Mesopotamia was under his control.⁷⁶ Despite Timarchus' efforts, his reign was short-lived. By May 14, 161, Demetrius was recognized as king in Babylonia, no doubt because the army loyal to him managed to wrest Mesopotamia from Timarchus' control. The final defeat and death of the former Seleucid governor must have occurred at about the same time.⁷⁷

We have seen that Timarchus' brother Heracleides had been one of Antiochus IV's Friends, who had performed diplomatic missions in Rome on the king's behalf. In addition, Heracleides held another post, "in charge of income" (ὁ ἐπὶ ταῖς προσόδοις) for Antiochus IV (Appian, *Syr.* 45, 47). In view of Heracleides' role as ambassador to Rome, and in light of Timarchus' important position as satrap of Media, Heracleides apparently had a senior post, possibly parallel to that of a *dioiketes*.⁷⁸ Once Demetrius landed in Syria, he had Heracleides removed from office (Appian, *Syr.* 47). It is clear that Heracleides, like his brother, maintained his position during the reign of Antiochus V and was loyal to Lysias and the young king. When Demetrius sought to dispose of his adversary's supporters, the brothers decided that Timarchus should make an effort to establish his own kingdom, and Heracleides went to Rome to win the Senate's approval for his brother's independent rule.

Heracleides were Antiochus IV's παιδικά, and reached their high standing by this means.

⁷⁶ Diod. 31.27a; Trogus, *Procl.* 34. For Timarchus' coins, see Bellinger 1945; Le Rider 1965: 332-34; Houghton 1979.

⁷⁷ For the earliest mention of Demetrius as king in Babylonia, see Parker & Dubberstein 1956: 23. Demetrius is also mentioned later in 161, see BM 46003 (Sachs & Hunger 1988-96: III. 40-41). Timarchus' death: Appian, *Syr.* 47. See Ed. Will 1979-82: II. 367-69.

⁷⁸ For Heracleides' high position, see Otto 1912b: 465; Mørkholm 1966: 103-4. The term employed by Appian for Heracleides' post is perhaps imprecise, because a similar title, ὁ ἐπὶ τῶν προσόδων refers not to a central financial official, as Heracleides must have been, but to a local one. See Bikerman 1938: 128-29; Bengtson 1944: 127-29; Musti 1984: 186.

Timarchus' failure and death only served to increase his brother's hostility towards Demetrius I, and enhanced his desire to regain a position of influence in the Seleucid kingdom. Years later, in 153/2, Heracleides again appeared in Rome, accompanied by Alexander Balas, who claimed to be Antiochus IV's son. Heracleides canvassed the members of the Senate energetically and convinced them to recognize the youth as king and allow him free rein to work against Demetrius I.⁷⁹

Other Seleucid Officials

A Seleucid official of much less importance is Gorgias, a governor of Idumaea under Antiochus IV, and one of the Seleucid commanders at Emmaus. Gorgias retained his position during the reign of Antiochus V, and was involved in additional clashes with the Jewish rebels.⁸⁰

Another figure in the court of Antiochus Epiphanes was Hegemonides son of Zephyrus, a native of the Achaean city of Dyme. In an inscription from that city, we find a dedication by Hegemonides himself to King Antiochus IV, his wife Laodice, and "Antiochus the son."⁸¹ Hegemonides of Dyme is obviously the same person as the Hegemonides who was appointed *strategos* of

⁷⁹ Polyb. 33.15.1-2, 33.18.6-14.

⁸⁰ Under Antiochus Epiphanes: 1 Macc. 3.38, 4.1-5; Jos. *Ant.* 12.298, 12.305-6, 12.309-12; 2 Macc. 8.9. Under Antiochus Eupator: 1 Macc. 5.59; Jos. *Ant.* 12.350-53; 2 Macc. 10.14, 12.32-37.

⁸¹ *OGIS* 252. For an improved reading see Bingen 1954: 395 no. 7; cf. *SEG* XIV 368. Habicht 1958b: 376-77, argues that τὸν υἱὸ[v] Ἀντίοχου of the inscription cannot be identified with Antiochus IV's co-regent, Antiochus son of Seleucus, as claimed by Bingen. If the "son" were the co-regent he would have been styled king. Hence the inscription refers to the future Antiochus V, and it dates after the murder of Antiochus the co-regent in 170. However, *SEG* XXXVI 1280, an inscription from Antioch dated to 198/7, honors Theophilus son of Diogenes for his devotion εἰς βασιλεία μέγαν Ἀντίοχο[v] [καὶ] Ἀντίοχου τὸν υἱὸν [καὶ] βασίλισσαν Λαοδίκην [καὶ] τὰ παιδία κτλ. "Antiochus the son," distinguished here from the "children," is the eldest son of Antiochus III, co-regent from 209 to 193. Cf. *SEG* XXXVII 859 A ll. 1-4, with Wörle 1988: 451. In both these inscriptions, "Antiochus the son" seems to be used as a title for the co-regent, in much the same way as "the sister" (ἡ ἀδελφή) refers to the queen. In similar fashion, "Antiochus the son" in *OGIS* 252 may refer to the co-regent, but may equally belong to a period after his death, and refer to the future Antiochus V, Antiochus Epiphanes' son in the simple sense of the word. Hence, the inscription should be dated more loosely to 175-164.

the coastal strip at the time of Antiochus V.⁸² Hence Hegemonides is yet another example of a Seleucid courtier who first served under Antiochus IV and then under his son. A second inscription from Dyme expresses the gratitude of a city named Laodiceia to Hegemonides for his benefactions.⁸³ This has been taken to reflect events in Syria after Demetrius took control of the kingdom. The new king, it is argued, intended to destroy Laodiceia-on-Sea, because of the murder of Cn. Octavius in that city, but Hegemonides, who must have transferred his allegiance to Demetrius when the Seleucid prince landed in Syria, convinced his new master to pardon the Laodiceians, and was duly rewarded with a dedication by the grateful citizens of Laodiceia. This restoration of events seems somewhat fanciful, since the Laodiceia of the inscription is not necessarily Laodiceia-on-Sea. In addition, the Laodiceian expressions of gratitude seem somewhat banal and shallow in comparison to the benefactions allegedly received by them.⁸⁴ We cannot know, then, what became of Hegemonides, once Demetrius landed in Syria. He may have defected to the new king's camp, or he may have been forced out of office, or even killed. The same can be said of Gorgias, since we have no information as to his fate after Demetrius gained control of the Seleucid kingdom.

4. *Succession and Political Parties in the Court of Antiochus Epiphanes*

This survey of the former Friends of Antiochus IV has shown that many of them either supported Demetrius after Antiochus Epiphanes' death or else joined the court of Antiochus V Eupator. It appears that the Friends of Antiochus IV were deeply divided among themselves.⁸⁵ The evidence, while partial and incomplete,

⁸² 2 Macc. 13.24. See Habicht 1958b: 377-78.

⁸³ SEG XIV 369, first published by Bingen 1954: 396-98 no. 8.

⁸⁴ For this reconstruction, see Moretti 1965: 283-87. Demetrius' intention to destroy Laodiceia-on-Sea, is discussed below p. 299 n. 118. On the style of the inscription, see J. Robert & L. Robert, *Bull. épigr.* 1966: no. 214.

⁸⁵ SEG XXXVII 992, which records the marriage between the son of a fleet commander who served under Alexander Balas, and Aristodice daughter of Menestheus, has been seen as an instance of a union between these two hostile Seleucid factions; cf. Herrmann 1987: 183-89. However, this marriage is not a definite instance of such a union, since Aristodice's father Menestheus may not have belonged to the family of Apollonius son of Menestheus. So, too, the marriage between the former *nauarch's* son and Aristodice may

does not point to a single Friend of Antiochus V Eupator who subsequently became a member of Demetrius' administration.⁸⁶ While the strong rivalry and sharp hostility between the two parties is evident from the behavior of individuals in both camps, it is unlikely that the division between the two groups was so extreme that loyalties could not be adjusted in the face of political change.⁸⁷ Meleager and Nicanor, who were members of Antiochus Epiphanes' court and served under him until quite late in his reign, appear in Rome as supporters of Demetrius almost immediately after the death of Antiochus. They clearly had supported Demetrius even earlier, while Antiochus IV was still alive, but after his death they could no longer reconcile this stance with a position in the court of the new king. Consequently, they fled to Rome. Another member of their faction, Ptolemy Macron, failed to draw the right conclusions from the inauguration of a new king, and paid for his mistake with his life. Lysias sought to eliminate all opposition both to the rule of the young king and to his own influence within the kingdom. The behavior of Timarchus and Heracleides, the two brothers who were central figures in the courts of Antiochus Epiphanes and his son, is also instructive. As soon as it became clear to them that Antiochus Eupator had been murdered, they refused to recognize Demetrius as king and worked together towards the establishment of a new kingdom, with Timarchus as ruler. This course of action suggests that the two felt that no accommodation with the new king was possible: their only alternative was to create a rival power base and carry on the fight against Demetrius. Heracleides' later effort to depose Demetrius and install Alexander Balas in his place is proof of the sharp enmity felt by him towards the king and his supporters, although, of course, Heracleides had the added motive of avenging his brother's death.

have taken place considerably later, after the death of Antiochus VI, the last alleged successor of Antiochus IV. With the death of Antiochus VI, the grounds for the feud between the supporters of these two branches of the Seleucid royal house would have disappeared.

⁸⁶ The only example is Alcimus, the Jewish high priest, who, strictly speaking, was not a member of the court and his story is not without its problems; see above p. 278 n. 65.

⁸⁷ The analysis of affairs in Syria by Diodorus, Demetrius' confidant (as reported in Polyb. 31.12.3-6), stresses the readiness of the masses to abandon Antiochus Eupator. Surely this feeling would have spilled over to some of the king's Friends.

Since this conflict between the two camps broke out immediately after Antiochus IV died, it must have taken root during the king's lifetime. Thus, two main factions were already operating in the court of Antiochus IV Epiphanes. One of these supported Demetrius, while the other, led by Lysias, upheld the cause of Epiphanes' son, the future Antiochus V. The members of both factions must have been in conflict over the identity of the next king, but both accepted the legitimacy of the reign of Antiochus IV.⁸⁸

Antiochus' Heir

What of Antiochus IV Epiphanes' own position concerning the question of the succession? We can assume that Antiochus IV's natural inclination was to will his kingdom to his son, but the king had to consider more important factors. His son, who was born in 173, was still a child and therefore unfit to rule. Antiochus himself, on the other hand, was in his forties and could expect to reign for many years to come.⁸⁹ The advantages in declaring his son co-regent and heir at this time were small, while there were weighty reasons for the king to avoid taking such a step. Demetrius, the son of Seleucus IV, had a strong claim to the throne, but Antiochus could not be blamed for ruling the Seleucid kingdom in his nephew's stead, as long as the prince was kept as a hostage by the Romans. Had Antiochus Epiphanes decided to appoint his son as his successor, he would have alienated Demetrius, as well the latter's supporters in the Seleucid court. The king chose instead to leave the question of succession open, thereby allowing both factions the hope that some day their champion would become king. As long as Demetrius remained in Rome, the Friends were united in their loyalty to Antiochus Epiphanes, and the king could make use of the talents of the members of both groups. Furthermore, by keeping the hopes of Demetrius alive, the king could prevent Rome from using Demetrius to stir up matters within the Seleucid kingdom. Antiochus Epiphanes no doubt understood that his rule

⁸⁸ We have seen, however, that there were others, most notably Philip, who pursued their own policies. Philip supported Antiochus IV's son, but counted himself among Lysias' enemies.

⁸⁹ For Antiochus Epiphanes' approximate date of birth, see above p. 109 n. 5.

would remain stable as long as the balance of power within the court was not disturbed. Perhaps he also hoped that he could settle the question of succession over the course of time and gradually resolve the problem of internal dissension in the kingdom. But Antiochus IV's death in Tabae left the Seleucid kingdom open to a bitter struggle between the two parties in his court.

We have seen that Demetrius did not press his claim to the throne while Antiochus Epiphanes was alive. Polybius explains the young prince's lack of initiative by saying that Demetrius was still a child while his uncle reigned. This is not entirely satisfactory. When Antiochus IV died in 164, Demetrius was already twenty two years old. He clearly did not change from a mere child to a man at the height of his powers overnight, as Polybius claims (31.2.3-4). Rather, Demetrius' inactivity before his uncle's death indicates that there was no overt conflict of interest between the two. The king kept the hopes of his nephew alive, but at the same time did not rely completely on Demetrius' supporters. Antiochus also cultivated a rival group headed by Lysias, a group which was loyal to him and his son. While the members of this faction could perhaps understand Antiochus' reasons for not choosing a successor, their future in the Seleucid court depended on the throne passing from the king to his son, should Antiochus Epiphanes die. The king played a subtle game with these two factions. He must have encouraged, at times, members of each of the two groups, but he consciously avoided deciding the question of succession, and did not choose his heir until his death, or at least until the very last months of his life.

While some of our sources suggest that Antiochus IV did, in fact, appoint his son as co-regent, these statements cannot be trusted.⁹⁰ In addition, a series of coins are said to belong to a period in which Antiochus Epiphanes and his son ruled jointly. These coins show the portrait of a boy wearing a crown on their obverse, while on the reverse side one can see Apollo sitting on an *omphalos* and the legend ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ ΑΝΤΙΟΧΟΥ. Houghton and Le Rider argue persuasively that these coins could not have been issued in Acre-Ptolemais before 168/7 and that the boy should therefore be identified as the son of Antiochus Epiphanes, Antiochus V Eupator. They further add that these coins cannot be dated to the period of

⁹⁰ 2 Macc. 9.25; Porphyry, *FGH* 260 F 32.13. For the rejection of these sources, see Habicht 1976b: 3-7; Houghton & Le Rider 1985: 82-83.

Antiochus V's reign as sole monarch, because the king is called simply Antiochus and not Antiochus Eupator. Appian (*Syr.* 46) and 1 Macc. (6.17) suggest—but do not explicitly say—that the new king was given the epithet Eupator as soon as he ascended to the throne. The coins must therefore belong to an earlier stage, when Antiochus IV Epiphanes was still alive. Houghton and Le Rider conclude their discussion of this series of coins by saying that the period in which Antiochus IV shared the throne with Antiochus V was very brief. The joint rule was inaugurated during Antiochus IV's illness immediately prior to his death.⁹¹ Even if these conclusions are correct (and some doubt must remain),⁹² they do not contradict the claim that there was no obvious rift between Demetrius and his uncle Antiochus IV. Houghton and Le Rider maintain that Antiochus V was co-regent with his father for a brief period, at the very end of Antiochus Epiphanes' life. Since the king died in late 164, this would mean that his son was associated to the throne in the early winter of that year, and news of the king's choice of his son over Demetrius would have reached Rome in the spring of 163, together with word of Antiochus' death. Hence it is clear that if there was a co-regency, it would have had no actual bearing on the relationship between Demetrius and Antiochus IV.

5. *Demetrius and Rome: 163–161*

Early in 163, news of Antiochus IV's death reached Rome. His nephew Demetrius now asked the Senate to conduct him to his ancestral kingdom and crown him. After all, his claim to the throne was superior to that of Antiochus IV's descendants, and his devotion to Rome and loyalty to the senatorial class had strengthened during his many years in the city. The Senate, however, turned down his request. Polybius states that the Senate chose to act in this way because it believed that the rule of the youthful and

⁹¹ Houghton & Le Rider 1985.

⁹² It is possible that the new king did not receive the epithet Eupator immediately after his father's death, but a few weeks later. This interim period, represented by the coins discussed by Houghton & Le Rider, would have been telescoped by later authors. Appian, *Syr.* 45, gives the impression that Eupator's father, Antiochus IV, was assigned the epithet Epiphanes as soon as he became king, yet this epithet is absent from his early coins (175-173/2); see Mørkholm 1963: 8-11, 34-37.

weak Antiochus V would better serve the interests of Rome than a government headed by Demetrius, who was now twenty three years old and at the height of his powers. The Senate then sent Cn. Octavius, Sp. Lucretius, and L. Aurelius Orestes to the east, with instructions to observe internal politics in Macedon. They were also to report back on the struggle in Asia Minor between the Galatians and their enemies, Eumenes II of Pergamum and Ariarathes IV, the ruler of Cappadocia. The delegates' most important destination was Syria, as Polybius and Cicero make clear. The Roman envoys were to see to the burning of Seleucid warships and the mutilation of elephants used by Antiochus V's army.⁹³ While Polybius' explanation of the Senate's attitude towards Demetrius is in accord with the mission entrusted to Cn. Octavius, it is also, as Walbank points out, precisely the claim a supporter of Demetrius, such as the historian himself, would make. The Achaean's explanation emphasizes Demetrius' good qualities, as opposed to those of Antiochus V, and provides a rationale for his claim to the throne.⁹⁴ Polybius expresses his opinion that the Senate's refusal to grant Demetrius' wish was based solely on pragmatic considerations and the senators were blind to the justice of Demetrius' claims (31.11.11). The Achaean historian may well be right about the motivation of the *patres*, but he does not state how they intended to use the weak position of Antiochus V and Lysias to their own advantage.

Lysias and the Romans

We have seen that Lysias and other members of Antiochus V's court had already supported the boy's right to inherit the throne while his father was still alive, and that these men were at odds with another faction which supported Demetrius' claim. Lysias and the other supporters of Antiochus V Eupator would hardly

⁹³ Polyb. 31.2.1-13; Cic. *Phil.* 9.4; Appian, *Syr.* 46; Justin 34.3.5-8; Zon. 9.25. Zonaras claims that the Roman representatives were sent to be Antiochus V's guardians, but this is based on a misunderstanding of Polyb. 31.2.9: εὐθέως γὰρ καταστήσαντες πρεσβευτὰς... τοὺς διοίησοντας τὰ κατὰ τὴν βασιλείαν.

⁹⁴ Polybius' presentation is accepted by various scholars; see Niese 1893-1903: III. 219; Badian 1958: 107-8; Ed. Will 1979-82: II. 365. On the propagandistic element, see Walbank 1957-79: III. 466. Gruen 1976: 80-81, claims that Rome wished to maintain stability. This view does not explain the instructions to Cn. Octavius, as Gruen 1984: II. 664, admits.

welcome Demetrius' return to Syria (Polyb. 31.2.10), and the Romans were in a position to take advantage of these fears. Lysias could be made to understand by Cn. Octavius and his colleagues that unless he acquiesced with the Senate's demands and agreed to a large-scale disarmament of the Seleucid army in accordance with the Treaty of Apamea, Demetrius would be set free and return to the Seleucid kingdom with Rome's blessing. Lysias knew that Demetrius' superior claim to the throne would enable him to win popular support in Syria. He also realized that the former Friends of Antiochus IV who stood behind Demetrius had the knowledge, experience, and connections to transform such popular support for Demetrius into political power. If Lysias refused the Roman request, he would pave the way for a dangerous rival to enter Syria. If, on the other hand, he acceded to their demands, the Romans would not interfere with his *de facto* rule. Lysias appreciated the consequences of refusing the Roman request and allowed Cn. Octavius and his colleagues to carry out their mission. Since the central Seleucid government did not hinder the destruction of Seleucid military might, or react in any significant way, a response came from a different quarter. Popular opposition to the Romans and to the regime of Lysias began to surface, fueled by wounded pride and by the damage done to the military establishment.⁹⁵ In Laodiceia-on-Sea, the site where the Seleucid fleet was actually destroyed, a certain Leptines took matters in his own hands and killed Cn. Octavius. Lysias, who was aware of his own unpopularity, chose not to heighten the tension and left Leptines at large. Isocrates, a grammarian, following in the wake of Leptines, openly incited the masses against the Romans. Lysias had reached an impasse, and his lack of response to Leptines' act exposed him to charges of complicity with the murder of Octavius.⁹⁶ The Seleucid chief minister could only offer weak excuses to the Senate, and deny allegations of his own involvement in the assassination. The Senate hedged, neither accepting the apologies of Lysias' envoys, nor making the chief minister responsible for Octavius' death (Polyb. 31.11.1-3).

⁹⁵ Compare the response of the military settlers in Apamea and its vicinity to their abandonment by Demetrius II; see E. Bevan 1902: 224-27.

⁹⁶ Appian, *Syr.* 46; Cic. *Phil.* 9.4; Zon. 9.25; Polyb. 31.11.1, 31.12.3-6, 32.2.1-32.3.2; Diod. 31.29; Pliny, *NH* 34.24 (confused). Obsequens 15, dates the murder to 162.

Demetrius

Demetrius now approached the Senate once again. The new set of circumstances seemed very promising, for Lysias had, at the very least, failed to protect a visiting consular, and had then left the assassin free from punishment. Demetrius no longer asked for active Roman support, but merely requested to be set free and not be held as a hostage on his cousin's account. The senators remained unmoved, and rejected Demetrius' petition.⁹⁷ At first sight, the fact that the Senate neither reacted to the murder of its envoy nor punished the Seleucid regime indirectly, by setting Lysias' rival Demetrius free, seems odd. We are left with the impression that Rome showed no interest in events in the eastern Mediterranean.⁹⁸ But the Senate was far from being disinterested. The *patres* realized that even if it entailed a loss of prestige, it was better to respond with restraint to the murder of the Roman representative, rather than relinquish their leverage over Lysias. As long as Demetrius was in Roman hands, so the *patres* must have thought, Lysias and Antiochus V would be amenable to Rome's demands. What the senators failed to take into account was that Octavius' very success in hamstringing the elephants and burning the Seleucid ships rocked Lysias' regime to its foundations. The Roman policy of using Demetrius as a lever against Lysias had run its course.

Demetrius was now ready to step into the void. The Senate's repeated refusal to set him free left the prince with no choice but to escape from Rome.⁹⁹ This, in fact, was the advice given to Demetrius by Diodorus, his former *tropheus*, who had come from Syria with up-to-date information on developments there, following the Octavius affair. Diodorus also stressed the need to avoid alienating the Senate. He suggested that the allegations concerning Lysias' involvement in the murder of Cn. Octavius might prove useful in allaying the Senate's anger, once Demetrius' flight became public knowledge. The planning and implementation stages of the escape began as soon as the decision to leave was taken.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁷ Polyb. 31.11; Appian, *Syr.* 47. Zon. 9.25, and Justin 34.3.5-9 combine Demetrius' two appeals to the Senate. See Habicht 1989: 355.

⁹⁸ Gruen 1976: 82-83; Gruen 1984: II. 664. See also the comments of Walbank 1957-79: III. 479.

⁹⁹ The escape plan may have owed much to Ptolemy VI Philometor's (apparently unannounced) departure from Rome in 163.

¹⁰⁰ Polyb. 31.12.3-6. The historian gives himself the credit for first

Polybius and the Scipios

It is clear why Demetrius chose to escape from Rome and why his Seleucid partisans, Diodorus and the sons of Apollonius son of Menestheus, assisted him in the plan. But why were Polybius and Menyllus of Alabanda involved? The historian, an exile in Rome, had little to gain from his participation in the conspiracy to smuggle Demetrius out of Rome. His involvement is best explained by the assumption that he was furthering the interests of his patrons, the Scipios, who would, if circumstances required, offer him protection.¹⁰¹ In political terms, Demetrius' escape was intended not only to replace Antiochus V Eupator with his older cousin, but to cause a breach between Pergamum and the Seleucid kingdom. The co-operation between the two kingdoms had been the cornerstone of Antiochus Epiphanes' foreign policy, and this policy must have continued during the short reign of Antiochus V Eupator, whose very epithet expresses commitment to the policies of his father. Demetrius, on the other hand, had distanced himself from Antiochus IV and his policies, after the latter's death. Thus Polybius' involvement in Demetrius' flight from Rome can be interpreted as an attempt by members of the Scipionic group to cut the link between the Seleucid and the Attalid kingdoms.

Are there any other hints that this was the position of the Scipios? Polybius, when telling of Attalus' visit to Rome in 168/7, speaks of a group of Romans, referred to as ἔνιοι τῶν ἐπιφανῶν ἀνδρῶν and ἐνίους τῶν ἀξιολόγων ἀνδρῶν, who enticed the Pergamene prince to ask the Senate to divide the Attalid kingdom between his brother Eumenes II, the reigning monarch, and himself. This story, which took place when the historian was not yet living in Rome, lacks credibility.¹⁰² Yet Polybius, who was

suggesting the idea, Polyb. 31.11.5: ὁ δὲ (Polybius) παρεκάλει μὴ δις πρὸς (τὸν) αὐτὸν λίθον πταίνειν, ἀλλ' ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὰς ἐλπίδας ἔχειν καὶ τολμᾶν τι βασιλείας ἀξιῶν. Polybius provides an extremely detailed description of the planning and execution of Demetrius' escape (31.12.7-31.15.6). Cf. Appian, *Syr.* 47, 67; *Zon.* 9.25; *Trogus, Prol.* 34; *Justin* 34.3.8-9; *Livy, Per.* 46; *Jos. Ant.* 12.389 and 402; *Porphyry, FGH* 260 F 32.14.

¹⁰¹ For Polybius' involvement, see Polyb. 31.11.4-31.14.1. A number of scholars argue persuasively that the Scipios supported Demetrius' escape. See *Volkman* 1925: 382-86; *Walbank* 1972: 9 n. 42; *Badian* 1958: 108; *Ed. Will* 1979-82: II. 366-67. *Gruen* 1976: 83 (cf. *Gruen* 1984: II. 664-65), views this as additional evidence of Rome's indifference to eastern affairs. *Eckstein* 1995: 12 is uncommitted.

¹⁰² Polyb. 30.1.7-10, see above pp. 195-97.

acquainted with political groupings in Rome from the autumn of 167 onwards, thought he could retroactively identify the enemies of Eumenes. Since Eumenes was a close ally of Antiochus IV, Polybius assumes that those senators who were disturbed by the political cooperation between the Attalids and the Seleucids had already tried to cause internal strife in Pergamum in 168/7, just as they would later encourage such dissension within the Seleucid kingdom.

After Demetrius became king, it was only a matter of time until he came into conflict with the Attalid kingdom. The immediate cause was Demetrius' support of the Cappadocian prince Orophernes, who had revolted against his younger brother, Ariarathes V, and deposed him. Ariarathes then turned to Rome, but the Senate was ready to support the division of the kingdom between Orophernes and Ariarathes. Attalus II of Pergamum, who became king after the death of his brother Eumenes II, offered more substantial aid. The Attalid king sent his forces into Cappadocia and restored Ariarathes to the throne.¹⁰³ Not content with this indirect victory over Demetrius, Attalus sought to put a candidate of his own on the Seleucid throne. Attalus took Alexander Balas, who claimed to be a son of Antiochus IV Epiphanes, under his wing, and in due course, in 153/2, sent him to Rome with Laodice, Antiochus IV's daughter, and Heracleides of Miletus. Heracleides, as we have seen, was a former ambassador of Antiochus Epiphanes and an influential minister in the court of Antiochus Eupator, who later aided his brother Timarchus in his efforts to create an independent kingdom. Heracleides' credentials as an avowed enemy of Demetrius were impeccable and his past services to Antiochus Epiphanes, the loyal ally of the Pergamene royal house, made him an ideal choice from Attalus' point of view. In Rome, through trickery and corruption, Heracleides managed to convince the Senate to lend political support to the two youngsters. The *patres* recognized Alexander's and Laodice's claims to the Seleucid throne as children of Antiochus Epiphanes, sanctioned their efforts to return to their ancestral kingdom, and even promised to aid them in their attempt.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰³ Diod. 31.19.6-8, 31.32-32a; Zon. 9.24; Appian, *Syr.* 47; Polyb. 3.5.2, 32.10.1-8, 32.12; Justin 35.1.1-2. For these events, see Ed. Will 1979-82: II. 371-73; Habicht 1989: 359.

¹⁰⁴ Diod. 31.32a (Attalus is mistakenly referred to here as Eumenes);

A minority group of senators objected to Heracleides' efforts, but to no avail. These senators must have supported Demetrius, and objected to Attalus' attempt to revive the alliance between Pergamum and the Seleucid kingdom. In other words, the same people who supported Demetrius' escape from Rome, because they were opposed to the existing alliance between the Attalid and Seleucid kingdoms, now confronted a political initiative designed to remove Demetrius from the scene and revive the good relations between the two kingdoms. The senatorial faction opposed to Alexander Balas is termed by Polybius τοῖς... μετρίοις τῶν ἀνθρώπων, and apparently the Scipios are meant.¹⁰⁵ We should recall how Polybius had described the Romans anxious to divide the Attalid kingdom as ἔνιοι τῶν ἐπιφανῶν ἀνδρῶν and ἐνίους τῶν ἀξιολόγων ἀνδρῶν, again apparently referring to the Scipios. Thus, in one instance, Polybius apparently acts on behalf of the Scipios, by aiding Demetrius, and attempting to break up the Pergamum-Antioch axis. In another case, the historian approves of those who try to maintain the division between the two kingdoms by keeping Demetrius in power, while on a third occasion, when telling the story of Attalus' visit to Rome in 168/7, the historian creates the impression that he knows the identity of the senators who wanted to weaken the Pergamene kingdom, the main ally of Antiochus IV. Polybius' stance in all three instances suggests that his patrons, the Scipios, were the prime force behind the attempts to cause dissension between the kingdom of Pergamum and that of the Seleucids.¹⁰⁶

Menyllus

Turning to Menyllus it must be stressed that it was Polybius who recruited his help in spiriting Demetrius away from Rome. Menyllus and the Achaean historian were already friends at that time, and Polybius had every confidence in him. As the ambassador of a foreign monarch, Menyllus was free to hire a boat to sail

Polyb. 33.15.1-2, 33.18.6-14. For Attalus' subsequent support of Balas, see Strabo 13.4.2 (C 624).

¹⁰⁵ Polyb. 33.18.10. See Volkmann 1925: 386; Walbank 1957-79: III. 561; Briscoe 1969: 61. Gruen 1976: 92 n. 124, denies that the term has a political significance.

¹⁰⁶ Pace Briscoe 1969; see above p. 204 n. 84.

to the eastern part of the Mediterranean without arousing suspicion, thus enabling Demetrius to flee from Rome undetected.¹⁰⁷ There may have been an additional factor behind Polybius' appeal to the ambassador to participate in Demetrius' escape. Menyllus had come to Rome because of Ptolemy VIII Euergetes' request to the Senate to overturn the settlement imposed on him by his brother, Ptolemy VI Philometor. Philometor, after regaining the throne in 163, had allotted Cyrene to his younger brother. Euergetes, not content with his share, appealed to Rome to add Cyprus to his kingdom and Philometor entrusted Menyllus with the task of defending him against his younger brother's accusations. The Senate, however, decided to support Ptolemy VIII's demand that Cyprus be annexed to his realm, and sent an embassy to enforce this decision.¹⁰⁸ The Senate's hostile attitude towards Ptolemy VI Philometor, and its rejection of Menyllus' arguments in favor of his king, made the frustrated ambassador an ideal candidate to be approached by Polybius. However, Menyllus' decision to facilitate Demetrius' flight was not based solely on his frustration, for his participation in the plot gave him the chance of creating a diversion. If the plan worked, as it eventually did, the Senate would not be able to concentrate all its efforts on forcing Ptolemy VI Philometor to relinquish Cyprus, for it would have to deal with the consequences of Demetrius' escape from Rome as well. Menyllus must have hoped that the Republic would turn the lion's share of its attention towards Demetrius, thus easing the pressure on Ptolemy VI Philometor. If, however, Rome were to treat Demetrius and Philometor with equal harshness, then the two kingdoms would be compelled to cooperate and withstand Roman acerbity in unison. Thus, as Rome's relations with Ptolemy VI Philometor reached a low point, Menyllus sought to improve his king's bargaining powers vis-à-vis Rome.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁷ Polyb. 31.12.8-13, 31.13.7, 31.14.8-13. Polybius' friendship with Menyllus is not surprising in view of the good relations the historian and his father had enjoyed with the Ptolemaic royal house; Polyb. 22.3.6, 22.9.1-4, 24.6.3-7, 29.23.1-29.25.7.

¹⁰⁸ Polyb. 31.10.1-10, 31.12.8. For background to the 163/2 conflict, cf. above pp. 181-185.

¹⁰⁹ If, as has been argued above, Polybius was acting for the Scipios, they could not have ignored the possibility that Menyllus' involvement might lead to a rapprochement between Demetrius and Ptolemy Philometor. Presumably, they were willing to pay this price in return for the dissolution of the Seleucid kingdom's alliance with Pergamum.

Resistance to Demetrius

Once Demetrius escaped from Rome, and reached Lycia, the Seleucid prince tried to placate the Romans. In a letter to the Senate, Demetrius claimed that his sole purpose was to remove Lysias from power, the man whom he held responsible for the murder of Cn. Octavius. The prince suggested that he did not intend to bring harm to his cousin, Antiochus V Eupator. However, once Demetrius landed in Tripolis, he took care not only to have Lysias put to death, but the young monarch as well.¹¹⁰

Demetrius' initial attempt to pacify Rome fell short. The Senate did not look kindly upon the Seleucid's defiance of two successive decisions of theirs, ordering him to stay in Rome. Nor were the majority of the *patres* pleased to see that a key weapon in Rome's foreign policy towards the Seleucid kingdom, the person of Demetrius, had slipped away from their hold. Hence the readiness of the Senate to bolster by diplomatic means the aspirations of Timarchus, the satrap of Media, and to recognize him as king (above pp. 280-82).

Rome's hostility towards the new Seleucid king is said to have caused not only the other kings to think slightly (*καταφρονήσαι*) of Demetrius, but the monarch's own satraps as well. Diodorus Siculus, who conveys this assessment to us, names Timarchus as the most prominent of these satraps (31.27a). Artaxias, the Armenian king, was another leader influenced by these developments. Earlier, in 165, he had been forced by Antiochus Epiphanes to recognize Seleucid authority over Armenia. Now, after the death of Antiochus V Eupator, Artaxias seems to have taken heart from Timarchus' stand against Demetrius and from the negative Roman attitude toward Demetrius. He allied himself with Timarchus, in an effort to free himself from Seleucid control and establish his own kingdom once again.¹¹¹

Ptolemy, the governor of Commagene, who is said to have disdained (*καταφρονήσας*) earlier Seleucid kings is apparently another example of a satrap who broke away from the Seleucid central government. Ptolemy's independent behavior, taken

¹¹⁰ Zon. 9.25; Appian, *Syr.* 47, 67; Justin 34.3.9; Trogus, *Procl.* 34; Livy, *Per.* 46; 1 Macc. 7.1-4; 2 Macc. 14.1-2; Jos. *Ant.* 12.389-90; Porphyry, *FGH* 260 F 32.14.

¹¹¹ Diod. 31.27a, where Artaxias is styled as king. The Armenian's independent status in 162 is also made clear by Diod. 31.22, and Polyb. 31.16.1-2.

together with the general attitude of satraps towards Demetrius at this period, both of which are mentioned by Diodorus Siculus, favors the dating of Ptolemy's rebellion to the time of Demetrius I.¹¹² It is worth noting that even though Ptolemy's attitude to former Seleucid kings is depicted as cool, his rebellion actually took place under Demetrius. It seems that Ptolemy, like Timarchus and Heracleides, was a Seleucid official who had served under Antiochus Epiphanes and Antiochus V, but could not serve under Demetrius I, and chose instead to rebel.¹¹³ One further challenge to Demetrius' authority came from Judaea, where the Jews under the leadership of Judas Maccabaeus continued their efforts to achieve independence. Judas, like Timarchus, sought recognition from the Senate, and here, too, the *patres* were accommodating. Rome signed a treaty with the Jews, thus declaring its support for the Jews' right to exist as a separate and independent entity (see below).

During this period Rome had refrained, naturally, from recognizing Demetrius as king, and did its best to undermine his control over his kingdom. However, the Republic was not willing to intervene by force in such remote regions of the Mediterranean, and thus Demetrius was able to overcome the threat to his sovereignty from Timarchus, as well as maintain his authority over the Jews.

Demetrius and Tiberius Gracchus

The first expression of Roman anxiety over Demetrius' escape came only a few days after his flight became public knowledge. The Senate decided to dispatch a delegation, led by Ti. Sempronius Gracchus, to the eastern Mediterranean. The Roman *legati* were instructed to observe affairs in Greece, and then to cross over to Asia Minor, where they were to await developments concerning Demetrius. The ambassadors were also told to ascertain the reactions of the various kings of Asia Minor to Demetrius' return,

¹¹² The location of Diod. 31.19a, between 31.17c and 31.27a, dates the rebellion to 164-162/1. Bouché-Leclercq 1913: 323; Meyer 1921: 239-40; Ed. Will 1979-82: II. 369; Gruen 1976: 85-86 associate the revolt with the time of Demetrius I, while Niese 1893-1903: III. 220, dates this event to the time of Antiochus V.

¹¹³ In the eyes of some, e.g. Honigmann 1924: 980-81, he was a local ruler. In that case, he should be compared to the Armenian king, Artaxias.

and to settle the differences between these kings and the Galatians. About a year and a half after the embassy of Gracchus left Rome, its members met with an ambassador of Demetrius for the first time, in Cappadocia.¹¹⁴ The Seleucid envoy, Menochares son of Dionysius, had come to the Cappadocian king, Ariarathes V, offering to link the Seleucid and Cappadocian royal houses by a marriage alliance. Hence, the meeting between the Seleucid representative and Ti. Gracchus was a chance one. Ariarathes rejected the Seleucid offer of an alliance, and he must have been influenced by the Roman *legati* at his court, or at least by their presence. Later on, the Cappadocian king sent an embassy to the Senate, claiming that he had rejected Demetrius' offer out of regard for Rome, and his statement was endorsed by Sempronius Gracchus and his colleagues.¹¹⁵

Once Gracchus compelled Menochares to recognize his decisive influence on Ariarathes, he mellowed somewhat and indicated to the Seleucid ambassador that Roman animosity towards Demetrius was not perpetual. The relations between the Republic and the Seleucid king might improve if Demetrius were to convince Ti. Gracchus and the Romans of his willingness to submit to Rome's wishes. Demetrius responded quickly, sending emissaries after Gracchus to Pamphylia and Rhodes. The Roman hinted, in reply, that the time was ripe for Demetrius to send his own embassy to Rome (Polyb. 31.33). Why was Ti. Gracchus now ready to move towards a reconciliation with Demetrius? The meeting between the Roman embassy and Menochares probably took place in the winter of 161/0.¹¹⁶ In the previous spring, Mesopotamia had already fallen into the hands of the Seleucid ruler. Demetrius' successes there, and most likely Timarchus' final defeat as well, probably convinced Gracchus that Roman policy had failed, and it was time for Rome to accept the inevitable.¹¹⁷ Gracchus, who had made plain Roman influence, as well as his

¹¹⁴ Polyb. 31.15.6-12, 31.33.1.

¹¹⁵ Diod. 31.28 (from Polybius); Polyb. 31.32.3, 32.1.1-4; Justin 35.1.2. Chance meeting: Olshausen 1974a: 221 no. 154, against Niese 1893-1903: III. 246; Ed. Will 1979-82: II. 368. Habicht 1989: 357 n. 124, rightly rejects the view of Gruen 1976: 88 n. 104 (cf. Gruen 1984: II. 583 n. 54), that no pressure was exerted on Ariarathes V.

¹¹⁶ Habicht 1989: 357 n. 124; Walbank 1957-79: III. 517.

¹¹⁷ Since the date of the Jewish defeat at the hands of Demetrius' general, Bacchides, is unclear—see below p. 312 n. 153—we cannot determine whether the defeat came before or after Gracchus' meeting with Menochares.

own, and demonstrated to the Seleucid envoy that he held the upper hand, was ready to offer the olive branch. Demetrius' first years in power had been fraught with conflicts and confrontations, and the king was now willing to pay homage to Rome in order to obtain recognition from the Republic and bring Roman support for the Jews and other rebellious elements in his kingdom to an end.

Demetrius selected Menochares, whose personal acquaintance with Ti. Gracchus would come in handy, to head the Seleucid mission to Rome. The king sought to establish his respect for Rome, and to convince the Senate of the sincerity of his earlier claim that his escape had been intended to punish those responsible for the killing of Cn. Octavius. He therefore delivered the murderer Leptines, as well as the anti-Roman agitator, Isocrates, to Rome. Demetrius sent a gift, a 'crown' worth ten thousand *staters*, to further gain the approbation of the *patres*.¹¹⁸ The Senate accepted the gift, but declined to take Leptines and Isocrates into its custody. In this way the *patres* refused to absolve the Seleucid government of its responsibility for the murder of Cn. Octavius, and left the door open for further meddling in Seleucid affairs. The senators also informed Menochares that Rome's future behavior towards Demetrius depended upon the king's conduct. Here, too, Demetrius received a warning not to take too much for granted.¹¹⁹ Despite the Senate's qualified answers, the senators' initial decision to grant Menochares an audience and their willingness to judge Demetrius according to his future behavior, indicated that Rome had bowed to the inevitable and recognized Demetrius as king.¹²⁰

¹¹⁸ Polyb. 31.33.5, 32.2.1 and 4; Diod. 31.29; Appian, *Syr.* 47; Zon. 9.25. Demetrius also considered pacifying Rome by destroying Laodiceia-on-Sea, the city where Octavius was murdered, but was dissuaded from doing so by the Laodiceian philosopher Philonides, see *P. Herc.* 1044 fr. 32. (Some scholars argue that fr. 9 refers to the same episode. This is problematic, as the ruler intending to demolish the city bears the name Antiochus, not Demetrius). For the view that Hegemonides was also involved in saving the city, see above p. 284.

¹¹⁹ Polyb. 32.2.2-3, 32.3.13; Diod. 31.29-30; Appian, *Syr.* 47.

¹²⁰ See Scullard 1973: 230; Gruen 1976: 83-84. Partial recognition by the Senate is argued, see Niese 1893-1903: III. 246-47; Briscoe 1969: 52-53. These scholars contend that Polyb. 31.33.3, *διεπέμπετο πρὸς τοὺτους... πάντα ποιῆσαι Ῥωμαίοις ἀναδεχόμενος, ἕως ἐξεργάσατο βασιλεὺς ὑπ' αὐτῶν προσαγορευθῆναι*, denotes that Demetrius was recognized as king by Ti. Gracchus and his fellow ambassadors, cf. Badian 1958: 108 n. 1. But *Ῥωμαίοις* stands closer to *ὑπ' αὐτῶν* than *τοὺτους*, and the sentence probably anticipates Rome's recognition of Demetrius. In any event, the *legati* would have had no authority to recognize Demetrius.

Menochares' embassy to Rome was apparently successful, but the very nature of the Roman response showed that the Senate reserved the right to rely once again on the methods it had employed in the years 162-160. This meant that it was only a matter of time before Rome would intervene yet again in the affairs of the Seleucid kingdom.

6. *The Jewish Rebellion: 163-161*

The Challenges facing Lysias

At the time of his death, Antiochus bequeathed a number of serious problems to his son and to Lysias, his chief minister. First of all, the king had not resolved the question of succession. The members of his court were deeply divided on the issue, and Antiochus IV Epiphanes avoided a decision as long as he could, perhaps even until his death. Even if the king did name his son as his heir in the very last weeks of his life, he had neither the time nor the opportunity to win over those supporters of Demetrius who had not accompanied him on his eastern campaign. To them, the appointment of the king's young son as co-regent and heir seemed arbitrary, if not a decision initiated by Lysias, which was then ascribed to the king posthumously. Demetrius' supporters would not recognize Antiochus V as king, and they treated Lysias and his ward as enemies. Another pressing problem for the chief minister was that Antiochus IV had died while on campaign in the East, and the bulk of the Seleucid troops were concentrated there. Moreover, at least one of Antiochus Epiphanes' eastern commanders, Philip, refused to acknowledge Lysias' authority and claimed that Antiochus, on his deathbed, had named him chief minister and regent to the young king, dismissing Lysias from these posts. Lysias needed to overcome the resistance of his opponents and establish the legitimacy both of his own position and that of his young charge.

Lysias dealt severely with his opponents. He pushed Ptolemy Macron, apparently a supporter of Demetrius, to kill himself, and had Antiochis, a sister of Antiochus IV who was opposed to Lysias for reasons unknown, eliminated. Thus, during the first months of his rule, Lysias concentrated his efforts on purging the Seleucid

court of his political rivals. The chief minister also awaited Philip's return from the East, and was obliged to muster an army to face his rival. It is possible that he was able to augment his military forces by gaining the support of some of Antiochus IV's other commanders in the East, such as Timarchus. But the chief minister could not put all his trust in such assistance and with the treasury of the kingdom at his disposal, he recruited mercenaries from other kingdoms and the islands.¹²¹ Lysias followed in the footsteps of his former king, and in the first months of his rule, he violated the terms of the Treaty of Apamea, and enlisted mercenaries from areas where recruitment was prohibited.

Lysias and the Jews

These demands on Lysias' resources shed light on the circumstances surrounding Antiochus V's letter to the Jews, in which the young king annulled the decrees imposed by his father and returned the Temple to the Jews (2 Macc. 11.22-26). Lysias could not afford to undertake a military campaign in Judaea, since his army at the time was still quite small and unprepared, and his presence in Syria was essential. The chief minister hoped that the king's letter would appease the Jews and stop the revolt from spreading. This, however, was not to happen. After their successes on the battlefield, the Jewish rebels were disinclined to end the revolt simply because the edicts, which the authorities were unable to enforce at the time, were formally lifted. Their aim now was to extend Jewish control over the areas lying outside Judaea proper, such as Idumaea, the southern maritime plain, and Trans-Jordan.¹²² When confrontations with the local population extended to the entire province of Coele-Syria and Phoenicia, Judas could not defend Jews living in more distant regions, and he sent his brother Simon to Galilee in order to evacuate the Jews living there.¹²³ These Galileans must have been relocated in the new territories recently conquered by the Jews. At first, the Seleucid central government stood by quietly. Neither Lysias, nor Macron's successor as

¹²¹ 1 Macc. 6.29.

¹²² Idumaea and the coastal plain: 1 Macc. 5.55-68; *Jos. Ant.* 12.350-53; 2 Macc. 10.14-23, 12.32-38. Trans-Jordan: 1 Macc. 5.6-13, 5.24-54; *Jos. Ant.* 12.329-31, 12.335-49; 2 Macc. 10.24-38, 12.2, 12.10-31.

¹²³ 1 Macc. 5.20-23; *Jos. Ant.* 12.334. However, 2 Macc. 10.19-23, has Simon remain in Judaea.

strategos of Coele-Syria and Phoenicia, Protarchus, are said to have initiated any steps either to fight the Jews or to reach a new agreement with them.¹²⁴ Resistance to the Jews was left up to local governors and officers, such as Timotheus and Gorgias, the governor of Idumaea. These men apparently fought the Jews on their own, without coordinating their activities with other officials in the province.¹²⁵

By the summer of 163, Lysias could no longer ignore the Jews' string of successes. He had already, it seems, raised an army capable of fighting Philip, but his rival was still in Babylonia and Lysias probably did not know when Philip would move towards Syria. The chief minister therefore decided to march against the Jews, taking the young king with him. Since he was reluctant to leave a significant part of his army under the command of officers he could not completely trust, Lysias advanced against the Jewish rebels with a sizable army.¹²⁶ The Seleucid superiority in manpower, weaponry and training explains why the Jews were defeated at Beth-Zachariah. In the aftermath of this victory, Lysias was poised to capture Jerusalem, but Philip's arrival in Syria forced him to come to terms with the Jews and withdraw his army to Antioch.¹²⁷

After Lysias and Antiochus V returned to Antioch, the chief minister could no longer devote himself to Jewish affairs. This is apparent from the two main sources for the history of the Jews during this period, 1 and 2 Maccabees: both turn directly from Lysias' retreat towards Antioch to Demetrius I's appearance in

¹²⁴ Protarchus is mentioned in 2 Macc. 10.11. Cf. Bengtson 1944: 165; Habicht 1976a: 251 n. 11c.

¹²⁵ Timotheus apparently was a member of the Seleucid administration; see 2 Macc. 12.2.

¹²⁶ The figures given for this army, in 1 Macc. 6.30, Jos. *Ant.* 12.366, and 2 Macc. 13.1-2, are highly inflated. Cf. Bar-Kochva 1989: 42-43 and 306-7, who accepts, with reservations, the lower numbers of Jos. *BJ* 1.41. However, the former commander of Galilee did not obtain this data from Nicolaus of Damascus, as Bar-Kochva believes. Rather, Josephus reduced the figures in 1 Maccabees so that his own defeat by Vespasian's army of 60,000 men (*BJ* 3.69), would not be adversely compared to Judas' failure against a supposedly much stronger Seleucid force.

¹²⁷ 1 Macc. 6.28-63; Jos. *Ant.* 12.366-83 and 386. According to *BJ* 1.41-46, the Seleucid army retreated because of a shortage of supplies, whereas 2 Macc. 13.1-26, has the Jews win the battle. The reconstruction of this battle by Bar-Kochva 1989: 126-29 and 291-346, relies mainly on 1 Maccabees, but Gera 1996: 27-46, contends that the description there is based on a series of Greek *topoi*, and cannot be trusted.

Syria.¹²⁸ We have already seen that Lysias faced new and serious difficulties within Syria at this time. At the end of the summer of 163, Cn. Octavius' delegation visited the court of Ariarathes V, King of Cappadocia.¹²⁹ From Cappadocia the delegation continued on to Syria, and arrived in Antioch in the autumn or early winter of 163/62. Lysias gave in to pressure from the Roman delegation and allowed the Seleucid ships to be burned and the elephants maimed. This fomented unrest in Syria, with hostility directed against both Lysias and the Roman representatives. The poisoned atmosphere eventually led to the murder of Cn. Octavius in 162 (Obsequens 15). Thus Lysias was forced to deal with the repercussions of Octavius' assassination in the winter or spring of 162. He sent a delegation to Rome at this time, but his representatives could not have arrived in Rome before the spring of 162, or returned home until the summer of that year. Throughout this period, there was a great deal of unrest in Syria, and the government at Antioch had to watch developments closely. This reconstruction of events indicates that in 162 Lysias was much too preoccupied to turn his attention towards Judas Maccabaeus and his forces yet again. The regent also had to contend with the low morale of his army in the wake of the Roman intervention, and deal with the material losses to the army brought about by that intervention. Judas and his followers must have taken advantage of the situation, strengthening their hold over the Jewish population and acquiring more territory from their non-Jewish neighbors. Thus the intense Roman involvement in Syrian affairs in 163/2 contributed indirectly to the success of Judas and his men.

The Background to the Roman-Jewish Treaty

When Demetrius I assumed the throne, the Senate was initially hostile towards him. Until 160/59 the Senate refused to recognize him as king, and in 162/1 the *patres* readily endorsed the royal status of Timarchus, a rebel in the eyes of Demetrius. It is possible that the Senate also established ties with other leaders who refused to accept the authority of the Seleucid king. Such leaders included Artaxias king of Armenia, who was an ally of Timarchus and a former client-king of Antiochus Epiphanes, and Ptolemy, the

¹²⁸ 1 Macc. 6.63-7.1; 2 Macc. 13.23-14.1.

¹²⁹ For the date, see Walbank 1957-79: III. 472.

governor of Commagene. Given all these factors—the attempts by various leaders to break away from the Seleucid kingdom, the Senate's overt hostility towards Demetrius, and Roman diplomatic backing for Timarchus—the year 162/1 was an especially suitable time to try to win Roman support against the Seleucid kingdom.

Hence, a Jewish appeal to Rome at this time made sense in political terms. The Republic was openly displeased with Demetrius and had proved capable of disarming, albeit partially, the Seleucid army during the reign of Antiochus V. Rome had also indicated its readiness to assist the Jews earlier, in 164. Consequently, Judas Maccabaeus sent two envoys to Rome, Eupolemus son of John and Jason son of Eleazar, to win diplomatic support from the Republic. The two Jewish emissaries were successful, and a treaty between the Roman Republic and the Jewish nation was signed.¹³⁰ It has been argued that the Romans would not have been willing to form an alliance with a subject people,¹³¹ but it should be remembered that when the Jewish ambassadors arrived in Rome, the Republic was still determined not to recognize Demetrius as king. Rome was under no legal obligation to the Seleucid king, since relations between them were, in effect, suspended, and the Republic could now contract political agreements with dynasts and peoples within the Seleucid kingdom, considering them *adespota*.¹³² Rome's readiness to forge relations with the Jews was analogous to its willingness to recognize Timarchus, both in the diplomatic and the legal spheres.

The Text of the Treaty

The text of this compact between the Romans and the Jews, as preserved in 1 Maccabees, merits careful study. The treaty begins with the wish that relations between the Romans and the Jewish nation (τὸ ἔθνος Ἰουδαίων) will evolve favorably (καλῶς γένοιτο) for

¹³⁰ 1 Macc. 8.17-22; 2 Macc. 4.11; Jos. *BJ* 1.38; *Ant.* 12.415-16. Niese 1900: 501 n. 2, raises the possibility that the short notice in the *Bellum* is independent of 1 Maccabees, and a similar argument is often used about the relationship between 1 Maccabees and 2 Maccabees, e.g. Gruen 1984: I. 43 n. 161. But Josephus' brief mention of the alliance contains nothing that is not found in 1 Maccabees, while 1 & 2 Maccabees seem to branch out from a common literary tradition.

¹³¹ Niese 1906: 824; Sherwin-White 1984: 72.

¹³² Cf. Täubler 1913: 249-51.

eternity. Next, the document specifies Jewish obligations towards Rome and its allies, if the Romans should find themselves at war, and enumerates identical commitments from the Romans to aid the Jews, if the Jewish nation will go to war. The treaty ends by stating that clauses to the agreement may be added or withdrawn, provided that both parties agree to such changes.¹³³ The contents of the covenant, as well as the wording of some of its clauses, are reminiscent of a series of inscriptions which record treaties concluded by Rome with Greek cities of the eastern Mediterranean. These treaties were signed in the course of the second century, that is at approximately the same time as the treaty discussed here.¹³⁴ A composite picture of these *foedera* shows that they contain the following sections:

1) An opening declaration stating that Rome and the contracting party are to enjoy everlasting peace, friendship, and alliance, and that no war will ever be fought between the two.

2) A neutrality agreement, in which the contracting party undertakes to bar any enemy of Rome from passing through its territory and to withhold the supply of corn, weapons, money, and ships from such opponents of the Republic. The Republic is bound by the same stipulations towards its ally.

3) A defense pact which commits either party to assist the other when attacked.

4) A modification clause, allowing a change in the terms of the alliance, provided that the alterations are acceptable to both parties.

5) A testimonial clause which states that one copy of the treaty is to be placed in the Capitol in Rome, while another is to be kept at the shrine of Rome's ally.

The alliance text in our Jewish source reproduces, at the very least, the contents of the opening statement, the defense pact, and the modification clause (sections 1, 3 and 4), as well as that portion

¹³³ 1 Macc. 8.23-30, summarized by Jos. *Ant.* 12.417-18, despite Giovannini & Müller 1971: 167, who argue that Josephus had recourse to the original document. 1 Macc. 8.31-32, ostensibly contains a letter from Rome warning Demetrius not to fight the Jews.

¹³⁴ The most pertinent parallels are: *SEG* XXXV 823 (Maronea); *IGRR* IV 1028 (Astypalaea); *Syll.*³ 693 (Methymna); *OGIS* 762 (Cibyra). See the surveys of Sherwin-White 1984: 67-69; Gruen 1984: I. 47-49. The treaties with Cibyra and Maronea seem to antedate the Roman alliance with the Jews; see Niese 1893-1903: III. 61; J. Stern 1987. Gruen 1984: II. 731-33 and 738-40, argues for a later date for both treaties. This is in line with his tendency to minimize Rome's involvement in the affairs of the Hellenistic world.

of the neutrality agreement which is concerned with the obligation of both parties to refuse material aid to their ally's enemies (section 2).¹³⁵

While the Roman Jewish alliance is similar to the treaties preserved on stone, it is not identical with them.¹³⁶ This is partly due to the fact that the present text of 1 Maccabees is a Greek rendering of an Hebrew original. The text of the treaty must have been written in Greek, translated into Hebrew when incorporated into the original Hebrew version of 1 Maccabees, and then re-translated into Greek. This process created a gap between the original language of the treaty and the present text.¹³⁷ Of more significance is the fact that the Hebrew translator of the original treaty apparently chose, at times, not to give a verbal translation, but instead paraphrased the original clauses.¹³⁸ In addition, mistakes were made in the course of the translations of the text.¹³⁹

One of the more intriguing problems relates to the phrase, ὡς ἔδοξε Ῥώμῃ, which appears twice in the neutrality section of the

¹³⁵ See the comparison of Täubler 1913: 240-42. The possibility that part of the testimonial clause (section 5) is also preserved in 1 Macc. 8, although not in the text of the treaty itself, will be discussed below.

¹³⁶ Cf. Fischer 1980: 109-110.

¹³⁷ The opening statement in SEG XXXV 823 ll. 10-11, has the formula καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν εἰς τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον. IGRR IV 1028 b ll. 3-4, is identical, but slightly restored. Compare this with 1 Macc. 8.23 ἐν τῇ θαλάσῃ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ξηρᾶς εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα.

¹³⁸ The opening statement in SEG XXXV 823 l. 10 begins with φιλία καὶ συμμαχία καλὴ ἔστω. Cf. the almost identical restored text in IGRR IV 1028 b ll. 2-3. 1 Macc. 8.23 has καλῶς γένοιτο Ῥωμαίοις καὶ τῷ ἔθνει Ἰουδαίων. Towards the end of the opening statement the documents from Maronea and Astypalaea have the formula πόλεμος δὲ μὴ ἔστω. In 1 Macc. 8.23, this is rendered as καὶ βροφαια καὶ ἐχθρὸς μακρυνθεῖη ἀπ' αὐτῶν. Cf. Täubler 1913: 49 n. 1. Another example is the formula μήτε... δόλωι πονηρῶι (*sine dolo malo*), which appears in connection with the reciprocal obligation to deny material assistance to the enemies of the other side. This appears in SEG XXXV 823 ll. 18-20, 26-28; IGRR IV 1028 b ll. 8-9, 14-15; Syll.³ 693 l. 2, 8-9. In 1 Macc. 8.28, this is expanded to καὶ φυλάσσονται τὰ φυλάγματα ταῦτα, καὶ οὐ μετὰ δόλου. (Vs. 26, which is almost an exact parallel, will be discussed below.) Täubler 1913: 241 and 244, equates only the second part of the phrase with the Latin formula. But this second part, the undertaking to act without fraudulent intent, is complemented by the first part which expresses the positive commitment to fulfill obligations. Thus the suggestion of Timpe 1974: 138, that the section καὶ φυλάσσονται τὰ φυλάγματα ταῦτα, is connected with the preceding section, ὡς ἔδοξε Ῥώμῃ, should be rejected. This addition to the *sine dolo malo* formula was appended by the translator and rests on biblical language; cf. Grimm 1853: 129. Gauger 1977: 216-17, is wrong to trace it to Greek oath formulas.

¹³⁹ See Täubler 1913: 242-43, on the translation of 1 Macc. 8.24 and 27, as well as vs. 26 and 28.

treaty. Täubler understood this phrase to be a translation of the Latin *censuere*, and concluded that the alliance between Rome and the Jews was arranged by the Senate through a *senatus consultum*.¹⁴⁰ This solution does not explain why the phrase ὡς ἔδοξε Ῥώμῃ is repeated twice, rather than appearing just once at the end of the document, as a sanction or seal on the treaty as a whole. Nor is it clear why the *censuere* formula should appear in mid-sentence, before the parties' undertaking to comply with the terms of the agreement in good faith. It is better to assume that the phrase ὡς ἔδοξε Ῥώμῃ is in fact a mistranslation of the original text.¹⁴¹ The words appear in our treaty after the obligation, taken by both parties, not to furnish strategic assistance to the other side's enemies, and before their commitment to act without fraudulent intent. In the Roman pacts with Maronea, Astypalaea, and Methymna, we find the formula δημοσίαί βουλή ("by public consent"), at exactly the same place.¹⁴² Since the Hebrew translator of the treaty between Rome and the Jews was not familiar with Roman procedure, and his knowledge of Greek was less than perfect, it is possible that he understood the word βουλή as referring to the Roman Senate. In other words, the translator wrongly perceived that it was the Senate (and possibly also the Roman people, if he took the expression to be the equivalent of δήμῳ καὶ βουλή) who decided that neither party would assist the other's enemies. He chose to translate this by the paraphrase "as was decided by Rome." Once this explanation is accepted, it is obvious that it was not the Senate who decided that Jews would not assist the enemies of Rome (1 Macc. 8.26), but rather this was an obligation undertaken by the Jews. The basis for our text of the Roman-Jewish alliance was a standard *foedus aequum*, which presented the equal, complementary obligations of the Roman Republic and the Jewish nation towards one another.¹⁴³

¹⁴⁰ 1 Macc. 8.26 and 28. See Täubler 1913: 243.

¹⁴¹ See Timpe 1974: 137-38. Cf. Goldstein 1976: 363.

¹⁴² *SEG* XXXV 823 ll. 19-20, 28; *IGRR* IV 1028 b l. 9; *Syll.*³ 693 l. 9.

¹⁴³ This undercuts the view that the document represents a *foedus iniquum* whose clauses give preference to Rome over the Jews. Grimm 1853: 129, argues that the subject of 1 Macc. 8.26 and 28, καὶ τοῖς πολεμοῦσιν οὐ δώσουσιν οὐδὲ ἐπαρκέσουσι σίτον ὄπλα ἀργύριον πλοῖα... καὶ τοῖς συμμαχοῦσιν οὐ δοθήσεται σίτος κτλ. is, in both sentences, the Romans. They are not liable to give material assistance to the Jews when Rome faces an enemy, nor are they obligated to give strategic help to their Jewish allies when the Jews are involved in a war. The Jews, however, must help their allies in both cases. Cf. Schürer 1973-87: I. 171 with n. 33. However, the Romans are *not* the subject

A comparison of our text with the Roman *foedera* of the second century preserved on stone indicates that the Jewish text has been rearranged, and that some of its sections are missing. Were these modifications introduced accidentally or by design? After quoting the treaty's opening statement, the translator first listed the Jewish commitments towards Rome and then noted the Republic's reciprocal obligations towards the Jews. The Jewish obligation to extend military aid to Rome is placed at the very head of the Jewish section (1 Macc. 8.24-26). This arrangement is undoubtedly intended to underline Jewish strength.¹⁴⁴ We have already seen that Roman *foedera* of the second century stipulated that a copy of the original treaty was to be set up in the chief temple of Rome's ally, while the original text of the compact was to be placed in the Capitol in Rome. Hence, these treaties always alluded to Rome's chief temple, and mentioned at times the deity residing in the temple, Zeus (Jupiter) Capitolinus.¹⁴⁵ It is quite obvious why this section of the treaty, or at least part of it, has dropped out of 1 Maccabees. The Jewish reader would hardly have been favorably impressed by Judas Maccabaeus and his treaty with Rome, if that treaty were to be deposited in the temple of an alien god. It is possible, however, that the translator preserved that part of the testimonial clause which deals with the deposit of a copy of the treaty in the temple of Rome's ally. 1 Macc. 8.22, which precedes the actual text of the alliance agreement, tells us that the Romans sent a copy of the agreement to Jerusalem, and this notice may go back to the original text of the treaty.¹⁴⁶ One other deviation in our

of the first of these two sentences. The Jews are the subject of 1 Macc. 8.25 and they continue as the subject of the following verse. Similarly, the Romans are the subject of vs. 27, and therefore of the next verse as well. Furthermore, the Roman *foedera* with other states do not include any article similar to Grimm's understanding of 1 Macc. 8.26 and 28, but do contain sections which obligate both parties equally to deny material aid to the enemies of the other side. See Täubler 1913: 245-47; Gauger 1977: 211-14; Gruen 1984: I. 44 n. 163.

¹⁴⁴ The same tendency is also revealed by the placing of chapter 8, the terms of the treaty, immediately after the account of Judas' victory over Nicanor, and by describing Jonathan's embassies to Rome and Sparta directly after recounting his triumph in the plain of Hazor, 1 Macc. 11.63-12.23.

¹⁴⁵ *IGRR* IV 1028 b ll. 23-24; *OGIS* 762 ll. 13-14. The Maronea treaty refers to the temple, but does not mention the god, see *SEG* XXXV 823 l. 42.

¹⁴⁶ Timpe 1974: 140, offers a different solution. He claims that the Jewish *foedus* was preceded by a *senatus consultum* which referred to a copy of the treaty being sent to Jerusalem. *Jos. Ant.* 12.416, adds that a copy of the treaty was placed in the Capitolium. As a resident of Rome for many years who had access to many of the Roman documents which he quotes, Josephus knew the

treaty from the standard language of the Republic's covenants with Greek city-states of the eastern Mediterranean is related to the obligation of the Jews to act in good faith towards their allies. Normally these compacts employ a Greek translation of the Latin formula *sine dolo malo*. In our text, this formula is used, albeit in an expanded form, in connection with the Roman obligations towards the Jews (1 Macc. 8.28). However, when the reciprocal Jewish undertaking is described, the language, although very similar, differs from the Roman obligation in one notable phrase. The Romans undertake to act οὐ μετὰ δόλου, while the Jews' commitment is rendered by the enigmatic words οὐθὲν λαβόντες (1 Macc. 8.26). The obligations of both sides are complementary and parallel, so that these two words should convey a Jewish commitment not to deviate from their obligations.¹⁴⁷ The wording of the Roman obligation in our text οὐ μετὰ δόλου suggests that the *sine dolo malo* formula had originally been employed of the Jewish commitments as well. Our translator, who did not want to use a formula which implied possible deceit by the Jews, softened the wording of the original text to οὐθὲν λαβόντες and added by way of preface a positive assertion, in biblical form, of the Jewish commitment to keep to the words of the treaty καὶ φυλάσσονται τὰ φυλάγματα αὐτῶν.

The Authenticity of the Treaty

The patent similarity both in structure and content between our Roman-Jewish compact and Roman *foedera* preserved on stone, taken together with the fact that most of the deviations in our text can be attributed to the translator's bias, serve to establish the authenticity of the document quoted in 1 Maccabees 8. However, not all scholars accept the treaty as genuine, and it has been argued that the text underlying our treaty was one dealing with the contractual relationship of Rome with some unknown state. This agreement, it is claimed, was then reworked to create the impression that Judas Maccabaeus had signed a treaty with Rome.¹⁴⁸ According to this view, the alliance text was quoted in order to substantiate a false claim that a treaty between the Romans

right procedure.

¹⁴⁷ Täubler 1913: 241, rightly stresses the parallelism between vs. 26 and 28.

¹⁴⁸ See Sherwin-White 1984: 73.

and the Jews had existed since the days of Judas. Yet this argument overlooks the fact that the document was translated into Hebrew and first used for internal consumption by Jews. The original readership was scarcely qualified to assess the authenticity of any Roman compact brought to its attention, and there was no real need to present the readers with an agreement which was phrased in accordance with conventional Roman treaties. But even if we assume that the treaty text was meant to mislead its audience, the manner in which it is presented is strange, to say the least. Instead of keeping as closely as possible to the original document, substituting only the name of the Jews for the alleged original party, the author made serious alterations in the document, thereby diminishing its verisimilitude. Furthermore, the translator, a man who thought that the Senate was comprised of 320 members, and that Rome was governed by one magistrate (1 Macc. 8.15-16), seems an unlikely candidate to find this hypothetical treaty and then transform it into a document recording an alliance between Rome and the Jews.

Other sources, which are independent of 1 Maccabees, attest to a diplomatic approach by the Jews to Rome during the first years of Demetrius' reign. In the *Antiquities*, Josephus quotes a communication from Gaius Fannius, the son of Gaius. The Roman magistrate notifies the *archons* of Cos in this letter that he had been approached by Jewish ambassadors, who asked for copies of the *senatus consulta* (τὰ συγκλήτου δόγματα) concerning them. Fannius granted them their wish, and then asked the Coan magistrates to ensure the safe passage of the Jewish diplomats through the island (*Ant.* 14.233). Fannius' title, στρατηγὸς ὑπατος, suggests a consul of the second century, and his name and filiation point to C. Fannius Strabo, the son of Gaius and the consul of 161.¹⁴⁹ Josephus dates this document to a later time, between the years 49-44, and this mistake indicates that his source here was independent of 1 Maccabees. Thus

¹⁴⁹ For *strategos hypatos* as consul in the 2nd century, see Holleaux 1918: 1-8. Identification: Niese 1906: 822-23; Gauger 1977: 168-71. Willrich 1924: 46-48, followed by Sherwin-White 1984: 73-74, suggests identifying C. Fannius either with the consul of 122 or with a pro-magistrate in Asia in 49-48, since both are mentioned by Josephus (*Ant.* 13.260, 14.230). However, the father of the consul of 122 was Marcus, while the title *strategos hypatos* is odd for a pro-magistrate of the mid-first century. Homonymy prompted Josephus to identify the consul of 161, C. Fannius Strabo, with his namesake, mentioned in *Ant.* 14.230.

Fannius' letter dates the visit of Judas Maccabaeus' envoys to Rome to 161, and confirms the statement that the Jewish emissaries were granted an audience by the Senate. Justin's *Epitome* of Pompeius Trogus, which is completely independent of the Jewish tradition, is also relevant here. Justin relates that at the time of their revolt against Demetrius Soter, the Jews appealed to Rome for *amicitia*. As a result, they were the first among the eastern peoples to win their freedom, because at the time the Romans were generously distributing what was not theirs to give.¹⁵⁰ This notice alludes to a Jewish appeal to Rome during the reign of Demetrius I, aimed at forging a diplomatic relationship between the Republic and the Jews. The positive reply from the Romans was perceived by Justin (and Pompeius Trogus) as equivalent to the recognition of Jewish independence. Thus, Justin confirms the other copious accounts of a Jewish appeal to Rome at the time, followed by the Republic's affirmative response. Furthermore, Justin's view that the Jews received their independence at this date is compatible with the form of the treaty between the Republic and the Jewish nation, a *foedus aequum* between Rome and the Jews.¹⁵¹

7. Conclusions

In sum, the alliance between Judas Maccabaeus and Rome should be accepted as fact. The question of its immediate impact is a different matter. We cannot determine the exact chronological sequence of events between the return of Judas' envoys from Rome with news of the treaty, and the Seleucid military campaigns

¹⁵⁰ Justin 36.3.9: *a Demetrio cum descivissent, amicitia Romanorum petita primi omnium ex Orientalibus libertatem acceperunt, facile tunc Romanis de alieno largientibus*. Demetrius' identity is assured through Justin 36.1.9-10, where it is said of his son, Antiochus Sidetes: *Iudaeos quoque, qui in Macedonico imperio sub Demetrio patre armis se in libertatem vindicaverant, subegit*. Willrich 1924: 48-50, claims that the king in both passages is Demetrius II and that *patre* should either be deleted or replaced with *fratre*. This desperate solution should be rejected; see M. Stern 1974-1984: I. 342; Gauger 1977: 264 with n. 209.

¹⁵¹ Sherwin-White 1984: 73, tries to diminish Justin's worth by claiming that 36.1.10 follows a source which states that the Jews gained their liberty by force, while 36.3.9 reflects another source which claims that Rome gave the Jews their independence. But this does not rob the second notice of its value as independent testimony; cf. M. Stern 1986: 23. So too, the contrast is more apparent than real, for 36.3.9 also refers to the Jewish rebellion.

ordered by Demetrius against the Jews.¹⁵² Jason and Eupolemus, the Jewish envoys to Rome, may have come back home in 161, the year in which the treaty was signed, but it is possible that they returned home only in 160. Equally problematic is the date of Judas' death, which can be assigned either to 161 or else to 160.¹⁵³ Thus it is possible that Demetrius was unaware of the Jews' powerful ally, but in any event, it is unlikely that knowledge of the Jewish-Roman alliance would have prevented him from sending an army against the Jews. The Roman policy in 161 was intended to break up the Seleucid kingdom and deny Demetrius his throne. While Rome did not recognize Demetrius as king, the Republic did award such status to Timarchus, and concluded an alliance with the (former) Seleucid subjects, the Jews. Demetrius' only recourse was to establish his rule by force of arms, and to present the Republic with irreversible facts, and that is what he eventually did.

An Indifferent Rome?

Despite the treaty of alliance, which included a Roman undertaking to defend the Jewish nation, as well as a reciprocal obligation on the part of the Jews, Rome did not come to the help of the Jewish nation.¹⁵⁴ This omission does not constitute a breach of the

¹⁵² Nicanor's campaigns at Kapharsalama and Adasa: 1 Macc. 7.31-32, 7.39-50; 2 Macc. 15.1-36; *Jos. Ant.* 12.405, 12.408-12; *Megillath Ta'anith* 30, ed. Lichtenstein p. 346. Bacchides' victory over Judas: 1 Macc. 9.4-18; *Jos. Ant.* 12.422-31; cf. the inaccurate report in *BJ* 1.47.

¹⁵³ Judas' victory over Nicanor is dated to the 13th of Adar, but no year is given. The victory must have taken place after Demetrius' escape from Rome in 151 S.E., October 162-October 161, 1 Macc. 7.1, which means that the earliest possible date for the 'day of Nicanor' is March 161. 1 Macc. 9.1-3, places the next Seleucid campaign, commanded by Bacchides, in chronological proximity to Nicanor's defeat and dates it to the first month of 152 S.E. This may be maintained if the date is reckoned according to the Macedonian system, and Bacchides arrived in Jerusalem in October 161; cf. Schürer 1973-87: I. 173. However, as far as we can check, Bickermann's view that dates related to Jewish events are reckoned according to the Babylonian system from spring 311 still holds; see above p. 141 n. 102. This would mean that Bacchides came to Jerusalem in the spring of 160, and Nicanor was killed only a month earlier. It is also possible that the picture in 1 Maccabees of close chronological proximity between the deaths of Nicanor and of Judas Maccabaeus is misleading, and that Nicanor was killed in 161, while Bacchides came to Jerusalem over a year later, in April 160.

¹⁵⁴ According to 1 Macc. 8.31-32, the Senate warned Demetrius by letter not to attack the Jews, but since the Senate did not recognize Demetrius at the

treaty, for an escape clause was appended to this section. The implementation of the defense pact was not absolute, but subject to circumstances. Each side could decide whether the time was right to extend military assistance to its ally.¹⁵⁵ Thus, the possibility that Judas' defeat preceded word of his alliance with Rome need not be invoked to justify Roman disregard of the fate of Judas and his followers.¹⁵⁶ If the Senate wanted to intervene on behalf of the Jews, the existing treaty with the Jewish nation allowed it to do so, and the death of the Jewish leader did not render the treaty defunct. Hence, Rome's lack of response to the Seleucid victories over Judas and over Timarchus, another ally of Rome, has been taken as a sign of the Senate's unwillingness to send Roman legions to the aid of the Republic's eastern friends.¹⁵⁷ This may well be true. During this period, the Republic chose to wage war in the eastern Mediterranean only when its interests in Greece seemed to be under threat. This had been the case in the Second and Third Macedonian Wars, as well as in the war against Antiochus the Great.¹⁵⁸ It is also doubtful whether Judas Maccabaeus, Timarchus, and the others who sought Roman recognition, friendship, and alliances, ever expected direct military aid from the Republic. For one thing, the distance a Roman army would have to travel in order to confront the Seleucid kingdom was so great that the Romans were likely to make the effort only when crucial Roman interests were at stake. There is only one occasion after Rome's victory over Antiochus the Great, when the Senate *may* have contemplated such a step, and that was during the Sixth Syrian War. Even if Judas Maccabaeus and other adversaries of the Seleucid kingdom deluded themselves that Rome would extend military assistance, they were bound to realize that on the short term at least, Roman military help would not be effective. Because of the distance and the time involved, Roman responses, both political

time, they could hardly address a letter to him.

¹⁵⁵ 1 Macc. 8.25: ὡς ἂν ὁ καιρὸς ὑπογράψῃ αὐτοῖς, and see the slight variation in vs. 27. This constitutes the parallel for the formula κατὰ τὸ εὐκαιρὸν βοηθεῖτω and its variations, which appears in Rome's *foedera* with Maronea, Cibyra and Methymna: *SEG* XXXV 823 ll. 33, 36; *OGIS* 762 l. 4; *Syll.*³ 693 ll. 12, 14-15.

¹⁵⁶ For this position, see Schürer 1973-87: I. 1-73; Goldstein 1976: 368.

¹⁵⁷ Gruen 1976: 85-87; Gruen 1984: I. 43-46, and see on p. 45: "... the Jews, like Timarchus, could claim independent status—but they would have to maintain it themselves."

¹⁵⁸ The campaign of Manlius Vulso in Asia Minor was a by-product of the 'Antiochic War', and Roman troops were already present in Asia Minor.

and military, to the affairs of the eastern Mediterranean could not but lag behind actual events.

What, then, were Judas' aims in sending Jason and Eupolemus to Rome? Surely the rebel leader wished to gain Rome's recognition of the separate and independent status of the Jews. The importance of such recognition is clear from the policies pursued by Judas' successors, Jonathan, Simon, and John Hyrcanus. These Hasmonaean leaders, although armed with the wisdom of hindsight, did not neglect their relations with the Republic. On the contrary, they wanted to renew and maintain diplomatic relations with Rome.¹⁵⁹ The Jews sought acceptance and respectability, and wanted to use their recognition by the most powerful country of the time to establish friendships with states closer to home, who would take their cue from the Roman attitude. Judas' successors must have also hoped that Roman influence on the Seleucids would curb the latter's freedom of action.

The Romans' affirmative response to Judas and their parallel encouragement of Timarchus' royal aspirations are best understood against the background of Demetrius' flight from Rome. In the view of the majority of senators, the Seleucid prince's act had caused the *patres* and the Republic to lose face, and harmed the Roman interest, which was to keep the Seleucid kingdom meek and submissive. The Senate did its utmost, short of committing the Republic to war, to frustrate Demetrius' ambition to establish himself as the Seleucid king. It tried to hasten the dissolution of the Seleucid kingdom by endorsing Timarchus' royal status and recognizing the independence of the Jews, and hoped to encourage others to break away as well. The rebellions of Artaxias of Armenia and Ptolemy of Commagene, which probably began at this time, demonstrate how the combination of instability within the Seleucid kingdom and Roman approbation of separatist movements could endanger the very existence of Seleucid rule. Indeed, the bids for independence by both Armenia and Commagene seem to have been successful, although not all the salient facts are at our disposal. It is true that Roman diplomatic support of Timarchus and the Jews proved less helpful. Demetrius' victories over

¹⁵⁹ For continuing Roman-Jewish relations in the second century, see Momigliano 1968: 151-59; Ginsburg 1928: 50-77; Roth 1914: 18-47; Giovannini & Müller 1971; M. Stern 1972: 90 ff., *passim*; Timpe 1974: 146-50; Gauger 1977: 179 ff., *passim*; Gruen 1984: II. 748-51; Sherwin-White 1984: 74-79.

these two rivals, and Rome's subsequent recognition of Demetrius, have been seen as signs of Rome's lack of interest in eastern affairs.¹⁶⁰ But Rome's attitude in 161 towards Timarchus and the Jews was not merely polite or obliging. Both were awarded Roman recognition at the same time that Demetrius was denied it, despite the Seleucid's eager efforts to appease the Senate from the moment he first landed in Lycia. The Republic's later recognition of Demetrius as king simply indicates that the *patres* knew how to bow to the inevitable. Demetrius had established his control over the kingdom by force, and Rome would not send her legions to Syria to depose him.¹⁶¹

Rome's military power was a factor not only in the minds of the *patres*, but also in the calculations of the kings, potentates, cities, and peoples of the eastern Mediterranean. However, Roman aims were usually furthered by diplomacy, rather than military intervention. Roman embassies toured the Hellenistic world, intervening on a fairly regular basis in the affairs of other states. Legations from the east came to Rome, not only to express devotion and loyalty, but to ask for Roman support against hostile neighbors. Coalitions would be forged with Roman blessing, while others were disbanded for the same reason. Princes would be sent to Rome, sometimes as hostages who served as collateral for the good behavior of more senior members of their royal families, sometimes as a *bona fide* expression of good intentions towards the Republic. In both these cases, the freedom of action of these rulers was impaired, while the opportunities for political manipulation by Rome increased. Rome left a strong imprint on future Hellenistic rulers.

Roman power was not negligible, but it was not absolute either. The Republic's interests in Greece became paramount towards the end of the third century, but its later involvement in the affairs of

¹⁶⁰ See Gruen 1976; Gruen 1984: I. 43-46, II. 664-66. Gruen's view here is part of his thesis, maintained throughout his well-argued book, that Rome's interest in the Hellenistic world was minimal and its compacts were initiated by others. The Republic, he contends, was merely courteous and obliging, and played no active part in fostering Hellenistic expressions of devotion to Rome, such as the dispatch of gifts, embassies, and even royal princes, destined to be educated at Rome. In a nutshell, Gruen argues that Rome became an empire despite herself.

¹⁶¹ M. Stern 1986: 8 with n. 15, stresses Rome's reliance on diplomacy, rather than armed intervention.

Asia Minor and the Seleucid kingdom was a by-product of the Second Macedonian War and Antiochus III's invasion of Greece. The Ptolemaic kingdom played little part in Roman foreign policy of the late third and early second century, and attitudes towards the kingdom were determined by the Republic's quarrels with Philip V and Antiochus the Great. Afterwards, the Ptolemies disappear from the Roman horizon, only to re-emerge on the eve of the Third Macedonian War and the Sixth Syrian War. Just as Rome's wars with Philip V and Antiochus III had contributed to increased Roman involvement in the affairs of Asia Minor, and, to a certain extent, in the Seleucid kingdom, so the Macedonian crisis with Perseus and Antiochus Epiphanes' exploitation of the affair revived Roman interest in Ptolemaic Egypt and awakened its concern with the Ptolemies' northern neighbor. From the end of the third century onward, each of the three great wars in the Hellenistic east in which Rome was involved expanded the Roman horizon. The Republic became ever more alert to the strength of others, most notably Macedon, Pergamum, and the Seleucid and Ptolemaic kingdoms, and sought to limit their powers. This was done mostly through diplomacy, rather than war. States and peoples were pitted one against the other, personal ambitions within royal houses were encouraged to increase strife, and discontent within kingdoms was often met with a Roman nod of approbation.

The general tendency of the Roman ruling class to act in this manner should not cloud the fact that different personalities were at play. Personal characters and ambitions shaped the meetings between the Roman *legati* in the east and the authorities there, be they kings, local dynasts, or city magistrates. There were also, we suggest, tactical differences in the approaches to a given problem. The division of opinion within the Senate regarding Demetrius seems to indicate that the isolation of Pergamum was the prime target of the Scipios, while other Roman leaders stressed the need to weaken the Seleucid kingdom. Ti. Gracchus seems to represent a third approach, which looked favorably upon the eastern kings, and sought to maintain a friendly relationship with them.

This difference of opinion within the Roman ruling class obviously lessened the impact of a Roman policy which was designed to increase the influence of the Republic and impair the authority of the relatively strong Hellenistic kingdoms. In addition, the Republic could not, of course, enforce its wish on every

occasion. Antiochus Epiphanes' manipulation of the tense relations between the Republic and Perseus, and of the war between the two, is an outstanding example of political constraints on Rome's foreign policy. The Republic's treatment of the Seleucid king from the 'day of Eleusis' until his death exemplifies how the Roman desire to avoid wars in remote parts of the world could mitigate the expression of its wrath. This aspiration to avoid faraway battles, together with Rome's inability to respond quickly to events well outside her immediate reach, often enabled others to confront the Republic with new circumstances which could not be overturned, at least in the short term. The expulsion of Ptolemy Euergetes II to Cyrene by his brother Ptolemy Philometor is a case in point, as is Demetrius' successful bid for the Seleucid throne.

The Seleucid Kingdom

The Seleucid kingdom underwent a fundamental change in status between the time of Antiochus IV Epiphanes and that of Antiochus V and Demetrius I. During Antiochus IV's reign, the Seleucid kingdom flourished on the economic, political, and military fronts. The king's death signified the beginning of a crisis at Antioch. Lysias, who held the central position of power in the court of Antiochus V, was unable to ensconce himself there. Some members of the court undermined him within the kingdom, while others chose to leave for Rome, where they worked to crown Demetrius I.

Demetrius' residence in Rome and the support he received from men such as Meleager son of Menestheus and Nicanor indirectly helped the Romans. They took advantage of this situation, forcing Lysias to give in to their demand that he destroy the Seleucid navy and elephant force, in accordance with the Treaty of Apamea. Lysias' capitulation generated widespread disquiet in Syria, both against the regent and against the Roman emissaries. Cn. Octavius was murdered and Lysias lost no time in apologizing to the Roman authorities. Although the assassination of Octavius provided ample excuse for the Romans to retaliate, they took no action against the chief minister because they wanted to continue to play Demetrius against Lysias and weaken Seleucid rule. Demetrius' escape from Rome, apparently aided and abetted by the Scipios, upset the plans of those men who set official policy in the Senate.

Demetrius, as a result, did not win Roman recognition when he first took control of Syria.

Rome changed her policy towards the Seleucid kingdom in 163-161. The new policy, which called for overt intervention in Seleucid affairs, was inaugurated at the time of Antiochus V and continued during the reign of Demetrius I. Ti. Gracchus prevented Demetrius from forming an alliance with Ariarathes V, and the Senate supported Timarchus and the Jews and granted them recognition. Demetrius I's military victories against the rebels in Judaea and Media affected Roman policy. From 159 until 153/2, Rome reconciled herself to the rule of Demetrius I, *faute de mieux*. Hence, whenever a new opportunity arose to weaken the Seleucid kingdom at the time of Demetrius I, the Senate quickly took advantage of it. This was the foundation of Roman support for Alexander Balas.

The Senate's policy towards the Seleucid kingdom in 163-161 convinced the Roman historian Pompeius Trogus that Demetrius I's reign was the beginning of the fall of the Seleucid kingdom. In fact, this process began during Antiochus V's reign, and was a product of the relentless plotting against Lysias, the support that Demetrius received from members of the elite, and the military and political paralysis in the Seleucid kingdom brought about by Cn. Octavius. Pompeius Trogus believed that the downfall was precipitated by the revolts of the Jews, Timarchus, Artaxias, and Ptolemy of Commagene, and it is not without significance that the Romans supported at least two of these rebellious parties and granted them official recognition.

AFTERWORD

For most of the five decades explored here the Jews were enmeshed in conflicts between the Ptolemaic and Seleucid kingdoms over the control of the Ptolemaic district of Syria and Phoenicia. The Jews adopted a somewhat passive political stance during the Fourth and Fifth Syrian Wars. It is true that in the Fifth Syrian War, the Jews did try to forge their own destiny, choosing to side with the Seleucid kingdom. But this course of action was similar to that adopted by the other residents of Palestine, and was inspired by Ptolemy son of Thraseas, the Ptolemaic governor of Syria and Phoenicia who defected to the Seleucid camp.

At first sight, Hyrcanus' alleged revolt against Seleucus IV, as described by Josephus, seems to show that Jewish leaders were willing to defy public opinion and rebel against the central rule, even if their chance of success was slim. However, we have demonstrated that the story of Hyrcanus and his father, Joseph, was by and large a fabrication. Written by a Jew in Ptolemaic Egypt, the tale was designed to underscore the Jews' loyalty to the Ptolemaic royal house and to illustrate that they were both able—and entitled—to rise to senior positions at court. The author therefore embellished the stories of Hyrcanus and his father, with the latter's deeds based primarily on those of the biblical Joseph. It is clear, then, that we must reject the description of Hyrcanus' pro-Ptolemaic stance, as it appears in Josephus' *Antiquities*. 2 Maccabees brings to light Hyrcanus' real political position—he was a well-respected figure in Seleucid Coele-Syria, whose views were similar to those of other members of the Jewish ruling class.

The political and military role played by the Jews supporting either the Ptolemaic or Seleucid kingdom differs radically from the behavior of Judas Maccabaeus and the rebels he commanded. The Jewish leaders in the Fourth and Fifth Syrian Wars were pragmatic; at the outset, the Hasmonaean rebels were motivated by religious concerns, and derived no particular hope for success from the general political situation. When they forged their alliance with Rome, the practical element in Jewish policy re-emerged, but here too, there was a difference from the earlier period. The Jews now cooperated with the non-Jewish world, but


did so in order to attain political and military freedom of action, and their deeds were not contingent upon the needs of an external power. At the time of Judas Maccabaeus, Jews no longer followed the example of their Palestinian neighbors; instead they worked against Seleucid rule by means of direct confrontation with the non-Jewish population of Palestine. This change in Jewish attitude was abrupt and was the direct outcome of the religious persecution initiated by Antiochus IV Epiphanes.

Our analysis has shown that during most of these fifty years the Seleucid kingdom enjoyed considerable freedom of action and great power, even if its military strength and the amount of territory it held underwent certain changes. During most of this period, the sworn enemy of the Seleucid kingdom, the Ptolemaic kingdom, experienced serious difficulties, and Rome was yet to take an active interest in the area. The period of Antiochus IV Epiphanes, when the Hasmonaean revolt began, was a time of renewal and growth for the Seleucid kingdom.

A dispassionate analysis of their situation would have convinced the Jews not to confront the Seleucid kingdom directly. But the deteriorating state of affairs in Judaea, which led to Antiochus' decrees in 167, fanned the flames of revolt. His edicts notwithstanding, Judaeans were not uppermost in the mind of Antiochus IV. The Seleucid king did not trouble to appear in Jerusalem in order to quell the Hasmonaean revolt. In fact, he departed on a military campaign to the East. The paucity of Seleucid forces in the western part of the kingdom, and the poor administration of Coele-Syria and Phoenicia by its governor, Ptolemy son of Dorymenes contributed to the Hasmonaean's first successes on the battlefield. Antiochus Epiphanes, pragmatic as ever, tried unsuccessfully to appease the Jews. It is possible that the outcome of the Hasmonaean revolt would have been different, had the king not died in Tabae, before he had an opportunity to implement his plans. Despite a number of failures, Antiochus IV proved a talented and accomplished politician. The negative portrait of him painted by Polybius was influenced by the political considerations of his friends, the sons of Apollonius son of Menestheus, and should not be trusted.

The period after Antiochus IV was dramatically different. An open struggle broke out over the throne in Antioch. The Romans took advantage of this situation to greatly reduce the power of the Seleucid army, and the Jews used the opportunity to expand their

areas of activity in Coele-Syria and Phoenicia. Demetrius' escape from Rome caused the Romans to continue to pursue their policy of undermining the foundations of the Seleucid kingdom. Thus Rome recognized Demetrius' enemies, Timarchus and the Jews, and encouraged them to take a stand against the government in Antioch. The decisive stage of the Jewish revolt started after the death of Antiochus IV. The rebellion gained momentum and received international recognition, precisely at the time when fissures began to appear in the Seleucid kingdom. Jewish and pagan sources tend to place special emphasis on the tensions between the Jews and Antiochus IV. Not only did the revolt break out during Antiochus' reign, but Jews and pagans alike saw the struggle against the king's religious edicts as a confrontation between the Jewish God and Greek deities. This approach to the Hasmonaean revolt should be complemented by a recognition of the wider international forces at work, both during and after Antiochus IV's lifetime.



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
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
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
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